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Abstract: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) is known in intellectual history for having es-
tablished the discourse of philosophical aesthetics with his ”Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad
poema pertinentibus” (Reflections on Poetry) and ”Aesthetica” (Aesthetics), which consists of two books
and is considered Baumgarten’s most important work. But this book amends that history. It shows that
Baumgarten’s aesthetics is a science of literature that demonstrates the value of literature to philosophy.
Baumgarten did not intend to pursue such a task, but in working on his philosophical texts and lectures,
he ends up analyzing, synthesizing, and contextualizing literature. He thereby treats it not as belles
lettres or as a moral institution but rather as an epistemic object. His aesthetics is thus the first modern
literary theory, and his articulation of this theory would never again be matched in its complexity and
systematicity. Baumgarten’s theory of literature has never been discovered. It waits latently to take its
place in intellectual history.
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This book is embedded in my research group ETHOS: Ethical Practices in Aesthetic
Theories of the Eighteenth Century, which is generously funded by the Swiss
National Science Foundation. Its publication would not have been possible with-
out Anthony Mahler. In translating and working on the manuscript with me, he
always made me feel better understood than I understand myself. I am extremely
grateful to him and will sorely miss our intense discussions. He also translated the
quoted paragraphs from Baumgarten’s Kollegium über die Ästhetik and Philoso-
phische Briefe von Aletheophilus. The translations from the Aesthetica and the
Ethica philosophica are by Maya Maskarinec and Alexandre Roberts, whose ef-
forts to translate Baumgarten’s aesthetics into English are admirable. Zoe
Zobrist’s prudent and meticulous management of the entire paratextual appara-
tus has been indispensable, as has been Alexandra Lüthi’s support. Alastair
Matthews did the copy editing with great care. Dorothea von Mücke’s and Sebas-
tian Meixner’s encouraging support, constructive criticism, and lucid interpretive
suggestions helped me navigate my way through Baumgarten’s complex thought.
In his afterword, Gabriel Trop brought clarity to certain issues that my own dis-
cussion had left somewhat obscure. Last but by no means least, I wish to thank
Rüdiger Campe and Paul Fleming for providing this book a home in the
Paradigms series; Manuela Gerlof and Anja-Simone Michalski from De Gruyter
for their loyalty, even in these market-oriented times, to the untrendy eighteenth
century; Stella Diedrich and Antonia Mittelbach for their steady guidance
through the publication process.
I hope that Facing Poetry will contribute to an appreciation of Baumgarten’s
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Qu’est-ce que la littérature? Jean-Paul Sartre posed this question in Les temps
modernes in 1948.¹ Two hundred years earlier, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten
had provided what remains a largely neglected answer: “LITERATURE is perfect
sensate discourse” (MED § 9; Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA). This definition
lays the foundation for Baumgarten’s philosophical approach to literature,which
is what this book is about.With constant and open-minded attention to concrete
literary texts – “facing poetry,” so to say – Baumgarten presents this definition
as the result of a radical conceptualization of literature:
I intend to demonstrate that many consequences can be derived from a single concept of
literature which has long ago been impressed on the mind, and long since declared hun-
dreds of times to be acceptable, but not once proved.
Ut enim ex una, quae dudum mente haeserat, poematis notione probari plurima dicta iam
centies, vix semel probata posse demonstrarem. (MED, [preface], 4)²
In intellectual history, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who was born on July 17,
1714, in Berlin and died on May 27, 1762, in Frankfurt an der Oder, is known as the
last prominent representative of Wolffian scholastic philosophy. He worked in an
age when every great philosopher sought to publish a universal system of philos-
ophy, spanning all the disciplines. Baumgarten’s publications reflect this objec-
tive with his often enormous monographs on aesthetics, metaphysics, ethics, ju-
risprudence, and epistemology. His aesthetics thus belongs to a holistic
philosophical system, and it must be considered from such a perspective. But
it is his aesthetics – which he initiated with his 1735 master’s thesis, entitled
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, and extended
with the two volumes of his Aesthetica, published in 1750 and 1758 – for
which he is best known.With these works, he established the modern discourse
of aesthetics and gave the discipline its name. Intellectual history has thus par-
ticularly sought to determine where Baumgarten fits in the development of major
facets of modern aesthetic philosophy, such as the autonomy of art, the univer-
sality of aesthetic judgments, and the subjectivity of aesthetic experience. My
study aims to intervene in the traditional understanding of his aesthetics by out-
lining how it developed the first modern theory of literature and discovered the
 Jean-Paul Sartre, “Qu’est-ce que la littérature?,” pts. I–VI, Les Temps Modernes 17 (février
1947): 769–805; 18 (mars 1947): 961–988; 19 (avril 1947): 1194– 1218; 20 (mai 1947): 1410–
1439; 21 (juin 1947): 1607–1641; 22 (juliette 1947): 7– 114.
 I here translate “poema” not as “a poem,” but as “literature.” See 2.1 Ambiguity; 5.1 Prose.
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central relevance of literature to philosophy. In brief, I want to show that as the
“science of everything that is sensate” (KOLL § 1; Wissenschaft von allem, was
sinnlich ist), Baumgarten’s aesthetics is actually a science of literature.
Baumgarten did not set out to demonstrate the value of literature to philos-
ophy. But in working on his philosophical writings and lectures, he ended up an-
alyzing, synthesizing, and contextualizing literature. It thereby became clear to
him that aesthetics demands a sensate realization; or put differently, aesthetics
is always an embodied philosophy. In any case, his aesthetics does not deal with
literature as belles lettres or as a moral institution but rather as an epistemic ob-
ject. Through his philosophical work, he discovers literature’s own unique ca-
pacity to address philosophical problems. Although Baumgarten was a philoso-
pher and not a literary critic, he was able to tackle his philosophical project only
because he approached it as a literary theorist avant la lettre. His aesthetics is
thus formative for a way of thinking about literature that would coalesce in
the coming centuries, beginning in particular with Friedrich Schlegel, who mo-
bilized the concept of theory against the poetological tradition and was the
first to programmatically call his poetics a theory. But no later literary theorist
would ever again match Baumgarten’s holistic view.
Despite the scope and significance of his work on aesthetics, his insights
into “the logic without thorns” (KOLL § 1; la logique sans épines) – a moniker
for aesthetics that he quotes from Dominique Bouhours³ – were quickly super-
seded by Immanuel Kant.⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel does not even men-
tion Baumgarten, and the European Romantics were utterly uninterested in his
scholastic philosophy with its hundreds of numbered paragraphs in indigestible
Latin.⁵ Baumgarten’s aesthetics was thus relegated to oblivion, and his theory of
literature remains undiscovered, waiting to take its rightful place in intellectual
history. This oversight is based on a simple misunderstanding of the role litera-
ture plays in his philosophical project. Literature was always at the heart of
Baumgarten’s theoretical interests, beginning with his 1735 master’s thesis.
Both his Meditationes and the later Aesthetica largely draw on literary examples,
 See Dominique Bouhours, La manière de bien penser dans les ouvrages d’esprit (Paris: Veuve
de S. Mabre-Cramoisy, 1688; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1974), 11.
 See Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers, “Introduction,” in Baumgarten and Kant on Meta-
physics, ed. Fugate and Hymers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 1–4.
 See Hans Reiss, “Die Einbürgerung der Ästhetik in der deutschen Sprache des achtzehnten
Jahrhunderts oder Baumgarten und seine Wirkung,” Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft
37 (1993): 109–138; Egbert Witte, Logik ohne Dornen: Die Rezeption von A. G. Baumgartens Ästhe-
tik im Spannungsfeld von logischem Begriff und ästhetischer Anschauung (Hildesheim: Georg
Olms, 2000).
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at first predominantly from lyric poetry, but later mainly from the great epics and
fables of antiquity. The passages he selects fascinate him because of their figural,
poetic qualities – and not because they belong to the genre of lyric poetry.
In the scholarship on Baumgarten, these passages are considered mere ex-
amples for something else, namely, for the “science of sensate cognition” (AE
§ 1; scientia cognitionis sensitivae). But if that were actually the case, then one
would expect Baumgarten to cite examples from other technical or fine arts.⁶
He does not. Only in a very few instances does he refer to other arts at all,
and these references never carry epistemological weight. Baumgarten is thus
concerned not with art in general but with literature in particular. And the con-
cept of literature itself emerges when he abstracts from his examples and draws
attention to the structure of literary discourse, the actual focus of his theory. This
means that by the mid-eighteenth century, literary theory had developed not
only out of genre poetics, as scholars have often claimed, but also out of philos-
ophy, albeit unintentionally.
To understand this unintended articulation of a theory of literature, one
needs to remember what Baumgarten’s philosophical project of aesthetics is
about. He ultimately wants to radically alter the order of knowledge, as he claims
in the second letter of the Philosophische Brieffe von Aletheophilus, in which he
introduces his project in 1741: “Why shouldn’t a talented philosopher be able to
work on a philosophical encyclopedia in which he presents the sciences that be-
long to philosophy in total in their relationship to one another?” (PHB, 6;Warum
sollte nicht ein geschickter Philosoph sich an eine philosophische Encyclopädie
machen können, darinn er die zur Philosophie gehörende[n] Wißenschafften ins-
gesamt in ihrer Verbindung vorstellte?). Such an overview of human knowledge
would have to consider both the upper and lower cognitive faculties, which mo-
tivates Baumgarten to organize his approach to an encyclopedia differently from
Johann Heinrich Alsted’s standard reference work of early modern knowledge,
the Encyclopaedia septem tomis distincta (1630). Baumgarten’s outline for a phil-
osophical encyclopedia only appeared posthumously in 1769 – it was entitled
Sciagraphia encyclopaediae philosophicae and edited by Johann Christian Förster
– but in this earlier “silhouette” (PHB, 6; Schatten-Riß), he presents logic
 See Jochen Schulte-Sasse, “Aesthetic Orientation in a Decentered World,” in A New History of
German Literature, ed. David E.Wellbery et al. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 2004), 351; Frauke Berndt, “Halle 1735: Die Entdeckung der Literatur,” in Medialität: His-
torische Konstellationen, ed. Christian Kiening and Martina Stercken (Zurich: Chronos, 2019),
371–377.
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as a science of rational cognition or distinct insight, and reserves the laws of sensate and
vivid cognition, even if it does not ascend to distinctiveness in the most precise sense, for a
specific science. He calls the latter aesthetics.
als eine Wißenschafft der Erkenntnis des Verstandes oder der deutlichen Einsicht […] und
behält, die Gesetze der sinnlichen und lebhafften Erkenntnis, wenn sie auch nicht bis zur
Deutlichkeit, in genauester Bedeutung, aufsteigen sollte, zu einer besondern Wissenschafft
zurück. Diese letztere nennt er die Aesthetik. (PHB, 7)
It is thus apparent that Baumgarten estabslishes the “art of aesthetic experience”
(PHB, 8; Aesthetische Erfahrungs Kunst) as a theoretical and not as an empirical
science. Aesthetics is intimately related and equal to logic, “its older sister by
birth” (AE § 13; soror eius natu maior), which substantiates his claim to its rele-
vance.With this revaluation of sensate cognition and the elevation of aesthetics
with regard to logic, Baumgarten overturns his predecessors’ positions, in partic-
ular those of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, and brings the pre-
modern order of knowledge into flux. In the end, aesthetics encompasses epis-
temology, metaphysics, and ethics, allowing Baumgarten to outline, as his
eighteenth-century biographer Thomas Abbt succinctly puts it, a “metapoetics”
of sensation.⁷
But in this philosophical project – and this is the crux – Baumgarten lacks
concepts for defining the a priori rules of sensate cognition and so instead turns
to literary texts to discover these fundamental principles. He insists that identi-
fying these principles must be done in a philosophically legitimate way and not
through habit, that is, not through basing the rule on a single case and then ex-
pecting to encounter similar cases. Only then can aesthetics claim to have the
status of a science.⁸ As early as the preface of his Meditationes, he wishes “to
make it plain that philosophy and the knowledge of how to construct a poem,
which are often held to be entirely antithetical, are linked together in the most
amiable union” (MED, [preface], 4; hoc ipso philosophiam & poematis pangendi
scientiam habitas saepe pro dissitissimis amicissimo iunctas connubio ponerem
ob oculos). Literature is not just a source of examples; it rather provides the
foundational model for Baumgarten’s aesthetics, which makes his aesthetics a
theory of literature, worthy of a philosopher: “I may now satisfy this obligation,
I have chosen a subject which many, to be sure, hold to be too trifling and remote
to deserve the attention of philosophers” (MED, [preface], 4; Nunc autem ut fiat
 Thomas Abbt, “Leben und Charakter Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens,” in Vermischte Werke,
vol. 4 (Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai, 1780; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1978), 222.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
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satis, materiam eam elegi, quae multis quidem habebitur tenuis & a philosopho-
rum acumine remotissima).
We can thus conclude that Baumgarten presents the first modern theory of
literature without intending to do so. In his theory, literature and philosophy do
not relate to each other as the particular to the general. According to the princi-
ples of his aesthetics (see AE § 73), literary texts should not be used to provide
initial examples or evidence. In other words, he employs examples in a rhetor-
ical and not a dialectical context. By establishing an analogy between literature
and sensate cognition, he lets the two illuminate each other reciprocally in an
epistemological balancing act. And while his analogical method may have
made him uncomfortable as a philosopher, he turned to it again and again dur-
ing the twenty-five years he devoted to this project – though in the end Baum-
garten was not able to recognize his own ultimate achievement.
Only through the detour of contemplating and describing lyric, dramatic,
and epic texts can Baumgarten translate the laws of logic into the laws of aes-
thetics.Viewed historically, this should not come as a surprise. In the eighteenth
century, many reflections on aesthetics exhibited a poetological character, and
literature was about to become the prototype for sensate world-making. But
such reflections lacked philosophical relevance. Literature first became episte-
mologically relevant when Baumgarten encountered its philosophical potential
while reading. His work drew his attention to poetic passages; in dealing with
them, he engages with the linguistic medium of literature in all its captivating
phonetic and textual features. Not only tropes but also the rhetorical figures
of detail (amplificatio) and figures of presence (hypotyposis) produce the striking
structure of literary discourse as a supermedium. For that reason, the concept of
figura (schema) is at the center of this theory of literature, which is indeed noth-
ing less or more than a philosophy of rhetorical figures.
When analyzing poetic passages, Baumgarten becomes attentive to the
unique power of what Ernst Cassirer calls “sensory ‘signs’ and ‘images’” as
human interpretations of the self and the world.⁹ The elevation of sensuality
in the eighteenth-century anthropological turn is accompanied by a radical affir-
mation of contingency: the predictable world, in which the rational subject pre-
vails by using a logical calculus, belongs to the past; the new world is sensate,
and the subject who interprets it operates aesthetically. Literature is thus posi-
tioned to offer privileged access to a sensate world that has lost its predictability.
 Ernst Cassirer, “The Concept of Symbolic Form in the Construction of the Human Sciences
(1923),” in The Warburg Years (1919– 1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology,
trans. S. G. Lofts and A. Calcagno (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 75.
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In Baumgarten’s meticulous work on literature, its epistemological, metaphysi-
cal, and ethical capacities for negotiating self and world come to the fore, and
its servile function of transmitting moral messages recedes into the background.
His reflections thus produce a literary epistemology, and literature migrates
within the order of knowledge from the blurry margins to the luminous center.
Although Baumgarten’s theory of literature contributes to a historical net-
work of concepts spanning multiple disciplines, the argument of my study is
not primarily a historical one. Only a perspective trained in contemporary liter-
ary theory and willing to take on what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls in Wahrheit
und Methode (1960) the fusion of horizons can awaken Baumgarten’s approach
from its latency. How can and should we engage in the twenty-first century with
literature and literary theory? I would argue that what is needed is not a reduc-
tionist approach or one that is overly specialized with an isolated, discrete inter-
est – such as a theory of figurality, of performativity, of authorship, of fiction, or
of praxeology, all of which can find their foundations in Baumgarten – but rather
a holistic theory of literature that cannot be subsumed under any one particular
school or ideology.
This book outlines Baumgarten’s holistic theory of literature as a theory. To
do so, I address its methodological basis (2 Methodology) and the epistemolog-
ical justification of his philosophical project (3 Epistemology), before articulating
its metaphysical aspects (4 Metaphysics). I then consider how his treatment of
lyric, dramatic, and epic texts prompts him to develop a narratology that con-
tains, with its constellation of epistemological and ontological perspectives,
the most significant eighteenth-century theory of fiction (5 Narratology). Finally,
I expand the frame of the book by addressing how he ties aesthetics to ethics in
evaluating creative practices and their traces in literary texts (6 Ethics). My study
thus aims to provide the first comprehensive engagement with Baumgarten’s
theory of literature. In contrast to studies of intellectual history, which focus
on his relevance to the Enlightenment reorganization of the order of knowledge,
this book is also particularly attuned to his relevance to literary theory today.
Central to my study are the 117 paragraphs of the Meditationes, which grew
into the 904 paragraphs of the Aesthetica over the course of decades of work.
Baumgarten’s supposed magnum opus can thus be viewed as a palimpsest of
the largely underestimated earlier work. Of the two, only the Meditationes has
been translated into English. I quote from this 1954 translation by Karl Aschen-
brenner and William B. Holther. The passages quoted from the Aesthetica have
been translated by Maya Maskarinec and Alexandre Roberts for this book. I
also consider the Metaphysica, which he published in seven editions between
1739 and 1757; Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers translated this work into
6 1 Introduction
English in 2013.¹⁰ Finally, I take into consideration the Ethica philosophica from
the year 1740, which appeared in a second edition in 1751 and in a third in 1763;
translations from this work are also by Maskarinec and Roberts.¹¹
The transcript of Baumgarten’s lectures on aesthetics, Kollegium über die Äs-
thetik, also proves to be particularly insightful for my purposes. In these academ-
ic lectures held in Frankfurt an der Oder, 613 paragraphs of the Aesthetica are
roughly translated into German. The freedoms Baumgarten takes in this transla-
tion significantly increase the epistemological value of this first modern theory
of literature. Anthony Mahler has translated the quoted passages into English
as well as the quotes from Baumgarten’s Philosophische Brieffe von Aletheophilus,
published in 1741. Facing poetry, Baumgarten crosses the border between meta-
language and object language: concepts give way to images, examples, similes,
and metaphors, to metonymies, allegories, and personifications; proofs take on a
subordinate role to that of associative, narrative, and scenic relations. This obser-
vation motivates my close readings: in large stretches of this book, Baumgarten’s
theory of literature is read as literature – with just as much attention to its sty-
listic techniques as to its propositional content.
Chapter 3 (Epistemology) is a comprehensive reworking of a chapter (2.1 Die
Struktur des Gedichts) from my book Poema / Gedicht: Zur epistemischen Konfi-
guration der Literatur um 1750, which was published in 2011 by De Gruyter. Most
notably, I have added a section (3.1.2 Desire) that considers the crucial signifi-
cance of the appetitive faculties to Baumgarten’s aesthetics. Chapter 4 (Meta-
physics) and chapter 6 (Ethics) also pick up some threads from my earlier
book, but their argumentative content and structure have been substantially
changed and enlarged. Chapters 2 (Methodology) and 5 (Narratology) are new.
Preliminary work for some of the chapters was published in essays cited in
the footnotes.
 I do not consider Baumgarten’s Initia philosophiae practicae: Primae acromatice (1760). For
an English translation of this work, which was published shortly after I completed this manu-
script, see Baumgarten’s Elements of First Practical Philosophy: A Critical Translation with
Kant’s Reflections on Moral Philosophy, trans. Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers (Oxford:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).




By defining aesthetics as the “science of everything that is sensate,” Baumgarten
claims that it is autonomous from logic. This entails a revaluation of the abun-
dance (ubertas) of the sensate world and how that abundance is perceived, a re-
valuation that he undertakes by engaging with the arts in general¹ – and with
literature in particular. Baumgarten begins this philosophical project in the
first edition of his Metaphysica from 1739, where he defines aesthetics as follows:
“The science of knowing and presenting with regard to the senses is AESTHE-
TICS” (MET1 § 533; Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et proponendi est AESTHE-
TICA). In the fourth edition from 1757, he adds a parenthesis to this definition:²
“The science of knowing and presenting <proponendi> with regard to the senses
is AESTHETICS (the logic of the inferior cognitive faculty, the philosophy of
graces and muses, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautifully, the art
of the analogue of reason)” (MET § 533; Scientia sensitive cognoscendi & propo-
nendi est AESTHETICA, (Logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris, Philosophia
gratiarum & musarum, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogitandi, ars analogi ra-
tionis)). What makes this definition so remarkable is the enormous tension be-
tween the two poles of aesthetics, two poles that are, from a philosophical per-
spective, incompatible: the philosophical pole of cognition and the medial pole
of presentation, which are connected in the Latin definition by an ampersand.
The “fundamental ambiguity” of aesthetics not only consists in its combination
of the theory of sensation and the theory of beauty, as Robert E. Norton states,
but most of all in its combination of epistemology and media theory.³ Embedded
in this way in the order of knowledge, the new science of aesthetics encompasses
sensate cognition, sensate desire,⁴ and sensate presentation. This transforms a
 See Arbogast Schmitt, “Die Entgrenzung der Künste durch ihre Ästhetisierung bei Baumgar-
ten,” in Ästhetische Erfahrung im Zeichen der Entgrenzung der Künste: Epistemische, ästhetische
und religiöse Formen von Erfahrung im Vergleich, ed. Gert Mattenklott (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
2004), 55–71.
 The editions were published in the following years: 1st: 1739, 2nd: 1743, 3rd: 1750, 4th: 1757, 5th:
1763, 6th: 1768, 7th: 1779. The second and third editions already mention the logic of the lower
cognitive faculty (logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris). See Paul Menzer, “Zur Entstehung
von A. G. Baumgartens Ästhetik,” Zeitschrift für Deutsche Kulturphilosophie 4 (1938): 292.
 Robert E. Norton, The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1995), 85.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
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philosophical critique of reason, as epitomized by Kant, into a critique of cul-
ture, as later founded by Cassirer.⁵
In light of this definition, one can foresee the problems with this philosoph-
ical project. In 1758, seven years after the appearance of the first volume of the
Aesthetica, Baumgarten published the second volume and quit the project. A
monograph of colossal prolixity, the Aesthetica has since been treated as an un-
finished work. Its abandonment cannot be explained by any biographical event:
Baumgarten only died four years later and still managed to publish the Acroasis
logica in Christianum L. B. de Wolff in 1761. Abandoning the experiment was,
rather, a necessity. In the two decades in which he worked on his aesthetics,
he encountered something so new that it exceeded what was philosophically
thinkable in his time. One can thus find traces of a permanent wrestling with
concepts throughout his writings on aesthetics. Johann Gottfried Herder, one
of Baumgarten’s first and most careful readers, accused him of an imperfect ap-
proach to this “je ne sais quoi”: his “mixing both concepts together […] naturally
results in a monstrosity of aesthetics.”⁶ The fact that “the trains of thought cor-
responding to the two primary considerations” – epistemology and media theory
– “constantly run side by side” is not, however, a “sign of Baumgarten’s lack of
methodological awareness”⁷ but rather the heart, the point, the essence of aes-
thetics. The ambiguity of aesthetics reflects an awareness of a problem that En-
lightenment philosophy lacked methods and concepts for. And this awareness
applies first and foremost to the problem of the mediality of cognition itself.⁸
In the preface to the Meditationes from 1735, this ambiguity is preceded by a
reference to the coming amicable marriage between epistemology and media
theory. Baumgarten attempts, in fact, to marry an extremely dissimilar pair –
 See Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 1, Language, trans. Ralph Manheim
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 80; Frauke Berndt, “Symbolisches Wissen: Zur Ökono-
mie der ‘anderen’ Logik bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in Kulturen des Wissens im 18. Jahr-
hundert, ed. Ulrich Johannes Schneider (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 383–390.
 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Critical Forests: Fourth Grove, on Riedel’s Theory of the Beaux Arts,”
in Selected Writings on Aesthetics, ed. and trans. Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006), 189– 190.
 Hans Rudolf Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis: Eine Interpretation
der “Aesthetica” A. G. Baumgartens mit teilweiser Wiedergabe des lateinischen Textes und deut-
scher Übersetzung (Basel: Schwabe, 1973), 25.
 See Christoph Menke, “Schwerpunkt: Zur Aktualität der Ästhetik von Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49.2 (2001): 229–231; Rüdiger Campe, “Der Ef-
fekt der Form: Baumgartens Ästhetik am Rande der Metaphysik,” in Literatur als Philosophie –
Philosophie als Literatur, ed. Eva Horn, Bettine Menke, and Christoph Menke (Munich: Wilhelm
Fink, 2006), 17–33.
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theory and art, spirit and matter, truth and method – and the announced mar-
riage of cognition and presentation will have to mediate between all these fun-
damental opposites. The prolegomena to the Aesthetica from 1750 do not testify,
however, to a happy and fertile union but rather to fifteen years of acrimonious
bickering, which the first paragraph ends by divorcing the unhappy pair. Since
the marriage failed, Baumgarten amends the marriage contract and renounces
the ambiguity of aesthetics as the science of both sensate cognition and sensate
presentation – the ambiguity openly asserted in his earlier writings: “AESTHE-
TICS (the theory of the liberal arts, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beau-
tifully, the art of the analogon of reason) is the science of sensate cognition” (AE
§ 1; AESTHETICA (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre co-
gitandi, ars analogi rationis,) est scientia cognitionis sensitivae).
Like the earlier definition in the Metaphysica, this one still bravely combines
“the theory of the liberal arts, inferior gnoseology, the art of thinking beautiful-
ly,” and “the art of the analogon of reason” into a new superdiscipline.⁹ The “sci-
ence of sensate cognition” encompasses in parentheses the four subdisciplines
of logic, psychology, rhetoric, and metaphysics. Yet the new definition removes
the ambiguous relation between epistemology and media theory by making aes-
thetics only the science of sensate cognition and no longer also the science of
sensate presentation.With the new definition, Baumgarten makes a few decisive
revisions.While he uses the adverb sensitive to designate the process of knowing
and presenting something “sensately” in the Metaphysica, in the Aesthetica he
employs the adjective sensitiva to specify cognitio. This transforms the old defi-
nition’s dynamic activity of “knowing and presenting with regard to the senses”
into a one-sided, static abstraction in the new definition: “sensate cognition.” As
the “theory of the liberal arts,” presentation has been relegated to the parenthe-
ses, where it appears, like the “philosophy of graces and muses” and the “art of
thinking beautifully,” as a mere apposition to aesthetics. As a result of these re-
visions, the Aesthetica only defines one science – the science of sensate cogni-
tion.
Although the price of this disambiguation is high since it fundamentally
pares down the new science, Baumgarten seems happy to pay it. He can now
qualify sensate cognition, like every other kind of cognition, with the six catego-
ries of perfection while ignoring the origin of these categories in the rhetorical
qualities of style:¹⁰ “abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life”
 See Michael Jäger, Kommentierende Einführung in Baumgartens “Aesthetica”: Zur entstehenden
wissenschaftlichen Ästhetik des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1980),
92–189.
 See 3.2 Rhetoric.
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(AE § 22; Ubertas, magnitudo, veritas, claritas, certitudo, et vita cognitionis; see
also MET § 515).¹¹ The origin of these categories can be ignored because the
amended definition installs a hierarchy among the disciplines that have been
combined into a superdiscipline, a hierarchy that subordinates sensate presen-
tation to sensate cognition. In other words, first one cognizes, then one presents;
and because this is so, the disciplinary origin of the categories can no longer
play any tricks on their new philosophical application.
Disambiguating aesthetics is also the precondition for Baumgarten to be
able to convince the republic of letters of the philosophical dignity of aesthetics,
allowing it to be put to use in philology, hermeneutics, exegesis, rhetoric, and
musicology (see AE § 4). In contrast to these historical disciplines (see AE
§§ 5– 12), however, the “science of sensate cognition” is worthy of a philosopher
because its object is capable of truth. And this would not be the case if he had
not disambiguated aesthetics. A medial presentation is not capable of truth in a
philosophical sense since it is tied to its materiality and is thus only given in the
experience of the medium. Medial presentation thus threatens the philosophical
project of aesthetics. This is why Baumgarten has to deny rhetoric its indepen-
dence and place it in the service of a philosophical principle, which he proposes
to do in the relevant paragraphs of the Aesthetica:
Hence, if the mind is to separate true rules from spurious ones, the particular arts require a
highest principle from which they can know their own particular rules; and this is so that
the art of aesthetics does not have to be established solely through the same unreliable ex-
pectation of similar cases in order to be rendered into the form of a science (§. 70).
Indigent hinc artes speciales, si veras a spuriis regulis seiungere sit animus, ulteriori prin-
cipio, ex quo speciales suas regulas cognoscere possint, et hoc, ars aesthetica, ne per ean-
dem male fidam expectationem casuum similium unice stabiliendum sit, ut in formam
scientiae redigatur. §. 70. (AE § 73)
 See Wolfgang Bender, “Rhetorische Tradition und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert: Baumgarten,
Meier und Breitinger,” Zeitschrift für Deutsche Philologie 99.4 (1980): 481–506; David E.Wellbery,
Lessing’s “Laocoon”: Semiotics and Aesthetics in the Age of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984), 53; Heinz Paetzold, “Rhetorik-Kritik und Theorie der Künste in der philoso-
phischen Ästhetik von Baumgarten bis Kant,” in Von der Rhetorik zur Ästhetik: Studien zur Ent-
stehung der modernen Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Gérard Raulet (Rennes: Philia, 1995),
9–40; Dagmar Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: ‘Gnoseologische Rhetorik,’” in Her-
ders Rhetoriken im Kontext des 18. Jahrhunderts: Beiträge zur Konferenz der Internationalen Her-
der-Gesellschaft Schloss Beuggen nahe Basel, ed. Ralf Simon (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2014), 93–
111; Ralf Simon, “Rhetorik in konstitutionstheoretischer Funktion (Leibniz, Baumgarten, Her-
der),” in Simon, Herders Rhetoriken, 113– 127.
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On this basis, Baumgarten can derive the “laws of sensation” (PHB, 7; Empfin-
dungs-Gesetze), which he also calls the laws of sensate cognition, in the second
letter of the Philosophische Brieffe von Aletheophilus.¹² These laws claim an a pri-
ori validity beyond experience: “Hence there is a need for distinct insight a priori
into the truth of the more important rules, and experience may then confirm and
illustrate this truth, just as experience was perhaps the first step in discovering
it” (AE § 73; Hinc opus est perspicientia veritatis regularum graviorum a priori,
quam dein confirmet ac illustret experientia, sicut illius inveniendae forte pri-
mum fuit subsidium).
Acting as a medially differentiated theory of presentation, rhetoric only pos-
sesses a servile function in this philosophical project. Above all, Baumgarten
draws on classical rhetoric as a descriptive inventory. In other words, ars is in
the service of scientia; rhetorical presentations are supposed to reveal the prin-
ciples of sensate cognition. It accordingly makes sense that he actually pays
more attention to presentation than to cognition despite his ultimate focus:
“Hence that part of aesthetics which treats of such presentation is more exten-
sive than the corresponding part of logic” (MED § 117; hinc aestheticae pars de
proponendo prolixior esset, quam logicae). Only by attending to sensate presen-
tation can he articulate the laws of sensate cognition.
Despite the revisions, the ambiguity of combining epistemology and media
theory, cognition and presentation, remains rampant. Even though Baumgarten
only uses the term presenting (proponere) in the Metaphysica, this ambiguity re-
veals its explosiveness in the Aesthetica. There, presenting is still found in the
descriptions of medial practices such as writing and painting, and it is also re-
placed by the concept of representation (repraesentatio), which refers to both
ideas and medial presentations and is used at times for both. From here on, I
will therefore only use representation and not presentation.¹³ All of this work
on concepts of representation makes clear that Baumgarten engaged with
them extensively. So if we follow Winfried Menninghaus’s claim that the concept
of representation – Darstellung in German – “is hardly to be found in philosophy,
poetics, and rhetoric before 1774 but […] becomes omnipresent and a kind of
 See Dagmar Mirbach and Andrea Allerkamp, “Ale.theophilus Baumgarten / Wenn die Magd
in den Brunnen fällt,” in Schönes Denken: A. G. Baumgarten im Spannungsfeld zwischen Ästhetik,
Logik und Ethik, ed. Allerkamp and Mirbach, Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwis-
senschaft Sonderheft 15 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2016), 317–340; Alessandro Nannini,
“Alexander G. Baumgarten and the Lost Letters of Aletheophilus: Notes on a Mystery at the Ori-
gins of Modern Aesthetics,” Diciottesimo Secolo 2 (2017): 23–43.
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
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trademark of every significant theoretical project after 1790,”¹⁴ then Baumgarten
must be viewed as one of the most important milestones in the early history of
this concept.
Although he lists a series of different kinds of representations in the prole-
gomena to the Aesthetica – a list that mixes concepts from epistemology and
media theory and includes sensory perceptions, fantasies, and inventions (see
AE § 6) – he understands literature as the prototypical representation. Literary
texts are thus the actual epistemic objects of analysis in Baumgarten’s aesthetics.
“That is” – as Baumgarten’s late eighteenth-century biographer Abbt explains –
“he already saw then, as one does in the twilight, that the rules poets work by
must come from basic principles that are perhaps more universal than one imag-
ines now, and that they must be capable of a more precise proof than has so far
been given for them.”¹⁵
Facing poetry – this is the action that is responsible for Baumgarten’s phil-
osophical project, the most important epistemological foundation of which is
therefore his Meditationes. This master’s thesis is something like an outline for
the Aesthetica, but with a focus on literature. It is thus the key to unraveling
this aesthetic theory that deduces its laws from literature. As Howard Caygill as-
serts, “Given the consistency between the fundamental structure of the two texts,
the earlier work represents the nearest Baumgarten came to developing a com-
plete philosophical treatment of art, and the development represented by the
Aesthetica appears less as an ‘abortive attempt’ than as a nuanced reconsidera-
tion of a previous achievement.”¹⁶ This is confirmed by the attention that schol-
ars such as Stefanie Buchenau, Simon Grote, and Ursula Franke – in her study
Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik (2018), a revision of her pioneering Kunst als
Erkenntnis (1972), she even provides her own “Baumgartian” theory of lyric po-
etry – have recently given to the role of the poem (poema) in Baumgarten’s aes-
thetics.¹⁷
 Winfried Menninghaus, “‘Darstellung’: Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstocks Eröffnung eines neuen
Paradigmas,” in Was heißt “Darstellen”?, ed. Christiaan L. Hart Nibbrig (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1994), 205. See also Claudia Albes and Christiane Frey, eds., Darstellbarkeit: Zu
einem ästhetisch-philosophischen Problem um 1800 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann,
2003).
 Abbt, “Leben und Charakter Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens,” 222–223.
 Howard Caygill, Art of Judgement (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 152.
 See Ursula Franke, Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik (Münster: Mentis, 2018), 119– 133.
See also Frauke Berndt, Poema / Gedicht: Die epistemische Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2011), 12–127; Stefanie Buchenau, “Die Sprache der Sinnlichkeit:
Baumgartens poetische Begründung der Ästhetik in den Meditationes philosophicae,” in
“Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Sinnliche Erkenntnis in der Philosophie des Rationalismus,”
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But when Baumgarten speaks of poema in theMeditationes, he is referring to
a concept of literature in general. Poema thus does not exclusively refer to a lyric
text, as Franke claims,¹⁸ and one cannot employ it for a general theory of prose
either, though Ralf Simon does note the relation between poema and silva, which
recalls the “old prose genre of poetic forests.”¹⁹ But such generic considerations
do not make much sense here. As stated in the introduction, Baumgarten is not
concerned with poetics but rather with the concept of literature as such, and the
poetic passages of different genres serve as examples for this concept. And while
he tends to cite examples from lyric poetry in the Meditationes – which is reflect-
ed in Aschenbrenner and Holther’s translation of poema as “poem” – in the
Aesthetica he also draws on dramas and epics.²⁰ Literature is thus where Baum-
garten comes face to face with sensate cognition. As Brigitte Scheer asserts when
she defines the relationship between epistemology and media theory in Baum-
garten’s aesthetics: “The cognitive significance of sensate representations first
became clear to Baumgarten in the techniques of literature.”²¹ In the poetic pas-
sages or aesthetically thick descriptions from literary texts, he finds “an appro-
priate methodological heuristic for the modalities of [literature’s] techniques”;
he derives this heuristic “as an ars from the rhetorical repertoire.”²² And while
the principles he heuristically derives from analyzing literature are different
from the principles of logic, they are still principles.
ed. Alexander Aichele and Dagmar Mirbach, thematic issue, Aufklärung 20 (2008): 151–173; Bu-
chenau, “Die Einbindung von Poetik und Ästhetik in die Logik der Aufklärung,” in Kunst und
Wissen: Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Erkenntnistheorie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, ed. As-
trid Bauereisen, Stephan Pabst, and Achim Vesper (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann,
2009), 71–84; Buchenau, The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment: The Art of In-
vention and the Invention of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 114–151. See
Simon Grote, The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Religion and Morality in Enlightenment
Germany and Scotland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 102–146; Werner Strube,
“Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Theorie des Gedichts,” in Dichtungstheorien der deutschen
Frühaufklärung, ed. Theodor Verweyen in collaboration with Hans-Joachim Kertscher (Tübingen:
Max Niemeyer, 1995), 1–25.
 Franke, Baumgartens Erfindung der Ästhetik, 121.
 Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa: Zur Ästhetikgeschichte von Baumgarten bis Hegel mit einem
Schwerpunkt bei Jean Paul (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013), 52.
 See 5.1 Prose.
 Brigitte Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, 1997), 56. See also Scheer, “Baumgartens Ästhetik und die Krise der von
ihm begründeten Disziplin,” Philosophische Rundschau 22.1/2 (1976): 108– 119.
 Anselm Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe zwischen Nacht und Tag: Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten und die Begründung der Kulturwissenschaften in Frankfurt an der Oder,” Deutsche
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 76.1 (2002): 17.
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It thus makes absolute sense to conclude that Baumgarten’s aesthetics is
based on an “internalization” and “individualization” of rhetoric.²³ For where lit-
erature as perfect sensate discourse is, there sensate cognition must have been.
In both the Meditationes and the Aesthetica, he patiently and confidently ana-
lyzes his examples and neatly extracts the structure of literary discourse from
them.What underwrites this logic is the simple like of analogy: sensate cognition
functions like literature. This method ensures that he can analyze sensate cogni-
tion in literature and, vice versa, can legitimize the truth of literature with the
“laws of sensation.” But this does not mean that Baumgarten simply equates
sensate cognition and literature. The analogy operates, rather, with two objects,
that of sensate cognition and that of literary texts, and reflects their literal in-
compatibility through the binary relation.
2.2 Analogy
Ut poema cognitio sensitiva – this extraordinary analogy makes it possible for
Baumgarten to move back and forth between literature and sensate cognition.
With a giant leap, it replaces the original analogy between logic and aesthetics,
which serves as the foundation of his philosophical project. The first analogy is
necessary because it makes it possible to adopt the categories of perfection from
logic – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life – for the great un-
knowns of the new science. And the second analogy is essential because it en-
ables him to observe and describe the structure and functions of sensate cogni-
tion when they are manifested in literary texts’ perceptible forms. In contrast to
all the other arts, these structures and functions appear in literature in a way
that is analogous to logic because literature is a linguistic medium that can be
analyzed using rhetorical and grammatical concepts and so is in a sense logical.
For precisely this reason – which he notes in passing – Baumgarten’s philosoph-
ical project starts with the Meditationes, in which he reflects on literature, and
ends with the Aesthetica, where he does not present a general media theory
but instead a genuine theory of literature.
Baumgarten’s propaedeutic deployment of literary examples in his master’s
thesis is well known in the scholarship. These examples provide evidence for
how sensate cognition and representation function analogously because the
two share a mediating element: both operate with the same rhetorical techni-
 Petra Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren: Religionstheoretische Studien zum Darstellungs-
begriff bei A. G. Baumgarten und I. Kant (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 51.
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ques. In using such examples, Baumgarten trusts in the tried and tested method
of analogy. Since antiquity, the example has been primarily defined “as a func-
tion and not as a genre concept.”²⁴ In the tradition of logical and dialectical
proofs, the example has three functions in scholarly discourse: it can be used
in “grounding induction, introducing a concept, and articulating a concept.”²⁵
The example thus serves an important purpose not only in the writing of history
but also, as in Baumgarten, in philosophy.²⁶
At the rhetorical origin of the example, this analogical relationship turns out
to be a lot more problematic than one would first expect, given the set of func-
tions examples normally serve. Presupposing an intimate relation between dia-
lectics and rhetoric, Aristotle defines the rhetorical example – paradeigma in
Greek – as inductive evidence (epagoge), but the example is something totally
different from a proof since its epistemological foundation is formed by similar-
ity and not by conceptual structures:
It has been explained that a paradigm is an induction and with what kinds of things it is
concerned.²⁷
It is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part, like
to like, when two things fall under the same genus but one is better known than the other.²⁸
With similarity, Aristotle leaves ontologically secure ground and entrusts exam-
ples to common sense: similar is what is held to be similar or what qualifies as
similar, which is independent of whether the laws of genre allow this similarity
or not: “It is an example when the <first> extreme is proved to belong to the mid-
dle by means of something similar to the third extreme.”²⁹ Precisely this stylistic
 Bernd Engler and Kurt Müller, “Einleitung: Das Exemplum und seine Funktionalisierungen,”
in Exempla: Studien zur Bedeutung und Funktion exemplarischen Erzählens, ed. Engler and Mül-
ler (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1995), 10. See also Frauke Berndt, “Die Kunst der Analogie:
A. G. Baumgartens literarische Epistemologie,” in Allerkamp and Mirbach, Schönes Denken,
183– 199.
 Gottfried Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” in Darstellungsformen der Wissen-
schaften im Kontrast: Aspekte der Methodik, Theorie und Empirie, ed. Lutz Danneberg and Jürg
Niederhauser (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 1988), 244.
 See Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 27–28.
 Arist., Rhet. 1356b. Quoted from Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans.
George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 Arist., Rhet. 1357b19.
 Arist., An. pr. 68b35. Quoted from Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. Robin Smith (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1989). See Christof Rapp, “Ähnlichkeit, Analogie und Homonymie bei Aristoteles,”
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 46.4 (1992): 526–544.
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technique of analogy moves the example into the vicinity of the metaphor, a fact
that Anselm Haverkamp has brought attention to by drawing a line from Aristotle
to Thomas Kuhn and Hans Blumenberg.³⁰ Aristotle himself defines the analogi-
cal metaphor as its own type of metaphor. Because it is both an argument of
comparison and “occasionally for Ornament,”³¹ ancient rhetoric assigns the ex-
ample both to the canon of invention (inventio) and to the canon of style (elocu-
tio). Stated roughly, this is because similarity (similitudo), which regulates the
relation between the substitute and the substituted, can be used to invent argu-
ments or to create figures. Quintilian, Baumgarten’s authoritative source in the
Aesthetica, therefore also thinks of similarity in a spatial manner when he de-
scribes the stylistic technique of the example (exemplum) as the “matching of
similar things [adpositio similium].”³² This similarity can be of “either Similars
or Dissimilars or Contraries [similia, dissimilia, contraria].”³³ From this it follows
that analogy is a technique, and similarity a quality.
Rhetoric thus draws attention to something other than the relationality of
the example, namely, to its semiotic quality. Indeed, rhetoric presupposes that
the example has more of a linguistic character than an ontological one. This lin-
guistic character consists, in part, in an epistemic function that Gottfried Gabriel
ties to a “visually concretizing function (in discourse).”³⁴ Evidentia thus results
from examples; examples present something to the eyes solely on the basis of
their phenomenal particularity. Indeed, the particular, the concrete, the individ-
ual makes an example an example. But the evidentia of examples is not really
generated by how an example stands for something like a metaphor; instead,
one could speak here, with analytical philosophy, of singular terms, and Quintil-
ian uses the concept of the image (eikon).³⁵ Similarly, historiography has shown
that examples produce evidentia not through metaphorical substitution but
through constituting very short stories: “The exemplum as a minimal narrative
 See Anselm Haverkamp, “Paradigma Metapher, Metapher Paradigma – Zur Metakinetik her-
meneutischer Horizonte (Blumenberg/Derrida, Kuhn/Foucault, Black/White),” in Epochen-
schwelle und Epochenbewusstsein, ed. Reinhart Herzog and Reinhart Koselleck (Munich: Wil-
helm Fink, 1987), 547–560.
 Quint., Inst. 8.5.10. Quoted from Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, ed. and trans. Donald. A.
Russell, 5 vols., Loeb Classical Library 124–127, 494 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).
 Quint., Inst. 5.11.1.
 Quint., Inst. 5.11.5.
 Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” 241.
 See Quint., Inst. 5.11.24.
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unit relates to the minimal systematic unit of the moral-philosophical precept in
such a way that they virtually form a compound.”³⁶
Baumgarten’s literary epistemology is based on a reentry of this rhetorical
epistemology of exemplarity. On the one hand, the literary text serves as an ex-
ample of sensate cognition. On the other, the rhetorical figure of the example,
which he already attends to in the Meditationes, is itself used as an example
of what makes literature literature – or, more precisely, it serves as an example
of the literary, which is what he is interested in. That is why he treats the exem-
plum in the Meditationes as a particularly poetic tool and isolates it – the Latin
eximere means to “take out,” “separate,” “sort out” – from other rhetorical fig-
ures when analyzing literary texts. Examples are, one could say, the figural is-
lands that Baumgarten focuses on. He differentiates categorically between the
epistemology and pragmatics of exemplarity by outsourcing the pragmatics to
a footnote in paragraph 22. There he criticizes both the arbitrariness and inex-
haustibility of the cultural heritage with reference to Leibniz’s Causa Dei asserta
per iustitiam eius (1719), which relies on the evidence of normative examples:
The illustrious Leibniz sees this in that excellent book in which he undertakes to justify the
ways of God, where he says, “The chief object of history, as well as of poetry, should be to
teach prudence and virtue through examples.” When we look for an example of an exam-
ple, we are confronted, rather like Tantalus, with such swimming abundance that we
scarcely know which draught to take. Let us race off to the sea of the unhappy Ovid: the
less determined representation –
Often when one god oppresses, another god brings help –
has scarcely escaped from his mouth, which drips with salty streams of tears and sea water,
when, behold! the poet suddenly justifies himself, to the extent of six verses, with a gath-
ering flood of examples:
Vulcan stood against Troy, for Troy Apollo …, etc.
Id, quod vidit Ill. LEIBNITZIUS egregio illo libro, quo caussam Dei defendendam suscepit
Part. II. p. 148. quando ait: Le but principal de la Poesie doit etre d’enseigner la prudence
& la vertu par des exemples. Exemplum exempli dum quaerimus, paene facti sumus Tantali
in tanta affluentia, unde potissimum hauriendum incerti. Decurramus ad mare miseri Na-
sonis Trist. l.I. & II. minus determinata repraesentatio:
Saepe premente deo fert deus alter opem.
vix elapsa erat ex ore falsis lacrumarum & maris imbribus rorante: & ecce repente sequitur
6 versus sibi vindicans exemplorum decumanus fluctus
Mulciber in Troiam pro Troia stabat Achilles &c. (MED § 22)
 Karl-Heinz Stierle, “Story as Exemplum – Exemplum as Story: On the Pragmatics and Poetics
of Narrative Texts,” in New Perspectives in German Literary Criticism: A Collection of Essays, ed.
Richard A. Amacher and Victor Lange, trans. David Henry Wilson et al. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), 400.
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Baumgarten is not actually interested in the normativity of the example here but
rather in what is sensate in the example, which is independent of its moral uses.
Examples thus wander out of the footnotes and into the paragraphs of the
Meditationes, allowing Baumgarten to analyze the structure of sensate cognition
with the example of the example. There the example functions as the microdou-
ble of sensate cognition such that the relationship between sensate cognition,
the literary text, and the rhetorical figure of the example forms a double syllo-
gism: the rhetorical figure of the example is the example of the literary text,
which is, in turn, the example of sensate cognition. The third element of both
analogies is their sensate nature:
major term: aesthetics | literature
middle term: sensate
minor term: literature | example
Because Baumgarten’s analogy is anchored in the rhetorical epistemology of the
example – that is, because he neither draws conclusions a priori about the laws
of sensate cognition nor chooses an example for these laws – his philosophical
project leads directly to the modern epistemology of exemplarity.While Kant and
nineteenth-century philosophical idealism rejected exemplarity, the example
later became an “actual agent for creating knowledge.”³⁷ In particular, Ludwig
Wittgenstein developed a method of the example,³⁸ in which examples neither
precede concepts nor illustrate them after the fact. Instead, they are a necessary
epistemic tool that replaces induction or deduction by forming analogies.
What is epistemologically spectacular about the rhetorical example is how it
neither moves from the particular to the general nor illustrates the general using
the particular but rather operates between a particular and another particular.
With regard to Baumgarten’s literary epistemology, this means that cognition
is not related to representation like the general to the particular: both operate
at the same level of the particular, concrete, and individual. As Stefan Willer con-
vincingly notes, “In view of this, the explicability of rules becomes problematic:
they actually appear as a simulacrum produced by examples.”³⁹ Giorgio Agam-
ben refers to exactly this contentious point when he argues that the example and
 Gabriel, “Logik und Rhetorik der Beispiele,” 242.
 See Luiz Antônio Marcuschi, Die Methode des Beispiels: Untersuchungen über die methodi-
sche Funktion des Beispiels in der Philosophie, insbesondere bei Ludwig Wittgenstein (Erlangen:
Palm & Enke, 1976).
 Stefan Willer, “Was ist ein Beispiel? Versuch über das Exemplarische,” in Originalkopie:
Praktiken des Sekundären, ed. Gisela Fehrmann et al. (Cologne: DuMont, 2004), 55.
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regularity really exclude one another and compares the example with the state of
exception:
What the example shows is its belonging to a class, but for this very reason the example
steps out of its class in the very moment in which it exhibits and delimits it […]. If one
now asks if the rule applies to the example, the answer is not easy, since the rule applies
to the example only as to a normal case and obviously not as to an example. The example is
thus excluded from the normal case not because it does not belong to it but, on the con-
trary, because it exhibits its own belonging to it. The example is truly a paradigm in the
etymological sense: it is what is “shown beside,” and a class can contain everything except
its own paradigm.⁴⁰
If that is the case, if the example really lacks an anchoring in the general be-
cause it balances the particular and the particular, then Alexander Gelley offers
a convincing deconstruction of exemplarity: an “example cannot assume a
whole on which it draws. Rather, it is oriented to the recovery of a lost whole
or the discovery of a new one.”⁴¹ With regard to Baumgarten, one can therefore
hardly avoid a topsy-turvy chronology: on the one hand, his rhetoric of analogy
belongs to early modernity, “the age of exemplarity”;⁴² on the other, he skips the
beginnings of modernity in such a way that his ideas constantly take the reader
directly into postmodernism.
Although the scholarship has paid a lot of attention to aesthetics as analo-
gous to logic, Baumgarten’s method of analogy, which helps him establish the
new discipline, has been neglected. Instead, the scholarship has contributed
to reining in the ambiguity of aesthetics and perpetuating the subordination
of ars to scientia, rhetoric to science.⁴³ But in Baumgarten’s analogical method
lies the unrecognized and unprecedented potential of this otherwise traditional
philosopher, beholden to the Leibniz–Wolffian school. In a manner that is to
some extent at odds with the thoroughly metaphysical positions he takes in
search of the “laws of sensation,” this method displays his utterly nonmetaphys-
ical thinking. For it is his stylistic technique of drawing analogies that thwarts
his self-censorship and the disambiguation of aesthetics. Following these oper-
ations might require a lot of patience, but it offers promising possibilities to leave
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 22.
 Alexander Gelley, “Introduction,” in Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity, ed.
Gelley (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3.
 John D. Lyons, Exemplum: The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 12.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
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the beaten tracks of the scholarship and outline Baumgarten’s theory of litera-
ture.
2.3 Etymology
With the double analogy of, on the one hand, logic and aesthetics and, on the
other, sensate cognition and literature, the literary text moves into the epistemo-
logical center of Baumgarten’s philosophical project. He did not intend to be-
come a literary theorist, but his analogical method turned him into one. In ad-
dition to the analogy with sensate cognition, literature shapes his philosophical
project in another, entirely different way. His theory of literature is a theory made
out of literature, a theory in which transtextuality constitutes the “unique char-
acteristic” of his writings.⁴⁴ While transtextuality is often a criterion for distin-
guishing literary texts from nonliterary ones, Baumgarten’s transtextuality is
rooted in early modern scholarly practices. All such relationships between
texts and pretexts can be described well with Gérard Genette’s typology, which
groups together quotes and paraphrases in the first type of transtextuality, called
intertextuality.
With intertextuality, Genette refers to “a relationship of copresence between
two texts or among several texts: that is to say, eidetically and typically as the
actual presence of one text within another.”⁴⁵ Within intertextuality, Ulrich
Broich and Manfred Pfister further differentiate between three forms, which I
find very useful for typologizing Baumgarten’s scholarly practices:
(1) intertextuality: the Aesthetica refers to texts by other authors;
(2) intratextuality: the Aesthetica refers to other texts by Baumgarten;
(3) autotextuality: the Aesthetica refers to the text of the Aesthetica itself.⁴⁶
(1) Intertextuality. Proving the presence of texts by other authors in Baum-
garten’s writings does not require any great philological art since he cites and
paraphrases a great deal. And his allusions also operate within a canonical
framework, allowing him to assume that his audience possesses the classical ed-
 Dagmar Mirbach, “Praeponitur – illustratur: Intertextualität bei A. G. Baumgarten,” in Aller-
kamp and Mirbach, Schönes Denken, 81.
 Gérard Genette, Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Channa Newman and
Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1–2.
 See Manfred Pfister, “Konzepte der Intertextualität,” in Intertextualität: Formen, Funktionen,
anglistische Fallstudien, ed. Ulrich Broich and Pfister (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1985), 11–20.
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ucation required to understand them. Dagmar Mirbach’s 2007 translation of the
Aesthetica into German documents these citations and allusions in endnotes, a
useful index, and a reference list of the texts and authors they refer to.⁴⁷ They
show that Baumgarten favors particular dialogue partners. Both the Meditationes
and the Aesthetica cite Horace extensively, especially his “Ars poetica,”⁴⁸ which
serves as the intertextual basso continuo in Baumgarten’s theory of literature. He
turns to Horace to lend authority to many of his own reflections on literary texts.
But he cites Horace in a way that proceeds more topically than argumentatively:
following the rhetorical tradition, he uses short sentences as mnemonic places
(loci) and attaches his own arguments to this scaffolding. The same is the
case for Cicero, whom Baumgarten cites in the Aesthetica even more often
than Horace, especially in the context of epistemological problems, as Buchenau
has eruditely demonstrated.⁴⁹ In addition, Pseudo-Longinus’s treatise On the
Sublime particularly plays a role when Baumgarten treats ethical problems,
and, above all, his philosophical project would be unthinkable without Quintil-
ian’s Institutionis oratoriae. For this reason, one hears the double voice of
“Baumtilian” across entire paragraphs of the Aesthetica, with Quintilian’s anal-
ysis of rhetorical figures especially resonant.⁵⁰ And the list of influences contin-
ues with a number of other ancient and early modern rhetorical and poetic texts.
While Baumgarten directly appropriates and integrates these texts on rheto-
ric and poetics, his relationship to the two preeminent philosophers of the Ger-
man Enlightenment, Leibniz and Wolff, is ambivalent. He positions his philo-
sophical project in response to them as if they were Scylla and Charybdis. As
is well known in the scholarship, Baumgarten begins a repudiation of rationalist
philosophy in his Metaphysica, and the Aesthetica continues this work. But de-
spite this antagonism, he quotes exhaustively from the rationalist canon and em-
ploys Leibniz–Wolffian concepts, which he redefines. Following Harold Bloom,
we can interpret this ambivalence as a textual figuration of anxiety. Although
Bloom only applies his model to literature, it captures well Baumgarten’s rela-
tionship to Leibniz and Wolff. Baumgarten jostles with these two giants not
only for epistemic space and legitimacy for his new science but also for his
own place in the history of philosophy – his own imaginary identity and unique-
 See Mirbach’s “Anmerkungen,” “Personenregister,” and “Bibliographie” in Ästhetik by
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, trans. Mirbach, vol. 2 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), 935–
1050, 1193– 1201, 1263– 1274.
 See Bengerd Juul Thorsen, “Baumgarten’s Meditationes as a Commentary on Horace’s ‘Ars
Poetica,’” Philosophica 44 (2014): 9–25.
 See Buchenau, The Founding of Aesthetics, 137– 151.
 See 3.4 Poetics.
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ness. In his psychoanalytic theory of influence, Bloom considers such an oedipal
rivalry between powerful men and presumably weaker followers as the driving
force of history. They “make that history by misreading one another, so as to
clear imaginative space for themselves.”⁵¹
(2) Intratextuality. Maybe even more stunning than Baumgarten’s references
to others’ texts are his references to his own. The Aesthetica refers constantly to
both his Metaphysica and his Ethica, forming an intratextual triad out of a thick
net of cross-references. Mirbach even refers to the Ethica and the Aesthetica as
the Metaphysica’s twin daughters:⁵² the Ethica delves further into the appetitive
faculties,⁵³ while the Aesthetica investigates the cognitive faculties.⁵⁴ These cross-
references reflect Baumgarten’s own understanding of the Metaphysica as his
principle work – or at least as the work that lays claim to philosophical authority
and so frequently has to come to the aid of the contentious “science of every-
thing that is sensate.”
(3) Autotextuality. The abundance of intertextuality and intratextuality in the
Aesthetica should not let us forget that it, above all, unyieldingly refers to its own
paragraphs – both to paragraphs within the same section and to paragraphs
from previous sections; to single paragraphs, groups of paragraphs, and entire
sections. This permanent insinuation of coherence and consistency comes across
as the textual figuration of an obsessive compulsion. But Baumgarten’s meticu-
lousness is more than justified. These self-citations often set the stage for his
conceptual work, which defines his philosophical project. For example, he trans-
fers concepts from the sphere of desire into the sphere of cognition – like sensi-
tivus⁵⁵ – or invents aestheticologicus to describe a new concept of truth for sen-
sate cognition.⁵⁶
So far I have described what texts Baumgarten cites, including texts by other
authors and his own. More significant, however, is the text that he does not cite
at all, his Meditationes. Although he embraces transtextuality in the Aesthetica,
he conspicuously leaves out the text that initiated his aesthetic project in 1735.
 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 5.
 See Dagmar Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica, Aesthetic Greatness: Ethical Aspects of
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Fragmentary Aesthetica (1750/58),” The Nordic Journal of Aes-
thetics 20.36–37 (2008/2009): 104.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
 See 3.2 Rhetoric.When referring to Latin adjectives or participles as concepts, I only use the
masculine nominative singular ending to improve readability.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
2.3 Etymology 23
The Aesthetica does not mention his earlier reflections on poetics a single time,
making it seem like Baumgarten is trying to avoid the topic that actually forms
the core of the Aesthetica: the theory of literature. This avoidance of poetics is
surprising since he extensively quotes the entire literary canon of antiquity, in
particular Virgil’s Aeneis.⁵⁷ The scholarship usually explains the absence of po-
etics by differentiating (misleadingly) between the main work, the Aesthetica,
and its preliminary stages in the Meditationes, the Brieffe, and part 3 of the Meta-
physica on psychology (psychologia).
Contrary to this generally accepted position in the scholarship, I argue that
the Meditationes is latently and compulsively present in the Aesthetica. The con-
nection to the Meditationes is first of all transmitted through Horace, whom
Baumgarten cites equally indefatigably in both works. Second, the Aesthetica
is structurally based on the Meditationes. Both are organized according to the
canons of rhetoric (officia oratoris; see MED § 10; AE §§ 13, 18–20): heuristics (in-
ventio), methodology (dispositio), and semiotics (elocutio). But before engaging
with this structure,⁵⁸ I want to turn to yet another type of transtextuality in order
to show that the Meditationes is not merely a preliminary draft of the Aesthetica.
Genette would classify the relationship between the two works as a fourth type
of transtextuality that he calls hypertextuality: “By hypertextuality I mean any
relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call the hypertext) to an earlier text
A (I shall, of course, call it the hypotext), upon which it is grafted in a manner
that is not that of commentary. The use of the metaphoric ‘grafted’ and of the
negative determination underscores the provisional status of this definition.”⁵⁹
In comparison to the concept of intertextuality, the concept of hypertextuality
does not refer to a single, precisely locatable reference such as a quote or a para-
phrase. Text B can refer to text A by mentioning text A but also without doing so.
What is decisive is that B cannot structurally exist without A. Text B is due to a
more-or-less obvious transformation of text A; that is, hypertextuality occurs in
the case of “an entire work B deriving from an entire work A.”⁶⁰ This means that
only a text that chronologically precedes a hypertext can become a hypotext. The
chronology guarantees the direction of the references: text B cannot exist with-
out text A, but A can exist without B; A influences the existence of B, but B does
not influence the existence of A.
Such hypertextuality depends structurally on the fifth, most abstract type of
transtextual relationship outlined by Genette: “The fifth type (yes, I know), the
 See 5 Narratology.
 See 3.2 Rhetoric.
 Genette, Palimpsests, 5.
 Genette, Palimpsests, 9.
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most abstract and most implicit of all, is architextuality, as defined above. It in-
volves a relationship that is completely silent, articulated at most only by a para-
textual mention, which can be titular (as in Poems, Essays, The Romance of the
Rose, etc.) or most often subtitular (as when the indication A Novel, or A Story, or
Poems is appended to the title on the cover), but which remains in any case of a
purely taxonomic nature.”⁶¹ For the same phenomenon, Broich and Pfister offer
the perhaps even more fitting concept of systemic reference, which they differen-
tiate from intertextual references to single texts.⁶² The Meditationes and the
Aesthetica are related by exactly such a systemic reference because both works
share a rhetorical blueprint – as I will later show in detail.⁶³ Based on this sys-
temic reference, we can infer that the Aesthetica has the same epistemic object as
the Meditationes: the literary text.
If one accepts that a systemic reference conjoins the Meditationes and the
Aesthetica, then one can either claim that the Meditationes is a condensed ver-
sion of the Aesthetica or that the Aesthetica suppresses the Meditationes into la-
tency; the latter view has a lot to commend it. Baumgarten’s anxiety might per-
haps even apply less to his philosophical predecessors than to his own preceding
text. Perhaps he wanted to distance himself from his earlier poetics because it
appeared unworthy to him as a philosopher? After all, his aesthetics aims to es-
tablish a new position in the order of knowledge. For precisely that reason, it
seems as if he wanted to steer clear of literature, the epistemic object that his
philosophical project depends on.
From the perspective of this avoided intertextuality, the hierarchy between
the two texts is inverted: the Meditationes is not a preliminary stage of the
Aesthetica, the supposed main work; rather, it is the other way around. The Me-
ditationes already reflects theoretically on everything Baumgarten views as im-
portant to literary texts, and it is where he gives a name to his aesthetic child:
literature (poema).We are thus dealing here with an inversion in the chronology
between text A and text B. Genette himself believes that such a temporal inver-
sion is at the base of all theories of intertextuality: “I can also trace in just about
any work the local, fugitive, and partial echoes of any other work, be it anterior
or ulterior.”⁶⁴ In Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History
(1999), Mieke Bal outlines a model of such a topsy-turvy chronology, in which
influences are no longer one-way streets. This model plots texts in a nonlinear
history, viewing earlier works as the belated reworkings (aftereffects) of later
 Genette, Palimpsests, 4.
 See Manfred Pfister, “Zur Systemreferenz,” in Broich and Pfister, Intertextualität, 52–58.
 See 3.2 Rhetoric.
 Genette, Palimpsests, 9.
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works. In this context, the Meditationes only unfolds its significance for Baum-
garten’s œuvre when one views it as an aftereffect of the Aesthetica or as an af-
tereffect of the entire triad of theMetaphysica, Ethica, and Aesthetica. Only under
the condition of this thought experiment does the preeminent role of literature in
his philosophical project become clear.
In addition to rampant transtextuality, Baumgarten’s Aesthetica is defined
by his unique style. While Mirbach emphasizes that his style is “achromatic”⁶⁵
– meaning that his text is formulated for the purpose of academic lecturing
and so proceeds less abstractly than philosophical discourse – I would like to
point out, as I did in the introduction, that Baumgarten lacked the requisite con-
cepts for his philosophical project. The Aesthetica thus functions with the help of
a “translation machine” that allows him to use the same concepts in different
contexts. Stubbornly and awkwardly, he transfers these concepts not only
from one discipline to another but also from one book to another. The translation
begins with epistemology (psychology, rhetoric, semiotics, poetics) and then
leads from metaphysics to ethics. His narratology, which is treated in the present
book for the very first time, forms an interface between epistemology and meta-
physics as he expounds on psychology, rhetoric, ontology, and even cosmology.
Baumgarten’s philosophy can thus basically be considered as a philosophy
of style in which the concepts themselves are discursively produced. They form
argumenta ex vi verbi. Originally rooted in dialectics, this method soon found its
way into rhetoric, which provides, on the one hand, topoi in the canon of inven-
tion and, on the other, figures in the canon of style. Cicero further develops the
dialectical method from Aristotle’s Topics in his own Topica and in De inven-
tione, where he provides catalogues of how to form arguments etymologically
and describes such arguments as loci ab etymologia. Baumgarten’s translation
machine is based on precisely this method, and its most important etymological-
ly rooted figure is analogy. Following Jacques Derrida, “all the so-called symbol-
ical or analogical figures” perform the etymological work of displacing words.⁶⁶
But one does not need to look into the future to postmodernism, for Baumgarten
imports etymology (etymologia) as an analogical method from dialectics into
philosophy in his Philosophia generalis, edited and published posthumously in
1770 by Förster. In the first part, on onomatology (onomatologia), he associates
etymology with the artes liberales in general, and with figures and tropes in par-
ticular (see PHG §§ 5–20).
 Mirbach, “Intertextualität bei A. G. Baumgarten,” 74.
 Jacques Derrida, “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in Margins of Phi-
losophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 215.
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As I will demonstrate in this study, the essential foundation of aesthetics
turns out to be the “fundament of literalness.”⁶⁷ In the process of working on
his philosophical project, Baumgarten switches back and forth between different
disciplinary registers, conjoining them etymologically to such an extent as to
produce an interdisciplinary relay. The transferred concepts do not have an ori-
gin; instead, his paragraphs invoke with every single concept a loop of disci-
plines that I will enter in the following chapter at the arbitrary point of psychol-
ogy. In doing so, I take the commonplace that his aesthetics is based on the
lower faculties of the soul as the starting point of my argument.
 Stefan Willer, “Orte, Örter,Wörter: Zum locus ab etymologia zwischen Cicero und Derrida,” in






The ambiguity of aesthetics arises from its combination of epistemology and
media theory. The order of knowledge forms its epistemological basis, literature
is its object, establishing its autonomy from logic is its goal, analogy its method,
and etymology its style. The eighteenth-century order of knowledge parcels cog-
nition up into a bright upper part and a dark lower part at the ground of the soul
(fundus animae) – thereby revisiting what Niklaus Largier analyzes as a promi-
nent “trope of mystical discourse.”¹ As is well known, Baumgarten’s “science of
everything that is sensate” contradicts the topical order of the faculties of the
soul, which was established by Leibniz and confirmed in Wolff ’s Psychologia em-
pirica (1732), by transposing the vertical spatial order into a horizontal order in
which sensation (sensatio/Empfindung) is the equal of reason. But in recon-
structing the epistemology of Baumgarten’s aesthetics, the scholarship often
makes a decisive mistake: it attends to the cognitive faculties (facultates cogno-
scitivae) but neglects the appetitive faculties (facultates appetitivae). In the fol-
lowing, I will discuss the lower cognitive faculty in relation to the appetitive fac-
ulty. In contrast to affect in the seventeenth century and feeling in the late
eighteenth century, Baumgarten posits that both sensate cognition and sensate
desire follow laws analogous to those of reason, making it possible to analyze
the formal processes of both. His aesthetics thus does not give emphatic irratio-
nality the role that it will later have in the eighteenth century in theories like Her-
der’s.
Baumgarten differentiates between higher cognitive faculties (facultates cog-
noscitivae superiores) and lower cognitive faculties (facultates cognoscitivae in-
feriores). He articulates this distinction in detail in the Metaphysica, but it is al-
ready present in the Meditationes, where he distinguishes between things known
(noeta) and things perceived (aistheta), and determines that “things known are to
be known by the superior faculty as the object of logic; things perceived [are to be
known by the inferior faculty, as the object] of the science of perception, or
 Niklaus Largier, “The Plasticity of the Soul: Mystical Darkness, Touch, and Aesthetic Experi-
ence,” MLN 125.3 (2010): 537. See also Hans Adler, “Fundus Animae – der Grund der Seele: Zur
Gnoseologie des Dunklen in der Aufklärung,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissen-
schaft und Geistesgeschichte 62.2 (1988): 197–220.
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aesthetic” (MED § 116; Sint ergo νοητα cognoscenda facultate superiore obiec-
tum logices, αισϑητα επιϛημης αισϑητιϰης sive AESTHETICAE).² He thus under-
stands sensation “as an organ of cognition independent from reason” that rep-
resents “the connections of things in its own particular way.”³
In this conception of sensation, the discipline of psychology is responsible
for articulating the laws of “representing”⁴ or “appropriating the world sensate-
ly.”⁵ In part 3 of the Metaphysica on psychology (psychologia) – where Baum-
garten treats both empirical and rational (speculative) psychology – he derives
the following series of sensate faculties (facultates sentiendi) from the different
characteristics of sensations:
(1) the inferior faculty for knowing the correspondences of things (§572, 279), to which per-
tains a sensitive wit (§575); (2) the inferior faculty for knowing the differences of things
(§572, 279), to which pertains sensitive acumen (§575); (3) sensitive memory (§579, 306);
(4) the faculty of invention (§589); (5) the faculty of judging (§606, 94), thus sensitive judg-
ment (§607) and that of the senses (§608); (6) the expectation of similar cases (§610, 612);
and (7) the sensitive faculty of characterization (§619, 347). All of these, insofar as they are
similar to reason in representing the nexus of things, constitute the ANALOGUE OF REA-
SON (§70), or the collection of the soul’s faculties for representing a nexus confusedly.
1) inferior facultas identitates rerum cognoscendi, §. 572, 279 quo ingenium sensitivum,
§. 575. 2) inferior facultas diversitates rerum cognoscendi, §. 572, 279. quo acumen sensiti-
vum pertinet, §. 575. 3) memoria sensitiva, §. 579, 306. 4) facultas fingendi, §. 589. 5) facultas
diiudicandi, §. 606, 94. quo iudicium sensitivum, §. 607. & sensuum, §. 608. 6) exspectatio
casuum similium, §. 610, 612. 7) facultas characteristica sensitiva, §. 619, 347. Hae omnes,
quatenus in repraesentando rerum nexu rationi similes sunt, constituunt ANALOGON RA-
TIONIS, §. 70. complexum facultatum animae nexum confuse repraesentantium. (MET
§ 640; see also AE §§ 30–37)
Baumgarten then organizes the third part of the Metaphysica, which is based on
this list of faculties, as follows:
 See Hans Adler and Lynn L. Wolff, eds., Aisthesis und Noesis: Zwei Erkenntnisformen vom
18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2013). See also Ted Kinnaman, “Aes-
thetics before Kant,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Steven Nadler (Malden:
Blackwell, 2002), 578–582.
 Ursula Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis: Die Rolle der Sinnlichkeit in der Ästhetik des Alexander
Gottlieb Baumgarten (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1972), 37. See also Franke, “Sinnliche Erkenntnis
– was sie ist und was sie soll: A. G. Baumgartens Ästhetik-Projekt zwischen Kunstphilosophie
und Anthropologie,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 73–99.
 Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 41.
 Friedhelm Solms, Disciplina aesthetica: Zur Frühgeschichte der ästhetischen Theorie bei Baum-
garten und Herder (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1990), 21.
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Section IIII: Imagination (phantasia)
Section V: Perspicacity (perspicacia)
Faculty of wit (ingenium)
Faculty of acumen (acumen)
Section VI: Memory (memoria)
Section VII: Faculty of invention (facultas fingendi)
Section VIII: Foresight (praevisio)
Section VIIII: Judgment (iudicium)
Section X: Anticipation (praesagitio)
Section XI: Faculty of characterization (facultas characteristica)
The science for analyzing these sensate faculties requires, like any science, a
method. As we saw in the last chapter, Baumgarten’s “science of everything
that is sensate” is largely based on the rhetorical figure of analogy, so it employs
a rhetorical method.⁶ He thus follows, as Herder astutely notes, a path that is
more philologically than philosophically grounded: “I am getting closer to the
heart of Baumgarten’s philosophy and have noticed that it is so tied up with lan-
guage that his explanations, differentiations, and proofs often seem to work ety-
mologically.”⁷ In other words, Baumgarten seems to shift the weight of his argu-
ments onto the concepts that constitute them. Herder becomes especially riled
up with Baumgarten’s use of sensitivus, in English “sensate,” which he seems
to apply to everything possible. In the context of the analogon of reason, the
data (sense perceptions), organs (faculties), and products (representations,
with regard to both quantity and quality) are all described with one and the
same word: sensitivus. Herder bemoans this fact in his discussion of Friedrich
Justus Riedel’s Theorie der schönen Künste (1767), which follows Baumgarten’s
mold:
We Germans dispute words as other nations dispute causes; we are as blessed with defini-
tions as others are with inventions, and in his definition Baumgarten has moreover used a
word that is rich and pregnant enough to conceal multiple meanings, thus leaving itself
open to dispute and misuse: the word sensuous [sinnlich; I translate as “sensate,” F. B.].
How many concepts German philosophy associates with this word! Sensuous leads us
back to the source and medium of certain representations, and these are the senses; it sig-
nifies those faculties of the soul that form such representations, and these are the so-called
lower faculties of the soul; it characterizes the species of representation, confused and
pleasant precisely in this rich, engaging confusion; that is, sensuous; finally, it refers
also to the intensity with which the representations enrapture us and excite sensuous pas-
 See 2.2 Analogy.
 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Von Baumgartens Denkart in seinen Schriften,” inWerke, ed. Martin
Bollacher et al., vol. 1, Frühe Schriften 1764– 1772, ed. Ulrich Gaier (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher
Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 653.
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sions – on all four conceptual paths the multifaceted words sensuous, sensitive are in keep-
ing with the definition of Wolff, Baumgarten, and Mendelssohn.⁸
Baumgarten’s conceptual politics made more than a small contribution to this
inflation. Even the concept aesthetics itself is an argument based on words (ar-
gumentum ex vi verbi). By deriving aesthetica from an etymological topos (locus
ab etymologia) in the first paragraph of the Kollegium, Baumgarten traces the
name for the “science of everything that is sensate” back to its original meaning
and provides an etymological explanation for the analogy between reason and
sensation:⁹
It actually comes from aisthanomai [I sense]; this word refers to what sentio refers to in
Latin, namely, to all clear sensations. Since sensations can be divided into external and in-
ternal ones – into those that I am conscious of occurring in my body and that relate to all
the senses, and those that only occur in my soul – this word, which refers to clear sensa-
tions in general, applies to both. Since, furthermore, the word sentio refers to perceiving
something with the senses and the Greek is completely the same, it will also refer to sensate
representations.
Es kommt eigentlich von αισϑανομαι her; dieses Wort bezeichnet das, was sentio im Latei-
nischen bezeichnet, nämlich alle klaren Empfindungen. Da die Empfindungen in äußerliche
und innerliche eingeteilt werden, in solche, die in meinem Körper als mir bewußt vorgehen
und sich auf alle Sinne beziehen, oder in solche, die nur in meiner Seele vorgehen, so wird
dieses Wort, das klare Empfindungen überhaupt bezeichnet, auf beides gehen. Da ferner das
Wort sentio etwas sinnlich wahrnehmen bezeichnet, das griechische aber mit ihm völlig
einerlei ist, so wird es auch sinnliche Vorstellungen bezeichnen. (KOLL § 1; see also MET
§ 535)
Baumgarten’s etymology twists and turns, exhibiting a stylistic technique that
does not reach an ontological origin – “a semantics beyond language” – but
rather always only refers, in a process of “continual displacement,” to other
words.¹⁰ In his thoroughly circular conclusion, he equates the subjective activity
of sense perception (aisthanomai/sentio) with the result of this activity, the (ex-
ternal or internal) clear sensations, which are then ascribed, based on etymolo-
gy, the same sensate quality that characterizes the verb. In this definition, Baum-
garten contorts the topical method for securing proofs into the stylistic technique
of the figura etymologica, which produces words by moving through different
morphological forms of the same root word, transforming etymology from a
 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Critical Forests,” 264.
 See Cic., Top. 2.8– 10.
 Willer, “Orte, Örter, Wörter,” 39.
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method for dialectical proofs into a stylistic technique on the surface of dis-
course.
Herder recognizes that precisely such an etymological method, which is at
work in the vocabulary of the Leibniz–Wolffian school, would be “conducive
to new paths” in philosophy:¹¹
If only there were a German philosopher who could forget all the tradition of the schools
and all Greek and Roman philosophy (a very difficult art!) and philosophized in our lan-
guage through and through; who did not place our language’s names as addendums
after the accepted scholastic concept, whether it be Latin or Latinized German – but rather
made acquiring a philosophy for our language his primary goal. He would proceed from the
common use of a word, try to develop his concept, to define it, to explain it, and, when
necessary, to improve it using the received philosophy of other languages.¹²
Separating Baumgarten’s philosophical arguments from his etymological meth-
od, as the scholarship has been wont to do, is thus a crude simplification. In
Baumgarten, there is no philosophy without philology.
That is even the case when he takes up the traditional assumption in the
Metaphysica that the reflective organ of the soul is a representing power (vis re-
praesentativa). When he defines the analogon of reason as the reflective organ
that processes sensate cognition, Baumgarten’s arguments do not address the
matter at hand but rather ground the concepts: “I think about my present
state. Therefore, I represent my present state, i.e. I SENSE it. The representations
of my present state, or SENSATIONS (appearances), are representations of the
present state of the world (§369)” (MET § 534; Cogito statum meum praesentem.
Ergo repraesento statum meum praesentem, i.e. SENTIO. Repraesentationes sta-
tus mei praesentis seu SENSATIONES (apparitiones) sunt repraesentationes sta-
tus mundi praesentis, §. 369; see also MED §§ 24, 27). The philosophical defini-
tion of sensation as representation only reproduces what Baumgarten
stipulates in his etymological practice of writing. The word sensio – the substan-
tive that comes from sentire and that he especially uses in the Meditationes – be-
comes sensatio through adding the letters at in the middle. By first shifting the
root word from one morphological form to the next and, second, by adding two
letters, Baumgarten’s etymological method anticipates what the definition ex-
plains with great effort or disguises as a logical derivation. The letters at mark
the conceptual aspect of sensation, which refers to both its repeatability and
its orientation toward a consciousness for whom this sensation is given. The ar-
 Herder, “Von Baumgartens Denkart,” 654.
 Herder, “Von Baumgartens Denkart,” 653–654.
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gument of repetition is depicted by the prefix re-, that of representation by the
prefix prae-. Together with sensatio, they yield the word re-prae-sentatio, in
which, additionally, the s in the middle of sensatio is switched to a t to form re-
prae-sentatio.
In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten analyzes the etymologically produced con-
cept of sensation – or sensate representation – first with regard to the temporal
relations of representations and represented states and their changes (past, pres-
ent, future); second with regard to the media of representation (imagination, lit-
erature, foresight, prophecies); and third with regard to the fundamental sensate
operations that compare states with one another (similarity and difference). Con-
sidering the effort he invests in his etymologies, it is surprising that Baumgarten
does not trust his etymological method when he deals with sensations in more
detail; instead, he introduces a foreign word to adequately describe sensate rep-
resentations: “A representation that is not distinct is called a SENSITIVE [I trans-
late as “sensate,” F. B.] REPRESENTATION. Therefore, the power of my soul rep-
resents sensitive perceptions through the inferior faculty (§520, 513)” (MET §521;
REPRAESENTATIO non distincta SENSITIVA vocatur. Ergo vis animae meae re-
praesentat per facultatem inferiorem perceptiones sensitivas, §. 520, 513).
While the attribute distinctus qualitatively differentiates between indistinct
representations and distinct ones, the attribute sensitivus seems at first to be su-
perfluous since sensations are already sensate on the basis of their etymology.
Have they now become even more sensate? We can only find an answer by turn-
ing from the cognitive faculties to the appetitive faculties. That is where Baum-
garten obtains this attribute so as to import it into his characterization of cogni-
tion.
3.1.2 Desire
The use of the concept sensitivus implies, as Franke explains, “differentiating”
sensation “from the sensual.”¹³ This would mean that the concept offers a par-
ticular perspective on processing sensate data that is more beholden to episte-
mological interests than psychological ones. While Hans Rudolf Schweizer,
who translated parts of the Aesthetica into German, has asserted that there is
“no reason to differentiate between ‘sensualis’ and ‘sensitivus,’”¹⁴ the concept
 Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 40.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 22.
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sensitivus actually does mark a difference to the attribute sensualis, the adjective
derived from the substantive sensus. This difference emphasizes the non-sensual
nature of sensitivus, which I translate as “sensate”: “Sensate does not mean sen-
sual.”¹⁵ This differentiation adds a further argument to the conceptual one, an
argument that is insightfully explained in the Kollegium: “Here one is not look-
ing at their [the acute senses’] tools, for example, at the eye or the ear” (KOLL
§ 29; Man sehe hier nicht auf die Werkzeuge derselben, z.B. auf das Auge oder
Ohr). In contrast to the external organs of sensation, the faculties of sensation
refer to an “inner consciousness” (inneres Bewußtsein), an “inner feeling”
(innere[s] Gefühl; KOLL § 29). Unlike the inner senses (sensus interni), the
outer senses (sensus externi) merely supply raw sensations (see MET § 535; AE
§ 30) by functioning as “aids” (Hülffs-Mittel), “weapons,” (Waffen), or “tools”
(PHB 8; Werckzeuge[ ]). As markers of two different interests in sensation, the
two competing attributes, sensualis and sensitivus, only meet in the Meditationes
a single time: “By sense representations we mean representations of present
changes in that which is to be represented, and these are sensate, § 3” (MED
§ 24; REPRAESENTATIONES mutationum repraesentantis praesentium sunt SEN-
SUALES, eaeque sensitivae §. 3).
Sensitivus is a loanword. Baumgarten imports this epistemological neolo-
gism along with its ethical implications from Wolff ’s theory of desire into his
Meditationes, where it technically does not belong. For desire and cognition
are two different psychological realms. Wolff defines desire in general as the
soul’s inclination to an object due to the good represented in the object.¹⁶ A de-
sire is called rational when it comes “from a distinct representation of the
good”;¹⁷ in contrast, a desire is called sensate when it comes “from a confused
idea of the good.”¹⁸ It is against this backdrop that Baumgarten applies the at-
tribute sensitivus to the representations he is interested in: “By sensate repre-
sentations we mean representations received through the lower part of the
cognitive faculty” (MED § 3; REPRAESENTATIONES per partem facultatis cognos-
citivae inferiorem comparatae sint SENSITIVAE). The risky transfer from the theo-
 Alfred Baeumler, Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis
zur Kritik der Urteilskraft, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967; repr., Darmstadt: Wissen-
schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981), 214.
 See Christian Wolff, Psychologia empirica, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de
anima humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continentur et ad solidam universae philoso-
phiae practicae ac theologiae naturalis tractationem via sternitur, new rev. ed., in Gesammelte
Werke, ed. Jean École, vol. 2.5 (Frankfurt, 1738; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1968), § 579.
 Wolff, Psychologia empirica, § 880.
 Wolff, Psychologia empirica, § 580.
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ry of desire into epistemology is again elegantly managed by means of analogy.
Both sensate desire and sensate cognition share the tertium comparationis of
being confused, which Baumgarten mentions in the note to the third paragraph
of the Meditationes:
Since desire, so far as it derives from a confused representation of the good, is called sen-
sate, and since, on the other hand, a confused representation, along with an obscure one,
is received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty, we can apply the same name to
confused representations, in order that they may be distinguished from concepts distinct at
all possible levels.
Quoniam appetitus quam diu ex confusa boni repraesentatione manat, sensitivus appella-
tur: confusa autem cum obscura repraesentatione comparatur per facultatis cognoscitivae
inferiorem partem, poterit idem nominis ad ipsas etiam repraesentationes applicari, ut
distinguantur ita ab intellectualibus distinctis per omnes gradus possibiles. (MED § 3n)
With regard to Baumgarten’s import of the concept sensitivus from Wolff ’s anal-
ysis of the appetitive faculties, Clemens Schwaiger points out that Baumgarten
“does not take over a single essential definition unchanged, and he introduces
a series of central new terms.”¹⁹ Most significantly, his “reformulation of the
[Wolffian] ‘lex appetitus’ is […] kept morally neutral.”²⁰
But even more remarkable than the foreign origin and transformation of the
concept is, once again, Baumgarten’s etymological technique, which he uses to
displace the word sensitivus from the theory of desire into epistemology. The
analogy does not, however, obscure the fact that he must first semantically
empty the concept sensitivus in order to be able to redefine it in the foreign dis-
cipline. In emptying the concept of meaning, the surface of discourse again
moves into the foreground and the argument retreats into the background. The
made-up word builds on the root of sentire, sensio, and sensatio, above all
through the addition of the letters itiv, which mark the performative aspect of
sensation in the adjective. The German translations of Baumgarten’s writings
nullify the etymologically produced difference between sensitivus and sensualis
by using the word sinnlich for everything based on the root sens. I maintain this
difference by following Aschenbrenner and Holther’s translation of sensitivus as
“sensate,” which I have chosen over the English word sensitive, since the latter
term often denotes the quality of being easily and acutely affected by external
objects.
 Clemens Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom: A Contribution to the Wolff–Lange
Controversy,” in Fugate and Hymers, Baumgarten and Kant on Metaphysics, 45.
 Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom,” 46.
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In the transfer of sensitivus, its original connotation from the theory of desire
is not, however, entirely replaced but rather suppressed into latency. Desire re-
mains desire and never fully becomes cognition. And it is important to remember
that in rationalist philosophy, the appetitive faculties and the cognitive faculties
are always juxtaposed. In his Metaphysica, Baumgarten defines the appetitive
faculty as follows: “If I endeavor or make an effort to produce some perception,
i.e. if I determine the power of my soul, or myself, to produce some perception, I
DESIRE. The opposite of what I desire, I AVERT” (MET § 663; Si conor seu nitor
aliquam perceptionem producere, i.e. si vim animae meae seu me determino ad
certam perceptionem producendam, APPETO. Cuius oppositum appero, illud
AVERSOR). Here Baumgarten makes the faculties of the soul, which are in them-
selves only potential powers, dependent on a representing power and defines
this power through its effect. One can thus understand desire and aversion as
purposeful (dis)inclinations toward an object.
The cognitive faculty and the appetitive faculty relate to each other in such a
way that desire and cognition can never be fully detached from one another.²¹
Mario Casula stresses the dependence of the appetitive faculty on the cognitive
faculty.²² Desire is not just a blind drive; rather, as a perception or representa-
tion, it is whitewashed so as to appear to some extent logical. The common de-
nominator consists in the fact that Baumgarten understands cognition and de-
sire as representations. Representations that contain the basis of an intention
are the “moving” causes of desires and aversions: “Whoever desires or averts in-
tends the production of some perception (§341, 663). Hence, the perceptions con-
taining the ground of this sort of intention are the impelling causes of desire and
aversion, and thus they are called the INCENTIVES OF THE MIND <ELATERES
ANIMI> (§342)” (MET § 669; Appetens & aversatus intendit productionem alicuius
perceptionis, §. 341, 663. hinc perceptiones intentionis eiusmodi rationem conti-
nentes caussae impulsivae sunt appetitiones aversationesque, unde ELATERES
ANIMI vocantur, §. 342).
All verbs that express desire and aversion – to endeavor (conari), to make an
effort (niti), and to intend (intendere) – stress the dynamics of such representa-
tions. They relate the present to the future (see MET § 664), and they are directed
toward a goal they seek to reach (see MET § 665). Desire is therefore, as Schwai-
ger emphasizes, closely related to the cognitive faculties of foresight and antici-
pation. He additionally points out that for a thing to “become a target of my de-
 See Ernst Bergmann, Die Begründung der deutschen Ästhetik durch Alex. Gottlieb Baumgarten
und Georg Friedrich Meier (Leipzig: Röder & Schunke, 1911), 166–172.
 See Mario Casula, La metafisica di A. G. Baumgarten (Milano: Mursia, 1973), 177–180.
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sire, it must not leave me indifferent, but rather must plainly and simply please
me.”²³ Cognition is thus living when it effectively sets desire or aversion in mo-
tion; and desire or aversion are successful when they have reached their goal in
the future. Baumgarten thus makes the soul dynamic and differentiates between
moving and inert cognition: “KNOWLEDGE [I translate as “cognition,” F. B.], in-
sofar as it contains the incentives of the mind, is MOVING (affecting, touching,
burning, pragmatic, practical, and, more broadly, living), and insofar as it
does not contain these incentives, it is INERT (theoretical and, more broadly,
dead)” (MET § 669; COGNITIO, quatenus elateres animi continet, MOVENS (affi-
ciens, tangens, ardens, pragmatica, practica & viva latius), quatenus minus,
INERS (theoretica & mortua latius)).
When one considers this context, it makes sense that Baumgarten equates
sensate cognition with intuition and movement. It thus guarantees an interpre-
tation of the world far more effective than logic:
Hence, symbolic knowledge, as such, is notably inert (§652), and only intuitive knowledge
is moving (§652). […] Therefore the vaster, nobler, truer, clearer, hence more lively or dis-
tinct, more certain, and more brilliant knowledge is, the greater it is (§515, 531).
Hinc cognitio symbolica, qua talis, est notabiliter iners, §. 652, sola intuitiva movens, §. 652.
[…] Ergo quo vastior, quo nobilior, quo verior, quo clarior, hinc vividior vel distinctior, quo
certior, quo ardentior cognitio est, hoc maior est, §. 515, 531. (MET § 669)
Finally, he captures the emphasis on movement in the opposition between living
cognition (cognitio viva) and dead cognition (cognitio mortua):
The KNOWLEDGE THAT MOVES effective desires or aversions, and ITS MOTIVE power
(§222), is LIVING (more strictly, cf. §669, rousing or sufficient for what is to be done). The
KNOWLEDGE, and ITS MOTIVE power (§222), of ineffective desires or aversions is DEAD
(more strictly, cf. §669, insufficient for whatever must be done, solicitation). The KNOWL-
EDGE that moves complete desires or aversions, and ITS POWER, is COMPLETELY MOVING,
and the knowledge that only moves incomplete desires and aversions is IMCOMPLETELY
MOVING. Living knowledge, all else being equal, is greater than dead knowledge, and in-
completely moving knowledge is less than completely moving knowledge (§669).
COGNITIO MOVENS appetitiones aversationesve efficientes, & VIS EIUS MOTRIX, §. 222. est
VIVA (strictius cf. §. 669. incendens, sufficiens ad agendum). COGNITIO & VIS EIUS MO-
TRIX, §. 222. appetitionum aversationumve inefficientium est MORTUA (strictius cf.
§. 669. insufficiens ad agendum, sollicitatio). COGNITIO movens appetitiones aversatio-
nesve plenas, & VIS EIUS est COMPLETE MOVENS, movens tantum minus plenas est IN-
COMPLETE MOVENS. Cognitio viva, caeteris paribus, maior est mortua, incomplete movens
minor complete movente, §. 669. (MET § 671)
 Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom,” 47.
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Like in the faculties of cognition, Baumgarten differentiates between a higher ap-
petitive faculty (facultas appetitiva superior) and a lower appetitive faculty (fa-
cultas appetitiva inferior). When desires and aversions are formed by the higher
faculty and are rational (see AE § 689), he treats them as volitions and nolitions
of the faculties of the will and of refusal:²⁴
Rational desire is VOLITION <VOLITIO>. I will <volo>. Therefore I have a faculty of willing,
the WILL (§216). Rational aversion is NOLITION. I refuse <nolo>. Therefore, I have a faculty
of refusing <nolendi>, REFUSAL <NOLUNTATEM> (§216). The superior faculty of desire is ei-
ther will or refusal (§689). Representations that are the impelling causes of volitions and
nolitions are MOTIVES. The incentives of the mind (§669) are either stimuli or motives
(§677, 521).
Appetitio rationalis est VOLITIO.Volo. Ergo habeo facultatem volendi,VOLUNTATEM, §. 216.
Aversatio rationalis est NOLITIO. Nolo, ergo habeo facultatem nolendi, NOLUNTATEM,
§. 216. Facultas appetitiva superior est vel voluntas, vel noluntas, § 689. Repraesentationes,
volitionis nolitionisque caussae impulsivae, sunt MOTIVA. Elateres animi, §. 669. vel sunt
stimuli, vel motiva, §. 677, 521. (MET § 690)
When desire and aversion are formed by the lower faculty, they are sensate (ap-
petitiones & aversiones sensitivae; see MET § 676). Baumgarten calls the faculty
of sensate desire the concupiscible faculty (facultas concupiscibilis) and the fac-
ulty of sensate aversions the irascible faculty (facultas irascibilis): “Sensitive de-
sires and aversions arise either from obscure representations or from confused
ones (§676, 520). And, insofar as they are the impelling causes of desiring and
averting, both are STIMULI (§669)” (MET § 677; Appetitus aversationesque sensi-
tivae vel oriuntur ex repraesentationibus obscuris, vel ex confusis, §. 676, 520.
Utraeque, quatenus appetendi aversandique caussae impulsivae sunt, sunt
STIMULI, §. 669). Together, the lower cognitive and appetitive faculties belong
to the flesh (carus). Interestingly, desire and aversion can either be pure – that
is the default mode of desire or aversion – “or they follow that intellect in
which there is some admixture of confusion, and these are volitions and noli-
tions in which there is some sensitive admixture” (MET § 692; vel sequuntur in-
tellectionem, cui aliquid admixtum est confusionis, & erunt volitiones nolitio-
nesque, quibus aliquid admixtum est sensitivi). This leads to an interesting
problem: “Then a CONFLICT BETWEEN THE INFERIOR AND SUPERIOR FACUL-
TIES OF DESIRE (dissension) arises (a conflict between sensitive and rational de-
sire, between flesh and reason). […] That faculty of desire is VICTORIOUS
through which I completely desire or avert after a conflict” (MET § 693; LUCTA
FACULTATIS APPETITIVAE INFERIORIS ET SUPERIORIS (appetitus sensitivi & ra-
 See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.
38 3 Epistemology
tionalis, carnis & rationis). […] Per quam facultatem appetitivam post luctam
plene appeto aut aversor, illa VINCIT).
In the wake of this impure admixture of desire from the lower and higher
faculties, Baumgarten stumbles on a paradox in sections 20 on choice (arbi-
trium) and 21 on freedom (libertas), a paradox that is highly relevant to his theo-
ry of literature, both to the structure of literary discourse²⁵ and to the ethics of
literature.²⁶ There sensate choice (arbitrium sensitivum) forms in the realm of de-
sire the counterpart to rational free choice (liberum arbitrium): “The faculty of
sensitively desiring and averting according to one’s own preference is SENSITIVE
CHOICE. The faculty of willing or refusing according to one’s own preference is
FREEDOM (free choice), cf. §707, 708, 710 (moral freedom, freedom in the unqual-
ified sense)” (MET § 719; Facultas appetendi aversandive pro lubitu suo sensitive,
est ARBITRIUM SENSITIVUM, facultas volendi nolendive pro lubitu suo est (li-
berum arbitrium) LIBERTAS cf. §. 707, 708, 710. (moralis, simpliciter sic dicta)).
As Schwaiger explains, “With this conceptual opposition of sensible and free
choice, Baumgarten more distinctly emphasizes the cognitive character of
human freedom than does Wolff. Freedom, in a strict sense, belongs only to will-
ing or rational desire […] not to sensible desire.”²⁷
In the paragraphs that follow, Baumgarten equips sensate desire and aver-
sion with a noteworthy rationality, which moves both of them into close proxim-
ity with the faculties of the will and refusal. He notices this when he is brooding
over sensate choice and comes to the conclusion that volitions and nolitions are
always imbued with sensate choice:
I sensitively desire and avert many things according to my own preference. Therefore, I have
sensitive choice (§216, 719). I will and refuse many things according to my own preference.
Therefore I have freedom (§216, 719). Many actions of mine, many actions of my soul, and
the soul in many of its own actions are free. Something of the sensitive is mixed with all of
my volitions and nolitions (§692). Hence pure freedom does not belong to me; for in my
freest actions, my freedom is mixed with sensitive choice (§719). Both sensitive and free
choice are actualized through the power of the soul for representing the universe according
to the position of my body in it (§712, 667).
Multa appeto aversorque sensitive pro lubitu meo. Ergo habeo arbitrium sensitivum, §. 219,
719. Multa volo noloque pro lubitu meo. Ergo habeo libertatem §. 216, 719. Multae actiones
meae, multae actiones animae meae, & anima in multis actionibus suis, sunt liberae.
Omnibus meis volitionibus nolitionibusque sensitivi quid admixtum est, §. 692. Hinc non
convenit mihi pura libertas, in liberrimis meis actionibus arbitrio sensitivo mixta mea est
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
 See 6.1 Anthropology.
 Schwaiger, “Baumgarten’s Theory of Freedom,” 52.
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libertas, §. 719. Tam arbitrium sensitivum, quam liberum, actuantur per vim animae reprae-
sentativam universi pro positu corporis mei in eodem, §. 712, 667. (MET § 720)
If there is no pure freedom (pura libertas) and if, in addition, the upper and
lower appetitive faculties cooperate to a certain extent in all decisions, then a
problem appears in the theory of desire: the question inevitably arises of wheth-
er there is not only a rational will but also a “sensate will,” which would be by
definition paradoxical. Since sensate desire and rational will as well as sensate
aversion and rational refusal are analogous, the will reigns both in the realm of
reason and in the realm of sensation. And such a sensate will is the actual con-
tentious proposal of the “science of everything that is sensate.” It is not the pos-
itive revaluation of the lower faculties but rather the consequence of a sensate
will that riles rationalist philosophy.
The scholarship has drawn much attention to the content of the argument
but has ignored the etymological method at its base. It has focused on how, con-
trary to the alternative sensualis, the concept sensitivus emphasizes an indepen-
dent, “productive modeling” in sensation.²⁸ Sensate cognition represents “man’s
ability for structured creation, for meaningfully formative action,”²⁹ an activity or
an “independent organ”³⁰ that makes present the states, changes, and relations
of the soul and the world in its own particular way. Due to a certain tunnel vision
in philosophy, the discussion quickly reaches a point that abstracts from Baum-
garten’s stylistic techniques of argumentation and instead judges his concept of
sensate cognition in terms of the history of philosophy.
Such scholarship above all asks how Baumgarten’s psychologically based
aesthetics relates to Kant’s transcendentally based aesthetics. While some, like
Heinz Paetzold, assume that Baumgarten’s grounding of aesthetics attains its
goal with Kant,³¹ others, such as Schweizer, deny such a teleology: “As the ‘sci-
ence of all a priori principles of sensation,’ ‘transcendental aesthetics’ almost
has nothing more than a name in common with Baumgarten’s new discipline.”³²
In contrast to Kant, Baumgarten emphasizes, as Caygill explains, “the continuity
between sensation and reason in place of a strict separation between the facul-
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 22.
 Steffen W. Groß, Felix aestheticus: Die Ästhetik als Lehre vom Menschen; Zum 250. Jahrestag
des Erscheinens von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens “Aesthetica” (Würzburg: Königshausen &
Neumann, 2001), 70.
 Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 37.
 See Heinz Paetzold, Ästhetik des deutschen Idealismus: Zur Idee ästhetischer Rationalität bei
Baumgarten, Kant, Schelling, Hegel und Schopenhauer (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), 54.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 23.
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ties of reason and sensation.”³³ According to Petra Bahr, this position constitutes
a virtually insurmountable “distance” between Baumgarten and Kant: “Whereas
Baumgarten remains in the imponderable threshold on the border of rationalist
philosophy, which he duly strains yet cannot overcome, Kant sees the landscape
of human consciousness in a new light – and recognizes its boundary lines, for
which he designs a map with transcendental philosophy.”³⁴
In fact, however, this philosophical discussion is about nothing more than
the meaning of the word sensitivus. Does it have a transcendental meaning?
Does Baumgarten “already” consider the conditions of the possibility of process-
ing sensate data? Does he also assume an operating system that serves as the
foundation for this process but is itself independent from it? Or does the word
have a different meaning – and in this context, different would mean one that
is not transcendental. The etymology of the word determines whether the rela-
tionship between reason and sensation is based on continuity or difference,
and it thereby also defines how Baumgarten’s and Kant’s aesthetics are related.
But only an even more precise analysis of Baumgarten’s etymological meth-
od – which does not allow itself to be reduced to simple statements and whose
stylistic techniques are themselves relevant to meaning – can reveal the subtle-
ties of the “science of everything that is sensate.” In the case of the word sensi-
tivus, the etymological method leads away from psychology into rhetoric, where
the concept obtains its profile.
3.2 Rhetoric
As a loanword from the theory of desire, the concept sensitivus acquires a sophis-
ticated rhetorical profile in theMeditationes before Baumgarten elaborates it psy-
chologically in the Metaphysica. In the first six paragraphs of the Meditationes,
he uses the concept to define discourse (oratio): “By discourse we shall under-
stand a series of words which designate connected representations” (MED § 1;
ORATIONEM cum dicimus, seriem vocum repraesentationes connexas significan-
tium intelligimus). This definition invokes Baumgarten’s decisive analogy, in
which discourse leads to cognition and cognition to discourse as in a circle.
He thus concludes that “connected representations are to be apprehended
from discourse, § 1” (MED § 2; Ex oratione repraesentationes connexae cognoscen-
 Howard Caygill, “Über Erfindung und Neuerfindung der Ästhetik,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für
Philosophie 49.2 (2001): 239. See also Caygill, Art of Judgement, 152.
 Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 173.
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dae sunt §.1). After introducing the unexpected loanword sensitivus for represen-
tations formed by the lower cognitive faculties in the third paragraph, he uses
the term to define discourse that does not capture its objects with concepts
but rather visualizes them: “By sensate discourse we mean discourse involving
sensate representations” (MED § 4; ORATIO repraesentationum sensitivarum sit
SENSITIVA). Five paragraphs later, this definition sets the stage for turning to lit-
erature, which is related to discourse as the particular is related to the general:
“LITERATURE is perfect sensate discourse” (MED § 9, my translation; Oratio sen-
sitiva perfecta est POEMA). The general discipline of rhetoric correspondingly
forms the background for the particular discipline of poetics.³⁵
Ut oratio cognitio sensitiva – this analogy is at the epistemological epicenter
of the “science of everything that is sensate.” While nothing changes in Baum-
garten’s etymological method – he transfers the word sensitivus from one side of
the definition to the other so that it now defines discourse and cognition – dra-
matic things still take place in the opening paragraphs. This is because the con-
cept sensitivus becomes the door for rhetoric to enter epistemology. Rüdiger
Campe is therefore right to ask if, since it is based on the Meditationes, Baum-
garten’s “phenomenal aesthetics” interprets rhetoric and, further, if the Aesthe-
tica even outlines “a material rhetoric and poetics.”³⁶ What role does rhetoric
play in this theory? He himself calls for an experimental use of rhetoric, which
he differentiates from the usual technique of compilation (actum compilationis;
see KOLL § 114).
But in contrast to this demand, the function of rhetoric in his writings turns
out to seem rather conventional. Following Wolff ’s Philosophia rationalis sive
logica (1728) and many other texts, Baumgarten uses rhetoric as a blueprint. Al-
though he simply numbers the paragraphs of the Meditationes consecutively and
does not divide it into parts or chapters, he still successively treats the rhetorical
canons of invention (inventio), method (dispositio), and style (elocutio), as he
outlines in the preface:
To this end, through § 11 I shall be occupied in developing the notion of a poem and the
appropriate terminology. From § 13 to § 65 I shall try to work out some view of poetic cog-
nition [inventio]. From § 65 to § 77 I shall set forth that lucid method of a poem which is
common to all poems [dispositio]. Finally, from § 77 to § 107 I shall subject poetic language
to a rather careful investigation [elocutio]. After I have in this way exhibited the fruitfulness
of my definition, I regard it proper to compare it with some others and to add at the end a
few words about poetics in general.
 See 3.4 Poetics.
 Rüdiger Campe, “Bella Evidentia: Begriff und Figur von Evidenz in Baumgartens Ästhetik,”
Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49.2 (2001): 252.
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usque ad §. XI. in evoluenda poematis & agnatorum terminorum idea teneor, deinde co-
gitationum aliquam poeticarum imaginem animo concipere laboro a §. XIII–LXV. post
haec methodum poematis lucidam, qua communis est omnibus, eruo a §. LXV–LXXVII. tan-
dem ad terminos poeticos conversus eos etiam ponderare curatius instituo §. LXXVII–CVII.
Definitionis nostrae foecunditate declarata eandem conferre visum est, cum non nullis
aliis, & in fine de poetica generali tria verba subnectere. (MED, [preface], 4–5)
He later organizes the Aesthetica like an educational book of rhetoric into two
parts, a first part on theoretical aesthetics (aesthetica theoretica) and a second
part on practical aesthetics (aesthetica practica). The first part again encompass-
es the rhetorical canons:
Our aesthetics (§ 1), just like logic, her older sister by birth, consists of (I) a THEORETICAL
first part that is instructive and general, teaching (1) about matters and potential thoughts
HEURISTICALLY (chapter 1), (2) about lucid organization, METHODOLOGY (chapter 2), and
(3) about the signs of what is thought and organized beautifully, SEMIOTICS (chapter 3);
and (II) a PRACTICAL second part that is applied and particular.
Aesthetica nostra §. I. sicuti logica, soror eius natu maior, est I) THEORETICA, docens, ge-
neralis, P[ars]. I. praecipiens 1) de rebus et cogitandis HEURISTICE. C[aput]. I. 2) de lucido
ordine, METHODOLOGIA C[aput]. II. 3) de signis pulcre cogitatorum et dispositorum, SE-
MIOTICA, C[aput]. III. II) PRACTICA, utens, specialis. P[ars]. II. (AE § 13)
In both the Meditationes and the Aesthetica, a second structure runs obliquely to
this one; it organizes the paragraphs based on the canon of style. This is because
Baumgarten treats three concepts that further delineate sensate discourse: con-
fusio, claritas, and vita. These concepts obviously mirror the three most impor-
tant categories of the six categories of style.³⁷ Everything in Baumgarten revolves
around these three concepts: aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica) = confu-
sio, aesthetic light (lux aesthetica) = claritas, and aesthetic life (vita cognitionis
aesthetica) = vita. He also organizes the fifty-three finished sections on heuristics
(inventio) in the Aesthetica according to the six stylistic categories. Within each
set of sections, another schema from ancient rhetoric divides the argumentation
into general and specific problems;³⁸ under specific problems, the canon of style
is also extensively treated.
In these sets of sections, Baumgarten is particularly interested in interpret-
ing the stylistic techniques of ornamentation as operations of both sensate cog-
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 See Marie-Luise Linn, “A. G. Baumgartens Aesthetica und die antike Rhetorik,” Deutsche
Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 41.3 (1967): 429; Klaus Dock-
horn, Macht und Wirkung der Rhetorik: Vier Aufsätze zur Ideengeschichte der Vormoderne (Bad
Homburg: Gehlen, 1968).
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nition and sensate desire. To do so, he understands rhetorical figures as form-
giving patterns and turns his attention to figures of thought (figurae senten-
tiae), figures of order (figurae ordinis), and figures of speech (figurae significa-
tionis, figurae dictionis; see AE § 26). Baumgarten’s intention is obvious: he
aims to reveal the laws of sensation using the canon of style. Trusting in anal-
ogy, he thus outlines “the singularity and diversity of things” according to the
figures of detail, or amplification (amplificatio), and figures of presence, or hy-
potyposis.³⁹ Against this backdrop, he can classify sensate representation rhe-
torically:
A PERCEPTION whose power manifests itself in knowing the truth of another perception,
and ITS POWER, is PROBATIVE. A perception whose power renders another perception
clear, and ITS POWER, is EXPLANATORY (revealing). A perception whose power renders an-
other perception lively, and ITS POWER, is ILLUSTRATIVE (depictive). A perception that
renders another perception distinct, and ITS POWER, is RESOLVING (explicative).
PERCEPTIO, cuius vis se exserit in veritate alterius perceptionis cognoscenda, & VIS EIUS,
est PROBANS (g), cuius vis alteram claram reddit, & VIS EIUS, est EXPLICANS (h) (decla-
rans), cuius vis alteram vividam reddit, & VIS EIUS, est ILLUSTRANS (i) (pingens), quae al-
teram distinctam, & VIS EIUS, est RESOLVENS (k) (evolvens). (MET § 531)
One could thus say that the Aesthetica presents the first philosophy of the rhe-
torical figure, an endeavor that would only be taken up again two hundred
years later by deconstruction. Baumgarten professes his commitment to this ex-
periment in the Kollegium: “We will group them according to the six parts of cog-
nition” (KOLL § 26; wir werden sie aber mit Grund nach den sechs Stücken der
Erkenntnis einteilen). He thus organizes the sections of the first part of the
Aesthetica as follows:
Sections VIII–XIIII: aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica)
Section XI: enriching arguments (argumenta locupletantia)
Sections XV–XXVI: aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica)
Section XXIII: magnifying arguments (argumenta augentia)
Sections XXVII–XXXVI: aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica)
Section XXXIII: evidential arguments (argumenta probantia)
Sections XXXVII–XXXXVIII: aesthetic light (lux aesthetica)⁴⁰
Section XXXXIII: illustrative arguments (argumenta illustrantia)
 Rüdiger Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck: Zur Umwandlung der literarischen Rede im 17. und
18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1990), 5.
 In the synopsis of the Aesthetica, the concepts claritas and certitudo are replaced by lux and
persuasio.
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Sections XXXXVIIII–LIII (fragmentary): aesthetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica)
Section LIII (fragmentary): persuasive arguments (argumenta persuasoria)
Planned sections: aesthetic life (vita cognitionis aesthetica)
Planned section: passionate arguments (argumenta ardentia)⁴¹
In the course of this unconventional use of rhetoric, Baumgarten inverts the tra-
ditional production phases of discourse. He does not proceed from sensate cog-
nition (inventio) but from sensate representation (elocutio).⁴² The analysis of ex-
pression therefore always precedes the analysis of thought, and stylistic
categories are transferred from the canon of style into the canons of invention
and method. In other words, thought is “never clearly separated from aspects
of linguistic expression.”⁴³ This “interest in representation corresponds with a
change in the weighting of aesthetic inventio and elocutio in favor of the latter.
As has been shown, Georg Friedrich Meier would later expand the significance
of aesthetic elocutio to such a degree that it almost makes up the entire disci-
pline of aesthetics.”⁴⁴ Dispositio and inventio are left out of rhetoric so that rep-
resentation can become “coextensive with the rhetorical in general.”⁴⁵
In projecting the canon of style onto the canon of invention, Baumgarten not
only initiates considerable changes within the rhetorical system but also within
the order of knowledge. Since such an extension cannot remain without conse-
quences, Ulrich Gaier has diagnosed this “rhetoricization of thinking” as a fun-
damental epistemic change, which he sees not only in Baumgarten but also in
Leibniz and Wolff.⁴⁶ The “downgrading of rhetoric into philosophy” comes at
the end of the classical episteme,⁴⁷ which portrays cognition and representation
as transparent reflections of one another. In the episteme that follows, rhetoric –
or at least inventio and dispositio – loses its significance, and representation be-
comes opaque. Menninghaus describes this process as follows: “People have fre-
quently overlooked how the avowed end of the rhetorical model of discourse is
only one side of a process; on the other side of it, a genuinely rhetorical concep-
tion of language as nontransparent action migrates into the basic assumptions of
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 Linn, “Baumgartens Aesthetica,” 428.
 Caygill, “Erfindung und Neuerfindung der Ästhetik,” 238. See also Linn, “Baumgartens
Aesthetica,” 441–443.
 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 220.
 Ulrich Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” in Homo inveniens: Heuristik und Anthropologie
am Modell der Rhetorik, ed. Stefan Metzger and Wolfgang Rapp (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 2003),
19.
 Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” 19.
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poetics and philosophy.”⁴⁸ But when rhetoric moves into philosophy, the pure,
free thought of rational logic also comes to an end since, instead of linguistic ex-
pression, “thought becomes principally a form of selectable elocutio.”⁴⁹ Men-
ninghaus makes a similar argument when he emphasizes that elocutio still dis-
plays remnants of inventio: “From a modern perspective, representation
[Darstellung] is no longer merely a supplementary, decorative performance;
rather, it itself arranges the field of the represented, which was otherwise
found in inventio and ordered in dispositio. Elocutio thereby becomes theoreti-
cal.”⁵⁰ Campe therefore concludes that “philosophical aesthetics assesses rheto-
ric in one of its parts not as an art (of words) but rather as a simple or antecedent
fact of the human (cognitive) faculty.”⁵¹
Like the eighteenth century in general, Baumgarten was vexed by the effects
of employing rhetoric in an experimental manner. This vexation reveals itself in
the fact that he abandoned the Aesthetica, despite having only covered four and
a half of the six stylistic categories, because he must have found that he had al-
ready said everything there was to say.What more could he possibly state about
dispositio and elocutio when the Aesthetica already exhaustively deals with the
canon of style in inventio? Strictly speaking, nothing! And the concept of repre-
sentation itself also produces problems. Baumgarten cannot exhaust its potential
for his philosophical project because he remains committed to the rationalist
ideal of transparency despite the innovative force at work in his writings. This
ideal is continually challenged by the materiality of representation, for which ra-
tionalist philosophy does not provide any concepts. Only much later would phe-
nomenology develop the concepts used in aesthetic theory today. For that rea-
son, Baumgarten falls back on rhetoric to express his interests in materiality.
Rhetorical terms function for him as “search term[s] for the material, pre-predi-
cative shaping of our language,”⁵² as concepts for the pre-predicative aspect of
representation.
This causes immense cracks in the foundation of Baumgarten’s philosophi-
cal project. Although he does everything he can in the Aesthetica to subordinate
rhetoric to philosophy and degrade elocutio to a propaedeutic for epistemology,
the ambiguity of aesthetics again breaks through precisely where he transfers the
 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 221.
 Gaier, “Rhetorisierung des Denkens,” 19.
 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 220–221.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 5–6.
 Sybille Krämer, “Sprache – Stimme – Schrift: Sieben Gedanken über Performativität als Me-
dialität,” in Performanz: Zwischen Sprachphilosophie und Kulturwissenschaften, ed. Uwe Wirth
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 332.
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canon of elocutio into the canon of inventio. In contrast to what the scholarship
has presupposed until now, this transfer does not carry out a replacement but
rather maintains a constitutively equivocal discourse. Baumgarten does not
treat representation to draw conclusions about cognition; nor does he simply
treat representation. Rather, as in a reversible figure, the epistemological argu-
ments turn out to be rhetorical, and the rhetorical ones epistemological, and
there is no way out of this circle. In these etymological transfers from one disci-
pline to another, ambiguity is continually produced anew.⁵³
It is Kant who inadvertently completes what Baumgarten started. That is sur-
prising since Kant’s concepts of pure sensation and pure intuition are epistemo-
logically anchored. While Baumgarten’s concept sensitivus marks a specifically
material interest in representation, Kant’s concept of representation does not
have a material aspect “in the sense of re-praesentatio, meaning reproduction”
but rather has “the meaning of ‘sensately construable,’ ‘viewable,’ ‘immediately
palpable to the senses.’”⁵⁴
There is, however, one passage in Kant that is comparable to Baumgarten. At
one point in the Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790), Kant is forced to employ an etymo-
logical method, which immediately results in a comparable surplus of insight
into media theory. Like the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), the Kritik der Urteils-
kraft probes the question of how concepts and intuitions come together. In the
relevant passage, Kant is concerned with the assertion that ideas of reason (Ver-
nunftideen) do not have any corresponding immediate intuitions. As a result, the
productive imagination must find mediated intuitions for rational ideas by using
metaphors:
All intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a priori are thus either schemata or symbols,
the first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept. The first
do this demonstratively, the second by means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions
are also employed), in which the power of judgment performs a double task, first applying
the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of
reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the sym-
bol.⁵⁵
With the symbol, Kant also transforms epistemology into rhetoric. As the form of
intuition for ideas of reason, the symbol requires that Kant describe it in its ma-
teriality; to do so, he falls back, like Baumgarten, on the canon of style, mainly
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 107.
 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Guyer and Eric Mat-
thews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), § 59.
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on analogical figures. Such an intuition is just as much a hypotyposis – which
means a “presentation [Darstellung], subjecto sub adspectum”⁵⁶ – as an episte-
mological category. At a loss for a concept for this peculiar problem, Kant im-
ports hypotyposis into his aesthetics: “The use of the word symbolic in contrast
to the intuitive kind of representation has, of course, been accepted by recent
logicians, but this is a distorted and incorrect use of the word: for the symbolic
is merely a species of the intuitive. The latter, namely (the intuitive), can be di-
vided into the schematic and the symbolic kinds of representation. Both are hy-
potyposes, i.e., presentations (exhibitiones).”⁵⁷ Kant turns to the concept of hypo-
typosis when there are no other available terms for what he wants to say.Where
he struggles with words, the canon of style appears in his epistemology, just as it
does in Baumgarten’s. But in contrast to Kant’s third critique, the problem Baum-
garten encounters is not an epistemological state of exception but rather the
rule. Like Kant, Baumgarten also refers to sensate cognition in the traditional
philosophical sense as intuitive cognition (cognitio intuitiva; see MET § 620). Be-
cause intuitive cognition requires mediation, he also has to come to grips with
the same methodological problem for which Kant employs the concept of the
symbol. But Baumgarten only refers to intellectual cognition as symbolic cogni-
tion (cognitio symbolica). For the mediation of intuition, he instead mobilizes
the loanword sensitivus.
The ambiguity of aesthetics is thus bundled up in this attribute such that
sensitivus is not only itself an ambiguous concept but also a concept that refers
to the principle of ambiguity. No strategy of disambiguation is in a position to
remove the ambivalence introduced by this concept because it always refers to
two different things: a mode of cognition and a mode of representation. The
one can never be had immediately but is rather always mediated in the mirror
of the other in such a way that the permanent reference of cognition to represen-
tation and of representation to cognition inevitably drives discourse about liter-
ature into an infinite regress. How can one acknowledge representation even
only for a second as the index (the materially fixed trace) of cognition if one al-
ways projects cognition from representation? One can thus bid farewell to the
categorical separation of epistemology and rhetoric. In Baumgarten, there is
no cognition measured without mediation.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 59. See Rodolphe Gasché, “Some Reflections on the
Notion of Hypotyposis in Kant,” Argumentation 4.1 (1990): 85–100.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 59.
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3.3 Semiotics
The concept of representation confronts rationalist philosophy with materiality,
which defies the ideal of the transparency of cognition. The discipline where this
confrontation occurs is neither psychology (the theory of the soul) nor rhetoric
(the theory of representation) but rather semiotics (the theory of signs).⁵⁸ Until
the mid-eighteenth century, semiotics was based on the rationalist paradigm
of representation; its theories uncoupled the relation of sign and meaning
from all relations of similarity and described signification as a psychological
process of representation. According to David E. Wellbery, this rationalist para-
digm of representation “replaces rhetoric with semiotics. Semiotics makes possi-
ble the comparative study of different types of aesthetic representation, the de-
scription of their intrinsic limits and possibilities, the measurement of their
relative efficacy.”⁵⁹
Before Baumgarten, rhetoric was “only seldom explicitly confronted with the
representational theory of the sign”⁶⁰ – in the seventeenth century above all in
Bernard Lamy – but after Baumgarten, semiotics was everywhere. He did not,
however, establish a semiotic aesthetics. His specific interest in representation
as it becomes manifest differentiates his approach from a “general theory of
signs.”⁶¹ He is neither a semiotician nor a media theorist, and that applies to
all the steps in his argumentation. Semiotics (scientia de significanda) does
not replace rhetoric (scientia de proponenda; see KOLL § 1) in his discipline ei-
ther; rather, it only adds a further perspective to the ambiguity of aesthetics.⁶²
Following Leibniz and Wolff, Baumgarten differentiates the representation of
the signified (repraesentatio signati) from that of the sign (repraesentatio
signi). Rationalist semiotics adds a third representation to these two since, as Mi-
chel Foucault has explained, a sign “can become a sign only on condition that it
manifests, in addition, the relation that links it to what it signifies. It must rep-
resent; but that representation, in turn, must also be represented within it.”⁶³
 See Ursula Franke, “Die Semiotik als Abschluß der Ästhetik: A. G. Baumgartens Bestimmung
der Semiotik als ästhetische Propädeutik,” Zeitschrift für Semiotik 1.4 (1979): 345–359; Dietfried
Gerhardus, “Sprachphilosophie in der Ästhetik,” in Philosophy of Language: An International
Handbook of Contemporary Research, ed. Marcelo Dascal et al., vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1995), 1519– 1528.
 Wellbery, Lessing’s “Laocoon,” 47.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 473.
 Wellbery, Lessing’s “Laocoon,” 70.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Rout-
ledge, 2005), 71.
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Based on this premise, Baumgarten differentiates logical signs from sensate
signs:
I perceive signs together with the signified, and therefore I have a faculty of joining signs
together in a representation with the signified, which can be called the FACULTY OF CHAR-
ACTERIZATION (§216). […] The nexus of signification is known either distinctly or indistinct-
ly, and hence the faculty of characterization will be either sensitive (§521) or intellectual
(§402).
Signa cum signatis una percipio; ergo habeo facultatem signa cum signatis repraesentando
coniungendi, quae FACULTAS CHARACTERISTICA dici potest […]. Nexus significativus vel
distincte, vel indistincte cognoscitur, hinc facultas characteristica vel sensitiva erit,
§. 521. vel intellectualis, §. 402. (MET § 619)
The signified and the sign are thus the two sides of semiotics; and only a miracle
– a formal function – makes sure that the sign means something by representing
that something. Since the Enlightenment always strives to suppress the material
aspects of the sign – aspects that Baumgarten comes face to face with – it “can
be considered as fundamentally in conflict with the sign.”⁶⁴ He manages this
conflict by means of the concept sensitivus, which always emphasizes something
in the process of signification other than what is signified.⁶⁵ Based on this at-
tempt to capture the sign, Bahr determines that Baumgarten’s semiotics cannot
do “without being qualified through rhetoric”: “Only in this way can he set it off
from the logical sign theories of the time […]. A semioticized rhetoric should save
the indexical and iconic aspects of the sign.”⁶⁶
It is not, however, the attention Baumgarten draws to the sign’s representa-
tional function, its function as an image, that subverts the paradigm of represen-
tation but rather the attention he draws to the sign’s own materiality. He comes
to consider the materiality of signs through a new interest in representations that
are essentially based on a relational logic: signs stand for something else; they
signify or represent this other. Such a negativity applies to both intellectual and
sensate representations. Material representations are affirmative. “They do not
only represent or substitute for something,” as Dieter Mersch, who elaborates
on semiotics by drawing on media theory, concludes, “but rather with them
the thing itself comes into view – not the thing of reference, the signified, but
rather the reality of the symbolic or of the representation itself, its specific ma-
 Wellbery, Lessing’s “Laocoon,” 71.
 See Dieter Mersch, “Medial Paradoxes: On Methods of Artistic Production,” in Critical Com-
position Today, ed. Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf (Hofheim: Wolke, 2006), 62–74.
 Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 51.
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teriality or mediality.”⁶⁷ Mersch thus defines representations not as signs but as
acts of “showing.”⁶⁸ In opposition to the rationalist ideal of transparency, Baum-
garten proposes – like other theorists after him – a sign whose materiality makes
the sign opaque. This semiotic model takes into account the “surplus of the sign
over the signified in the representation of aesthetic ideas” and “the (reflexive)
inclusion of unrepresentability in the representation itself.”⁶⁹ For that reason,
the material surplus of the sign characterizes the sensate process of significa-
tion:
If the sign is joined together in perception with the signified, and the perception of the sign
is greater than the perception of the signified, this is called SYMBOLIC KNOWLEDGE. If the
perception of the signified is greater than the perception of the sign, the KNOWLEDGE will
be INTUITIVE (intuited).
Si signum & signatum percipiendo coniungitur, & maior est signi, quam signati perceptio,
COGNITIO talis SYMBOLICA dicitur, si maior signati repraesentatio, quam signi, COGNITIO
erit INTUITIVA (intuitus). (MET § 620)
In the Aesthetica, Baumgarten does not reserve such a material surplus of the
sign for any specific medium. On the contrary, different media of one sensate
representation stand for each other unproblematically: “Here we do not only
mean language. One can also explain oneself to someone else through other
signs” (KOLL § 37; Wir verstehen hier nicht bloß die Sprache. Man kann auch
durch andere Zeichen sich dem anderen erklären), and one can do so “in facial
expressions, words, brush strokes, and so on” (KOLL § 13; in Mienen, in Worten,
in Pinselstrichen usw.). All rhetorical figures and tropes can thus be performed
with any sign material. For a metaphor is, according to Baumgarten,
every elegant substitution of one perception for another, whether signified with transferred
words, which is most familiar, or with sounds substituted for each other by a musician, or
with colors by a painter, or when through any other type of sign you express that you ele-
gantly have one thing in mind in place of another.
omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem, sive vocabulis translatis
significetur, quod notissimum, sive sonis sibi invicem substitutis a musico, sive coloribus
a pictore, sive per aliud quodcunque signorum genus eleganter te pro uno aliud cogitasse
exprimas. (AE § 780)
 Dieter Mersch, “Paradoxien der Verkörperung: Zu einer negativen Semiotik des Symboli-
schen,” in Aktualität des Symbols, ed. Frauke Berndt and Christoph Brecht (Freiburg im Breis-
gau: Rombach, 2005), 34.
 Mersch, “Medial Paradoxes,” 67.
 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 219.
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In contrast to, for example, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s medially differentiated
semiotics in his Laokoon oder über die Grenzen der Mahlerey und Poesie (1766),
the problem of medial difference and competition thus plays only an ancillary
role in this “early theory of the sign and communication” (see MED
§§ 40–41).⁷⁰ There is no trace of the premodern paragone in Baumgarten’s writ-
ings. Steffen Groß finds that this “abstaining from fixing a canon of acceptable
forms or media of expression” constitutes the “modernity und current relevance”
of the Aesthetica, which Baumgarten seems to advertise as being useful for all
the arts (see AE § 4).⁷¹
In this semiotics, the messenger or medium does not disappear after deliver-
ing the message; instead, it remains present on the semiotic scene of the literary
text. But with its concept of an abstract sign that applies to various media, the
Aesthetica forfeits medial differentiation and instead implicitly focuses on the
medium of literature. The materiality of the literary text plays a major role in
the Meditationes, and the preface of that work brings together semiotics and
the three-stage model of production from rhetoric, the discipline responsible
for the tangible materiality of the linguistic medium: “The various parts of sen-
sate discourse are: (1) sensate representations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) the
words, or the articulate sounds which are represented by the letters and which
symbolize the words, § 4, § 1” (MED § 6; Orationis sensitivae varia sunt 1) reprae-
sentationes sensitivae, 2) nexus earum 3) voces sive soni articulati litteris con-
stantes earum signa. §. 4. 1).
Semiotically, the signs of sensate discourse are based on the links (nexus)
between representations (repraesentationes) and signs (signa). And Baumgarten
does not begin with individual signs but rather with links between multiple
signs, which he bases on the rhetorical canon of method and transfers into semi-
otics. This focus on links makes clear that his semiotics is based on a textual
model.⁷² Against this backdrop, the concept of nexus becomes theoretically rel-
evant because it is the first argument that ascribes a concrete media profile to
sensitivus. A discourse is only sensate when it links together multiple elements,
which Baumgarten calls marks (notae), following rationalist philosophy. With
these links and marks, he is thinking of the materiality of sensate discourse,
its words, and, most of all, its letters. Words or articulated sounds (voces sive
soni articulati) consist in written letters (litterae) as their signs. This doubling
on the side of the sign goes back to Aristotle, who couples sensate signs with
 Groß, Felix aestheticus, 88.
 Groß, Felix aestheticus, 87.
 See 3.4.1 Complexity; 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
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sounds and sounds with letters: “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections
in the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds.”⁷³ For Aristotle, both
sounds and letters are media, which means they are events in an emphatic sense
– unrepeatable in their auratic eventfulness: “And just as written marks are not
the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first
place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these af-
fections are likenesses of – actual things – are also the same.”⁷⁴
Baumgarten steers clear of this eventfulness of sounds – signs of a sensate
representation – by not defining them: “But these things the poem has in com-
mon with imperfect sensate discourse.We may, then, easily pass them over so as
not to wander too far from our purpose. There will, therefore, be nothing here
about the character of a poem as a series of articulate sounds” (MED § 97; sed
haec ipsi cum imperfecta sensitiva oratione communia facile transimus, pro
fine ne nimii simus. Nihil ergo de qualitate poematis, qua series sonorum arti-
culatorum). Instead of considering sounds as events, he works with a concep-
tualized voice so as to address the problematic relation between the two medial
representations of language in any discourse: text and voice. In his few para-
graphs on metrics – in which he refers not only to ancient Greek and Latin po-
etics but also to Hebrew philology – Baumgarten notes how the transformation
from the acoustic medium of the voice into the graphic medium of the text does
not proceed without a loss due to friction: “By quantity of a syllable we mean
that property which cannot be known apart from association with another sylla-
ble. Therefore, quantity cannot be known from the value of the letters” (MED
§ 98; QUANTITAS SYLLABAE est, quicquid in ea non potest cognosci sine com-
praesentia alterius syllabae. Ergo ex moris elementorum non potest cognosci quan-
titas). The orthographic measurement of syllables is thus also fundamentally dif-
ferent from the prosodic measurement of syllables because the latter is based not
on the number of letters but on the syllable as an internally structured phonetic
entity. Defining the length of syllables occurs in the context of quantitative met-
rics, which uses a ratio of 1:2 for short:long: “Amongst the grammarians, the
value of a letter is the unit of time necessary for pronouncing it. Now, since
the matter concerns only syllables, by the ‘duration of a syllable’ we shall under-
stand, allowing necessary changes, the unit of time necessary for pronouncing
the syllable” (MED § 100n; Mora in grammaticis est pars temporis elemento ef-
ferendo necessaria, iam ergo quum de syllabis solum agendum est, mutandis
 Arist., Int. 16a3–4. Quoted from Aristotle, De interpretatione, in The Complete Works of Aris-
totle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984).
 Arist., Int. 16a5–8.
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mutatis per moram syllabae intelligimus partem temporis efferendae syllabae
necessariam). The reference to “grammarians” – both those of antiquity like
Quintilian and Cicero and those of Renaissance humanism like Joseph Justus
Scaliger and Gerhard Johannes Vossius (see MED § 9) – shows what Baumgarten
is aiming at. In De causis linguae latinae (1540), Scaliger relates the differential
principle of language to the paradigm of the sign. And Scaliger outlines this prin-
ciple of clearly differentiable sounds with reference to the graphic medium of
text and a concept for the representation of sounds: litterae.⁷⁵ As a proper
voice of the text, the so-called vox produces ideal “letter sounds” that distinguish
themselves from real sound events by their repeatability – and this voice stays
silent.
The vox, or voice, of the text, which Baumgarten wrestles with in a charac-
teristically meticulous way following rationalist semiotics, appears in the Medi-
tationes next to a voice whose sounds cannot be represented by letters, or at
least not completely. There can thus be no doubt about whether he differentiates
between medial aspects and conceptual aspects of written and spoken lan-
guage.⁷⁶ Baumgarten’s rationalist model of the linguistic sign assumes that it
represents both a sound and the letter that represents that sound. For the letter
to represent the sound, it must be able to recall the sound concept; that is, it
must recall the concept of the other medium. Since he understands letters as sig-
nifying sounds, Baumgarten moves sounds to the side of the signified. Along
these lines, Charles S. Peirce determines that the meaning of a sign always con-
tains “the translation of a sign into another system of signs” as its interpretant.⁷⁷
From this, it follows that “the meaning of a sign is the sign it has to be translated
into.”⁷⁸
But the matter is even more intricate. Baumgarten not only differentiates the
concepts of signs and the media of their realization but also assumes that the
 See Gregor Vogt-Spira, “Vox und Littera: Der Buchstabe zwischen Mündlichkeit und Schrift-
lichkeit in der grammatischen Tradition,” Poetica 23.3/4 (1991): 295–327, esp. 311–315; Albrecht
Koschorke, Körperströme und Schriftverkehr: Mediologie des 18. Jahrhunderts, 2nd ed. (Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, 2003), 323–346.
 See Wulf Oesterreicher, “Grenzen der Arbitrarietät: Zum Verhältnis von Laut und Schrift,” in
Mimesis und Simulation, ed. Andreas Kablitz and Gerhard Neumann (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rom-
bach, 1998), 218. See also Peter Koch, “Graphé: Ihre Entwicklung zur Schrift, zum Kalkül und zur
Liste,” in Schrift, Medien, Kognition: Über die Exteriorität des Geistes, ed. Koch and Sybille Krä-
mer (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1997), 43–81.
 Charles Sanders Peirce, “The Logic of Quantity,” in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. 4, The Simplest Mathematics (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1933), 99.
 Peirce, “The Logic of Quantity,” 105.
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medial qualities are themselves preserved in memory and retrievable in the pro-
cess of remembering. Thus, despite all the rationalist abstraction, a secret Ur-
szene of articulation is actually the basis for how he models the voice of the
text. Every stimulation of the senses through optical, olfactory, haptic, or acous-
tic stimuli is processed into a sensate representation. He thus converts the rela-
tion of concept and event into a cycle in which the phonetic sequence of an ar-
ticulated word is perceived but this perception assumes the concept of the
phonetic sequence: “Words, in the respect that they are articulate sounds, be-
long among audible things; hence they elicit sense perceptions” (MED § 91;
Voces, qua soni articulati, pertinent ad audibilia, hinc ideas sensuales produ-
cunt).
Baumgarten’s model of the sign offers the possibility of defining all the qual-
ities of the media of representation – including, for example, the graphic qual-
ities of the textual image perceived by the reader (lector; see MED § 113) – as sen-
sate representations. With this move, he converts the relation of event and
concept into a cycle without beginning and end, since the perception of articu-
lated sounds both assumes and produces concepts. One can thus find the para-
dox of a conceptualized performativity at the base of the Meditationes. In Baum-
garten, a complex semiotic process replaces the simple rationalist model of the
sign. He integrates a syntactic complexity,which creates a linking of signs,with a
medial complexity of text and voice, breaking through, in multiple respects, the
rationalist fixation on the singular word.
3.4 Poetics
3.4.1 Complexity
Turning rhetoric and semiotics into aesthetics depends on qualities of literary
texts. To analyze these qualities in more detail, Baumgarten draws on concepts
from poetics instead of from rhetoric, a switch that forces him to determine heu-
ristically the importance of literature within the framework of rhetorical argu-
mentation. That he then works with a categorical differentiation between rheto-
ricus and poeticus is indicated through the most important analogy in the
Meditationes – through Baumgarten’s notoriously repeated phrase sensate,
hence poetic (sensitvus ergo poeticus). With this switch from rhetoric to poetics,
he generates the added value of aesthetic cognition over “merely” sensate cog-
nition, which in the end does aim to apply a concept. This added value is thanks
to the harmless replacement of one word with another. He not only ensures that
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the “sensuous constitution”⁷⁹ – and that means the “stock”⁸⁰ of an object’s sen-
sately perceivable qualities – is recognized and conceptually classified but also
that this process goes hand in hand with attention to the nondiscursive, “phe-
nomenal presence of the object,”⁸¹ which does not enter into the archive of
knowledge that is held to be true. On this basis, Martin Seel differentiates sensate
cognition from aesthetic cognition, and this differentiation forms the core of
Baumgarten’s theory of literature in the Meditationes.
In articulating his theory of literature, Baumgarten replaces the word dis-
course with the word literature, for which the same things apply as for discourse:
“The several parts of a poem [I translate as “literature,” F. B.] are: (1) sensate rep-
resentations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) words as their signs, § 9, § 6” (MED
§ 10; Poematis varia sunt, 1) repraesentationes sensitivae 2) earum nexus 3) voces
earum signa. §. 9. 6). This replacement specifies the preconditions for discourse
that Baumgarten creates with the concept sensitivus, but instead of sensate dis-
course, suddenly perfect sensate discourse is being put to the test: “By perfect
sensate discourse we mean discourse whose various parts are directed toward
the apprehension of sensate representations, § 5” (MED § 7; ORATIO SENSITIVA
PERFECTA est, cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesentationum sensitiva-
rum. §. 5). At first, the difference between sensate discourse and perfect sensate
discourse is not an essential difference but a quantitative one, so I would actual-
ly propose first translating perfectus at the disciplinary interface of poetics and
rhetoric as “complete” instead of immediately arguing on a metaphysical level
with “perfect.” A discourse is more complete the more marks it integrates: “A
sensate discourse will be the more perfect the more its parts favor the awakening
of sensate representations, § 4, § 7” (MED § 8; Quo plura varia in oratione sensi-
tiva facient ad excitandas repraesentationes sensitivas, eo erit illa perfectior. §. 4.
7). After defining complete sensate discourse by this gradation, Baumgarten sim-
ply replaces it with the concept of literature, which stands at the end of the scale
since it integrates the most marks: “LITERATURE is perfect sensate discourse”
(MED § 9, my translation; Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA).
But behind this definition hides nothing other than an affirmation of the
“phenomenal individuality”⁸² achieved by literary texts. While sensate cognition
can store its objects in a conceptual archive, literature – especially in its poetic
passages – is characterized by the highest possible degree of completeness and
 Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, trans. John Farrell (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2005), 45.
 Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, 46.
 Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, 25.
 Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, 28.
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so usually by an openness that does not aim for conceptual fixation. Literature is
thus the most prominent and worthy example of aesthetic cognition. And in an
ingenious move, Baumgarten transforms the argument of quantity into one of
quality by making the substantive poema into the adjective poeticus: “By poetic
we shall mean whatever can contribute to the perfection of a poem” (MED § 11;
POETICUM dicetur quicquid ad perfectionem poematis aliquid facere potest).With
the adjective poeticus, he refers to a specific structure of discourse oriented to-
ward an excellence that elevates the material surplus of the literary text into a
distinguishing criterion. Discourse has a poetic structure when it deviates stylis-
tically from “normal” discourse. I refer to this structure as the structure of literary
discourse.
With confusio, claritas, and vita, Baumgarten conceptualizes three functions
of the structure of literary discourse: the functions of complexity, opacity, and
performativity. These three functions follow from one another and correspond
in the Aesthetica to ubertas aesthetica, lux aesthetica, and vita cognitionis
aesthetica, respectively. To describe these functions in his theory of literature,
he can continue to rely on the six rhetorical categories of style, which serve as
categories of perfection in the Metaphysica and the Aesthetica: “Therefore the
vaster, nobler, truer, clearer, hence more lively or distinct, more certain, and
more brilliant knowledge is, the greater it is (§515, 531)” (MET § 669; Ergo quo
vastior, quo nobilior, quo verior, quo clarior, hinc vividior vel distinctior, quo cer-
tior, quo ardentior cognitio est, hoc maior est, §. 515, 531).
I will begin by reconstructing the first function of the structure of literary dis-
course: complexity. The starting point is, as stated, the poetic passages of literary
texts. Even though single marks can be sensately discerned in such pregnant
representations (repraesentationes praegnantes),⁸³ there are too many to pro-
cess, so the passage cannot be captured in a concept. This main idea leads
Baumgarten in the Meditationes to a descending series of objects from the higher
genus, the lower genus, and the species down to individual objects (see MED
§ 20): “Individuals are determined in every respect. Therefore, particular repre-
sentations are in the highest degree poetic, § 18” (MED § 19; Individua sunt omni-
mode determinata, ergo repraesentationes singulares sunt admodum poeticae
§. 18). This is why his theory of literature is grounded in examples; as a singular
term that represents a bundle of marks, an example is preferable to any general
term.⁸⁴ Surprisingly, Baumgarten demonstrates the example’s particularity with
proper names, which – like rhetorical antonomasia – are poetic due to their
 See 4.1.3 Twilight.
 See 2.2 Analogy.
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abundance of marks: “Proper names are names designating individuals. Since
these are highly poetic, proper names are also poetic, § 19” (MED § 89; Nomina
propria sunt individua significantia, quae quum admodum poetica, poetica
etiam nomina propria § 19).
Baumgarten’s theory of literature depends on this conceptually undefinable
abundance of marks in poetic passages. Because he always relates epistemology
and media theory,⁸⁵ the affirmation of particularity requires the affirmation of a
harmony (consensus) that, as he says again and again in the Aesthetica, is a phe-
nomenon (AE § 18; qui phaenomenon sit, §. 14).⁸⁶ This harmonic unity is not phe-
nomenally manifest on the level of thoughts or organization but rather on the
level of signs. Because Baumgarten attends in the Aesthetica to phenomena as
phenomena, he also takes into consideration the difference between sensate
and aesthetic appearance, which corresponds in the Meditationes to the differ-
ence between the attributes rhetoricus and poeticus. On this difference, Seel
notes that “both are ways in which the empirical appearance of an object is ac-
cessible. Aesthetic appearing is thus a mode of the sensuous givenness of some-
thing.” This is because aesthetic objects “are given to us in an outstandingly sen-
suous manner; they are grasped by us in an outstandingly sensuous way.”⁸⁷
Following Baumgarten three decades later, Kant attributes this quantitative
excellence to, above all, the mode of the aesthetic idea. He defines the aesthetic
idea as “that representation of the imagination that occasions much thinking
though without it being possible for any determinate thought, i.e., concept, to
be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully attains or can make
intelligible.”⁸⁸ In a comparable way to Baumgarten, when Kant writes that it “oc-
casions much thinking,” he means it in a thoroughly quantitative sense: “The
aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination, associated with a given
concept, which is combined with such a manifold of partial representations in
the free use of the imagination that no expression designating a determinate
concept can be found for it, which therefore allows the addition to a concept
of much that is unnameable, the feeling of which animates the cognitive facul-
ties and combines spirit with the mere letter of language.”⁸⁹
From a similar quantitative point of view, Baumgarten defines sensation – as
well as the other sensate and intellectual cognitive faculties – using Leibniz’s
and Wolff ’s two-coordinate system. One of its axes measures the recognizability
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing, 22.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 49.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 49.
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of a representation and stretches from obscure (cognitio obscura) to clear (co-
gnitio clara); its other axis measures the differentiability of the marks of a rep-
resentation and ranges from distinct (cognitio distincta) to confused (cognitio
confusa). Intellectual representations aim to be clear and distinct, while sensate
representations aim to be clear but confused (repraesentatio clara et confusa;
see MED § 12; MET §§ 519–533). Clear, confused representations guarantee the
recognizability and repeatability of their marks but not differentiation or identi-
fication (see MED §§ 13– 14). Knowledge is “confused,” as Leibniz explains,
“when I cannot enumerate one by one marks [nota] sufficient for differentiating
a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such marks and
requisites into which its notion can be resolved. And so we recognize colors,
smells, tastes, and other particular objects of the senses clearly enough, and
we distinguish them from one another, but only through the simple testimony
of the senses, not by way of explicit marks.”⁹⁰ In fact, however, Baumgarten’s
concepts have less to do with Leibniz’s than one might initially think. In partic-
ular, Baumgarten seems to take the attribute confusus somewhat literally. Al-
though the two functions of complexity (confusio) and opacity (claritas) are com-
plementary, their respective etymologies emphasize different aspects of the
structure of literary discourse. “When it is said that poetry is confused,” as
Aschenbrenner and Holther state to explain their translation of confusus, “it is
meant that its representations are fused together and not sharply discriminated.
(The reader of the Reflections must be careful to keep fusion foremost here and
not confusion in the derogatory sense.)”⁹¹ The etymological play is based on the
meaning of the Latin words fusio and confusio. The translators emphasize that
representations in literary texts flow into one another like liquids mixing togeth-
er.
Based on the etymological proximity to fusus, the spindle (of the Parcae), I
think it is even more productive to shift the metaphorical resonance for confusus
from liquids to textiles in the sense that a textile is a complex, interlinked struc-
ture. In the Meditationes, Baumgarten at one point speaks of singular terms as
complex concepts (conceptus complexus; see MED § 23), and in the Aesthetica,
he correspondingly equates complexus with abundance (see AE §§ 731–732). In
sum, he is interested less in confused cognition than in complex cognitio (co-
gnitio complexa), cognition in which many marks are con-fused, or fused togeth-
er. A glance at the Kollegium, in which he mathematically calculates complexity
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas (1684),” in Philo-
sophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 24.
 Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther, “Introduction,” in Baumgarten, Reflections on
Poetry, 21.
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and makes proposals for increasing the number of marks, can substantiate the
degree to which Baumgarten actually thinks about this in a material manner:
“One first thinks, for example, of only 10 marks of a thing and afterwards, in
the mixture of clear and confused, one thinks of the thing perhaps in 150
marks” (KOLL § 80; Man denkt sich z. B. erstlich nur 10 Kennzeichen von einer
Sache und hernach in der Mischung vom Klaren und Dunkeln denkt man die
Sache vielleicht in 150 Kennzeichen).
Complex cognition assumes, of course, a certain form of intuition in which a
representation is given to consciousness. This is why the phenomenon of the se-
ries is central to Baumgarten’s theory of literature. He already settled on the se-
ries in the first paragraph of the Meditationes as the defining criterion for dis-
course. In series, marks not only follow one another but are also firmly
located in their sequence such that the spatial relations between the linked
marks can be described. The question as to whether or not Baumgarten relates
the spatial form of intuiting literature to the graphic medium of text does not ac-
tually play a role in his argumentation. Even if one did not start – as he in fact
does – from sequences of letters but rather only from phonetic sequences, the
spatial form of intuition would remain constitutive for the literary text. In this
case, one would have to treat a kind of “textual phoneticism” that can be real-
ized either graphically or acoustically.⁹²
The poetic passages in literary texts thus lead Baumgarten to syntagmatic
structures with at least two parts and usually infinitely many. He delineates
these structures during a long and tedious foray through the rhetorical canon
of style, mainly through the figures of amplification. In searching there for the
logic of literature, he encounters the so-called figures of repetition, figures
that link their marks into a spatial composition (see MED § 39) according to
the maxims of similar with similar (simile cum simili) and related with related
(cognatum cum cognato; see MED §§ 72, 69). In the Aesthetica, he distributes
his analyses of the figures of repetition into sections on enriching, magnifying,
and evidential arguments. There he also registers the established phonological
and morphological figures of repetition: homoeoteleuton, anaphora, epiphora,
symploce, repetitio, epizeuxis, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, ploce, pleonasm, and
polyptoton. Every form of repetition is at first an “intratextual copy” because
the “element that qualifies as (‘mere’) repetition […] refers to an earlier” ele-
 See 3.3 Semiotics.
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ment.⁹³ One could thus consider the figure as a matrix of literature. It is formed
by the aesthetic rule: out of one, make two.
For trained phenomenologists such as Eckhard Lobsien, the form of intu-
ition in which spatial simultaneity is given immediately entails also considering
the temporal form of intuition. “One can only speak of a repetition if the percep-
tion of an element (A) is explicitly accompanied by an awareness that it actually
has to do here with the repetition of an earlier element (that is, with AO, or more
precisely, AO[A]).”⁹⁴ As soon as consciousness links two elements or marks of a
series together, this mutual dependence of the spatial and temporal forms of rep-
etition becomes manifest. Lobsien thus describes the spatiotemporal structure of
the literary text as follows: “Rhetorical repetition brings out the similarity of
signs (from the level of phonemes up to the level of the entire text) in the organi-
zation of succession; it assembles series of correspondence and paradigmatic se-
quences in linear succession”⁹⁵ because “one and the same item [appears] at two
different points in time.”⁹⁶ In his aesthetic theory, Baumgarten does not, howev-
er, consider aesthetic repetition in which marks can be experienced in their spa-
tial “simultaneity.”⁹⁷ Instead, aesthetic repetition remains what it was as rhetor-
ical repetition: a relation of marks that are reproduced in a series and can only
be experienced successively in their linking.
In further elaborating on the phenomenon of repetition, Baumgarten deline-
ates four relations of identity between repeated elements: they can be similar,
equal, congruent, or markedly the same (see AE § 735). It is possible that he im-
ported his categories from Aristotelian metaphysics or rationalist philosophy. But
in the disciplinary context of topics, Cicero and others translate these logical and
ontological relations into linguistic, material ones.⁹⁸ In the course of this mate-
rialization, the categorial differences between the various relations of identity
lose their distinctiveness such that Baumgarten only uses the concepts to evalu-
ate greater or lesser degrees of identity, resulting in a structural approach to the
phenomena. Figures are based on the technique of sensate mnemonics and sen-
sate wit (see MED § 73) because they constitute either relations of correspon-
dence (ingenium) or relations of difference (acumen; see MET § 640). Following
 Eckhard Lobsien, Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung: Phänomenologie poetischer Sprache (Mu-
nich: Wilhelm Fink, 1995), 15.
 Lobsien, Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung, 15. See also Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repeti-
tion, trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
 Lobsien, Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung, 23.
 Lobsien, Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung, 22.
 Lobsien, Wörtlichkeit und Wiederholung, 23.
 See Cic., Top. 2.7–9; De or. 2.130.
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Roman Jakobson, we can say that Baumgarten’s typology of figural operations
does not just try to differentiate relations of identity (that is, repetitions of the
same elements) from relations of equality and similarity but also that each of
these relations – and not merely the method of forming a syntagm – “projects
the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination.
Equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence.”⁹⁹
This is why Baumgarten is above all interested in figures that can be catego-
rized as amplifying a discursive object. As figures of quantity, they produce text
by dissecting a discursive object into all its marks and lining up the elements ac-
cording to the rules of syntax (see MED § 20n). He fundamentally differentiates
between amplification that only defines one object and amplification that moves
from one object to another. He then adds a second differentiation to this first
one. Sometimes amplification divides an object into its marks and subordinates
them. This way of amplifying the object aims for a self-contained, closed repre-
sentation of it that encompasses the object in all its marks. To this kind of am-
plification belong the figures of definition (determinatio; see MED §§ 19–21,
50–52), addition (epitheton; see MED § 86), and description (descriptio; see
MED §§ 54–55); one would also expect enumeration (enumeratio) and distribu-
tion (distributio) to belong here. To this group Baumgarten adds enriching,¹⁰⁰
magnifying,¹⁰¹ evidential,¹⁰² illustrative,¹⁰³ and persuasive figures in the Aesthe-
tica.¹⁰⁴ Alternatively, amplification can simply collect the marks of an object and
coordinate them in a representation that never completely grasps the object in its
manifold marks and relations. “Texts of this kind,” notes Heinrich Plett, as if he
 Roman Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics,” in Language in Literature, ed. Krystyna Pomor-
ska and Stephen Rudy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 71.
 See section 11 on argumenta locupletantia: pleonasmus (AE § 145); synonymia, synthesis,
ellipsis (AE § 146); hypallage, homoeoteleuton, periphrasis (AE § 147); praeteritio, synathroismus
(AE § 148).
 See section 23 on argumenta augentia (following Pseudo-Longinus’s On the Sublime): αὔξη-
σις (amplificatio) – augmentum/incrementum (AE § 330); meteora (AE § 331); hypotyposis (AE
§ 332); repetitio (AE § 333); hyperbaton, climax, gradatio (AE § 334); anticlimax (AE § 335); meta-
phora, similia, comparatio (AE § 336); hyperbole (AE §§ 339–341); polyptoton (AE § 342); ana-
phora (AE § 343); epistrophe/epiphora (AE § 344); symploce, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, ploce,
epizeuxis (AE § 345); synathroismus (AE § 348); parrhesia (AE § 349); exclamatio (AE § 351).
 See section 33 on argumenta probantia: sententia (AE § 549); definitio, descriptio (AE § 551).
 See 3.4.2 Opacity.
 See 6.3.1 Ethopoeia.
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were referring directly to Baumgarten’s theory of literature, “can be either clearer
or more cryptic than others.”¹⁰⁵
One way or the other, amplification is, of course, always threatened with los-
ing sight of the object or talking it to death. Baumgarten’s examples show how
increasingly distinguishing the marks constantly crosses the limit of perception
into knowledge, leading him to justify famous examples of digressive series like
the famous Homeric catalogue of ships:
Our tyro poets, far from observing this nicety of a poem, turn up their noses at Homer, who
tells in Iliad II of the
Leaders and chieftains, commanders of ships, and all the fleet.
In VII he tells the stories of all those who crossed Hector’s path. In the Hymn to Apollo he
lists the many places sacred to the god. Likewise, in Virgil’s Aeneid, anyone who reads
through book VII and following will have many opportunities to observe the same thing.
We may also cite, in the Metamorphoses of Ovid, the enumeration of the dogs who rend
their master to shreds.
Nostris Choerilis tantum abest, ut observetur haec poematis elegantia, ut potius naso adun-
co suspendant Homerum Il. β. ηγεμονας ϰαι ϰοιρανȣς, αρχȣς αυνηων νηας τε προπασας di-
centem, narrantem Il. η omnes, Hectori qui obviam ire sustinebant, in Hymno autem Apol-
linis plurima regnantis dei loca sacra recensentem. Idem in Virgilii Aneide, qui libr. VII.
finem & posteriores evolverit satis superque notare poterit. Addatur & Ovidii catalogus
canum dominum lacerantium in Metamorphosi. (MED § 19n)
For Baumgarten, the most significant digression is in Horace’s first ode. Such ex-
amples are particularly exciting since they expand the links of the structure of
literary discourse; in them, all words function as “nodal points of numerous
ideas”¹⁰⁶ and so open up the literary encyclopedia:¹⁰⁷
If there were no merit in putting narrower concepts for broader ones, why, then, in this
poem “great-grandsires” for ancestors, “Olympic dust” for the dust of the Games fields,
“the palm” for the prize, “Libyan threshing-floors” for productive countries, “the circum-
stances of Attalus” for affluence, “Cyprian beam” for a trading ship, “Myrtoan sea” for a
dangerous sea, “Africus struggling against the Icarian floods” for the wind, “Old Massic”
for a well-aged wine, “the Marsian boar” for a destructive animal, and so on?
 Heinrich F. Plett, Einführung in die rhetorische Textanalyse, 9th ed. (Hamburg: Helmut
Buske, 2001), 57.
 Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey in collaboration with
Anna Freud, vol. 5, The Interpretation of Dreams (Second Part) and On Dreams (1900– 1901)
(London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 340.
 See 5.3.3 Accessibility.
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Cur in ea atavi pro maioribus, pulvis olympicus, pro pulvere ludorum, palma pro praemio,
Lybicae areae pro terris frugiferis, Attalicae conditiones pro magnis, trabs Cypria pro merca-
toria, mare myrtoum pro periculoso, luctans Icariis fluctibus Africus , pro vento, vetus Mas-
sicum pro vino generoso, Marsus aper pro fulmineo &c. nisi virtutis esset substituere con-
ceptibus latioribus angustiores. (MED § 20n)
Similarity is, in the end, also the central category of the amplifications that leads
to the comparisons, the heart of the figures of repetition:
By resemblances [I translate as “comparisons,” F. B.] we shall indicate the means by
which a superior concept combines like with like. Therefore, resemblances pertain to the
same species or the same genus. Therefore, it is highly poetic to represent resemblances
along with an image to be represented, § 35.
SIMILIA sunt, quibus idem convenit conceptus superior, ergo similia ad eandem speciem vel
genus idem pertinent. Ergo cum repraesentando phantasmate uno repraesentare similia ad-
modum poeticum. §. 35. (MED § 36)
Baumgarten elaborates this further in the sections of the Aesthetica on illustra-
tive arguments (argumenta illustrantia), which is based on the eighth and ninth
books of Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria. Baumgarten does not “rewrite” his men-
tor Quintilian’s text in an emphatic sense but rather simply copies from him.¹⁰⁸
To a certain extent, in a longwinded compilation, Baumgarten plays Quintilian
off against Quintilian in such a way that something new appears through this
transtextual relation. Baumgarten explicates comparison in the broad sense
(comparatio latius dicta), which, as the principal illustrative figure (figura
princeps illustrantium), encompasses all the special cases of producing complex-
ity qua similarity (see AE §§ 735, 742). The comparisons are based on substituting
or linking words that are in a relation of similarity or affinity to one another:
Hence the substitution of one beautifully thinkable perception for another, or the conjunc-
tion of one with another, not without vividness, will produce an ARGUMENT that illustrates
BY COMPARISON, which others call BY MEDITATION (§ 730). As for us, let us call the figure
(§ 26) COMPARISON and collation IN THE BROADER SENSE, which includes assimilation
but also extends to many kinds of arguments other than those based on something similar.
Hinc substitutio illius pro hac pulcre cogitanda, vel coniunctio illius cum hac, non sine vivi-
ditate, dabit ARGUMENTUM illustrans A COMPARATIS, quod aliqui dicunt A MEDITA-
TIONE, §. 730, nos dicamus figuram, §. 26, COMPARATIONEM et collationem LATIUS,
quae complectitur assimilationem, sed in multa etiam alia argumentorum genera diffundi-
tur, quam quae petantur a simili. (AE § 734)
 Cf. Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 17.
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Baumgarten divides up comparison as the master figure into four groups; of
these four groups, he first names those that are based on the four types of iden-
tity:
Comparison more broadly speaking can include an argument that illustrates (1) from some-
thing similar, equal, congruent, or quite markedly the same; this figure is more properly
called ASSIMILATION (§ 734) if similar, equal, congruent, or quite markedly the same
things are conjoined. It is also possible for one of these to be substituted for the other in
thought.
comparatio latius dicta sub se comprehendet argumentum illustrans 1) a simili, aequali,
congruente, notabilius eodem, quod figura dicitur a potiori ASSIMILATIO, §. 734 si similia,
aequalia, congruentia, notabilius eadem coniungantur. Potest et eorundem unum cogitan-
do substitui pro altero. (AE § 735)
Yet comparisons in which the relationship between object and detail is regulated
according to other relations that go back to topics also belong to comparisons in
the broad sense. These include comparisons based on relations of part and
whole (comparatio maioris et minoris/comparatio adscendens et descendens;
see AE § 742), antitheses (antithesis; see AE § 763), and comparisons in the nar-
row sense (comparatio strictius dicta). Under the last of these, Baumgarten treats
external amplification, which crosses the border from one object to another (see
AE § 773).
This differentiation of the methods of linking comparisons reduces the dis-
tance of the leap when one moves from the level of figures to the level of texts.
The microstructure of figurality thus models the macrostructure of textuality.
3.4.2 Opacity
Complexity and opacity are complementary functions of the structure of literary
discourse. Yet the scholarship has paid much more attention to the concept of
claritas because Baumgarten uses it to analyze the evidentia of poetic passages.
In Baumgarten, evidentia serves as the collective name for the entire register of
figures and tropes.¹⁰⁹ Bahr thus refers to evidentia as the “master trope” of
Baumgarten’s aesthetics.¹¹⁰ Evidentia certainly has a special place in his theory
of literature; and in engaging with evidentia, the very luminosity of the Enlight-
enment is to some extent at stake. The epistemological preeminence of intuition
 Cf. Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 253.
 Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 109.
3.4 Poetics 65
in the eighteenth century grants evidentia a central role in metaphysics.¹¹¹ But
even in rhetoric, the matter is not as simple as the one-size-fits-all definitions
suggested in the scholarship. With regard to evidentia, Baumgarten does not
treat a single concept but instead considers the two stylistic categories of clarity
(enargeia) and vividness (energeia) – which are tied together in the rhetorical
concept of evidentia – as two different functions of the structure of literary dis-
course. Literature is therefore, in a way I will define more precisely, both clear
(clarus) and vivid (vividus). With vividus (or vivus in the Aesthetica), the third
function of the structure of literary discourse comes into play: the performativity
of literature.¹¹²
With regard to clarity, Baumgarten combines the textile metaphors of the
first literary function, complexity, with visual metaphors to produce an algo-
rithm: the more complex a representation is, the clearer it is – or, more precisely,
the more extensively clear. For this differentiation, he adds a third axis to the
Leibniz–Wolffian two-coordinate system; this third axis differentiates between
the intensive and extensive clarity of cognition. A sensate representation is
thus not distinct but confused, not obscure but clear, and in this quality not in-
tensively but extensively clear. With regard to the lower cognitive faculties, the
Metaphysica states the following: “Therefore, clarity is increased by a multitude
of notes [I translate as “marks,” F. B.] (§162). Greater clarity due to the clarity of
notes can be called INTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY, while greater clarity due to
the multitude of notes can be called EXTENSIVELY GREATER CLARITY” (MET
§ 531; Ergo multitudine notarum augetur claritas, §. 162. CLARITAS claritate nota-
rum maior, INTENSIVE (a), multitudine notarum, EXTENSIVE MAIOR (b) dici
potest). The result of this combination presents a paradox: the light of a repre-
sentation increases, the more densely the marks are interwoven (see AE § 747).
Thus, if a representation’s degree of complexity increases due to the number
of marks, the degree of clarity also intensifies:
When in representation A more is represented than in B, C, D, and so on, but all are con-
fused, A will be said to be extensively clearer than the rest.
[n] We have had to add this restriction so that we may distinguish these degrees of clarity
from those, already sufficiently understood, which, through a discrimination of character-
istics, plumb the depths of cognition and render one representation intensively clearer than
another.
Si in repraesentatione A plura repraesententur, quam in B. C. D. &c. sint tamen omnes con-
fusae, A erit reliquis EXTENSIVE CLARIOR.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
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[n] Addenda fuit restrictio, ut distinguerentur hi claritatis gradus a satis cognitis illis, qui
per notarum distinctionem descendunt ad cognitionis profunditatem, & unam repraesenta-
tionem altera intensive reddunt clariorem. (MED § 16; see also MED §§ 15, 17)
With this paradox, Baumgarten makes several unreasonable demands. How
should something be clear if it is thickly woven together at the same time? Or,
put differently, how can the successiveness of linking be converted into the si-
multaneity of vision? He treats this problem in the Aesthetica in the sections
on aesthetic light (lux aesthetica). With liberal recourse to Quintilian,¹¹³ he ties
the clarity of thickly woven sensation to sensate perspicuity (perspicuitas sensi-
tiva), which must be differentiated categorically from the concept of perspicuity
in Cartesian logic (see AE § 614). Since he obtains his concepts by aestheticizing
logical concepts based on the analogical method, the old concepts acquire a to-
tally different meaning in the new context. Contrary to intellectual perspicuity,
which appears step by step, sensate perspicuity takes Baumgarten once again
to the register of figures and tropes (see AE § 852). In section 43 on illustrative
arguments (argumenta illustrantia), the concept of clarity acquires a profile
that sharpens the structure of literary discourse:
ARGUMENTS whose force (whether unique, more proper, or now most worthy of consider-
ation) is to shed light on a given perception are DECLARATIVE (explanatory). Accordingly,
they impart perspicuity, either intellectual – such arguments are SOLVENT (analytic), such
as a definition that explains the particular nature of any given thing (Cic., De or. 1.190) – or
sensate (§§ 614, 618); such arguments exhibit brilliance, at times, to be sure, absolute bril-
liance (§§ 617, 625), at other times, at any rate, some brilliance, and are preferably called
ILLUSTRATIVE (depictive).
ARGUMENTA, quorum (vel unica, vel potior, vel nunc maxime consideranda,) vis est, lucem
datae perceptioni affundere, sunt DECLARANTIA (explicantia). Dabunt itaque perspicuita-
tem vel intellectualem, RESOLVENTIA (analytica) quale est definitio, propriam cuiusvis rei
vim declarans, Cic. de Or. I. 190. vel sensitivam, § 614, 618. nunc absolutam certe, §. 617,
625, nunc omnino nitorem aliquem exhibent, et a potiori dicuntur ILLUSTRANTIA (pingen-
tia). (AE § 730)
With such depictive arguments (argumenta pingentia), sensate “images” now
truly stand at the center of Baumgarten’s theory of literature. Yet they raise sur-
prising points, since he does not consider the simultaneity of images and also
does not advance an emphatic concept of the image. The starting point of his
analysis of the structure of literary discourse is rather the integration of visuality
into the complexity of the literary text.
 See Quint., Inst. 8.2.22–23.
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Like many eighteenth-century theories of literary imagery, Baumgarten’s is
characterized by an analogical method: statements about the medium of the
image are applied to the medium of the text. Like others, he derives the visual
function of language from mental images (phantasmata): “for who would
deny that an image is what we have imagined? […] What, then, are images if
they are not newly made (reproduced) impressions (representations) received
from sense? This is what is intended here under the concept of things sensed”
(MED § 28n; quis enim negaret phantasma esse, quod imaginati sumus? […]
Quid ergo phantasmata, nisi refictae (reproductae) sensualium imagines (reprae-
sentationes) a sensatione acceptae). Following this presumption, Baumgarten
differentiates the media of pictures and texts by describing a picture as repre-
senting just the surface of a mental image (phantasma in superficie) and a
text as images of words and discourse (phantasma vocum et orationis; see
MED §§ 40–41).
Projected onto the rationalist paradigm of representation, both picture and
text can be combined into the Horatian analogy: “Poetry is like a picture”
(MED § 39n; Ut pictura, poesis erit). Both representations of pictures (repraesen-
tationes picturarum) and images (phantasmata) are similar to the sensual idea
(idea sensualis) of what they represent (see MED §§ 38–41). That Baumgarten
is using the attribute sensualis is due to the fact that the picture, as a medium
closer to perception, is more strongly anchored in reality than literature. He
thus concludes: “Therefore, a poem and a picture are similar, § 30” (MED § 39;
Ergo poema & pictura similia §. 30).When he speaks of this imagery of literature,
he often uses the concept imago instead of pictura and speaks of the poetic
image (imago poetica).
But neither the analogical method nor the reference medium of the picture is
suitable to define the concept of claritas, though Baumgarten does not explain
why. He merely remarks:
Since a picture represents an image only on a surface, it is not for the picture to represent
every aspect, or any motion at all; yet it is poetic to do so, because when these things are
also represented, then more things are represented in the object than when they are not,
and hence the representing is extensively clearer, § 16.
Pictura cum repraesentet phantasma in superficie tantum, eius non est omnem situm ul-
lumque motum repraesentare, sed est poeticum, quia his etiam repraesentatis plura in
obiecto repraesentantur, quam non repraesentatis iis, & hinc fit illud extensive clarius
§. 16. (MED § 40)
A theory and critique of images thus go hand in hand in the Meditationes when,
in an about-face, Baumgarten holds images to be less clear – and that means less
poetic (see MED § 29) – than other sensate representations and even explicitly
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evaluates visions (visiones; see AE § 490) negatively. The medial comparison
does not, however, anticipate the arguments about the simultaneity of images
and the successiveness of texts (see MED §§ 49–51) – arguments that will deter-
mine the semiotic debate starting in France and Germany a few years later. In-
stead, Baumgarten’s interest in the reference medium of images simply langui-
shes to such an extent that in the end images entirely disappear from the
argumentation.
At first the image is replaced by the literary text’s visual function of repre-
sentation; examining this function would have affected Baumgarten’s assump-
tions about the reference medium if he had risked even just another sidelong
glance at it. From the beginning, he emphasizes the poetic image’s net-like
links, which are stored in the spatial form of intuition but do not allow a simul-
taneous vision. In the Aesthetica, he only applies one and the same concept –
claritas – to the long list of all the figures of description, the visual figures
that come under the general concept of hypotyposis: “Since HYPOTYPOSIS,
the vivid description of something, not only illustrates (§ 618) but also proves
something (§§ 550, 551), it is deservedly reckoned among the better depictive ar-
guments (§ 731)” (AE § 733; Quoniam HYPOTYPOSIS, vivida alicuius descriptio,
non illustrat solum, §. 618, sed etiam probat, §. 550, 551. inter meliora pingen-
tium argumenta merito refertur, §. 731). Placing before the eyes (ob oculos po-
nere) is accordingly the task of literature (see AE § 39 passim), as Baumgarten
copies from Quintilian, who copied from Cicero: “As for what Cicero calls ‘put-
ting something before our eyes,’ this happens when, instead of stating that an
event took place, we show how it took place, and that not as a whole, but in de-
tail. […] Celsus actually calls the Figure evidentia, but others prefer hypotyposis,
that is, the expression in words of a given situation in such a way that it seems to
be a matter of seeing rather than of hearing.”¹¹⁴ “Not as a whole” (simultaneity)
“but in detail” (successiveness) – this formulation of Quintilian’s can easily be
made consistent with what Baumgarten intends for the structure of literary dis-
course. The demand to see successiveness refers to a new function of this struc-
ture, which he discusses with recourse to visual figures. In the “abundance of its
roles and the variety in its types of substitution and effect, placing before the
eyes appears itself like the unknown of a function,” a function that Baumgarten
explores without having anything more than one unsuitable reference medium
(images) and an unwieldy catalogue of figures and tropes.¹¹⁵ For this literary the-
 Quint., Inst. 9.2.40.
 Rüdiger Campe, “Vor Augen Stellen: Über den Rahmen rhetorischer Bildgebung,” in Post-
strukturalismus: Herausforderung an die Literaturwissenschaft; DFG-Symposion 1995, ed. Gerhard
Neumann (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1997), 209.
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orist, there is no other alternative than to make use of these inadequate concepts
as best as possible. In the rhetorical tradition, enargeia encompasses “painterly
description, plastic expression, and modeling; examples here are hypotyposis,
diatyposis, illustratio, demonstratio with the subforms effictio, conformatio, de-
scriptio, topographia.”¹¹⁶ The stylistic technique of description (descriptio) there-
fore takes up a lot of space in the Meditationes. By developing it in four variants
– descriptio rei, descriptio personae, descriptio loci, descriptio temporis – Baum-
garten moves this antiquated concept from baroque poetics into the center of the
first modern theory of literature (see MED §§ 31–32, 54–55). Descriptions pro-
duce detailed poetic images by accounting for as many marks of an object as
possible.
With this elevation of description, Baumgarten follows the otherwise feud-
ing parties – which include Johann Christoph Gottsched, Johann Jakob Bodmer,
and Johann Jakob Breitinger – in the contemporaneous poetology of the imagi-
nation, though unlike them he gives priority to description for theoretical rea-
sons. Moses Mendelssohn and the supporters of sensualist aesthetics also held
description as suitable for producing evidentia and were influenced by Baum-
garten.¹¹⁷ But unlike the others, Baumgarten could not get anywhere with the
contemporary concepts of clarity based on simultaneous vision. In his view, sen-
sate perspicuity is never clear since the inner gaze cannot pause and fixate on a
poetic image. Instead, this gaze wanders through space, realizing as many links
as possible until the poetic image becomes completely opaque in the movement
of this wandering. Baumgarten thus has to make a few corrections to the visual
figures, especially to the tropes, since they have been held since antiquity to be
the quintessential visual technique. Metaphors in particular are traditionally un-
derstood to belong to a text’s “imagery” in English or are referred to as Sprach-
bilder in German. They are understood to deal with images and could thus guar-
antee a simultaneous vision.
But does Baumgarten’s “metaphorology”¹¹⁸ actually renounce the syntag-
matic linking of marks merely because he turns to their paradigmatic replace-
ment in tropes? Anything but! Neither in the Meditationes nor in the Aesthetica
does he exclude the concept of metaphor from the complexity that makes meta-
phor into a figure sui generis. In section 47 on tropes (tropi), Baumgarten lets the
 Ansgar Kemman, “Evidentia, Evidenz,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. Gert
Ueding, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1996), col. 40.
 See Moses Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 178.
 Bahr, Darstellung des Undarstellbaren, 74.
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cat out of the bag.¹¹⁹ There he defines tropes not only by taking a spirited posi-
tion in an old rhetorical fight but also by resolving the conflict between text (suc-
cessiveness) and image (simultaneity). He at first confirms substitution as the
primary operation of tropes, which are neither just ornamentation nor a lexical
necessity:
I do not attend much here to TROPES, seeing as they are the skillful exchange of a word’s or
phrase’s proper meaning for another meaning (Quint., Inst. 8.6.1), and even less to tropes
that necessity and the poverty of language make necessary whenever something is to be
expressed for which a given language does not have a dedicated word, and least of all
to tropes forged in the process of speaking by ignorance of a word’s proper meaning. In-
stead, I attend to every elegant substitution of one perception for another.
TROPUM hic non attendo tantum, quatenus est verbi vel sermonis a propria significatione in
aliam cum virtute mutatio, Quint.VIII. 6. multo minus, quem necessitas et linguae paupertas
necessarium facit, quoties significandum est, cuius non est in data lingua proprium voca-
bulum, minime, quem ignorantia proprietatis in loquendo procudit: sed omnem elegantem
perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem. (AE § 780)
In opposition to Quintilian, who defines metaphor as the substitution of the
meaning of a word (translatio),¹²⁰ Baumgarten does not treat the metaphorical
operation on the side of the signified. In the Meditationes, he is concerned
with the complexity of metaphors, a complexity they acquire, like all other
tropes, on the basis of their own phenomenal particularity; and this particularity
depends, first of all, on literalness. Thus, while Baumgarten defines tropes as
producing a tension between word and meaning, he reckons not with the trans-
ferred meaning but with the literal one of the metaphor – and in this he is closer
to Aristotle than Quintilian:
Nonproper meaning lies in the nonproper word. Nonproper terms, since most of them are
appropriate to sensate representations, are poetic figures, because (1) the representation
which approaches a thing through a figure is sensate, hence poetic, § 10, § 11; and (2)
these terms supply complex confused representations in abundance, § 23.
Significatus improprius est in voce impropria. Improprii autem termini, quum plerumque
sint proprii repraesentationis sensitivae, tropi poetici : 1) quia repraesentatio per tropum
accedens sensitiva est, hinc poetica §. 10. 11. 2) quia suppeditant repraesentationes com-
plexas confusas §. 23. (MED § 79)
 Baumgarten catalogues exceptio, metaphor, synecdoche, irony, metonymy, antonomasia,
allegory, metalepsis, enigma, catachresis, hyperbole, and emphasis.
 See Quint., Inst. 8.6.4–6.
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In the Aesthetica, he comes in the end to a stunning conclusion: the metaphor is
a figure. To be able to formulate this thesis, Baumgarten deconstructs Quintilian,
who differentiates operations with words in their literal sense (figures) from op-
erations with words in a figurative sense (tropes). At this point, Baumgarten
plays Quintilian off against Quintilian with a quote in which the question of
method ranks above the question of meaning: “We must note, however, that
Trope and Figure are often combined in the same sentence, because metaphor-
ical words can contribute to a Figure just as much as literal ones.”¹²¹ This state-
ment in Quintilian is enough for Baumgarten to justify his own theory of litera-
ture (see AE § 783).
After first measuring all the tropes with the yardstick of the figure, Baum-
garten is pushed toward a subtler approach that secures for tropes their own
unique position among the visual figures based on changed parameters. “Nor-
mal” figures substitute an object with its features and portray this operation
in a sequence. By contrast, Baumgarten speaks of cryptic figures when the sub-
stitution of one element for another is, to a certain extent, contracted into the
smallest amount of space: “Every trope I have defined is a FIGURE, but a CRYP-
TIC one whose genuine form is not immediately apparent since it is a figure ab-
breviated through substitution” (AE § 784; Omnis tropus, quem definivi, est FI-
GURA, sed CRYPTICA, cuius genuina forma non statim apparet, quoniam est
figura contracta per substitutionem §. 782). With the attribute crypticus, Baum-
garten imports a foreign word taken from “Petrus Ramus” (KOLL § 1) into his aes-
thetics and adapts it to his needs:
Scholastic logicians teach that an EXPONIBLE PROPISITION is composed cryptically out of
an affirmative and a negative proposition,which are exclusive, exceptive, restrictive, and so
on. If I did not fear being disagreeable to Latin ears, I would call tropes exponible figures.
Logici scholasticorum docent PROPOSITIONEM EXPONIBILEM, ex affirmanti et negante
cryptice compositam, quales exclusivae, exceptivae, restrictivae, e. c. Nisi vererer latinis in-
commodus esse auribus, tropos figuras dicerem exponibiles. (AE § 785)
Norman Kretzmann explains this Ramian concept with reference to the need for
such propositions or figures to be elucidated if one wants to integrate this logical
concept into aesthetics: “An exponible proposition is a proposition that has an
obscure sense requiring exposition in virtue of some syncategorema occurring
either explicitly or included within some word.”¹²²
 Quint., Inst. 10.1.9.
 Norman Kretzmann, “Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata,” in The Cambridge His-
tory of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scho-
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But Baumgarten is less interested in the obscurity of exponible figures (fi-
gurae exponibiles) or cryptic figures (figurae crypticae) than in their spatializa-
tion through the necessary context, since he underlays the concept of claritas
with the spatial form of intuition. It is this spatiality that, in a certain way,
makes the trope into a textual image, a Textbild, and not into linguistic imagery,
a Sprachbild. Baumgarten accomplishes this turn by at first tying tropes to the
methods of comparison that are at the center of amplification: “From this arises
the trope, the not-inelegant substitution of the term of a comparison in the place
of its subject (§ 780)” (AE § 781; Unde nascitur substitutio termini comparationis
pro subiecto eiusdem non inelegans, tropus, §. 780). He changes course in this
way so as simply to apply the typology of comparison in the broad sense (com-
paratio latius dicta) to tropes, which he defines as contracted varieties of the fig-
ural techniques: contracta assimilatio, contracta comparatio maioris et minoris,
contracta antithesis (see AE § 782):
Explain a metaphor, and you’ll have a manifest assimilation (§ 735). Explain a synecdoche,
and you’ll see a comparison of larger and smaller. It is therefore either an ASCENDING or
DESCENDING SYNECDOCHE (§ 742). Explain irony, and you’ll have an antithesis (§ 763). Fi-
nally, metonymy is resolved into some form of comparison more strictly speaking (§§ 773,
782). And so whatever has been said up to now about the figures mentioned above
(§§ 730–779) is not necessary for us to repeat about tropes, the concealment of figures.
Metaphoram exponens habebis manifestam assimilationem, §. 735. Synecdochen exponens
videbis comparationem maioris et minoris. Est ergo vel ADSCENDENS SYNECDOCHE, vel
DESCENDENS, §. 742. Expone ironiam: habebis antithesin, §. 763. Metonymia denique resol-
vetur in aliquam comparationem strictius dictam. §. 773, 782. Quicquid itaque de figuris
commemoratis huc usque dictum est. §. 730–779. illud ut de tropis, earum crypsesi, repe-
tamus, non est necesse. (AE § 786)
In this context, Quintilian’s definition of metaphor,which Baumgarten makes the
basis of his own, is put in a new light: “In general terms, Metaphor is a short-
ened form of Simile; the difference is that in Simile something is compared
with the thing we wish to describe, while in Metaphor one thing is substituted
for the other. It is a comparison when I say that a man acted ‘like a lion,’ a Met-
aphor when I say of a man ‘he is a lion.’”¹²³ While in “normal” figures, the sub-
stitute and the substituted appear at two positions of the syntagm, the cryptic
figure diverts attention away from surface of the literary text. Attention is turned
lasticism, 1100– 1600, ed. Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 215n17. See also Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 16; Haverkamp, Fi-
gura cryptica: Theorie der literarischen Latenz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), 14.
 Quint., Inst. 8.6.9. See also AE § 787.
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to what is contracted in the techniques based on similarity or affinity – to the
substituted, which is suspected to be in the crypt of the text. Haverkamp speaks
of the “elementary deep structures of the cryptic functioning of the senses for
every interpretation” and apprehends the proper meaning “in the deep moments
motivating the surface, moments that Baumgarten’s ars analogi rationis theorizes
in detail.”¹²⁴ But this crypt knows neither depth nor deeper meanings. Despite all
of his efforts in reflecting on the matter, the trope cannot be anything other than
a further figuration on the surface of the literary text, an ornament. While the
“normal” figures are characterized by how they project the principle of repetition
from the axis of selection (paradigm) onto the axis of combination (syntagm),
the cryptic figures proceed exactly the other way around. They posit that the
paradigm already has the syntagmatic structure, which is actually first created
by the figure through the process of projection.
The result is clear: the surface of the literary text and the deep structure of
the crypt can no longer be differentiated. In contrast to the “normal” figures, the
cryptic figures link one text to other texts, making it encyclopedic. With tropes,
Baumgarten thus also identifies the point when the structure of literary dis-
course becomes encyclopedic. It is the point when the trope receives his atten-
tion as a singular term. Here again, the more media-specific argumentation in
the Meditationes proves to be superior to the Aesthetica. In his Halle master’s
thesis, he favors the first two of the four Aristotelian types of metaphor – meta-
phors in which a concept of a species is replaced by a concept of a genus or a
concept of a genus by a concept of a species. The relationship leads Baumgarten
first to synecdoches, in which the species replaces the genus and the individual
the species (see MED § 84), and then to allegory, which results in this trope out-
stripping metaphor as the master trope. The structure of literary discourse, as ori-
ented along the spatial form of intuition, would not actually allow it any other
way. Due to their doubled linking – both paradigmatic (words) and syntagmatic
(sentences) – allegories surpass every other trope by far in complexity, and
Baumgarten elevates them to the figurative principle of the literary (see MED
§ 85; AE §§ 802–805).¹²⁵
The point of the compilation from Quintilian consists, of course, in how
Baumgarten dissolves the traditional differentiation between tropes and figures.
Tropes are figures because they, like all other figures, depict two elements at two
 Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 16. See also Haverkamp, “Metaphora dis/continua:
Figure in de/construction; Mit einem Kommentar zur Begriffsgeschichte von Quintilian bis
Baumgarten,” in Allegorie: Konfigurationen von Text, Bild und Lektüre, ed. Eva Horn and Manfred
Weinberg (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), 29–45.
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
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positions in space. Hypotyposis therefore becomes the umbrella term for all
tropes. In Baumgarten, the sensate perspicuity of tropes does not result from im-
agery but from the links between the positions of the substituted and the substi-
tute. He not only replaces the traditional model of evidentia with a model of
complex and almost encyclopedic intertextuality, he also shifts his interest
from the meaning of the sign to its materiality, with emphasis on the opacity
of the literary text. In this, he pursues a possibility suggested by classical rhet-
oric, as when Quintilian emphasizes the moment of self-reference and how the
figure exhibits itself in visual figures: “We must thus count as an Ornament
the quality of enargeia, which I mentioned in giving instructions for Narrative,
because vividness, or, as some say, ‘representation,’ is more than mere perspicu-
ity, since instead of being merely transparent it somehow shows itself off.”¹²⁶
This phenomenal “showing itself off” points to the performativity of literature
at the center of Baumgarten’s literary theory.
3.4.3 Performativity
In the structure of literary discourse, the function of opacity depends on that of
complexity. Complex cognition and representation are evident. In rhetoric, how-
ever, evidentia has always been discussed in relation to two discursive functions:
on the one hand, it is about a certain manner of clarity; on the other, about viv-
idness.Whereas clarity is manifested as the opacity of poetic passages, aesthetic
vividness concerns the performativity of such passages. Analyzing it therefore re-
quires changing the frame of reference.While the scholarship has especially ad-
dressed the relation between art and epistemology in Baumgarten’s aesthetics, I
will show in the following that the third function of the structure of literary dis-
course – which he refers to with the attribute vividus and then vivus in the
Aesthetica – depends on the theory of desire. The form of the sensate will is
vivus, “living,” in the structure of literary discourse. He thus categorically differ-
entiates figures into those based on images and those based on movement. The
temporal form of intuition, which goes along with energeia, brings movement
into the spatial form of intuition, which is activated by enargeia. As I will
show in the following, clarity stimulates images and vividness stimulates ac-
tions.
The third function, performativity (vita), can first be described as an action –
not as an action that is the object of a literary text like those Lessing considers in
 Quint., Inst. 8.3.61–62.
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his Laokoon but rather as an action that consummates the structure of literary
discourse. This action is thus less an action than a function.Whenever Baumgar-
ten defines the characteristics of literature in the Meditationes, the grammar of
his sentences ascribes semantic agency – the role of the one who acts,
“whose various parts are directed toward the apprehension of sensate represen-
tations, § 5” (MED § 7; cuius varia tendunt ad cognitionem repraesentationum sen-
sitivarum. §. 5) – to the literary text. By emphasizing such a performativity in per-
fect sensate discourse, a “directing toward” or an “aiming” (tendere),
Baumgarten assigns both a direction and a goal – the goal of perfection – to
the spatial linking of elements within the structure of literary discourse. In its
performativity, the literary text becomes the agent of the sensate will.
Just as poetics is to guide literature toward perfection (perfectio; see MED
§ 115), aesthetics aims for the perfection of sensate cognition. In this sense,
the prolegomena of the Aesthetica make the famous claim that the “goal of aes-
thetics is the perfection of sensate cognition as such (§ 1)” (AE § 14; Aesthetices
finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis, §. 1). The syntactic construc-
tion leaves open – as Michael Jäger has pointed out¹²⁷ – whether the phrase “per-
fectio cognitionis sensitivae” is to be read as an objective or subjective genitive.
As a subjective genitive, sensate cognition would indeed be an action that aims
for perfection. This grammatical decision complements Baumgarten’s stylisti-
cally conspicuous personification of sensate cognition in the paragraph. Sensate
cognition seems to be like an agent that intentionally aims to reach a goal in the
future.
Because of this intentional aiming, one is forced to switch with Baumgarten
from the cognitive faculties to the appetitive faculties when reconstructing this
third function of the structure of literary discourse. This is because the first
two functions and the third function are not – in contrast to what Caroline
Torra-Mattenklott claims¹²⁸ – actually related according to their systematic posi-
tions. Although this aiming still has to do with evidentia, the performative func-
tion is not a visual function but rather sets the elements within the structure of
literary discourse in motion. To refer to this performativity of literature, Baum-
garten uses the traditional rhetorical concept vividus in the Meditationes: “We
call that vivid in which we are allowed to perceive many parts either simulta-
neously or in succession” (MED § 112; VIVIDUM dicimus, in quo plura varia,
seu simultanea fuerint, seu successiva, appercipere datur).
 See Jäger, Kommentierende Einführung in Baumgartens “Aesthetica,” 31.
 Cf. Caroline Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung: Ästhetische Theorie und Me-
chanik im 18. Jahrhundert (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2002), 176.
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In eighteenth-century poetics, vividus is, as Baumgarten notes, generally
translated in German as “lebhafft[ ]” (MED § 112n). Not only literature but also
paintings, speeches, and behaviors are described as vivid. Instead of vividus,
however, the Aesthetica uses the term vivus, or “living,” which he takes from
the Metaphysica. There it refers to living cognition (cognitio viva), which sets de-
sire and aversion in motion such that they reach their goal in the future.¹²⁹
Scheer explains the relevance of living cognition to Baumgarten’s aesthetics as
follows: “Beautiful thinking is thereby induced to an unending movement be-
tween partial representations. In contrast, intellectually determined thinking
proceeds in a much less moving and lively manner. For it tends to make the pro-
cess of representation finite in a result; that is, it fixes its object with a concept
on the basis of fewer marks. This concept makes constantly running through the
object’s abundance of marks anew unnecessary.”¹³⁰
In section 37 on aesthetic light (lux aesthetica), Baumgarten therefore distin-
guishes the concept of life from vividness:
Brilliant vividness, graceful meditations – let it not be confused with its fire or life (§ 22),
which will be further discussed later. It is right and beautiful that they are joined as
often as possible so that thoughts not only gleam but are also ablaze (§§ 142, 143; see
Quint., Inst. 8.3). Yet by their nature these beauties appear separately in the process of
thinking and should be judged separately according to an accurate theory of them.
Nitida vividitas venustae meditationis ne confundatur cum eius ardore ac vita, §. 22. de qua
deinceps curatius. Recte pulcreque coniunguntur, quoties fieri potest, ut cogitationes non
splendeant solum, sed et ardeant. §. 142, 143. cf. Quint. VIII.3. Natura tamen sua disiunctae
sunt in cogitando veneres, per accuratam harum theoriam separatim expendendae. (AE
§ 620)
The difference between vividness and life metaphorically encapsulates the two
different functions of the structure of literary discourse. In contrast to the con-
cept of life (vita; vivus), which evokes the metaphors of fire that have belonged
to the rhetoric of affects since antiquity, the concept of vividness (vividitas; vivi-
dus) is related to metaphors of light, which belong to the second function of the
structure of literary discourse, opacity (claritas; clarus). Before Baumgarten dif-
ferentiates the two functions of vividness and life in the Aesthetica, he uses the
concept vividus to integrate affect into the structure of literary discourse. In the
Metaphysica, he defines extensively clear perceptions as vivid in the sense that
they stimulate the affects: “An extensively clearer PERCEPTION is LIVELY [I
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 64–65.
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translate as “vivid,” F. B.]” (MET § 531; Extensive clarior PERCEPTIO est VIVIDA).
This use of the concept corresponds to the contemporaneous poetological de-
mands for “vivid perspicuity” in literature.¹³¹ In the Aesthetica, he remedies
the excessive structural demand on this concept by differentiating within eviden-
tia between opacity and performativity as two different functions of the structure
of literary discourse.
It is not surprising that affect plays a major role in Baumgarten’s theory of
literature. Deleting the two letters i and d in vividus yields the word vivus and
leads back to empirical and rational psychology, the disciplines in which
Wolff analyzes affect. According to Campe’s explanation of the theoretical frame-
work, empirical psychology characterizes and classifies the individual affects,
and rational psychology asks “how the passions are to be explained from certain
modifications to the faculty of representation in a perceptual apparatus that is
bound to its body and so positioned within the world.”¹³² With this framework,
Wolff removes “the reasons for the unanalyzability of affect as they had existed
up to the end of the seventeenth century.”¹³³ In the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, affect stands “between perception/judgment and desire/will, between theo-
retical questions within perception and disciplinary moral practice.”¹³⁴ The way
in which Baumgarten treats affect may thus not meet one’s expectations, given
that this epoch was the height of sensibility (Empfindsamkeit). He criticizes the
definition of affect in Johann Georg Walch’s Philosophisches Lexikon, arguing
that literature does not speak a “language of affects”; he thereby marks a signifi-
cant distance between himself and the epochal code (see MED § 114).
In his psychological definition, in which he follows Wolff, affects are libidi-
nous impulses (stimuli), a kind of representation,¹³⁵ which Baumgarten places
on a scale from weak to strong:
The (stronger) desires and aversions originating from confused knowledge are AFFECTS
(sufferings, affections, perturbations of the mind), and their science is (1) PSYCHOLOGICAL
PATHOLOGY, which explains the theory of these; (2) AESTHETIC PATHOLOGY, which con-
tains the rules as to how they are to be excited, restrained, and signified, and to this per-
tains oratorical, rhetorical, or poetic pathology (§622); and (3) PRACTICAL PATHOLOGY,
which exhibits the obligations of the human being with respect to their affects.
 Johann Jakob Breitinger, Critische Dichtkunst (Zurich: Conrad Orell, 1740; facsimile, Stutt-
gart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), 52.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 71.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 71.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 71.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
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Appetitiones aversationesque (fortiores) ex confusa cognitione sunt AFFECTUS (passiones,
affectiones, perturbationes animi), eorumque scientia PATHOLOGIA 1) PSYCHOLOGICA,
eorundem theoriam explicans, 2) AESTHETICA, eorum excitandorum, compescendorum,
significandorumque regulas continens, quo pertinet pathologia oratoria, rhetorica, poëtica,
§. 622. 3) PRACTICA, obligationes hominis respectu affectuum exhibens. (MET § 678)
Neither in the Meditationes nor in the Aesthetica does Baumgarten actually offer
a new evaluation of affect like the one with which Herder later establishes a cul-
ture of emotion. Contrary to affect, emotion always has a semantic script and
tends toward narration. The semantic catalogue of affective ready-mades in
the Metaphysica may point in this direction (see MET §§ 682–685), but beyond
that, affects in Baumgarten remain libidinous impulses and often appear as rep-
resentations in conjunction with other sensations in poetic passages:¹³⁶
Since affects are rather marked degrees of pleasure or pain, their sense representations are
given in the representing of something to oneself confusedly as good or bad. Therefore, they
determine poetic representations, § 24; and therefore, to arouse affects is poetic, § 11.
Affectus cum sint notabiliores taedii & voluptatis gradus, dantur eorum repraesentationes
sensuales in repraesentante sibi quid confuse, ut bonum & malum, ergo determinant re-
praesentationes poeticas §. 24. ergo affectus movere est poeticum. §. 11. (MED § 25; see
also MET §§ 655–662)
Since Baumgarten integrates affects into the paradigm of representation, he un-
derstands them “in their basic definition as types of perception, sensation, and
representation.”¹³⁷ This allows him to incorporate affect “into the grammaticality
of textual expression and into the logic of representation,”¹³⁸ erasing “the dis-
tance between sign theory and rhetoric.”¹³⁹ Baumgarten accordingly places af-
fects on a scale in the same way he does other sensate representations (reprae-
sentationes sensitivae):
Whatever increases the stronger sensitive pleasures and displeasures increases the affects
(§678). Hence the more composite, the more noble (§515), the truer, the livelier, the more
certain, and the more brilliant are the pleasure or displeasure from which affects arise
(§658, 669), the greater are these affects (§656). If one were only to sense the cause of an
affect as evil or good, and another were at the same time to imagine it to themselves
 See Ernst Stöckmann, Anthropologische Ästhetik: Philosophie, Psychologie und ästhetische
Theorie der Emotionen im Diskurs der Aufklärung (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2009), 89.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 72.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 73.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 75.
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and foresee it, then the affect of the latter, all else being equal, will be greater than that of
the former (§595, 557).
Quicquid auget voluptates & taedia sensitiva fortiora, augebit affectus, §. 678. Hinc quo
magis composita voluptas taediumve, ex quibus affectus, quo nobiliores, §. 515. quo ve-
riores, vividiores, certiores, ardentiores, §. 658, 669. hoc illi maiores, §. 656. Si alter tantum
sentiat affectus caussam, ut malum, vel bonum, alter simul imaginetur, simul praevideat,
posterioris affectus, caeteris paribus, maior erit, quam prioris, §. 595, 597. (MET § 681)
Based on such statements, Albert Riemann points out that Baumgarten ascribes
affects with “an even greater clarity” than other sensations, since affects form “a
composite concept with the representations that they cling to,” a concept “that,
as a result, possesses greater extensive clarity than a simple concept.”¹⁴⁰ Such
complex representations legitimize “the poeticality of affect.”¹⁴¹ Despite the
“pure occurrence of movement in affect,”¹⁴² he does not see a conflict between
this paradigm of movement and the paradigm of representation.¹⁴³ The “concat-
enation of representation and movement”¹⁴⁴ is first dissolved in the 1770s in the
same breath with which modern antirationalist psychology becomes the disci-
pline that regulates the discourses concerning the newly liberated emotions.
The fact that Baumgarten does not always use the logically colored attribute sen-
sitivus but rather also the attribute sensualis marks the border between the para-
digms, between his premodern aesthetics, anchored in rationalism, and moder-
nity. It is the border between sensation analogous to reason and “real”
sensuality, between rationalist representation and the presence of aesthetic ex-
perience.
But where then does affect become manifest in the structure of literary dis-
course? The answer is obvious: not in visual figures but in what I call perfor-
mative figures. For the “movement that is affect” is analogous to the movement
“through which the use of figures is defined.”¹⁴⁵ This has to do, first, with the
performativity of every figure in which vividness and life have been related to
one another in the long history of these concepts.¹⁴⁶ In this history, Campe ex-
 Albert Riemann, Die Ästhetik Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens unter besonderer Berücksich-
tigung der “Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus” nebst einer Überset-
zung dieser Schrift (Halle an der Saale: Max Niemeyer, 1928), 53–54.
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 175.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 34.
 See Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 102– 104, 465–467.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 379.
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 25.
 See Heinrich F. Plett, Rhetorik der Affekte: Englische Wirkungsästhetik im Zeitalter der Re-
naissance (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1975), 135– 136.
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plains, additions and substitutions are not only confronted with “terminological
mix-ups” but also with an “eclectic synopsis of different concepts of language”¹⁴⁷
that consolidates a visual, representational concept of language from late antiq-
uity (enargeia) with an energetic, performative concept of language that dates
back to Aristotle (energeia). The one letter e that differentiates energeia from
enargeia therefore marks nothing other than a media-theoretical expansion of
static representation (enargeia) into dynamic representation (energeia). Search-
ing for the technical operations of such a representation, Baumgarten touches
on the temporally indexed figures of actualization (present verb forms, the im-
perative, apostrophe, direct speech), which Aristotle also provides,¹⁴⁸ but tropes
are even more important techniques of dynamic representation in the Aesthetica.
“Two types of energeia,” as Torra-Mattenklott explains, “gain the most relief:
on the one hand, the visualization of events and characters by being staged, and
on the other, the metaphorical animation of inanimate objects.”¹⁴⁹ To adapt them
theoretically, Baumgarten does not make recourse to any particular reference
medium, as had been done until then, but rather to a physical model: following
Aristotle, he asserts that there is an analogy between figures, physical move-
ment, and desire. Aristotle transfers the principle of dynamism from his Physics
into his Metaphysics and Nicomachean Ethics before importing it as the principle
of movement into his Rhetoric and Poetics.¹⁵⁰ In his Rhetoric, Aristotle defines
energeia in the following way: “I call those things ‘before-the-eyes’ that signify
things engaged in activity.”¹⁵¹ In this context, metonymy in particular gains in
significance among the tropes, leading Aristotle to say that Homer, who always
trusted in the power of metonymies of “the lifeless for the living” and of “meta-
phor by analogy”¹⁵² in his epics, “makes everything move and live, and energeia
is motion.”¹⁵³ With reference to Quintilian, Campe captures the merging of enar-
geia and energeia in the theory of the figure as follows: “The rhetorical technique
of ornament thus binds the simple seeing of something before oneself of enar-
geia to a representation with action in mind, which is here called energeia.”¹⁵⁴
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 230n22.
 See Arist., Rhet. 1410b; [Longinus], De subl. 27.1; Quint., Inst. 9.2, 9.41.
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 181.
 See Anselm Haverkamp, “Masse mal Beschleunigung: Rhetorik als Meta-Physik der Ästhe-
tik,” in Masse und Medium: Verschiebungen in der Ordnung des Wissens und der Ordnung der Li-
teratur 1800/2000, ed. Inge Münz-Koenen and Wolfgang Schäffner (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,
2002), 65–77; Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 185– 196.
 Arist., Rhet. 1411b.
 Arist., Rhet. 1411b.
 Arist., Rhet. 1412a.
 Campe, “Vor Augen Stellen,” 218.
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Because Baumgarten attempts to grasp the performativity of the structure of
literary discourse with the concept of vita and the physical model of movement,
nothing actually speaks for accepting a displacement of the “moment of anima-
tion or effectiveness from the metaphorical production of the represented to the
relation between speech and listeners,”¹⁵⁵ as Torra-Mattenklott proposes. While
“life and activity are qualities of representation in Aristotelean rhetoric, in
Baumgarten they concern, by contrast, the relation between the text and the
reader or listener.”¹⁵⁶ From this, it follows that “movement and representation”
coexist “in the context of the same aesthetic and epistemological configura-
tion.”¹⁵⁷ Since Baumgarten’s student Meier “develops a lot that his teacher just
hints at without deviating significantly from the implications of Baumgarten’s
concepts,” Torra-Mattenklott takes the concept of life from Meier’s Anfangs-
gründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (1748– 1750), but this method has consider-
able disadvantages.¹⁵⁸ Although the rhetorical discussion of figures offers con-
nection points for the aesthetics of both production and reception –
connection points that Meier’s kindred rendering of the Aesthetica realizes¹⁵⁹ –
Baumgarten only extrapolates moving cognition (cognitio moventis) from the
canon of elocutio. In this sense, the Renaissance scholar Scaliger – whose
works were important to Baumgarten – also treats energeia as the force of
words (vis verborum).¹⁶⁰
With his emphatic focus on reception aesthetics, Meier actually deviates
considerably from Baumgarten’s argumentation, which is primarily oriented to-
ward the literary text. Reconstructing the third function of the structure of liter-
ary discourse is certainly complicated by the fact that the Aesthetica remains a
fragment and that the intended sections on aesthetic life (vita cognitionis aesthe-
tica) are presented in the synopsis but then never developed further. According
to the logic of the rhetorical system, these sections would have had to typologize
the passionate arguments (argumenta ardentia)¹⁶¹ and translate the eighteenth-
century theory of affects (Affektenlehre) into aesthetics. They would also have
had to formulate the conditions for delineating the concept of vita in the
canon of style. In other words, the theory of affects would not have migrated
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 189.
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 184.
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 19.
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 142; see also 145.
 See Georg Friedrich Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften, 2nd ed., 3 vols.
(Halle an der Saale: C. H. Hemmerde, 1754–1759; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1976).
 See Plett, Rhetorik der Affekte, 116.
 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.
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into the canons of invention and method but would rather have remained in the
canon of style.
In fact, the best clues as to how Baumgarten wanted to profile the concept of
vita are found in the Metaphysica. Its paragraphs on living cognition (cognitio
viva) are key to understanding the performativity of the literary text. The attri-
bute vivus refers to cognition that is resolutely oriented toward its object:
“KNOWLEDGE, insofar as it contains the incentives of the mind, is MOVING (af-
fecting, touching, burning, pragmatic, practical, and, more broadly, living), and
insofar as it does not contain these incentives, it is INERT (theoretical and, more
broadly, dead)” (MET § 669; COGNITIO, quatenus elateres animi continet,
MOVENS (afficiens, tangens, ardens, pragmatica, practica & viva latius), quate-
nus minus, INERS (theoretica & mortua latius)). One can therefore reconstruct
how the sections on aesthetic life (vita cognitionis aesthetica) would have articu-
lated the concept of vita in analogy to the “psychic apparatus as a wish ma-
chine”:¹⁶² certain rhetorical figures set the structure of literary discourse in mo-
tion.
For that reason, Baumgarten would probably not have just considered fig-
ures and tropes in general; instead, he would perhaps have carried out a change
of medium from the visual medium of the text and its letters (litterae) to the
acoustic medium of the voice (vox). The Meditationes suggest as much: as
soon as he is concerned with movement, the spatial form of intuition, which
is so important for analyzing the structure of literary discourse, recedes into
the background of the argumentation. This is because movement presupposes
a temporal form of intuition, and so performative figures draw Baumgarten’s at-
tention to the voice.¹⁶³ As a consequence of this attention to the voice, he does
not discuss literature in general but rather lyric poetry in particular in the diffi-
cult definition of the concept of life: “Since the poem, taken as a series of artic-
ulate sounds, excites pleasure in the ear, § 92, § 91, there must also be a perfec-
tion in it, § 92, and indeed the highest perfection, § 94” (MED § 96; Quum poema
excitet voluptatem aurium, qua series sonorum articulatorum §. 92. 91. qua tali
etiam inesse debet perfectio §. 92. & quidem summa §. 94).
In eighteenth-century poetics like those of Gottsched, Bodmer, and Breitin-
ger – all of whom made new discoveries in the analysis of literature around the
same time as Baumgarten – the “doctrine of generally assigning actio to the af-
fects is,” as Campe observes, “entirely developed with regard to the voice (pro-
 Torra-Mattenklott, Metaphorologie der Rührung, 147.
 See 3.3 Semiotics.
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nuntiatio, and in it the vox).”¹⁶⁴ Baumgarten thus holds meter to be the most im-
portant performative figure responsible for the actio of the voice: a verse form
that orders all the syllables of poems according to the same pattern of long
and short syllables: “Since meter produces sense impressions by § 103, § 102,
and since these have the greatest extensive clarity, they are to that degree the
most poetic, and more so than those less clear, § 17. Thus it is highly poetic to
observe most carefully the laws of meter, § 29” (MED § 107; Quum metrum
ideas sensuales producat §. 103. 102. eae vero extensive clarissimae adeoque
maxime magisque poeticae, quam minus clarae §. 17. metri leges accuratissime
observari admodum poeticum. coll. §. 29; see also MED § 103). In his definition
of meter, Baumgarten seems to orient himself obstinately on Greek quantitative
meter. Accentual meter,which Martin Opitz campaigned for as a German prosody
in the seventeenth century, does not interest Baumgarten at all; indeed, he ex-
plicitly objects to correlating accent and the length of a syllable (see MED
§ 101n). Baumgarten takes Greek quantitative meter to be so natural and univer-
sally accepted that he only recalls it in passing and instead relates meter in al-
most all his arguments to its material, phonetic manifestation. For example, he
explains the association of the length and the scansion of syllables as follows:
“Thus, in scanning, as much time as the quantity of the syllable requires, so
much will be its value” (MED § 100n; in scandendo ergo, quantum temporis syl-
labae quantitas postulat, tantum eius est morae); and two paragraphs later he
introduces the ear as the éminence grise in his metrical theory: “Measure produ-
ces pleasure in the ear, § 101. Therefore it is poetic, § 95” (MED § 102; Numerus
voluptatem auribus creat §. 101. ergo est poeticus §. 95). Baumgarten invokes
this organ of aesthetic cognition again and again, and in these invocations, apos-
trophe follows closely on the heels of personification. The ear should differenti-
ate one syllable from another, determine whether they are short or long, and rec-
ognize their relation to forms of verse. The ear is the part of consciousness that
first constitutes a temporal relation, because it recognizes similarity (ingenium)
in the sequence of syllables, differentiates (acumen) them from other sequences,
remembers (memoria) previous sequences, and anticipates (praesagitio) future
ones. In short, the ear gives the text of the poem its time; the aesthetics of move-
ment is based on the sensate judgment (iudicium) of the ear.
This discussion of meter may seem to be theoretically imprecise, but it
proves to be extremely consistent with regard to the structure of literary dis-
course. The ear’s constant judgments about the lengths of syllables and their re-
lations have a remarkable effect on how Baumgarten switches media to define
 Campe, Affekt und Ausdruck, 68.
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the concept of life. These judgments reverse, to a certain extent, the flow of the
voice; they interrupt the spatial intuition of text by creating links between ele-
ments that project a temporal intuition onto it. In every individual act of con-
sciousness, the ear projects the temporal form of intuiting the voice onto the spa-
tial form of intuiting text. This occurs, for example, in the definition of end
rhyme (see MED § 106), which Baumgarten does not derive from the acoustic fig-
ure of homoeoteleuton but rather from the graphic figure of paronomasia finalis.
In the same enumeration of such textual, or eye, rhymes, he treats the play with
letters in acrostics and the phenomena that today fall under the general concept
of visual poetry (expressiones figurarum). Every trace of the voice is missing
from this argumentation because, for Baumgarten, stable repetition cannot
exist without memory, and memory is only reflected in the space of text.
In this way, the ear actually reinstalls the spatial form of intuiting text,
which was Baumgarten’s starting point for analyzing the structure of literary dis-
course. Hans-Jost Frey posits this temporalization of space or, turned the other
way round, spatialization of time – and the resulting simultaneity of the two
forms of intuition, the spatial one for text and the temporal one for voice – as
a condition for the rhythm of literary texts (see MED § 106). In going back to
the model of walking, he emphasizes “that rhythm can only be constituted as
an experience and that it therefore does not only depend on how one walks
but also on the fact that there is someone who walks and on how he experiences
his walking.”¹⁶⁵ With this “that” and “how,” Frey relates the temporal form of
intuiting experience to the spatial form of intuiting text. “But this being swept
along has an artificial structure as its precondition, a structure that, in creating
expectations, stretches into the future of what is yet to come, and this structure,
not rapture, is the distinguishing feature of the rhythmic.”¹⁶⁶ In his Kollegium,
Baumgarten recalls an artform in which time and space have been related to
one another since antiquity – dance: “Good feet and a well-structured posture
are required from every single person, but they are required above all from fe-
male dancers who have the intention of pleasing us with the dexterity of their
feet” (KOLL § 269; Man erfordert von einem jeden Menschen gute Füße und
eine wohlgeordnete Stellung, man erfordert sie aber vorzüglich von einer Tänze-
rin, die den Vorsatz hat, uns durch die Geschicklichkeit ihrer Füße zu vergnü-
gen). A good poem is like a good dance – one also finds this comparison in
the Meditationes, where Baumgarten notes that the shepherds Damon and Al-
 Hans-Jost Frey, Vier Veränderungen über Rhythmus (Basel: Engeler, 2000), 89.
 Frey, Vier Veränderungen über Rhythmus, 107.
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phesiboeus from the fifth of Virgil’s Eclogae “will imitate the dancing satyrs” with
their songs (MED § 109; Saltantes Satyros imitabitur Alphesiboeus).
With this comparison of literature to dance, Baumgarten attaches the phys-
ical reference model of movement – a model he needs to define the performative
function of the structure of literary discourse – to a reference medium from the
sphere of the arts that would rise to prominence under the rubric of representa-
tion (Darstellung) beginning in the 1770s. The relevant studies frequently refer to
how Aristotle differentiates contemplation (theoria), action (praxis), and crea-
tion (poiesis), which Quintilian later builds on to divide the arts into the theoret-
ical arts (like astronomy), the active arts (like dance), and the creative arts (like
painting and poetry). Whereas the goal of creation lies outside of itself in the
work (ergon), action is limited to carrying out the action itself (energeia). Be-
cause Baumgarten dismisses the reference medium of the image, the new refer-
ence medium of dance must have appeared particularly attractive to him.With it,
he is able to establish the performativity of literature and attain a level of differ-






Baumgarten discovers not just the laws of sensate cognition but those of both
sensate cognition and sensate desire, which are intrinsically tied together at
the dark ground of the soul, where one would usually expect “the other” of rea-
son. Moreover, he uncovers these laws in the poetic passages of literary texts,
whose structure and functions he analyzes in the Meditationes. In analyzing lit-
erary discourse as perfect sensate discourse (oratio sensitiva perfecta), he be-
comes attentive to the metaphysical capacities of literature. Within the scope
of this analysis, sensate cognition turns out to be aesthetic cognition. Baumgar-
ten’s literary epistemology thus encompasses more than just rhetorical, semiotic,
and poetological applications of his psychology. His epistemology also leads to
questions about being, which belong to ontology; about the world, which belong
to cosmology; and about God, which belong to natural theology. In his Kolle-
gium, Baumgarten boils aesthetics down to its essence: “One could thus call aes-
thetics, due to some similarity, the metaphysics of beauty” (KOLL § 1; so könnte
man die Ästhetik nach einiger Ähnlichkeit die Metaphysik des Schönen nennen).
“For the world of the senses is,” as Gadamer formulates it, “not mere nothing-
ness and darkness but the outflowing and reflection of truth.”¹ Today, anchoring
literature in metaphysics is generally considered ideologically dubious, but
Baumgarten’s analogical method alone clears him of all suspicion.² He does
not become ensnared in the ideological traps that the metaphysics of art falls
into at the end of the eighteenth century. This is in part because his aesthetics
pursues what Carsten Zelle refers to as “paralogical objectives,”³ meaning that
in the Aesthetica, the metaphysical attributes of perfection “have all already ap-
peared in the guise of poetology or aesthetics before the concept of truth is the-
oretically treated.”⁴ In other words, Baumgarten continues to transfer his theo-
retical concepts from one discipline to another. The point is not, however, that
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York:
Crossroad, 1975), 66.
 See 2.2 Analogy.
 Carsten Zelle, Die doppelte Ästhetik der Moderne: Revisionen des Schönen von Boileau bis
Nietzsche (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1995), 70.
 Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 70.
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he develops a typology and metaphorology of truth in the Aesthetica; rather, it is
that he confronts the beauty of literature with its sheer materiality, with the real.
His investigation into the beauty of literature thus reveals itself to be an Urszene
of the modern metaphysics of media.
Literature and beauty pivot around the concept of perfectio.What qualifies as
completeness in rhetoric is perfection in metaphysics. In the Meditationes, this
concept marks the difference between poetics and rhetoric since literature, in
contrast to sensate discourse more generally, strives toward perfection:⁵ “Gener-
al rhetoric may be defined as the science which treats generally of unperfected
presentation of sensate representations, and general poetics as the science
which treats generally of the perfected presentation of sensate representations”
(MED § 117; Iam quum perfecte hoc fieri possit & imperfecte, hoc doceret RHE-
TORICA GENERALIS scientia de imperfecte repraesentationes sensitivas proponen-
do in genere, & illud POETICA GENERALIS scientia de perfecte proponendo re-
praesentationes sensitivas in genere; see also MET § 533). Designating a
discourse as literature presumes its perfection in a metaphysical sense, and
only imperfect sensate discourse can be the object of descriptive rhetoric (see
KOLL § 24), which is a historical discipline for analyzing a series of given exam-
ples. Describing perfect sensate discourse therefore requires a different method
and a different discipline. In the Meditationes, the science of perfect sensate dis-
course is called poetics, and in the first edition of the Metaphysica from 1739,
Baumgarten expands its scope to all forms of art: “The science of cognizing
and presenting sensately is AESTHETICS, the science of sensate meditation
and discourse aiming either for lesser perfection, RHETORIC, or greater perfec-
tion, UNIVERSAL POETICS” (MET1 § 533; Scientia sensitive cognoscendi et pro-
ponendi est AESTHETICA, meditationis et orationis sensitivae vel minorem in-
tendens perfectionem, RHETORICA, vel maiorem POETICA UNIVERSALIS). In
considering the Meditationes and the Aesthetica together, my contention is
that the Aesthetica realizes precisely such a universal poetics by elaborating a
holistic theory of literature.
In the Aesthetica, perfection in the realm of aesthetics is defined as beauty:
“The goal of aesthetics is the perfection of sensate cognition as such (§ 1). This,
however, is beauty (Metaphysica §§ 521, 662)” (AE § 14; Aesthetices finis est per-
fectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis, §. 1. Haec autem est pulcritudo, Metaphy-
sic. §. 521, 662). This marks the crossroads where the discourses of beauty and
 See 3.4.1 Complexity.
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literature meet.⁶ Baumgarten cites Shaftesbury’s Sensus communis (1709) to jus-
tify associating truth, beauty, and literature (see AE § 556).⁷ In Baumgarten,
beauty does not just partially overlap with literature, as Kant later proposes in
the Kritik der Urteilskraft when he refers to metaphorically produced beauty as
a “symbol of the morally good.”⁸ Instead, beauty is a constitutive quality of lit-
erature, which differentiates perfect sensate cognition from all other forms of
sensate cognition.With his art of beautiful thinking (ars pulcre cogitandi), Baum-
garten thus takes up a provocatively anachronistic position in the contempora-
neous European discourses on beauty and art.
Whereas Bouhours and Jean-Baptiste Dubos, who both influenced Baum-
garten, subject beauty to the sensus communis – and that means to the public’s
tastes – Baumgarten does not want to have anything to do with such democratic
half measures. In the Kollegium, he argues that the well-known French treatises
oriented toward the so-called artes cannot “exhaust” (KOLL § 1; erschöpfen) the
problem of beauty. For he is not concerned with being moved by beauty but
rather with the truth of beauty. Under this metaphysical premise, Baumgarten
counters every “nescio quid” with the conviction that one has to be able to
argue about taste (elegantia). He knows what is beautiful and what is not –
namely the imperfect, which for him is ugly: “and the imperfection of sensate
cognition as such is to be avoided (§ 1). This, however, is ugliness (Metaphysica
§§ 521, 662)” (AE § 14; et cavenda eiusdem, qua talis, imperfectio, §. 1. Haec
autem est deformitas, Metaphysic. §. 521, 662).
In the Kollegium, Baumgarten confirms that the perfection of cognition in
general is the criterion for aesthetics in particular: “Aesthetics will have to
have the perfection that cognition in general must have if it is to be perfect”
(KOLL § 22; Die Ästhetik wird die Vollkommenheit haben müssen, die die Er-
kenntnis überhaupt haben muß, wann sie vollkommen sein soll). In the course
of his reflections, he ties this demand for perfection back to confusio, the first
function of the structure of literary discourse, by equating perfection with the
abundance of marks. He even arithmetically calculates beauty through its de-
grees of perfection:
 See Joachim Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur: Zur Geschichte eines Problems von Gorgias bis
Max Bense (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2007).
 See Third Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), “Sensus Communis, an Essay on the
Freedom of Wit and Humour in a Letter to a Friend,” in Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opin-
ions, Times, ed. Lawrence E. Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 65.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 59.
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Suppose I were thinking perfectly well in the low manner of thinking = 10 [perfections], in
the middle manner of thinking = 100 [perfections], in the sublime manner of thinking I
should reach 1000 [perfections], but I only reached them −100 [perfections] and −10 [per-
fections], then I would only have [890] perfections, which in all their mistakes would be,
however, greater than the 100 perfections and the 10 perfections that I would have reached
without mistakes in the other manners of thinking.
Gesetzt, ich dächte in der niedrigen Denkungsart = 10˚ vollkommen gut, in der mittleren
= 100˚, in der Erhabenen sollte ich 1000˚ erlangen, ich erlangte sie aber nur – 100˚ und – 10˚,
so hätte ich nur 89˚ Vollkommenheiten, die aber bei allen ihren Fehlern doch noch größer
wären als jene 100 und als jene 10 Vollkommenheiten, die ich ohne Fehler in den anderen
Denkungsarten erlanget hätte. (KOLL § 210)
Both the perfection of every cognition (perfectio omnis cognitionis) and, analo-
gously, the beauty of sensate cognition (pulcritudo cognitionis sensitivae) are
measured using the same rhetorical categories of style: abundance, greatness,
truth, clarity, certitude, and life.⁹ With this analogy, Baumgarten presupposes,
of course, a universal concept of beauty (pulcritudo universalis). Based on this
concept, he opens, as Franke explains, a “discussion about the beauty of art
within a field of problems” “that Kant then delimits terminologically through de-
fining, on the one hand – teleologically justified – natural beauty and, on the
other, artistic beauty.”¹⁰ In Baumgarten, this categorical division between natu-
ral and artistic beauty does not exist. The universal beauty of sensate cognition
(pulcritudo sensitivae cognitionis universalis) is therefore measured like the par-
ticular beauty of singular phenomena using the same six categories of style. As
Scheer puts it, the ontological predicates of being are made in the Aesthetica into
conditions for the existence of beauty.¹¹
In part 1 of the Metaphysica on ontology (ontologia), Baumgarten according-
ly grounds beauty in the three logical principles: the principle of contradiction,
the principle of ground, and the principle of sufficient ground, which he then
transfers to the Aesthetica (see AE § 426).¹² But instead of endorsing Benedetto
Croce’s position that this Leibnizian inheritance demonstrates the antiquated-
 See 2.2 Analogy.
 Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 79.
 See Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 70.
 See Hans Carl Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens: Texttheo-
rie zwischen Philosophie und Rhetorik,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft
und Geistesgeschichte 70.2 (1996): 202.
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ness of the Aesthetica,¹³ I will show that Baumgarten’s ontology can shed new
light on central concepts in his literary epistemology,¹⁴ in particular on his nar-
ratology, which I will discuss in chapter 5. In his ontology, he lists six predicates
of being that are universally valid:
Section I: The possible (possibile)
Section II: The connected (connectum)
Section III: A being (ens)
Section IIII: The one (unum)
Sections V–VI: The true (verum)
Section VII: The perfect (perfectum)
In the following, I will discuss the three predicates of being italicized above; I
will address the true later in this chapter¹⁵ and the possible in the context of
his theory of fiction.¹⁶
In section 2 on the connected (connectum), Baumgarten adds another onto-
logical justification for the structure of literary discourse to the three logical prin-
ciples; this justification consists in the linking of the manifold elements or marks
of an object.¹⁷ The series A, B, C thereby becomes a logical series: “The ground A
of ground B is the ground of the consequence C. From the ground of B, it is pos-
sible to know why C is (§23); hence, A is the ground of C (§14)” (MET § 25; Ratio A
rationis B, est ratio rationati C. Ex ratione τȢ B cognosci potest, cur C sit, §. 23.
hinc A est ratio τȢ C. §. 14; see also MET § 33). In section 7 on the perfect (per-
fectum), Baumgarten defines precisely this linking as the agreement (consensus)
of all elements within a structure: “If several things taken together constitute the
sufficient ground of a single thing, they AGREE. The agreement itself is PERFEC-
TION, and the one thing in which there is agreement is the DETERMINING
GROUND OF PERFECTION (the focus of the perfection)” (MET § 94; Si plura
simul sumta unius rationem sufficientem constituunt, CONSENTIUNT, consensus
ipse est PERFECTIO, et unum, in quod consentitur, RATIO PERFECTIONIS DE-
TERMINANS (focus perfectionis)). This definition culminates in the concept of
 See Benedetto Croce, Storia dell’estetica per saggi (Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1942), 93– 122;
Croce, “The Aesthetica of Baumgarten,” in Philosophy, Poetry, History: An Anthology of Essays,
trans. Cecil Sprigge (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 427–450.
 See 3 Epistemology. See also Angelica Nuzzo, “Determination, Determinability, and the
Structure of Ens: Baumgarten’s Ontology and Beyond,” in Fugate and Hymers, Baumgarten
and Kant on Metaphysics, 23–41.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
 See 3.4 Poetics.
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a rule-bound structure: “Therefore, in perfection there is order (§78) and com-
mon rules of perfection (§86)” (MET § 95; ergo est in perfectione ordo, §. 78. et
communes perfectionis regulae, §. 86). Since rhetorical figures and tropes pre-
scribe the rules of perfection in the Meditationes, rhetorical and metaphysical
perfection coincide.
In the Metaphysica, perfection is closely accompanied by the question of
how the parts of a structure relate to a composite (compositum) whole.Whereas
in section 4 on the one (unum), Baumgarten engages with this problem from a
philosophical perspective, the Aesthetica is concerned with how elements relate
to each other to form a unity in the structure of literary discourse. To put this on-
tological principle in a nutshell, a lot must become one for something to be not
only quantitatively complete but also qualitatively perfect: “The universal beauty
of sensate cognition will be (§ 14) (1) the agreement of thoughts […] among them-
selves upon a single thing that is a phenomenon (§ 14; Metaphysica § 662)” (AE
§ 18; Pulcritudo cognitionis sensitivae erit universalis, §. 14. 1) consensus cogita-
tionum […] inter se ad unum, qui phaenomenon sit, §. 14. Metaphysic. §. 662). In
a syntactic analysis of this passage, Schweizer convincingly argues that the
“masculine ‘qui,’ which begins the relative clause, can only refer back to ‘con-
sensus.’ The representations thus do not, as the ‘ad’ in the expression ‘ad
unum’ at first leads one to expect, refer to something beyond themselves; rather,
the unity that their ‘agreement’ is based on is equated with the phenomenon it-
self.”¹⁸ In his translation of the fourteenth paragraph – “[a]esthetices finis est
perfectio cognitionis sensitivae qua talis” – Haverkamp even emphasizes that
the apposition “qua talis” (as such) refers to “perfectio” and not to the genitive
modifier “cognitionis sensitivae.”¹⁹ In this way, the grammar completes a self-re-
flexive turn with regard to beauty.²⁰ Both perfection in paragraph 14 and unity in
paragraph 18 are set free from heteronomous points of reference (God, world, na-
ture) because the elements of sensate cognition are linked among themselves
(inter se), which encompasses both the relation of elements to one another (de-
terminationes internae) and their relation to other objects (determinationes ex-
ternae; see AE § 439). This allows Baumgarten to liberate beauty both from its
task of imitating the world (mimesis)²¹ and from its duty to serve other systems
like religion or morality.We have thus entered the realm of modern poiesis in its
emphatic sense.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 38–39.
 See Haverkamp, “Wie die Morgenröthe,” 15n23.
 See Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens,” 211.
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
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Yet between the parts and the whole of the perfect order there arises an enor-
mous tension, indeed, a structural contradiction, which Baumgarten resolves in
the Aesthetica in the sections on aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica). There
he posits that all rhetorical figures and tropes should strive for “copiousness,
profusion, multitude, riches, and wealth” (AE § 115; copia, abundantia, multitu-
do, divitiae, opes). In these sections, he particularly exploits Pseudo-Longinus’s
On the Sublime by relying, like Kant, on superlatives to describe the sublime.
Here again, the most important thing is the abundance of marks, which distin-
guishes the sublime from the other types of style: “Thus, according to this
scale of intensity, the most beautiful argument and figure will be one that at
once makes the cognition of something else […] richer and weightier and truer
and clearer and more certain and more ardent (§ 22)” (AE § 142; Erit itaque secun-
dum hanc intensionis scalam argumentum et figura pulcerrima, quae cognitio-
nem et locupletiorem, et graviorem et veriorem et clariorem et certiorem et ar-
dentiorem alterius […] simul efficiant, §. 22).
As Schweizer explains, the concept ubertas “anticipates on the level of rhe-
torical instruction what is called ‘metaphysical’ and at the same time ‘real’ and
‘material’ truth in the context of the epistemological questions” (see AE § 424).
He continues: “The ‘abundance’ of the manifest world cannot be even approxi-
mately grasped with either logical cognition or aesthetic cognition; it transcends
all cognitive possibilities and appears on the level of the epistemological ques-
tions as a ‘metaphysical’ horizon of truth”²² such that “the rhetorical concept of
‘abundance’ is only used here as a symbol for the abundance of manifest reality
in general.”²³
Yet in these same sections on aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica),
Baumgarten surprisingly demands a well-rounded brevity (brevitas rotunda),
which he develops based on Cicero’s qualities of style. He already claims in
the Meditationes that “it is poetic to omit certain details and more remote con-
nections” (MED § 76; quaedam determinantia & remotius connexa omittere poe-
ticum): “By intrinsically or absolutely brief discourse we mean that which
has nothing in it that could be left out without loss of a degree of perfection.
Such brevity, since it is proper to every discourse, is also proper to a poem,
§ 9” (MED § 74; INTRINSECE sive ABSOLUTE BREVIS est ORATIO, cui nihil
inest, quod salvo perfectionis gradu abesse posset. Talis brevitas, quum sit
omnis orationis, est etiam poematis §. 9). Here Baumgarten takes up the classical
oratorical ideal of brevity and combines it with the reflexive figure of the circle, a
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 48.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 47.
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symbol of perfection in the Neoplatonic tradition. To quote again from Schwei-
zer, “The concept of ‘brevitas’ points, in contrast, to the individual act of sensate
cognition and representation, to ‘intuition,’ which always only captures – visu-
ally speaking – a ‘round something’ in the fluctuating abundance of phenomena,
whether it has to do with poetic, rhetorical expression or purely receptive acts of
cognition.”²⁴
Aesthetic cognition thus has to “obtain at the same time both a pleasing
round brevity (sections XIII–XIV) and beautiful coherence (§ 437)” (AE § 439:
et placentem simul rotundam illam brevitatem S. XIII. XIV. et pulcram obtinebis
cohaerentiam, §. 437): “We may refer to every kind of thinking beautifully as
seemly brevity (§ 160), that full and replete brevity (§ 158), not lacking, without
gaps (§ 159), nevertheless frugal and sober (§ 164), not luxuriant or disreputable
(§ 165), in a word, ROUND BREVITY” (AE § 166; Brevitatem omne pulcre cogitan-
di genus decentem, §. 160, plenam illam et refertam, §. 158, non mancam, non
hiulcam, §. 159. parcam tamen ac sobriam, §. 164, non luxuriantem aut maculo-
sam, §. 165. uno nomine ROTUNDAM BREVITATEM dicere liceat; see also AE
§ 657). Only this well-rounded brevity transfers the infinite curvature of the meta-
physical line of beauty onto the formal conditions of literature in a structurally
analogous way, which induces Baumgarten to a comparison with geodesy: “Just
as the horizon appears now wider, now narrower in geography, so can my aes-
thetic horizon be contracted or broadened” (AE § 149; Sicut in geographicis ho-
rizon apparens, nunc latior est, nunc angustior, ita meus horizon aestheticus
potest contrahi, potest dilatari). The horizon is curved as far as necessary to
grasp the limitless aspects of such a unique object in its well-rounded unity
(see AE § 561).
In rhetoric, both abundance and brevity are quantitatively measured either
by the number of arguments (using the spatial form of intuition) or by the dura-
tion of a speech (using the temporal form of intuition). Is it sufficient to simply
transform quantity into quality for the metaphysics of beauty? Since Baumgarten
refrains from any concrete comment about the point at which beautiful brevity
turns into ugly length, a different model than quantitative measurement appears
conceivable, and I am, indeed, of the opinion that the double unity of abun-
dance and brevity follows a different logic when Baumgarten deploys it as a
model for beauty. In this model, determining abundance and brevity is not sim-
ply a matter of calculating more or fewer links.With aesthetic abundance, he as-
signs an eccentricity to the structure of literary discourse, and with brevity he
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 48.
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places a concentricity at its side; without both of them, literature cannot be
beautiful.
This model leads back again to rhetorical figures, the matrix of literature in
Baumgarten’s theory. Eccentricity and concentricity define the two sides of fig-
ures. This understanding of figures is based on the appetitive faculties. The sen-
sate will, which Baumgarten conceptualizes in his psychology, defines the per-
formative function of the structure of literary discourse in the context of his
poetics. It is this function, which plays out sensate desire, that sets literature
in motion. Every figure is performative since it can be conceived as a series
(abundance).²⁵ Figures are then also eccentric since the first element of a figure
– which has by definition at least two positions – desires the second, the second
the third, and so forth, without this open structure ever arriving at the goal of
this desire. But we can also think of a figure as a circle (brevity). Figures are con-
centric since their elements aim to arrange each other in a circle. In that closed
form, all the elements have the same distance from the center of the circle.
The eccentricity and concentricity of literature make it a self-reflexive entity
and produce, through the opposing movements, the ambiguity of literature. So
far I have referred to the ambiguity of aesthetics to emphasize that Baumgarten’s
new science consists in both epistemology and media theory, but the concept of
ambiguity also applies to the structure of literary discourse itself. Its “ambiguity
is not a contingent but a constitutive dimension.”²⁶ The ambiguity of an infinite
finitude or a limited limitlessness positions beauty in an unresolvable tension
between openness and closure. Achieved through the lower cognitive faculties,
the beautiful remains “tied to a particular place and to a particular time”;²⁷
the desire for beauty is a never-ending process, kept in motion in literature by
the difference from the absolute. The tension between an existing form, on the
one hand, and such an ambiguous beauty, on the other, culminates in the exclu-
sion of sensation and perfection. In this context, one should once again recall
the matrix of literature, the rhetorical figure.²⁸ Figures are structurally character-
ized by how they make two out of one in the repetition of their elements. In
Baumgarten’s theory of literature, figures thus form not only the core of poetics
but also the core of metaphysics. So when Cassirer writes that “the beautiful is
essentially and necessarily a symbol because, and to the extent that, it is split
 See 3.1.2 Desire; 3.4.3 Performativity.
 Frauke Berndt and Klaus Sachs-Hombach, “Dimensions of Constitutive Ambiguity,” in Am-
biguity: Language and Communication, ed. Susanne Winkler (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015),
273.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 44.
 See 3.4.1 Complexity.
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within itself, because it is always and everywhere unity and double,”²⁹ he seems
to be thinking of Baumgarten.
4.1.2 Truth
Baumgarten’s metaphysics of beauty creates the riddle of this aesthetics since it
leaves open not only the relation between perfection and sensate cognition but
also the relation between its subjective and objective aspects.³⁰ Is he articulating
a theory of aesthetic experience or an ontology of beauty?³¹ As Scheer demon-
strates, the answer is both: “This twofold site of beauty in Baumgarten makes
this thinker a transitionary figure in aesthetics. Beauty is anchored objectively
(in traditional ontology) and subjectively (in the functions of sensation).”³²
While in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant recognizes “not the perfection of any ob-
ject” but rather nothing “but the subjective purposiveness of representations in
the mind of the beholder,”³³ in Baumgarten, ontology and aesthetics are still two
sides of the same coin: one side concerns the beauty of the object, the other the
judgment of sensate taste (see MET § 640). The necessity of such a doubling lies
in the ambiguity of aesthetics itself, which he brings into play with the doubling
of cognition and representation (Darstellung).³⁴ Once this doubling is recog-
nized, the strategy no longer seems problematic – except, apparently, to Baum-
garten, who attempts to penetrate the beautiful surface of literature to its true
depths. In the Aesthetica, this leads to the sections on aesthetic truth (veritas
aesthetica), where the concept of beauty cedes all its functions to the concept
of aesthetic truth,³⁵ and aesthetic truth becomes the focus of the philosopher’s
enormous efforts to resolve the ambiguity of aesthetics.
 Ernst Cassirer, “The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy (1927),”
in The Warburg Years, 255.
 See Anna-Maria C. Bartsch, Form und Formalismus: Stationen der Ästhetik bei Baumgarten,
Kant und Zimmermann (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2017), 35–91.
 See Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 89.
 Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 78. See also Alexander Aichele, “Wahrheit
– Gewissheit – Wirklichkeit: Die systematische Ausrichtung von A. G. Baumgartens Philo-
sophie,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 13–36; Armin Emmel,
“Logische, ästhetische und metaphysische Wahrheit bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in
Identität – Logik – Kritik: Festschrift für Ulrich Pardey zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Benedikt Fait
and Daniela Zumpf (Berlin: LIT, 2014), 211–242.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 15.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 See Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 40.
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In the Kollegium, Baumgarten uses an illustration of his typology of truth to
discuss the traditional metaphysical premises of truth. He includes his own new
position in this schema with yet another etymologically created neologism: ve-
ritas aestheticologica (Fig. 1: KOLL § 424).
The opposition of metaphysica obiectiva and subiectiva concerns the relation-
ship of objective and subjective aesthetics. While objective, real, or material
truth (veritas realis, materialis) is based on the ontological unity of the mani-
fold,³⁶ subjective truth refers to a concept of the subject similar to the one
used in rationalist epistemology. Subjective truth can therefore be called mental
truth (veritas mentalis) or the logical truth of affinity, correspondence, and con-
formity (veritas logica afficientiae, correspondentiae et conformitatis) if it is ach-
ieved through the higher cognitive faculties; subjective truth is aesthetic truth if
it is achieved through the lower cognitive faculties. There are no universal con-
cepts (universalia) for knowing aesthetic truths but rather only singular terms
(individua).³⁷ The more particular something is, the more complex and true it
is, too, such that the singular truth (veritas singularis) of perceptions increases
from the genus to the species to the individual: “the first [perception] is of the
true, the second is of the truer, and the third is of the truest (§ 440)” (AE
§ 441; Prima veri, secunda verioris, tertia verissimi. §. 440). Given this presuppo-
sition, Baumgarten is faced with the problem of justifying aesthetic truth with
regard to logical truth. The easiest way for him to do so is by referring to the dif-
Fig. 1
 See 4.1.1 Perfection; 4.2 The Real.
 See 3.4.1 Complexity.
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ferent ratios for mixing aesthetic and logical truth. On the one hand, what is aes-
thetically true is often also logically true (see AE § 427); on the other, aesthetic
parts contribute to a logically true whole (see AE § 428).
Aestheticological truth is further differentiated into general and singular aes-
theticological truth (see AE § 440), depending on whether it refers to universal
concepts or singular terms:
It will be preferable, however, to repeat the degrees of aestheticological truth somewhat
more deeply for more serious supporters [of aesthetics]. The smallest aestheticological
truth is the smallest perception of the smallest metaphysical truth. Hence (1) the richer,
(2) the greater and worthier, (3) the more precise, (4) the clearer and more distinct, (5)
the more certain and firmer, (6) the more fiery the perception of an object is, (7) the
more things the object itself encompasses, (8) the greater and weightier the things it en-
compasses, (9) the stronger the standards according to which it encompasses, (10) the
more consistent the things it encompasses, so much greater is the aestheticological truth
(§ 437; Metaphysica § 184).
Praestabit autem severioribus veritatis fautoribus aestheticologicae gradus altius nonnihil
repetere. Minima est minima perceptio veritatis metaphysicae minimae. Hinc 1) quo ube-
rior, 2) quo maior et dignior, 3) quo exactior, 4) quo clarior et distinctior, 5) quo certior
et solidior, 6) quo ardentior est perceptio obiecti, 7) quo hoc plura, 8) quo maiora ac gra-
viora, 9) quo fortioribus regulis, 10) quo convenientiora complectitur, hoc maior est veritas
aestheticologica, §. 437. M. §. 184. (AE § 556)
In this passage, Baumgarten switches – and this has escaped notice in the schol-
arship – to a theory of fiction in which he concretizes what is aesthetically or log-
ically true in a poetic world.³⁸ But since I would first like to remain on the ab-
stract level of concepts before I take up this problem in chapter 5 on
narratology, I will only discuss a brief example here. The cover of this book dis-
plays the painting Artus reitet from Dieter Asmus’s Parzival-Zyklus (2011). In this
painting, King Arthur and his armed entourage are riding through a field of giant
poppies. The horses are logically true, and so is the historical background. The
magnificent poppies are aesthetically true, as is the mythological background
and the connotation of sleep and death, which makes the poppy a chthonic-ma-
ternal symbol in Arthur’s rite of passage. By contrast, the proportions of the
knights and poppies are logically and aesthetically false. Would this image not
be a perfect emblem for Baumgarten’s own adventure in facing poetry? But if
we turn away for now from this theory of fiction to literature’s linguistic nature,
we can understand the relation of logical and aesthetic truth in a more general
manner, since language has both logical and aesthetic aspects. Grammar is re-
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
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sponsible for the logical truth of literature; the pre-predicative phenomena of po-
etic passages, such as figurality, phonetics, and rhythm, are responsible for its
aesthetic truth.³⁹
The compound attribute aestheticologicus has to reconcile reason and sensa-
tion within subjective truth. Aestheticological truth is a kind of truth “in which
aesthetic intuition and logical distinction are combined into a unity or […] in
which the difference between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘logical’ has not yet even become
relevant.”⁴⁰ In any case, the difference between aesthetics and logic does not
concern the hierarchy of reason and sensation or the different relations between
the aesthetic and logical components of truth (see AE §§ 427–428). It is rooted,
rather, in the problem that aesthetic and logical truth must be oriented toward
one and the same absolute: the logical truth of the whole (veritas totius logica).
Baumgarten does not leave any room for doubt that aestheticological truth is al-
ways deficient in comparison to the highest form of truth, logical truth, which
can only be intuited by God. Aestheticological truth is, by contrast, human
and thus imperfect (see AE § 57).
In the end, Baumgarten is actually not interested in logical truth at all but
only in aesthetic truth. In analyzing aestheticological truth, he is concerned
with an indirect mode of truth only possible in aesthetic truth:
We only note this: that truth, insomuch as it is intellectual, is not sought directly by the
aesthetician; if it emerges indirectly out of many aesthetic truths or coincides with some-
thing that is aesthetically true, the rational aesthetician can congratulate himself on this
(§ 38). Yet this is not what he was chiefly seeking (§ 423).
Hoc unum observamus, veritatem ab aesthetico, quatenus intellectualis est, non directo in-
tendi, si per indirectum ex veritatibus aestheticis pluribus una prodeat, aut cum aesthetice
vero coincidat, de illo sibi gratulari aestheticum rationalem, §. 38. neque tamen illud esse,
quod nunc potissimum quaerebatur, §. 423. (AE § 428)
The concept aestheticologicus thus acts as a placeholder in the discourse on
truth. The logical part of the concept provides temporary assistance and serves
at the same time as a nod to the rationalist tradition, but its main purpose is
to allow Baumgarten to proceed as quickly as possible to engaging with aesthetic
truth:
Of the general aestheticological truths, the aesthetic ones are those that can – and they are
aesthetic only insofar as they can – be represented sensately by the analogon of reason
without losing their beauty (§§ 440, 423), either manifestly and explicitly, or cryptically
 See 4.2.1 Materiality.
 Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, 42.
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in the omitted assertions of enthymemes, or in examples, in which, just as in concrete
things, these abstract things are detected.
Veritatum aestheticologicarum generalium eae tantum aestheticae sunt, quae et quatenus
analogo rationis, salva venustate, sensitive repraesentari possunt, §. 440, 423. vel manife-
sto, et explicite, vel cryptice in omissis enthymematum enunciationibus, vel in exemplis,
in quibus, tanquam concretis, haec abstracta deprehendantur. (AE § 443)
With aestheticologicus, Baumgarten thus brings together metaphysics, epistemol-
ogy, and rhetoric by positing that the sensate operations of the analogon of rea-
son are responsible for producing aesthetic truth.
But this raises the question of how the indirect mode of aesthetic truth is
consistent with the certain intuition of beauty, which is the only way it is avail-
able to cognition. The truth of literature is, according to Baumgarten, beautifully
evident. In section 50 on aesthetic evidentia (evidentia aesthetica) – which be-
longs to the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica) – he there-
fore outlines the concept of an evidentia that is defined by the attributes aesthe-
tica, bella, pulcra, or sensitiva. As I discussed above, evidentia plays an
important role in Baumgarten’s literary theory since it defines two of the three
functions of the structure of literary discourse: opacity in the tradition of enar-
geia and performativity in the tradition of energeia.⁴¹ But in addition to these
rhetorically anchored concepts, evidence also has a metaphysical dimension,
which is based on Cartesian logic. Baumgarten introduces evidence in the Meta-
physica as follows: “The clearer, livelier, more distinct and more certain is knowl-
edge, the greater it is. A PERCEPTION having the certitude of another as a cor-
ollary, and ITS POWER, is either PERSUASIVE or CONVINCING. Certain
perspicuity is EVIDENCE” (MET § 531; Quo clarior, quo vividior, quo distinctior,
quo certior cognitio est, hoc maior est. PERCEPTIO certitudinem alterius habens
pro corollario, & VIS EIUS, est vel PERSUASORIA, vel CONVINCENS. Certa perspi-
cuitas est EVIDENTIA).
In this context, Baumgarten first juxtaposes intellectual evidence and sen-
sate evidentia and differentiates sensate certitude (certitudo sensitiva) through
persuasion from rational certitude through conviction (convictio): “Sense certi-
tude is PERSUASION, whereas intellectual certitude is CONVICTION” (MET
§ 531; Certitudo sensitiva est PERSUASIO, intellectualis CONVICTIO). When he
later defines evidentia in the Aesthetica, he reconfirms this difference between
intellectual evidence and sensate evidentia, “which others call a demonstration
for the eye, for the senses, and palpable, the analogue of an intellectually con-
vincing demonstration” (AE § 847; quam alii demonstrationem ad oculum, ad
 See 3.4.2 Opacity; 3.4.3 Performativity.
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sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter convincentis
analogon). Such bella evidentia is immediately accessible and intuitive. That
this definition of sensate evidentia is analogous to that of intellectual evidence
once again reaffirms Baumgarten’s analogical method:
However much more clearly, yet sensately so (§ 614), hence however much more vividly
(§ 619), however many more and greater truths are set up before the eyes of the mind by
persuading your personal objects, so much greater will the persuasion be, and so much
greater the evidentia that will accompany it (Metaphysica § 880).
Quo clarius, sensitive tamen, §. 614 hinc quo vividius, §. 619. quo plures, quo maiores ve-
ritates persuadendo sistuntur obiectis tuis personalibus ob oculos mentis: hoc maior erit
persuasio, hoc maior eam comitabitur evidentia, M. §. 880. (AE § 853)
Campe argues that in addition to the tension between logic and rhetoric, Baum-
garten repeats the “doubling of intuition and rhetoric” on the side of sensate evi-
dentia by differentiating between visual figures in the sections on aesthetic light
(lux aesthetica) and figures of intentionality in the sections on aesthetic persua-
sion (persuasio aesthetica). The former aim for a “certitude that is due to atten-
tion in the representation,” and the latter for a “certitude that lies in the inten-
tion of the representation.”⁴² Contrary to Campe, I think this differentiation has a
different force, one that is mainly based on how Baumgarten distinguishes with-
in evidentia between enargeia and energeia, and thus describes the function of
opacity in the context of the cognitive faculties and the function of perfor-
mativity in the context of the appetitive faculties.
With regard to literature, Baumgarten assigns opacity to the field of visuality
and performativity to the field of affectivity. He accordingly differentiates be-
tween visual evidentia, which he discusses in the sections on aesthetic light
(lux aesthetica), and affective evidentia, which he treats in the sections on aes-
thetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica). Visual evidentia places something be-
fore the eyes of the mind, producing sensate perspicuity, while affective eviden-
tia moves and touches. Of course,we cannot be certain about this differentiation,
since Baumgarten abandoned the Aesthetica at this point and did not complete
the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio aesthetica) where he would have
defined bella evidentia as affective evidentia; but I think he would have had to
turn there to performative figures related to the voice.⁴³
In any case, visual evidentia depends on the rhetorical figures and tropes re-
sponsible for sensate perspicuity. Especially the figures of allegory and descrip-
 Campe, “Der Effekt der Form,” 33. See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
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tio prove to be particularly productive for metaphysics. In this respect, Campe
offers insightful remarks on the origin and redeployment of descriptio: “When
Baumgarten calls the perfection of the aesthetic object its complete determina-
tion, he constructs the fundamental concept framing the sensate cognition of
aesthetics based on visual descriptio of baroque provenance. Nowhere is it clear-
er that rhetoric is absorbed into some of its concepts in the eighteenth century.”⁴⁴
Campe’s suggestion that Baumgarten must have been reserving bella evidentia
for the figures “that are not tropes, that is, for syntactic, tonal, and morpholog-
ical figures,”⁴⁵must, however, be rejected in light of my earlier analysis of figures
and tropes,⁴⁶ both of which induce bella evidentia. For the whole canon of style
is responsible for both the visual and the affective evidentia of beauty.
4.1.3 Twilight
The search for truth leads into a fog (nebula; see AE § 451). It is a fog that results
from the necessity of using metaphors instead of concepts in this philosophical
context. By employing figures and tropes, Baumgarten’s own discourse makes
bella evidentia beautifully evident. And in total, the Aesthetica contains more
sections on metaphorology than on the typology of truth. Altogether, this sug-
gests that it would be productive to read some paragraphs of the Aesthetica lo-
cated at the intersection between psychology, rhetoric, and metaphysics as liter-
ature – with just as much attention to their techniques of representation as to
their propositional content. In particular, the epistemological metaphors of
light running through the Aesthetica express what Baumgarten expects from
the metaphysics of beauty. These metaphors culminate in the sections on aes-
thetic light (lux aesthetica).
Bella evidentia appears at “dawn” (KOLL § 7; Dämmerung). The truth of
beauty is thereby measured against the logical ideal of reason, which shines
brightly like the sun (sol; see AE § 616). Baumgarten turns away from this ratio-
nalistic ideal and looks for the beautiful not in the bright sun but rather in the
waning night, the realm of shadows. Especially in the third part of the Meta-
physica on psychology (psychologia), he views darkness as the anthropological
foundation of aesthetics: “There are obscure perceptions in the soul (§ 510).
The collection of these perceptions is called the FOUNDATION OF THE SOUL”
 Campe, “Vor Augen Stellen,” 209.
 Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 253.
 See 3.4.2 Opacity.
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(MET § 511; Sunt in anima perceptiones obscurae, §. 510. Harum complexus FUN-
DUS ANIMAE dicitur). Dark or obscure representations are those that do not
draw any distinct contours between marks but instead blur marks together:
“Therefore, one who is confusedly thinking something represents some things
obscurely” (MET § 510; Ergo confuse quid cogitans quaedam obscure repraesen-
tat).⁴⁷ Baumgarten draws a very clear correlation between the concepts confusus
and obscurus, which means that nondistinct sensate representations belong to
the realm of darkness (regnum tenebrarum), for which the lower cognitive facul-
ty is responsible: “Hence the faculty of knowing something obscurely and con-
fusedly, or indistinctly, is the INFERIOR COGNITIVE FACULTY. Therefore, my
soul has an inferior cognitive faculty (§57, 216)” (MET § 520; Unde FACULTAS
obscure confuseque seu indistincte aliquid cognoscendi COGNOSCITIVA INFE-
RIOR est. Ergo anima mea habet facultatem cognoscitivam inferiorem, §. 57,
216; see also MET § 518).
This model literally paints things in black and white: here is the sphere of
reason and light (perspicuitas, lux), and there the sphere of sensation and dark-
ness (obscuritas, caligo). Although Baumgarten vindicates darkness with refer-
ence to nature (obscuritas naturae; see AE § 653), he rejects it when he is con-
cerned with literature “since the lack and opposite of clarity is obscurity” (AE
§ 631; Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit obscuritas). Whatever
contains a flaw like that of darkness cannot be perfect or beautiful. He therefore
repeatedly juxtaposes beautiful perspicuity (bella perspicuitas) with ugly dark-
ness. So, unlike the models of the unconscious that build on Herder, Baumgar-
ten’s Aesthetica does not affirm irrational darkness. Instead, like Leibniz and
Wolff, Baumgarten conceives of the dark processes of the soul from the perspec-
tive of the rational:⁴⁸
Our soul is made in such a way (which one would not realize from the improvements in
psychology) that an astonishing quantity of representations remain dark in its foundation
but often reach a low degree of darkness and simultaneously latch onto the realm of clarity.
[…] The realm of clarity and this field of dark representations, which moves somewhat to-
ward the realm of clarity, together provide a broad field for the beautiful spirit.
Unsere Seele ist so beschaffen (welches man vor der Verbesserung der Psychologie nicht
bemerkte), daß eine erstaunende Menge von Vorstellungen im Grunde derselben dunkel
bleiben, daß sie aber oft zu einem geringen Grade der Dunkelheit gelangen und sich
gleichsam an das Reich der Klarheit anhängen. […] Das Reich der Klarheit und dieses Feld
 See 3.4.1 Complexity. See also Frauke Berndt, “In the Twilight Zone: Ambiguity and Aesthet-
ics in Baumgarten,” in Amphibolie – Ambiguität – Ambivalenz, ed. Berndt and Stephan Kammer
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 121– 136.
 See Adler, “Fundus Animae,” 202.
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der dunklen Vorstellungen, das etwas an das Reich der Klarheit anrückt, geben zusam-
mengenommen ein weites Feld für den schönen Geist. (KOLL § 80)
Since neither similarities nor differences can be made out in dark representa-
tions, completely dark sensate representations are incompatible with Baumgar-
ten’s theoretical presuppositions. He therefore suspects beauty to be somewhere
between light and darkness, a transition that he not only characterizes as tem-
poral but also as a spatially intermediate realm – a realm that opens up between
the heavenly domain and the foundation of the soul:
Our opponents say that confusion is the mother of error; let us extend the metaphor; a
mother cannot always give birth, so confusion also cannot always produce errors. In na-
ture, it is not now night and then bright day follows immediately after, but rather there
is a dawn in between them. So we do not immediately have the bright day of knowledge,
but rather confusion comes in between as the dawn.
Unsere Gegner sagen, die Verwirrung ist die Mutter des Irrtums; lasset uns die Metapher
fortsetzen; eine Mutter darf nicht immer gebären, so darf auch die Verwirrung nicht immer
Irrtümer hervorbringen. In der Natur ist nicht jetzt Nacht, und dann folgt gleich heller Mittag,
sondern es ist eine Dämmerung dazwischen. So haben wir nicht gleich hellen Mittag der
Kenntnis, sondern die Verwirrung als die Dämmerung ist dazwischen. (KOLL § 7; see also
MET § 511)
“Nature does not leap from obscurity into distinctiveness” (AE § 7; natura non
facit saltum ex obscuritate in distinctionem). With this statement, Baumgarten
justifies the metaphor of dawn, which stands for ambiguity. Yet such an ambigu-
ity – an equivocality located between perspicuity and darkness, between clear
explicitness and dark indeterminateness – could not have been his intention.
If he had related aesthetic truth to logical truth using the times of day as a
model and assigned a directional vector to this relationship – from the night
through sunrise to midday (ex noctis per auroram meridies; see AE § 7) – then
such a model would represent the unavoidable end of aesthetics’ autonomy
from logic, since every sunrise would be a step on the path toward midday.
His defense of dawn with respect to midday therefore turns out to be some-
what complicated: “We also do not seek it [confusion] because it is confused but
rather because it is vivid; let us give an example from theology: God seeks the
sinner but not because he is a sinner” (KOLL § 7; Wir suchen sie [die Verwirrung]
auch nicht, weil sie verworren ist, sondern weil sie lebhaft ist; und dürfen wir ein
Exempel aus der Theologie geben: Gott sucht den Sünder, aber nicht weil er ein
Sünder ist). Dawn is thus not a particularly apt metaphor for bella evidentia,
since the model of the times of day relates dawn and midday to one another
in a temporal continuum. This model does not adequately represent beauty be-
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cause ambiguity is not a rhetorical vice but rather the most dignified aesthetic
quality.
From an epistemological perspective, Baumgarten is well able to establish
the autonomy of aesthetics from logic. Sensate representations are not distinct
but confused, not obscure but clear, not intensively clear but extensively clear.
These differentiations guide the light metaphors in the prolegomena of the
Aesthetica. But in the sections on aesthetic light (lux aesthetica), they move
away from a kind of provisional solution like dawn to a much more sophisticated
model of light:
Section XXXVII: Aesthetic light (lux aesthetica)
Section XXXVIII: Aesthetic darkness (obscuritas aesthetica)
Section XXXVIIII: Aesthetic shadow (umbra aesthetica)
Section XXXX: The right dispensation of light and shadow (iusta lucis et umbrae dispensa-
tio)
In this shading of aesthetic light, Baumgarten posits that the light and darkness
of sensation are not located between the night and day of reason but are, in-
stead, different from its light and darkness:
Since the lack and opposite of clarity is obscurity, but light and clarity are either sensitive or
intellectual (section XXXVII), the ancients already distinguished quite rightly between ob-
scurity kat’ aisthesin [according to sensation] and obscurity kata noesin [according to intel-
lection]. The thing and thought that, when it is to be perceived by the senses, does not have
enough clarity, meaning extensive clarity, or aesthetic light, is obscure kat’ aisthesin [ac-
cording to sensation].
Defectus et oppositum lucis ac claritatis quum sit obscuritas, lux autem et claritas vel sen-
sitiva, vel intellectualis, S. XXXVII. rectissime iam veteres obscuritatem ϰατ’ αισϑησιν ab
obscuritate ϰατα νοησιν distinxerunt. Res et cogitatio, quae sensitive percipienda non
satis claritatis, extensivae scilicet, aestheticaeque lucis habet, est obscura ϰατ’ αισϑησιν.
(AE § 631)
A different light than that of the sun of logic shines in the realm of aesthetics.
Sensate light (lux sensitiva) does not shine less brightly than the sun but differ-
ently because it involves a kind of indirect illumination (see AE § 617). This twi-
light does not lead from the domain of aesthetics into the domain of logic be-
cause the world of twilight is a different one than that of logic. This indirect
light is suited to the specific structure of aesthetic cognition; it is the illumina-
tion technique of extensively clear representations, from which arises the opacity
of literature.⁴⁹
 See 3.4.2 Opacity.
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Baumgarten differentiates in this indirectly produced light between absolute
and relative aesthetic light. Whereas absolute light shines on the metaphysical
goal of all cognition, aesthetic cognition takes place in relative light. It appears
in the complex, opaque, and performative structure of literary discourse. This rel-
ative light strives toward a goal that it necessarily fails to meet (see AE § 617). In
opposition to active luminosity, aesthetic light only passively reflects absolute
light. This brilliance radiates from a body that does not glow itself but rather
is only shined upon:
And so all aesthetic light you directly strive for will be the sensate perspicuity of things, the
extension of clarity through the multitude of marks (§ 617), and indeed absolute, certainly
comparative, the brilliance and splendor of vivid thoughts and matter (Metaphysica § 531).
Omnis itaque lux aesthetica, quam in rebus intendas directo, perspicuitas rerum erit sen-
sitiva, claritatis per multitudinem notarum extensio, §. 617. etiam absoluta, comparativa
vero vividarum cogitationum et materiae nitor ac splendor. M. §. 531. (AE § 618)
In an open appropriation of Quintilian’s terms,⁵⁰ Baumgarten introduces two
types of beautiful cognition (cognitio pulcra): simple, clear, and distinct
(genus dilucidum et perspicuum) on the one hand, and brilliant and splendid
on the other (genus nitidum et splendidum; see AE § 625). Only the second
type possesses the splendor of beauty, with which he revives the medieval
idea of beauty as splendor veritas; Hegel will later inherit this metaphor from
Baumgarten.With complexity, brilliance increases less in intensity than in exten-
sity and thereby reaches its splendor; for this, Baumgarten uses the attribute
praegnans:⁵¹ “Pregnant perceptions (Metaphysica § 517), and complex ones too
(Metaphysica § 530) if all else is equal, themselves shine more than those that
are less complex, and can become arguments that are illustrative of the whole
meditation they undertake (§ 730)” (AE § 732; Perceptiones praegnantes, M.
§. 517. et complexae, M. §. 530. et ipsae, caetera si fuerint paria, magis splendent,
quam minus complexae, et totius, quam ingrediuntur, meditationis possunt ar-
gumenta fieri illustrantia, §. 730).
The differentiation between absolute and relative aesthetic light also finds
its way into aesthetic darkness. If it is absolute, Baumgarten speaks pejoratively
of aesthetic darkness; if it is relative, he speaks of aesthetic shadow, which he
universally characterizes positively in contrast to darkness and pure night
(nox; see AE § 634). He conceives of six rules for using the art of shading (ars
 See Quint., Inst. 8.2–3.
 See Gottfried Gabriel, “Baumgartens Begriff der ‘perceptio praegnans’ und seine systemati-
sche Bedeutung,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 61–71.
106 4 Metaphysics
obumbrandi), which playfully dips beauty into twilight by means of the appro-
priate illumination (see AE §§ 657–662). With the relationship of absolute light
and relative brightness, absolute darkness and relative shadows, he draws on
a comparison that strongly associates bella evidentia with a deficiency. But it
is a constitutive deficiency: like a painting that only becomes visible in the inter-
play of brightness and shadow, neither absolute light nor absolute darkness ap-
pear in literary texts (see AE § 635). That is the result of Baumgarten’s analysis of
a poem by Catullus:
It is true for all beauty just as for painting, provided that all things are conspicuous through
the light we called absolute, that not all things but rather only certain things that are com-
paratively bright
[shine with a] face as bright as a flower in bud –
white parthenium blossom or
golden yellowish poppy.⁵² (Catull.)
Certain things are truly, are suitably clear, although whenever they are compared to brilliant
and exceedingly illuminated things, they appear opaque, and at first glance they are judged
coarse (§ 621). Not everything but many things shine elegantly in a poem (Hor.; § 625).
Verum in omni venustate generatim, sicut in pictura, modo sint omnia luce, quam absolu-




quaedam sunt vere, sunt belle perspicua, quanquam, cum nitidis illis et admodum collu-
stratis ubi comparentur, appareant opaca, quaeque primo obtutu iudicentur horrida,
§. 621. Eleganter, non omnia, sed plura nitent in carmine. Hor. §. 625. (AE § 624)
The idea of uniform direct light does not do justice to beauty; what does, rather,
is a play of reflected light arising from the quick oscillation of brightness and
shadows. The literary text thus becomes a simulacrum – a will-o’-the-wisp
whose luminosity flits back and forth.
While Baumgarten does not coin a special metaphor for this, Meier does so
in the Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften (1748). With the help of the
metaphor of granularity, he explains the evidentia of pregnant concepts (concep-
tus praegnantes): “Such concepts,which are, as it were, pregnant, give rise to the
granularity [das Körnichte] of our thoughts. As often as one thinks about them,
one discovers something new in them that one had not perceived before, and
one must speedily, so to speak, make an extensive commentary on them.”⁵³
 Quoted (with modification) from Gaius Valerius Catullus, The Poems of Catullus: A Bilingual
Edition, trans. Peter Green (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 61.186– 188.
 Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften, vol. 1, § 126.
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The metaphor of granularity also stands for the structure of literary discourse,
which Baumgarten defines as a spatiotemporal composition. The entry on
körnicht in the Grimm dictionary defines the word as meaning “made up of
grains, in a granular form” and quotes, among others, a cosmological example:
“the ‘..’ shapes whose parts are strung together in a crystalline or granular man-
ner. Humboldt kosm. 1, 165. frequently together with another adj. such as groszkör-
nicht, kleinkörnicht, grobkörnig, feinkörnig, vollkörnig, wahnkörnig etc.”⁵⁴ The
attribute granular thus refers to a structure whose fragments variously refract
light. In a certain way, bella evidentia also appears in a granular manner, that
is, iridescently. Although Baumgarten never traveled and also does not qualify
as a connoisseur of art, he is apparently well acquainted with the staging of
light (light sources, light modeling, etc.) in landscape painting when he de-
scribes the truth of literature as analogous to the truth of a painted landscape
(see AE § 624; indeed, the Aesthetica would go on to influence eighteenth-centu-
ry visual art).⁵⁵ There he is fascinated by the change between illuminated and
unilluminated spots; and it is the relations that arise precisely through this con-
trast – and not, for example, the relations between what is depicted – that give
rise to the effect of the “whole” image; the effect, mind you, and nothing more,
since in its complexity, opacity, and performativity, literature always remains
granular.
When Baumgarten finally comes to a model of bella evidentia, he finds it in
the process of indirect illumination, which is just as different from the darkness
of the fundus animae and the sunlight of reason as it is from the idea of becom-
ing enlightened through a transition from darkness to light. Aesthetic light does
not shine uniformly, nor do single points always glow and others never; instead,
they shimmer in the permanent fluctuation of brightness and shadows. Neither
the brightest spot nor the darkest point reveals the beauty of literature because
literature must remain a thing of the twilight. The metaphors of light thus con-
firm the principle of ambiguity at the core of the metaphysics of beauty, which
situates the order of perfection between abundance and brevity in a constitutive
structural ambiguity. Baumgarten discovers that “unavoidable spin-off effect of a
 Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1873), s.v.
“körnicht.” See also Johann Christoph Adelung, Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hoch-
deutschen Mundart, mit beständiger Vergleichung der übrigen Mundarten, besonders aber der
Oberdeutschen, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: Johann Gottlob Immanuel Breitkopf, 1796), s.vv.
“Körnicht,” “Körnig.”
 See Andreas Jürgensen, “Der ästhetische Horizont: Baumgartens Ästhetik und Malerei um
die Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts” (Diss., Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, 1993).
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superordinate tendency or evolution towards higher autoreferentiality” discernible
in beauty, whose ambiguity is the signature of modernity.⁵⁶
4.2 The Real
4.2.1 Materiality
The order of perfection is ambiguous, and the truth of literature appears in the
twilight. This ambiguity of beauty, which extends Baumgarten’s literary episte-
mology into metaphysics, depends on the concept phaenomenon. In his analysis
of perfection and different lighting conditions, his attention repeatedly turns to
the materiality of literature. For the path, or rather the detour, to beauty always
has to go through the sheer material of signification. Every rhetorical figure or
trope clothes (vestire) a representation as if with a fabric (see AE § 565), which
he seems to think of less as a beautifully falling garment than as a veritable
web. On the basis of this radical materialization of beauty, of all the great nine-
teenth-century works on aesthetics, only Hegel can really be compared with
Baumgarten. When Hegel defines art in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik as a
form of consciously interpreting the world through a representation whose
task is to make truth evident, he emphasizes precisely the materiality of art
that is so central in Baumgarten. His aesthetics thus points toward the future
of a consolidating modernity.⁵⁷ Paying attention to the fact that literature always
appears in the materiality of its signs, he invents the first metaphysics of media;
in Baumgarten’s articulation, it is not a general metaphysics of media but rather
a metaphysics of literature.
With the concept phaenomenon, Baumgarten is concerned with how only
something “that is a phenomenon (§ 14)” (AE § 18; qui phaenomenon sit, §. 14)
can be beautiful. He first establishes the dependence of beauty on phenomenal-
ity in his Metaphysica.⁵⁸ In paragraph 662 – which he refers to in paragraphs 14
and 18 of the Aesthetica, the central paragraphs on beauty in that work – he de-
fines beauty as follows: “The perfection that is a phenomenon <perfectio phae-
 Christoph Bode, “The Aesthetics of Ambiguity,” in Actas del XII Congreso Nacional de la Aso-
ciación Española de Estudios Anglo-Norteamericanos: Alicante, 19–22 de Diciembre de 1988
(Granada: AEDEAN, 1991), 79.
 See Scheer, Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik, 123.
 See Franke, Kunst als Erkenntnis, 76– 116; Schweizer, Ästhetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen
Erkenntnis, 40–81; Paetzold, Ästhetik des deutschen Idealismus, 35–42; Groß, Felix aestheticus,
143– 162.
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nomenon>, or the perfection observable by taste in the broader sense, is BEAUTY,
whereas the imperfection that is a phenomenon <imperfectio phaenomenon>, or
the imperfection observable by taste in the broader sense, is UGLINESS” (MET
§ 662; Perfectio phaenomenon, s. gustui latius dicto observabilis, est PULCRITU-
DO, imperfectio phaenomenon, seu gustui latius dicto observabilis, est DEFOR-
MITAS).
With regard to literature, it is obvious that perfection becomes a phenome-
non on the material surface of the literary text. In the rhetorical canon of inven-
tio, Baumgarten differentiates the beauty of things from that of thoughts (pulcri-
tudo rerum et cogitationum); in the canon of dispositio, he finds the beauty of
order (pulcritudo ordinis), and in the canon of elocutio, that of the means of ex-
pression (pulcritudo significationis). These three types of beauty all also consist
in perfection (see AE §§ 18–24). On the material surfaces of literary texts, they
thus appear in figures of thought (figurae sententiae), figures of order (figurae
ordinis), and figures of speech (figurae significationis, figurae dictionis; see
AE § 26), which now have to be taken seriously in their materiality and also
with regard to their metaphysical aspects. While concepts, which can be repre-
sented in logical formulas, are completely available to human reason, Baumgar-
ten devalues them in comparison to phenomena:
For my part, I believe it is entirely apparent to philosophers that whatever particular formal
perfection is present in cognition and logical truth can only have been acquired with the
loss of much and great material perfection. For what is abstraction if not a loss?
Equi[d]em arbitror philosophis apertissimum esse iam posse, cum iactura multae magnae-
que perfectionis in cognitione et veritate logica materialis emendum fuisse, quicquid ipsi
perfectionis formalis inest praecipuae. Quid enim est abstractio, si iactura non est? (AE
§ 560; see also AE § 562)
In the second half of the eighteenth century, aesthetics actually limits itself to
the question of representations of the beautiful, whereas beautiful representa-
tions as such, either in the acoustic medium of the voice or the graphic medium
of the text, are ignored. In his analysis of the structure of literary discourse,
Baumgarten turns attention to precisely this question.⁵⁹ Almost simultaneously,
Henry Home’s Elements of Criticism (1762) articulates the preconditions for debat-
ing the relation between materiality and beauty, preconditions that apply both to
William Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty (1753) and Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s
art-theoretical writings from the 1760s: “The term beauty, in its native significa-
tion, is appropriated to objects of sight. Objects of the other senses may be agree-
 See 3.3 Semiotics.
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able, such as the sounds of musical instruments, the smoothness and softness of
some surfaces: but the agreeableness denominated beauty belongs to objects of
sight.”⁶⁰ In this context, there are only two possibilities for literature to be beau-
tiful: it is either related, in the context of crude illusionism, to the paradigm of
mimesis – in which case, it is not the arbitrary signs that are beautiful but rather
the image of the world that literature imitates and simulates, possibly better than
the natural signs of the visual arts can – or literature is regarded for its own
manifest beauty,which is based on the specific sensation of acoustic and graphic
media. In the 1760s, however, when Lessing and Denis Diderot laid the ground-
work for semiotic aesthetics, this second possibility did not come into consider-
ation.
To analyze the capacity of literature and visual arts to simulate beauty, Les-
sing and Diderot turn their attention to the different forms of intuition of the two
media. The bottom line of the examination is, contrary to traditional poetics,
their incompatibility: poetry is unlike a picture – ut pictura poesis non erit, as
Diderot formulates the new anti-Horatian phrase in his response to the 1767
Salon.⁶¹ For the non of this analogy, Lessing proposes the two well-known medial
passe-partouts: the temporal successiveness of language and the spatial simul-
taneity of the image. Based on them, he evaluates each medium’s suitability
for representing the beautiful and finds, as Joachim Jacob summarizes, that
“the beautiful is ‘uncomfortable’ for a linguistic representation that develops
in the course of discourse” because it “is a quality of an object that is only ad-
equately disclosed to a simultaneous visual impression.”⁶² According to Lessing,
the prudent poet “abstains entirely from the depiction of physical beauty as
such,” since “the concentrating glance which we try to cast back on the parts
after they have been enumerated fails to produce the effect of a harmonious
image.”⁶³
With such arguments, eighteenth-century media aesthetics is subject to the
tyranny of mimesis. The possibility of literary beauty – of a beauty of literature –
suffers under this subjugation;⁶⁴ paintings and sculptures are beautiful in this
sense, not texts. The concept of representation (Darstellung) thus serves as an
 Henry Home (Lord Kames), Elements of Criticism, vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1762; facsimile, Hildes-
heim: Georg Olms, 1970), 242–243.
 See Denis Diderot, Salons, ed. Jean Seznec and Jean Adhémar, vol. 3, 1767 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1963), 108.
 Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur, 187.
 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, trans. Ed-
ward Allen McCormick (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 104.
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
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“index and medium of an upheaval in the history of theory.”⁶⁵ Baumgarten, Les-
sing, and Herder use this concept to critique aesthetic illusion when they begin
to consider the nonintuitive remainder of language. With language, the “new
structure” of a linguistically mediated “imaginative synthesis” prevails in “thor-
oughly obscure sequences”⁶⁶ – a structure that is itself medially realized since it
combines what Lessing separates into the spatial form of intuiting texts and the
temporal form of intuiting voices.⁶⁷
By approaching literature with a metaphysics of media, Baumgarten posi-
tions himself somewhat askew to the discourses dominating the second half
of the eighteenth century. His engagement with the structure of literary discourse
and its functions of complexity, opacity, and performativity anticipates many ar-
guments that formalism and phenomenology will use to turn attention to the me-
dium of literature. Because he decouples beauty from vision and visuality,⁶⁸
beauty appears in the linguistic form itself: in letters, in conceptualized sounds
recalled by letters, and, above all, in the combination of signs, words, and sen-
tences that forms the graphic medium of the text as a whole.
Baumgarten even supplies the beauty of literature with an index of move-
ment. Whereas Winckelmann tries once again to tie beauty, equanimity, and
morality together in a single package, the categories of energy and life are at
the center of reception aesthetics in the second half of the eighteenth century,
which undergoes a paradigm change from docere to movere. As Jacob explains,
“This leads to the consequence of either, as Lessing demonstrates, charging the
beautiful with movement, or, following Edmund Burke’s example, placing it as
‘calm beauty’ – which is usually devalued in its aesthetic valence – in opposition
to an ‘animate sublime.’”⁶⁹ It is not by accident that Lessing sets beauty in mo-
tion using a concept that aesthetics shares with nascent neurophysiology. “Sti-
mulus [Reiz] is beauty in motion,”⁷⁰ as Lessing defines the media-specific beauty
of literature,⁷¹ a beauty that implements the impulses of movement as if they
were triggered by electrodes in a muscle.
This definition of a specifically literary beauty falls, however, far behind
Baumgarten’s. When he considers the general conditions of beauty at the inter-
 Menninghaus, “Darstellung,” 205.
 Inka Mülder-Bach, Im Zeichen Pygmalions: Das Modell der Statue und die Entdeckung der
“Darstellung” im 18. Jahrhundert (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1998), 142.
 See 3.3 Semiotics.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur, 259.
 Lessing, Laocoön, 112, translation modified. See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur, 242.
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face with the sublime, he defines all beauty as always and necessarily animate.⁷²
And he aims to provide the animate beauty of the performative literary text with
a mythology when he calls aesthetics the “philosophy of the Muses and Graces”
(KOLL § 1; Philosophie der Musen und der Grazien). He may have been familiar
with the concept of grace in English aesthetics. For example, Hogarth’s articula-
tion of grace bears a resemblance to Baumgarten’s performativity, the third func-
tion of the structure of literary discourse – that is, the sensate will that sets lit-
erature in motion and is compared to a dancer’s elegant movements.⁷³ For
Hogarth, the “line of grace” is, as Jacob explains, even superior to the “line of
beauty.” This is because the line of grace “adds a further dimension to the beau-
tiful in technique and, reaching far into the depths, is able to unite a variety to
an even greater extent. For the painter Hogarth, beauty and grace are thus decid-
edly painterly and sculptural categories, categories that relate to one another ac-
cording to the measure of complexity that is represented or made visible.”⁷⁴
Baumgarten realizes this possibility of translating grace from the visual arts
into literature, a possibility that is offered above all by Home, who notes that
both dance and public speaking can show grace: “Dancing affords great oppor-
tunity for displaying grace, and haranguing still more.”⁷⁵
In sum, beauty can never escape the two media of literature, text and voice.⁷⁶
Baumgarten therefore not only reflects on the metaphysics of phenomenal par-
ticularity but also on this metaphysics as a metaphysics of literature. Differently
from Meier, for whom media are merely “channels […] through which beautiful
thoughts flow out of one beautiful spirit and into another”⁷⁷ – and so also differ-
ently from the practice of suppressing or denying the materiality of the medium
or regulating it through fetishization in the age of sensibility (Empfindsamkeit) –
Baumgarten brings media into the horizon of theoretical reflection.⁷⁸ Considering
that even Lessing “foregoes formulating a concept of beauty tuned to the require-
ments of the poetic medium,”⁷⁹ Baumgarten’s model of the beautiful text is truly
something new.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
 Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur, 263.
 Home, Elements of Criticism, 1:348.
 See 3.3 Semiotics.
 Meier, Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften, § 711.
 See Karlheinz Stierle, “Das bequeme Verhältnis: Lessings Laokoon und die Entdeckung des
ästhetischen Mediums,” in Das Laokoon-Projekt: Pläne einer semiotischen Ästhetik, ed. Gunter
Gebauer (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1984), 23–24.
 Jacob, Die Schönheit der Literatur, 254.
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4.2.2 Formlessness
In the course of metaphysically legitimizing materiality in the sections on aes-
thetic truth (veritas aesthetica), something epistemologically exciting happens.
There Baumgarten becomes stuck on the example of an unhewn marble block
(see AE § 560), an example that he hopes will help elevate the standing of phe-
nomena in comparison to concepts. At this point in the text, he has already
shown how examples themselves are an excellent example of literariness.⁸⁰
Searching for the role of materiality in his media metaphysics of literature, he
turns to an example to capture what cannot be philosophically expressed in a
concept or even with the help of metaphors.What the marble block accomplishes
is simple to explain: Baumgarten has to think about a real object because this
thinking helps him on his way to exciting insights. He then projects his insights
about the marble block onto the concept of aesthetic truth. Through this projec-
tion, his statements about objective, real, material truth apply to aesthetic truth,
which is by definition a subjective truth. Thus, to a certain extent, the phenom-
enon models aesthetic cognition, and Baumgarten finally interfolds metaphysica
obiectiva and subiectiva into the twofold nature of beauty.
It is not without reason that Baumgarten chooses – as many others do after
him – sculpture as the reference medium for beauty, though he does not commit
to the human body as the symbolic intuition of perfection as Winckelmann,
Herder, Karl Philipp Moritz, and Johann Wolfgang Goethe later do.⁸¹ And
when Baumgarten interprets the example of the unhewn marble block semioti-
cally, he also does not fix the sign to the (partial) correspondence of shape and
meaning (see AE § 561) as it is later formulated with the concept of the intuitive
symbol (Anschauungssymbol) in the Goethezeit. Instead, the marble block gen-
erates its meaning on the basis of its own wealth of relations, and the material
excess of this wealth is beautiful: “By similar reasoning, one cannot produce a
marble globe out of irregularly shaped marble, at least not without such a
loss of material that the price of roundness will be quite high” (AE § 560; Pari
ratione ex marmore irregularis figurae non efficias globum marmoreum, nisi
cum tanto saltim materiae detrimento, quantum postulabit maius rotunditatis
pretium). The unhewn marble block does not have any form corresponding to
a geometric concept. In its fragmentariness, it nevertheless proves to be more
beautiful, and thus more perfect and more true, than the sphere. In the unhewn
 See 2.2 Analogy. See also Frauke Berndt, “Rock Sample: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in
Aesthetic Theory, ed. Dieter Mersch, Sylvia Sasse, and Sandro Zanetti, trans. Brian Alkire (Zurich:
Diaphanes, 2019), 21–35.
 See Mülder-Bach, Im Zeichen Pygmalions, 20–48.
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stone, Baumgarten does not want to round off anything or bring anything into a
form even if the sublimity of the phenomenon that arises from this abstention
exceeds the human powers of comprehension. That is exactly why the marble
block is an example of aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica).
Both Mirbach and Johannes Hees have pointed out that Baumgarten’s search
for aesthetic truth draws on Leibniz’s ontological concept of individuality.⁸² In
his introduction to the German translation of Leibniz’s Nouveaux essais sur l’en-
tendement humain (1765; written between 1703 and 1705), Cassirer notes:
But according to the fundamental principle that Leibnizian metaphysics expresses and un-
dertakes in full clarity for the first time, the character of the real lies in its thorough indi-
viduality. […] For if pure mathematical space is characterized by its total uniformity, then
matter is characterized by its thorough dissimilarity. Here in real being and happening,
there are no two elements that are completely similar, no two movements that are identical
to one another in all their individual phases. There are only the “same parts” in an abstrac-
tion that can arbitrarily disregard certain differing moments; not in reality, whose particu-
larity goes on infinitely. But how can this boundless manifold of reality be merged with the
demand for unity that lies in our understanding; how can the universality of rules and laws
grasp the individual, in which “being” originally and actually consists?⁸³
To deal with these metaphysical problems, Leibniz also employs a comparison
with an unhewn marble block in the Nouveaux essais, a comparison that Baum-
garten doubtlessly takes from him while making, however, decisive corrections.
For Leibniz, the marble illustrates the philosophical problem of innate ideas:
I have also used the analogy of a veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homog-
eneous block of marble, or to a blank tablet – what the philosophers call a tabula rasa. For
if the soul were like such a blank tablet then truths would be in us as the shape of Hercules
is in a piece of marble when the marble is entirely neutral as to whether it assumes this
shape or some other. However, if there were veins in the block which marked out the
shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then that block would be more determined
to that shape and Hercules would be innate in it, in a way, even though labour would
 See Dagmar Mirbach, “Einführung zur fragmentarischen Ganzheit von Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgartens Aesthetica (1750/58),” in Mirbach, ed. Ästhetik by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,
trans. Mirbach, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2007), xv–lxxx; Johannes Hees, “Denken und Be-
trachten: Zur Proto-Ästhetik bei Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz und Barthold Hinrich Brockes,” Zeit-
schrift für Ästhetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 64.1 (2019): 87– 109.
 Ernst Cassirer, “Einleitung,” in Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand, by Gott-
fried Wilhelm Leibniz, trans. Cassirer, vol. 3 of Philosophische Werke, ed. Cassirer (Hamburg:
Felix Meiner, 1996), xxiv–xxv.
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be required to expose the veins and to polish them into clarity, removing everything that
prevents their being seen. This is how ideas and truths are innate in us.⁸⁴
With the example of the marble block, Baumgarten is not interested in the prob-
lem of innate ideas. He is interested, rather, in its marbled materiality as such;
or, more provocatively, he is interested in the real – the material remainder that
constitutes objective, real, material truth (veritas realis, materialis). And with
precisely this marble block, he switches from discussing subjective truth to dis-
cussing objective truth. This switch, which is a philosophical no-go, proves to be
key to this theory of literature. For in Baumgarten’s metaphysics of beauty, the
beautiful is the material or the real in the sense of Jacques Lacan, who makes,
as I have summarized elsewhere, exactly the same movement between the sub-
ject and the object when he defines the real: “It [the real] forms, with the imag-
inary and the symbolic, the third position in the triad that constitutes the foun-
dation of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Like the other two concepts, the real also
refers to a psychic structure; but in relation to the imaginary and the symbolic,
it does not represent a mere remainder even though it is incomprehensible, un-
thinkable, impossible, and, above all, unsayable. Instead, Lacan defines the real
as something that eludes symbolization (and imagination), indeed, as something
that represents a resistance to the symbolic and, to a certain extent, a cut in the
symbolic.”⁸⁵ Baumgarten thus uses the example of the marble block to conceive
the real of the literary text, that is, its phenomenality, which confronts him with
the materially incommensurable remainder of literature.
When one considers the role of the marble block in discussing subjective
truth and the role of aesthetics in aestheticological truth, it becomes clear that
this example will have to stage the confrontation with the real as something
overwhelming. In fact, Baumgarten does trace how the subject is overtaxed by
the object’s sheer materiality. In his own argumentation, this inundation is ex-
pressed in a series of further examples, which again reflects his lack of concepts
for the problem he wants to describe. Instead of a single philosophical concept,
he cites three concepts that the Aristotelian tradition uses to refer to formless
matter: forest, Chaos, and matter (silva, Chao, et materia). He then returns to
the example of the marble block when he investigates working on the material,
the sculptor’s work with his tools on the marble. In contrast to Leibniz’s interpre-
tation, however, a human torso like Hercules does not appear out of the marble;
 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. Peter Rem-
nant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), para. 52.
 Frauke Berndt, “Das Reale,” in Handbuch Literatur & Psychoanalyse, ed. Berndt and Eckart
Goebel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2017), 638.
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instead, as little material as possible is to be lost. Baumgarten is concerned with
the apotheosis of formlessness, not with form – neither with geometric spheres
nor with classical sculpture. If, indeed, he is concerned with Hercules, then he is
interested in the destroyed, formless parts of a statue, just as Winckelmann is
fascinated by the fragmentariness of the Belvedere Torso, in whose formlessness
he imagines the presence of the actual mythological god in his Beschreibung des
Torso im Belvedere zu Rom (1755):⁸⁶
The aesthetic horizon especially delights, however, in the singular, individual, and most de-
termined things exhibiting the greatest material perfection of aestheticological truth, in its
forest, Chaos, and matter (§ 129), out of which it sculpts aesthetic truth into a form that is, if
not perfect, nevertheless beautiful (§§ 558, 14) such that while it is being worked, as little
materially perfected truth as possible may be lost and, for the sake of elegance, be rubbed
away by its own power (§ 563).
praesertim autem perfectionem materialem veritatis aestheticologicae maximam exhibenti-
bus singularibus, individuis, et determinatissimis fruitur horizon aestheticus, sua silva,
Chao, et materia, §. 129. ex quibus veritatem aestheticam ad formam, nisi perfectam omni-
no, pulcram tamen, §. 558, 14. ita exsculpat, ut inter elaborandum, quam fieri potest mini-
mum veritatis materialiter perfectae pereat et elegantiae caussa pollendo deteratur, §. 563.
(AE § 564)
With the comparisons, Baumgarten also draws a line back to the philosophical
concepts he uses to define the example – to singular, particular, and most-deter-
mined objects. This exceptional and thus thoroughly modern truth only applies
to them. It is this truth that is visually and affectively evident, that both stands
before the eyes and touches and moves us.
When Baumgarten wants to describe the role of aesthetics in aestheticolog-
ical truth, the role that the example plays in his literary epistemology changes. In
the Meditationes, the example is an example of literature, or rather of literari-
ness. The objects of his observations and descriptions are single examples,
such as Horace’s first ode or the catalogue of ships in the second canto of Ho-
mer’s Iliad (see MED §§ 19–20), but these examples are, to a certain extent,
only examples of the example itself; and the example itself is, in turn, an exam-
ple of what literature is; and literature is itself, finally, an example of aesthetic
cognition. Baumgarten therefore treats examples in the Aesthetica because, first,
 See Frauke Berndt, “Ex marmore: Evidenz im Ungeformten bei J. J. Winckelmann und A. G.
Baumgarten,” in Präsenz und Evidenz fremder Dinge im Europa des 18. Jahrhunderts, ed. Birgit
Neumann (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015), 73–96; Ralf Simon, “Petites perceptions und ästhetische
Form,” in Leibniz in Philosophie und Literatur um 1800, ed. Wenchao Li and Monika Meier (Hil-
desheim: Georg Olms, 2016), 210–212.
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the analogon of reason can only grasp aesthetic truth sensately, that is, through
examples. And, second, he uses them – for better or worse – at the crucial point
on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), which starts with a series: the marble
block, the forest, Chaos, and matter are not merely deployed where knowledge
is lacking or too complex but rather where knowledge no longer has a proposi-
tional form at all.
This discovery of a new aesthetic truth that is precisely not analogous to log-
ical truth drives Baumgarten to switch within his own discourse from a concep-
tual mode to a literary one. It is in this moment, in using examples, that the phi-
losopher himself becomes a poet. For the creative poet can do something that the
strict philosopher does not even dare to dream of: he simply transfers real or ma-
terial truth from the position of the object (veritas obiectiva) in his philosophical
system to the position of the subject (veritas subiectiva). There, real or material
truth organizes Baumgarten’s concept of aesthetic truth. The example thus does
not illustrate aesthetic truth. Instead, the marble block develops a “dynamic of
displacement” that he condenses into a series of metonymies: “silva, Chao, et
materia.” As an etymological “trope that displaces borders,”⁸⁷metonymy thereby
accomplishes exactly what the conceptual work of philosophy is incapable of ac-
complishing. Baumgarten etymologically displaces the border between premod-
ern and modern knowledge – as well as between conceptual and nondiscursive
knowledge – just enough for the new concept of aesthetic truth to be inserted
into the eighteenth-century order of knowledge, and he condenses this new con-
cept in a series of examples since he lacks other concepts to explain it.
By doing so, he also separates – I would say irrevocably – similarity from the
epistemology of the exemplary. The marble block, the forest, Chaos, and matter
are neither similar nor dissimilar nor opposite to aesthetic truth. Baumgarten
does not ground his analogy ontologically like Leibniz, nor does he anchor it eth-
ically in the archive of things that have been held to be similar. In the literary
mode, examples attain autonomy. The marble block, the forest, Chaos, and mat-
ter are not analogies for aesthetic truth because they produce a semantic relation
between a particular and another particular but rather because, in their form-
lessness, they embody the nondiscursivity of aesthetic truth in a structurally
analogous way. The example is thereby the relay between the episteme of repre-
sentation and the episteme of presence. With this structural analogy, Baumgar-
ten’s literary epistemology does not, of course, collapse in a logical paradox
that does not allow any differentiation between embodiment and the embodied.
 Wolfram Groddeck, Reden über Rhetorik: Zu einer Stilistik des Lesens (Frankfurt am Main:
Stroemfeld, 1995), 234.
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Instead, his analogy drifts metonymically in the direction of the never-reachable
vanishing point of aesthetic truth: beauty. And again, this dynamic requires that
sensate desire be considered both in epistemology⁸⁸ – where it primarily appears
as the performativity of the structure of literary discourse⁸⁹ – and in metaphys-
ics.⁹⁰
In the Aesthetica, Baumgarten copes with this philosophical crisis, which lit-
erally leaves him speechless, by inserting an epistemologically exciting break in
the argumentation: namely, he suddenly returns from metaphysics to rhetoric.
According to Baumgarten’s summation of his theoretical experiment, literature
cannot actually be true at all in a philosophical sense – neither objectively
nor subjectively, neither logically nor aesthetically – and the whole metaphysics
of beauty was just a waste of time. Literature – this is his conclusion – cannot
claim any kind of truth but rather only truth-likeness. That is the crux that Baum-
garten attends to in section 29 on aesthetic verisimilitude (verisimilitudo aesthe-
tica). Precisely this rhetorical concept takes him to a new field of literary theory –
the theory of poetic fiction.⁹¹
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 See 3.4.3 Performativity.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
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5 Narratology
5.1 Prose
That literature can be true – aesthetically true – is somewhat plausible as long as
one remains on the abstract level of concepts. But right in the middle of his
metaphysics of beauty, in the sections on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), a
challenging question upsets Baumgarten’s reflections: Can poetic fiction be
true? And if yes, how true? If the question of the truth of aesthetic cognition
drives him to despair, then the truth of poetic fiction pushes his project to the
brink of collapse.While he usually progresses from section to section with amaz-
ing consistency, he suddenly interrupts his argumentation on aesthetic truth to
cope with this challenging question and inserts three revolutionary sections:
Section XXX: Fictions (fictiones)
Section XXXI: Poetic fictions (fictiones poeticae)
Section XXXII: Fables (fabulae)
Together, I call these sections the sections on fiction.¹ They have not played a
noteworthy role in the scholarship; only Hans Adler has considered Baum-
garten’s “phenomenology of fiction” in the Meditationes.² Yet in these three sec-
tions of the Aesthetica, Baumgarten lays out his own narratology and the first
modern theory of fiction, over twenty years before Friedrich von Blanckenburg’s
Versuch über den Roman (1774) and Johann Jakob Engel’s Ueber Handlung, Ge-
spräch und Erzehlung (1774), which are considered the most significant German
contributions to narratology in the eighteenth century.³ Baumgarten’s sections
on fiction may therefore be the most exciting and unprecedented in the entire
Aesthetica.
So far I have shown how Baumgarten’s investigation into beauty and the real
provides a metaphysical explanation for the three functions of the structure of
 See Frauke Berndt, “Mundus poetarum: A. G. Baumgartens Fiktionstheorie,” in Komplexität
und Einfachheit: DFG-Symposion 2015, ed. Albrecht Koschorke (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2017),
316–338.
 Hans Adler, “Utopie und Imagination: A. G. Baumgartens Fiktionstheorie am Rande der
Aufklärung,” in Positive Dialektik: Hoffnungsvolle Momente in der deutschen Kultur; Festschrift
für Klaus L. Berghahn zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Jost Hermand (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 24. See
5.3.2 Probability.
 See Sebastian Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie: Studien zu Goethes frühen Erzählungen
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2019), 72–78.
OpenAccess. © 2020 Frauke Berndt, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110624519-006
literary discourse: complexity, opacity, and performativity. The matrix of his con-
cept of literature consists in the poetic passages of literary texts; indeed, Baum-
garten often finds his examples in lyric poetry, and in the Meditationes he above
all considers phenomena like rhyme, meter, and rhythm, so his literary theory in
that work tends toward poetics. The Aesthetica too has a distinctly poetological
character, but genre does not play any role in the examples he selects. With
poema, Baumgarten is thus concerned with a general concept of literature,
which is additionally confirmed by the fact that in eighteenth-century German,
the terms Gedicht and Dichtung do not only designate poems but rather literature
more generally.
The Aesthetica’s arguments are not just indifferent to genre; they actually
dissolve genre boundaries in the concept of literature. For example, Baumgarten
does not care whether an author is “a writer of prose, a writer of verse, a painter,
or a sculptor etc.” (AE § 592; sive prosaicus scriptor, sive metricus, sive pictor,
sive sculptor, e.c. fuerit).⁴ Baumgarten would, of course, have been familiar
with genre concepts defined by linguistic forms. Prose is based on the flow
and grammar of discursive language, whereas verse manipulates rhyme, meter,
and rhythm.Yet he elides these differences by focusing on tropes. And his tropol-
ogy not only dissolves boundaries between genres but also between media. For
example, he defines metaphor as
every elegant substitution of one perception for another, whether signified with transferred
words, which is most familiar, or with sounds substituted for each other by a musician, or
with colors by a painter, or when through any other type of sign you express that you ele-
gantly have one thing in mind in place of another.
omnem elegantem perceptionis unius pro altera substitutionem, sive vocabulis translatis
significetur, quod notissimum, sive sonis sibi invicem substitutis a musico, sive coloribus
a pictore, sive per aliud quodcunque signorum genus eleganter te pro uno aliud cogitasse
exprimas. (AE § 780)
Considering such formulations, one can assume that Baumgarten’s concept of lit-
erature tends toward being a medial concept; perhaps his literary theory is even
a mediology.While I have shown that this is not the case with regard to the dom-
inance of literature as the medium of reference,⁵ the dissolution of boundaries in
the concept of literature confirms that he is hardly interested in literary genres in
the Aesthetica, which distances his theory from poetics.
 See 6 Ethics.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
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Considering this disregard for genre, it is striking that the sections on fiction
focus on the two great founding narratives of Rome,Virgil’s Aeneis and Livy’s Ab
urbe condita. In these sections, he additionally cites – in alphabetical order –
other narratives from Roman antiquity, again mixing epic and historical genres:
Pseudo-Ausonius’s In Didonis imaginem, Silius Italicus’s Punica, Statius’s Achil-
leid and Thebaid, Juvenal’s Satire XV, Ovid’s Metamorphoseon, Petronius’s Saty-
ricon, and Virgil’s Georgica. He also occasionally cites Horace’s Carmina, Ter-
ence’s Andria, and secondhand examples from Horace, Quintilian, and Cicero.
Most of these texts are, of course, not in prose but in verse; in particular, Virgil’s
Aeneis uses the hexameter of heroic verse.
Yet Baumgarten seems nevertheless to be thinking of prose, which shares its
narrative form, though not its linguistic form, with the ancient epics he treats.
This can be seen in the etymological displacement that organizes his argument.⁶
The concept of prose appears in the paragraphs on truth where he refers to the
three Aristotelian metaphors for formless matter: “forest, Chaos, and matter
(§ 129)” (AE § 564; silva, Chao, et materia, §. 129).⁷ The concept silva is also
used by Latin poets as a title for collections of “raw” occasional poems, which
are born from the “chaos” of improvisation and wait as “matter” or material
for further refinement. In this sense, Quintilian notes how there are poets
“who elect to make a draft of the whole subject as rapidly as possible, and
write impromptu, following the heat and impulse of the moment. They call
this draft their ‘raw material’ [silva].”⁸ In his use of silva, Baumgarten may
have been thinking of the Silvae of the Roman poet Statius, whom he cites in
the sections on fiction. But there is little reason to bring into play, as Simon
does, Herder’s theoretical essays entitled Kritische Wälder, which only appeared
in 1769.⁹ In any case, in the Aesthetica, the concept of prose does not refer to a
linguistic form but to a decomposition of form. Baumgarten thus does not define
the concept of prose positively but rather negatively; in contrast to the forms of
verse, prose appears in literary texts that exhibit only weak formal structures,
though they do tell stories.
Because he developed his theory of literature over a period – between the
Meditationes (1735) and the Aesthetica (1750/1758) – when the literary field was
fundamentally changing and the novel was rising to prominence, Baumgarten
was confronted with the problem that a theory claiming universal validity and
devoted to the philosophically explosive question of the truth of literature
 See 2.3 Etymology.
 See 4.2.2 Formlessness.
 Quint., Inst. 10.3.17.
 Cf. Ralf Simon, Die Idee der Prosa, 52–54.
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could not concentrate only on lyric poetry and ignore the novel. In the middle of
the eighteenth century, as early modern romance and picaresque novels were
being supplanted and the modern novel was beginning to take shape, the
genre of the novel moved with rapid speed to become the focus of intellectual
attention to literature. In the 1730s, Johann Gottfried Schnabel published Die
Insel Felsenburg under the pseudonym Gisander; in the 1740s, Samuel Richard-
son wrote his sentimental novels in England; Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones ap-
peared in 1749; and in the 1750s, Christoph Martin Wieland began publishing
his novels.
In addition to the appearance of these seminal novels in the decades leading
up to Baumgarten’s Aesthetica, the novel also attained a relatively fixed position
and definition in encyclopedic knowledge. In his analysis of eighteenth-century
theories of the novel, Sebastian Meixner notes that the entry on “Romanen, Ro-
mainen, Romans” from the 1742 volume of Johann Heinrich Zedler’s Grosses voll-
ständiges Universal-Lexicon Aller Wissenschafften und Künste “is taken – except
for negligible changes in its formulations – word for word” from the 1722 edition
of the Allgemeines historisches Lexicon edited by Johann Franz Buddeus.¹⁰ This
suggests that by the time of the Aesthetica, the novel was a well-established
genre. This must have suddenly become clear to Baumgarten in the sections
on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), where he seems prompted to change the
parameters for the concept of literature. There he tries to prove his theory of lit-
erature with regard to this expansion of the subject matter, though he only tests
it on ancient epics and not on such wondrous and adventurous stories as Miguel
de Cervantes’s Don Quijote (1605/1615) or on the novels by his contemporaries.
In his recent study on theories of prose, Simon defines the “maximal elastic-
ity of form” found in great epics and encyclopedic novels as the matrix of Baum-
garten’s aesthetics. In doing so, he ascribes an implicit concept of prose to
Baumgarten and places his aesthetics in a tradition of prose and reflection on
prose that goes back to François Rabelais and forward to Jean Paul, James
Joyce, and Arno Schmidt, a tradition that makes it possible “to call the poema
prose.”¹¹ Contrary to this invention of a generic genealogy, I am of the view
that Baumgarten does not present a genre poetics of the epic in his sections
on fiction. The only genre that he really treats as a genre in a narrow sense is,
of all things, the fable. And only a single concrete collection of fables is the
basis of section 32 on fables (fabulae): Phaedrus’s Fabulae Aesopiae, which free-
ly adapts Aesop’s Greek fables in iambic senarii. The masters of the fable are
 Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 47n7.
 Simon, Die Idee der Prosa, 53.
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missing from Baumgarten’s sources, as is any trace of modern fables. He places
the fable at the center of his reflections on fiction because it was particularly im-
portant to Enlightenment discussions about using literature for didactic purpos-
es. He may thus have discovered the theoretical relevance of the fable in the rhe-
torical textbooks he worked with or in Lessing’s Fabeln, an Enlightenment
rejoinder to Jean de La Fontaine’s Fables choisies, mises en vers (1668). Lessing’s
work appeared in 1759 and served as a model for eighteenth-century narratolo-
gy,¹² but it cannot be proved that Baumgarten was familiar with it.
In fact, neither the epic nor the fable lead him to consider genre poetics,
which historical narratology views as containing theories of fiction avant la let-
tre. This is because Baumgarten is not concerned with prose genres but rather
with expanding his concept of literature. With the weak formal structures
found in epics and fables, he transitions from the level of form to the level of
content. In Virgil, Livy, and Phaedrus, he turns his attention to the stories nar-
rated in epics and fables. Hence, when Baumgarten considers what aesthetic
truth might be, the problems associated with conceptualizing aesthetic truth
compete in his argumentation with problems related to the objects of thought
and representation (Darstellung). His attention therefore shifts in the sections
on fiction from the how to the what of literature in such a way that he implicitly
differentiates, like twentieth-century structuralists, between discourse and story.
Based on these considerations, neither prose nor the fable can serve as alterna-
tives to Baumgarten’s concept of literature; instead, they are subordinate to the
concept poema, which he further elaborates in the sections on fiction.
This shift from how to what is not surprising since the novel, lurking in the
background, is like a thorn in this philosopher’s side. Indeed, one could even go
a step further and argue that Baumgarten projects the formlessness of the novel
onto the narrative genres of antiquity. In this context, one should remember that
the whole project of the Aesthetica has an apologetic character since he must jus-
tify the new science to the philosophers’ guild. How can a philosopher devote
himself to aesthetic cognition when only logic can lay claim to truth? That is
the central problem.¹³ Something so unthinkable as explaining aesthetic truth
by employing a general concept of literature as the model for aesthetic cognition
only barely works. Baumgarten already sows the seeds for his theory of fiction in
the Meditationes: “The objects of such representations are either possible or im-
possible in the real world. Let the latter be called fictions and the former true
fictions. […] Only true and heterocosmic fictions are poetic, § 50, § 52” (MED
 See Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 51–55.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
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§§ 51, 53; Repraesentationum talium obiecta vel in mundo existente possibilia vel
impossibilia. Has FIGMENTA, illas liceat dicere FIGMENTA VERA. […] Sola
figmenta vera & heterocosmica sunt poetica. §. 50 52).
Baumgarten’s theory of literature manages to integrate the question of
whether literature is true or not through a twofold argumentation. First, he care-
fully approaches the structures of narratives on the level of discourse (discours).
Second, he relates poetic fiction to his ontology, working on the level of the story
(histoire) to address modes of truth in worlds that do not correspond to our own
actual world because they are remembered, dreamed, foreseen, anticipated, or
imagined. Because Baumgarten first places ontology on a secure foundation be-
fore inserting the sections on fiction into his inquiries on aesthetic truth, one
could say that he first analyzes narrative discourse so as, second, to modify on-
tology on that basis. Representation and truth once again depend on one anoth-
er here, as Baumgarten’s comparative analysis of Virgil’s and Livy’s narratives of
the founding of Rome will make clear.
Following this insight, the layout of my chapter on Baumgarten’s narratology
ties narrativity and fictionality into a twofold unity, retracing the steps we have
already taken in the previous chapters. In 5.2 Narrativity, I return to my analysis
of sensate cognition and sensate desire (see 3 Epistemology) so as to add a nar-
rative function to the three functions of the structure of literary discourse. I do
not base my argumentation in this part on Genette or on other structuralist nar-
ratologists but rather on the minimal definition of narration that both historical
narratology and transmedial narratology work with. This definition posits that
narrative conveys sequences of at least two linked events, which narratology
calls narrative events. The next two subsections discuss sequentiality (5.2.1)
and mediation (5.2.2), the two characteristics of the structure of literary discourse
that Baumgarten observes and analyzes in his examples. In 5.3 Fictionality, I re-
turn to the metaphysical problems of the structure of literary discourse (see 4
Metaphysics) in order to address the problems relevant to the narrative function.
I do not limit my analysis to the sections on fiction but rather look again at the
sections on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica) to show that Baumgarten invents
an aesthetic ontology or even cosmology. In these sections, he attempts to clas-
sify different groups of narratives, which leads to a surprising explanation of lit-
erature and its truth. Sections on possibility (5.3.1), probability (5.3.2), and acces-




In chapter 2 on methodology, I argued that aesthetic discourse functions with the
help of a translation machine. This makes it possible for Baumgarten to describe
different aspects of aesthetics with the same six concepts: abundance, greatness,
truth, clarity, certitude, and life. The translation begins with epistemology (psy-
chology, rhetoric, semiotics, poetics) and then leads to metaphysics (and later
even to ethics).¹⁴ Baumgarten’s narratology, too, functions with the help of
this machine. Above all, he employs the central concept (con)nexus, which is
rooted in the complexity, opacity, and performativity of the structure of literary
discourse. He uses this concept in the context of psychology and rhetoric, when
he analyzes the structure of narratives, and in the context of ontology and cos-
mology, when he considers the structure of worlds. This results in different types
of narratives and worlds serving as variables in the structure of literary dis-
course. I will elaborate this in what follows.
Baumgarten does not reinvent the wheel for his narratology. Poetic fiction is
also anchored in the faculties of sensate cognition, which he posits in the Me-
ditationes, explains in the Metaphysica, and carries over into the Aesthetica.
This faculty consists in the imagination (phantasia), perspicacity (perspicacia),
memory (memoria), the faculty of invention (facultas fingendi), foresight (prae-
visio), judgment (iudicium), anticipation (praesagitio), and the faculty of charac-
terization (facultas characteristica).¹⁵ In section 7 on the faculty of invention (fa-
cultas fingendi) in part 3 of the Metaphysica on psychology (psychologia),
Baumgarten delineates the poetic faculty and defines invention structurally as
the ability to separate the attributes of an object – which he calls its marks
(notae) following rationalist philosophy – and then to combine them into a
new object. This faculty thus formally operates pars pro toto like synecdoche
(see AE § 505). Mythological figures such as the centaur or mermaid, which Hor-
ace uses to introduce his “Ars poetica,” serve as prototypes for this operation:
the centaur combines marks from a horse and a man, and the mermaid marks
from a woman and a fish (see AE § 446). This is why the English translation of
the Metaphysica uses invent for the Latin fingere; the German translation uses
the word dichten, which means something like “to compose literature” and is fit-
 See 6 Ethics.
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
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ting in this context since the faculty of invention is characterized as being poetic
(facultas poetica fingendi):
By SEPARATING and combining images, i.e. by only being attentive to a part of some per-
ception, I INVENT. Therefore, I have the POETIC faculty of invention (§216). Since a combi-
nation is a representation of many things as one, and hence is actualized through the fac-
ulty of perceiving the correspondences of things (§572, 155), the faculty of invention is
actualized through the power of the soul for representing the universe (§557, 576).
Combinando phantasmata & PRAESCINDENDO i.e. attendendo ad partem alicuius percep-
tionis tantum, FINGO. Ergo habeo facultatem fingendi, §. 216. POETICAM. Combinatio
quum sit repraesentatio plurium, ut unius, hinc facultate identitates rerum percipiendi ac-
tuetur, §. 572, 155. facultas fingendi per vim animae repraesentativam universi actuatur,
§. 557 576. (MET § 589)
Separating and combining are the two operations that sensing (sentire) and in-
venting or composing literature (fingere) share with each other: “Things that we
do not perceive with as many ideas as we in turn think of them with, but that
must nevertheless be known sensately, have to be invented (Metaphysica
§ 589)” (AE § 505; Quae non totidem ideis sensimus, quot denuo cogitamus,
quaeque tamen sensitive cognoscenda sunt, sunt fingenda, M. §. 589). This is be-
cause any fiction selects a few ideas from the entirety of ideas that belong to the
sensate cognition of an object and combines them into new objects. The first
philosophical principles regulate the coherence of the combination.¹⁶
With selection and combination, Baumgarten’s psychological delineation of
the faculty of poetic invention treats the same two operations that Jakobson
traces two hundred years later for both language in general and poetic lan-
guage.¹⁷ In Baumgarten, selection and combination should be governed, on
the one hand, by the law of beautiful coherence (pulcre cohaerentia; see AE
§ 439): “This is the rule of the faculty of invention: Parts of images are perceived
as one whole (§589)” (MET § 590; Facultatis fingendi haec est regula: Phantasma-
tum partes percipiuntur ut unum totum, §. 589). On the other hand, this metaphys-
ical imperative is empirically grounded because every sensation or experience
(experientia) operates in the same way as the faculty of invention (see AE
§ 482). In fact, Baumgarten goes so far as to define fiction as the actual object
of aesthetics. This is because all objects can be thought in a beautiful way
with the help of the faculty of invention; they can, as it were, become aestheti-
cized: “Hence FICTIONS MORE BROADLY SPEAKING (Metaphysica § 590), per-
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
 See Jakobson, “Linguistics and Poetics.”
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ceptions formed by combining and separating images, constitute by far the great-
est part of things that are to be thought beautifully” (AE § 505; Hinc FICTIONES
LATIUS DICTAE, M. §. 590. perceptiones combinando praescindendoque phan-
tasmata formatae, longe maximam pulcre cogitandorum partem constituunt).
Although the imagination is only let off its leash later in the eighteenth cen-
tury to engage in free play by Kant, Baumgarten has no choice but to make aes-
thetically unbridled dreams the reference medium for these fictions: “The imag-
ination of someone sleeping is more unbridled (§571), and the faculty of
invention more exorbitant, than of someone wide awake (§592). Those asleep
produce more lively imaginations and fictions not obscured by stronger sensa-
tions (§549)” (MET § 594; Dormientis phantasia magis effraenis, §. 571. & facultas
fingendi exorbitantior, quam vigilantis, §. 592. non obscuratas fortioribus sensa-
tionibus vividiores imaginationes & fictiones producunt, §. 549). Although this
reference creates quite a few ethical problems,¹⁸ Baumgarten holds to it. Fictions
are not only based on the same operations of selection and combination as
dreams but also share their novelty (novitas). The first separated and then
newly combined marks make each object appear in a new light (lux nova), as
he explains with regard to the appeal of the new in Cicero and Quintilian (see
AE §§ 809–810). In the eighteenth century, this appeal was broadly discussed
as a poetics of the wonderful.¹⁹ But as stated, Baumgarten does not feel entirely
comfortable with such fictions, and negative examples instead of positive exam-
ples of such a poetic ars combinatoria – like chimeras (chimaerae) and empty
images (vana phantasmata) – tend to dictate his argumentation. In particular,
Horace’s mythological figures lack the logical coherence (see MET § 590) that
Baumgarten’s theory requires:²⁰ “Suppose a painter chose to put a human
head / Upon a horse’s neck and add assorted plumes / To limbs from every
beast so that an ugly fish / Below attaches to a woman’s curves above” (AE
§ 446; Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam / Addere si velit, et varias inducere
plumas / Undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum / Desinat in piscem mulier
formosa superne). From an aesthetic perspective, such hybrids of the imagina-
tion must appear as falsehoods,²¹ and from an ethical perspective, as lies (see
AE § 525).
Baumgarten refers to such hybrids with the term figura when he is interested
in the structural operations of fiction, switching with this concept from psychol-
ogy to rhetoric. The concept of the figure makes clear that his reflections on po-
 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.
 See 6.2.2 Wonder.
 See Thorsen, “Baumgarten’s Meditationes.”
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
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etic fictions are directly related to the canon of style, raising the question of
whether rhetoric is capable of again providing concepts for the sections on fic-
tion. And it does indeed supply this protonarratologist with his concepts, creat-
ing a bridge from fictions in general to poetic fictions in particular – and so to
narrative (narratio). For in rhetoric, narrative is, on the one hand, the part of dis-
course that follows the introduction (exordium), which makes it an essential part
of all speeches and of the theory of oration. On the other hand, narrative belongs
to the figures of amplification, which intensify the evidentia of discourse. In this
sense, Quintilian writes, “As to vividness [evidentia], it is […] undoubtedly an im-
portant virtue of Narrative, when a truth requires not only to be told but in a
sense to be presented to the sight. All the same, it can be included under Lucid-
ity [perspicuitas].”²² In his explanation of the technique of “putting something
before our eyes,” Quintilian lays out the narratological basis of the correspond-
ing figure: evidentia “happens when, instead of stating that an event took place,
we show how it took place, and that not as a whole, but in detail.”²³
Following Quintilian, Baumgarten models narrative in the context of ampli-
fication between the poles of the spatial and temporal forms of intuition.²⁴ Se-
quentiality forms the starting point, leading from the simple figures of repetition
to the narrative trope of allegory. He therefore advocates linking representations
into sequences with the goal of amplifying one theme (see MED §§ 66–68), link-
ing different themes, and linking one theme to other unlinked representations to
build thematic sequences (see MED §§ 67–69): “By theme we mean that whose
representation contains the sufficient reason of other representations supplied in
the discourse, but which does not have its own sufficient reason in them” (MED
§ 66; Id, cuius repraesentatio aliarum in oratione adhibitarum rationem sufficien-
tem continet, suam vero non habet in aliis est THEMA). Andrea Krauss points out
that Baumgarten’s understanding of theme draws on Leibniz–Wolffian ontology:
a theme is “sufficient reason” for organizing a sequence of representations.²⁵ In
the Aesthetica, he refers to such sequences as collations (collationes; see AE
§ 734), and they link at least two elements, if not infinitely many elements,
into a perfect order; and this is exactly where performativity, the third function
of the structure of literary discourse, enacts sensate desire.²⁶ For these links,
 Quint., Inst. 4.2.64.
 Quint., Inst. 9.2.40.
 See 3.4.1 Complexity.
 See Andrea Krauss, “Nuancen des Firmaments: Versuchsanordnungen ‘extensiver Klarheit’
zwischen Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten und Barthold Heinrich Brockes,” in Allerkamp and
Mirbach, Schönes Denken, 237.
 See 3.1.2 Desire; 3.4.3 Performativity.
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Baumgarten introduces the concept (con)nexus, which is also central to his meta-
physics of beauty.²⁷
In his treatment of narrative, (con)nexus replaces the concept of complexity,
which dominates the analysis of lyric poetry, because it more strongly empha-
sizes “linking together” than “flowing into” one another: “The interconnection
of poetic representations must contribute to sensate cognition, §7, §9. Therefore,
it must be poetic, §11” (MED § 65; Nexus repraesentationum poeticarum debet fa-
cere ad cognitionem sensitivam §. 7. 9. ergo debet esse poeticus. §. 11). The result-
ing sequentiality amplifies the extensive clarity of literary texts – which I have
elaborated as their opacity²⁸ – meaning that literature should strive to combine
single ideas together: “It is poetic for sense impressions and images of a poem,
which are not themselves themes, to be determined through the theme, for if
they are not determined through it, they are not connected with it, and it is
the interconnection that is poetic, § 65” (MED § 68; Ideas sensuales & phantasma-
ta poematis, quae non sunt themata, determinari per thema poeticum, nisi enim
determinantur per illud, non connectuntur cum eo, nexus vero est poeticus
§. 65). On account of this contribution to the evidentia of literature, sequentiality
is governed by a lucid method (methodus lucida): “Since order in a succession of
representations is called method, method is poetic, § 69. And, with Horace,
when he attributes a lucid order to poets, let us call that poetic method lucid”
(MED § 70; Quum ordo in repraesentationum successione dicatur methodus,
methodus est poetica, §. 69. eam vero METHODUM, quae poetica, dicamus,
cum poeta lucidum ordinem poetis tribuente, LUCIDAM).²⁹
But neither Horace, whom Baumgarten invokes, nor he himself possess con-
cepts for this method (see MED § 73n). To describe it, Baumgarten falls back on
light metaphors since the “general rule of the lucid method” requires that thick
links be clear:³⁰ “poetic representations are to follow each other in such a way
that the theme is progressively represented in an extensively clearer way”
(MED § 71; Methodi lucidae generalis regula est: ita se excipiant repraesenta-
tiones poeticae, ut thema extensive clarius sensim clariusque repraesentetur).
Within progressively represented sequences, the links are based on various
methods for making something lucid:
Since, according to § 71, certain of the coördinate ideas can cohere as premises with con-
clusions, certain as like with like and related with related, certain through the law of sen-
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See 3.4.2 Opacity.
 See Hor., Ars P. 41.
 See 3.4.1 Complexity.
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sation and imagination, therefore there is available for lucid presentations the method of
reason, the method of wit, and the method of the historians, respectively.
Quum secundum §. 71. coordinatarum repraesentationum quaedam possint ut praemissae
cum conclusionibus cohaerere, quaedem ut simile cum simili & cognatum cum cognato,
quaedam per legem sensationis & imaginationis, methodus historicorum, ingenii & rationis
in lucida possibilis. (MED § 72)
As figures, such sequences are characterized by coherence since they, like every
other figure, are given to consciousness in a temporal form of intuition. Yet the
temporal form of coherence in sequences is more complex than in “normal” fig-
ures, since one element not only follows another in a series; rather, the tempo-
rality of the sequence also represents temporally structured events in the world.
This necessary expansion of the purely formal analysis of the structure of literary
discourse to include content leads Baumgarten to consider synecdoches of spe-
cies for genus and individuals for species in the Meditationes (see MED § 84),³¹
and he uses such synecdoches in the Metaphysica to describe the operations
of the poetic faculty of invention.
But it is actually allegory, not synecdoche, that serves as the trope of narra-
tive. In Baumgarten, the master trope of allegory marks the fluent transition from
poetic passages to narratives. As a narrative, allegory surpasses every other trope
both in complexity and in evidentia, making it the figural principle of the liter-
ary: “Since by allegory we mean a series of connected metaphors, it contains
individual poetic representations, § 79, and more interconnection than where un-
related metaphors flow together. Thus allegories are highly poetic, § 65, § 8”
(MED § 85; ALLEGORIA cum metaphorarum connexarum sit series in ea & reprae-
sentationes singulae poeticae §. 79. & maior nexus, quam ubi heterogeneae con-
fluunt metaphorae. Ergo allegoria admodum poetica §. 65. 8; see also AE §§ 802–
805). In itself, this concept of allegory is not really new; it corresponds to the
type of allegory Quintilian refers to as allegory “without Metaphor” (allegoria
sine translatione).³² In contrast to other types of allegory, this one is only char-
acterized by its sequentiality,³³ so Quintilian associates it with narrative long be-
fore Paul de Man asserts that the intentionality of allegory lies in its temporal-
ity.³⁴ In short, as Joel Fineman puts it, “the problem of allegorical narrative
 See Arist., Poet. 1457b22, 1459a; Rhet. 1412a.
 Quint., Inst. 8.6.46.
 See Gerhard Kurz, Metapher, Allegorie, Symbol, 3rd ed. (Göttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1993), 40–41.
 See Quint., Inst. 8.6.46. See also Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” in Blindness
and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge,
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[is] primarily a temporal issue.”³⁵ And he relates allegory to Jakobson’s model of
language as follows: “Allegory would be the poetical projection of the meta-
phoric axis onto the metonymic” axis under the precondition that “metaphor
is understood as the synchronic system of differences which constitutes the
order of language (langue), and metonymy as the diachronic principle of combi-
nation and connection by means of which structure is actualized in time in
speech (parole).”³⁶
Yet it is less the figural temporality of allegory than its specific temporality
that makes it a narrative. Allegories are not only composed of elements in se-
quences; their elements are rather also semantically coded temporal events. Nar-
rative coherence is produced, of course, through linking these events. One could
refer to this structure of time, following Edward M. Forster, as a “story,” for
which he gave the famous example of two linked elements: “the king died,
and then the queen died.”³⁷ In allegory, this sequentiality is also the precondi-
tion for motivating the links. Events are not only ordered in succession but
also motivated in different ways. Motivation thus always accompanies the tem-
porality of sequences such that one event results from another. Following For-
ster, one can call the structure of motivation the “plot”: “the king died, and
then the queen died of grief.”³⁸ Not only does the king die first and then the
queen; the queen also dies after the king for a good reason. In sequences,
story and plot form two sides of the same coin. In his critique of Genette’s nar-
ratology, Meixner therefore unites temporality and motivation into the single cat-
egory of consecution (Folge).³⁹ For Jakobson, this double linking within a se-
quence by means of temporality and motivation is the precondition of
narration. “Unessential details”⁴⁰ are linked both temporally and through con-
sistent motivation. Narration only achieves “verisimilitude” through such “justi-
fication.”⁴¹
2005), 187–228; Anselm Haverkamp, “Die Wiederkehr der Allegorie in der Ästhetik der Avant-
garde: Baumgarten in der Vorgeschichte des New Criticism,” in Allegorie: DFG-Symposion
2014, ed. Ulla Haselstein et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2016), 244–272.
 Joel Fineman, “The Structure of Allegorical Desire,” in Allegory and Representation, ed. Ste-
phen J. Greenblatt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 26.
 Fineman, “The Structure of Allegorical Desire,” 31.
 Edward Morgan Forster, Aspects of the Novel (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), 130.
 Forster, Aspects of the Novel, 130, emphasis mine.
 See Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 31–37.
 Roman Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” in Language in Literature, 22.
 Jakobson, “On Realism in Art,” 21, 27.
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5.2.2 Mediation
Baumgarten’s narratology is based on the rhetorical canon of style. The three
functions of the structure of literary discourse – complexity, opacity, and per-
formativity – are characterized by sequentiality. But now a fourth function is
added to them: narrativity. He introduces narrativity with a brilliant move: he
“narrativizes” the analogon of reason itself.⁴² As I have argued in previous chap-
ters, Baumgarten grounds his aesthetics etymologically in the Kollegium: the
word aesthetics “actually comes from aisthanomai [I sense]; this word refers to
what sentio refers to in Latin” (KOLL § 1; kommt eigentlich von αισϑανομαι
her; dieses Wort bezeichnet das, was sentio im Lateinischen bezeichnet). In
the sections on fiction, he simply replaces aisthanomai, “I sense,” with “I nar-
rate” (AE § 506; narrem). Two hundred years before Russian formalism invents
narratology, Baumgarten’s clever substitution constitutes the birth of modern
narrative theory. In the following, I will show that the narrative function of
the structure of literary discourse presupposes both sequentiality and narrative
mediation.
Since narrem substitutes for sentio at its position in the syntagm “I sense/
narrate,” the two form a paradigm.What differentiates “I sense” and “I narrate”
is not complexity, opacity, and performativity, which “I narrate” of course also
partakes in. Instead, something is added in “I narrate” that “I sense” does not
have and cannot do. This is mediation, which equally characterizes both fictions
and experiences.⁴³ Baumgarten structurally equates fictions and experiences
with regard to both their sequentiality and their narrative mediation, although
in fictions, “real” experience is missing: “Nor in these fictions is anything miss-
ing except experience strictly speaking, if they are narrated purely and nakedly”
(AE § 506; Nec in his fictionibus carent, nisi experientiae stricte dictae, si narren-
tur omnino pure nudeque). Purity (puritas) and nakedness (nuditas) refer to the
coherence of narration (see AE § 505; MED § 72). Such a pure narration is one in
which, following Aristotle, ideas are linked according to the three unities of time,
space, and action (see AE § 469).
In thinking about poetic fiction, Baumgarten seems to encounter only narra-
tological problems, which suggests that he, as Meixner puts it, “decidedly thinks
of [poetic] fiction as narrative fiction.”⁴⁴ In this way, in the sections on fiction,
the narratological duo of invention and narration replaces the duo of cognition
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
 Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 74.
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and representation (Darstellung) that founded Baumgarten’s philosophical proj-
ect. Just as one cannot speak of cognition without representation or of represen-
tation without cognition, all discourse about invention and narration is also am-
biguous.⁴⁵ Invention is, namely, the cognitive operation that corresponds to the
representational technique of narration; it is impossible to discuss one without
discussing the other.What differentiates the inventions of poetic fiction from ex-
perience is merely the immediate witnessing of something. Only someone who
experiences something immediately can testify as an eyewitness.
It is the case not only for things very close to true things but also for many things that are
themselves true in the strictest sense that they cannot be thought beautifully or sensately
except through what are loosely called fictions. How many objects does a person who wants
to think beautifully have about which he can say: I myself saw it,
And played a leading role?⁴⁶
Non proxima solum veris, sed et ipsa strictissime vera plurima, non nisi fictionibus latius
dictis pulcre cogitari sensitiveque possunt. Quot ea sunt obiectorum pulcre cogitaturi, de
quibus ille possit dicere: quae ipse vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui? (AE § 506)
Differentiating between experience and poetic fiction does not have to do with
the problem of truth but rather with a level of narration where the I-Origo is de-
coupled from someone who has a particular experience at a particular time and
place. For that reason, narrative mediation supplants immediate eyewitnessing.
Although such narration still uses the grammatical form of the first-person sin-
gular, the personal pronoun no longer denotes someone who has experienced
something but rather marks the level of narration from which the epic singer
– Baumgarten’s master example remains the Aeneis – tells of other characters
and events. That Baumgarten actually analyzes a function with “I narrate” is ad-
ditionally made clear by the grammatical finesse of the definition. In conditional
sentences of fact – si narrem – the first-person singular present subjunctive ac-
tive form of the verb narrare marks the distance between the level where the nar-
rative is produced and the level of the narrated events themselves. Baumgarten
defines this extradiegetic level as the birthplace of fiction (genita sit fictio; see
AE § 508). The narrative function is thus poietic and not mimetic; it produces
narrative discourse and narrated worlds.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 Quoted (with modification) from Vergil, The Aeneid, trans. Sarah Ruden (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2008), 2.5–6.
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It was very difficult for twentieth-century narratology to avoid anthropo-
morphizing this narrative function, which Baumgarten grounds in the shift
from immediate eyewitnessing to narrative mediation. At worst, author and nar-
rator are still confused with one another or combined together in the strange
construct of an “author-narrator” in cases of particularly dominant narrative voi-
ces. Only structural narratology formally analyzes the category of voice with re-
gard to level, person, and discourse time (Erzählzeit): “What Genette refers to
with voice is thus best described as the specification of a pragmatic textual func-
tion in which the grammatical and rhetorical personification of the narrating
agent can take place more or less explicitly.”⁴⁷ Yet even Genette does not escape
the aporias of anthropomorphization when he emphasizes that the “narrator’s
voice is indeed always conveyed as the voice of a person, even if anonymous.”⁴⁸
Two hundred years pass after Baumgarten before Käte Hamburger formalizes
narration in Die Logik der Dichtung (1957/1968), removing any possibility of an-
thropomorphization. Meixner shows that Hamburger’s narrative function,
which is similar to a mathematical function, can be made productive for analyz-
ing eighteenth-century narratology.⁴⁹ Hamburger defines narration as the func-
tion “through which the narrated persons, things, events, etc., are created: the
narrative function, which the narrative poet manipulates as, for example, the
painter wields his colors and brushes.” In this model, narrating about is replaced
by narrating that: “Between the narrating and the narrated there exists not a sub-
ject-object relation, i. e., a statement structure, but rather a functional correspon-
dence.”⁵⁰ As a “classificatory guideline,” the narrative function determines the
“impersonal, purely functional relation existing between generative language
and the generated fictional structure in thought.”⁵¹ As a result, every narrating
agent represents a secondary way of filling the narrative function, which sets
the epistemological frame for the narrator. Narrating agents are a visualization
of the narrative function, which they personify with varying degrees of concrete-
 Andreas Blödorn, Daniela Langer, and Michael Scheffel, “Einleitung: Stimmen – im Text?,”
in Stimme(n) im Text: Narratologische Positionsbestimmungen, ed. Blödorn, Langer, and Scheffel
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 1.
 Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse Revisited, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1988), 64.
 See Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 18–27.
 Käte Hamburger, The Logic of Literature, trans. Marilynn J. Rose, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 1973), 136.
 Claudia Löschner, Denksystem: Logik und Dichtung bei Käte Hamburger (Berlin: Ripperger &
Kremers, 2013), 36.
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ness, from a rough pattern to the personal characteristics of an “author-narra-
tor.”
In Baumgarten, the “laws of sensation” (Empfindungs-Gesetze)⁵² set the pa-
rameters for this “classificatory guideline,” meaning that the narrative function
is not characterized by logical omniscience. As an aesthetic function, the narra-
tive function is subjected instead to the limitations of the analogon of reason. In
the sections on fiction, Baumgarten therefore lays out nothing less than an epis-
temological foundation for unreliable narration – for sensate narration, for
which aesthetics prescribes the laws. Although the narrative function is extradie-
getically anchored with regard to the various narrative levels, the narrating agent
cannot narrate omnisciently with the sunlight of logic.⁵³ Instead, since all narra-
tion is sensate, there can only be unreliable narrating agents who are limited to
sensate capacities. In the passages where Baumgarten articulates the anthropo-
logical foundation of sensate cognition and sensate desire and also describes
their traces in literary texts, he also delineates the felix aestheticus, the happy
aesthetician, as an allegorical personification.⁵⁴ This personification helps one
understand Baumgarten’s epistemology of narration. As an ethical personifica-
tion of aesthetics, the felix aestheticus can and wants to do everything, and
also only the things, that the laws of sensation prescribe (see PHB 7). He there-
fore also occupies the extradiegetic narrative level and embodies, in all of his
sensate limitations, the narrative function.
Narratology generally analyzes this narrative function using the category of
voice (voix). In the following, I will show that Baumgarten not only formalizes
the voice of narration but also formally analyzes the narrative function of the
structure of literary discourse. In analyzing his examples, he encounters precise-
ly the phenomena that will lead to various narratological systems in the twenti-
eth century. He himself is still far from such a system and is actually just collect-
ing mistakes he notices in poetic fiction. They form the core of section 28 on
aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthetica), which is extremely relevant to both narra-
tology and fiction theory even though it has been largely ignored in the scholar-
ship.⁵⁵ The catalogue of mistakes in this section evidences – before Baumgarten
turns to their justification in the sections on aesthetic truth – the birth of narra-
tology out of the spirit of deviation from pure and naked narration. For a devia-
tion is not a mistake if the analogon of reason holds it to be aesthetically neces-
sary. Judging these deviations leads to an astounding turning point in
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
 See 4.1.3 Twilight.
 See 6.3.1 Ethopoeia.
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
136 5 Narratology
narratology: in the end, Baumgarten does not judge deviations to be mistakes
but rather to be achievements within the wide spectrum of possible kinds of nar-
ratives – especially of mythological narratives. And while his analysis does not
form a closed system like those pursued by twentieth-century structuralists, he
does provide the elements for such a system. In particular, he considers the ar-
rangement of discourse time in the spectrum of narratives. Just as he grounds
narrative coherence in sequentiality, discourse time plays the decisive role in
narrative mediation. Most of the mistakes that Baumgarten encounters when an-
alyzing the narrative function concern time, and they do so with regard to three
aspects, which also form the core of twentieth-century narratological analyses of
time: (1) order, (2) duration, and (3) frequency.
(1) Order. The examples he chooses for illustrating offenses against narrative
order come from mythology. Mythological narratives violate “genealogy, geogra-
phy, and chronology” (AE § 473; genealogia, geographia, chronologia). Baum-
garten attends to such anachronies both in the sections on fiction and in section
28 on aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthetica), which reads like a blacklist of such
offenses. This draws his attention to inconsistencies; for example, in comparing
Livy’s and Virgil’s stories of the Trojan origins of the Romans, he notes that Virgil
first takes Aeneas to Thrace, while in Livy, Aeneas first goes to Macedonia (see
AE § 508). Ovid also violates chronology with the speech of Pythagoras in his
Metamorphoseon – and he does so, like Virgil, without graceful necessity (neces-
sitas venusta). Long before Baumgarten, the passages in Ovid and Virgil were pe-
joratively designated as glossema (see AE § 473), which means something like
“disturbing passages.” Another example of such offenses are prophecies. Baum-
garten treats the genre of prophetic fiction in the Meditationes (see MED
§§ 60–64) and considers prophecies to be highly poetic and common in
epics.⁵⁶ Prophecies dramatically violate chronology because they narrate future
events. To be on the safe side, he delegates them to the perspective of characters:
Yet it is dangerous to make predictions of things whose future state is unknown, and a
prophecy belied by the event is sadly ridiculed.What should the poet do here? The cleverest
of them prophesy in the name of others about things which have already come to pass, as if
the prediction had anticipated the event. What does Helenus in Virgil not sing to Aeneas?
Or Anchises in the Elysian Fields? Or the Cumean Sibyl? Or Vulcan about the shield? Horace
has Nereus predict the outcome of the Trojan War, since he knew he could invent prophe-
cies which the outcome had already confirmed.
Est tamen periculosum praedicere, quorum ignoratur futuritio, & destitutum eventu vatici-
nium misere ridetur. Quid hinc poetis agendum? Callidissimi homines vaticinantur in alte-
 See 6.3.3 Dubitatio.
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rius nomine de rebus, quae nunc iam factae sunt, ac si tunc praedictae essent, cum non-
dum factae erant. Quae non Helenus canit Aeneae apud Virgilium? quae Anchises in cam-
pis Elysiis? quae Cumana ante Sibylla? quae Vulcanus in clypeo? Horatius Nerea iubet
praedicere belli Troiani eventum, quum sciret, nunc ea se fingere posse vaticinia, quae
eventus iam sequutus confirmarat. (MED § 64n)
Such anachronies not only concern minor deviations in pure narrative but also
crude anachronies (anachronismi) and historical errors (anistoresias), of which
Baumgarten also finds plenty of examples in Virgil. But they are only problem-
atic when the analogon of reason does not hold them to be aesthetically neces-
sary. Baumgarten notes that Virgil himself plays a self-referential game with this
problem when he refers to an anachronistic description of the mythological ship
Chimaera as a chimera (see AE § 474).⁵⁷ And he even looks kindly on proper
metalepses, such as when Sosia and Mercury swear in the name of Hercules
in Plautus’s play Amphitruo even though Hercules is actually only born at the
end of the play (see AE § 474).
(2) Duration. In addition to these offenses against order, changes in the
speed of narration can also represent a deviation from the pure form of relation
between discourse time (Erzählzeit) and story time (erzählte Zeit). While dis-
course time and story time overlap in dialogue, Baumgarten describes forms
of accelerating story time in relation to discourse time, such as ellipses in Sta-
tius’s Thebaid. And he analyzes the deceleration of story time in a passage
where Tydeus stretches a moment of consecration into a thanksgiving prayer
to Minerva twenty-five lines long (see AE § 461). The paradigm for these varia-
tions in speed within the doubled temporal sequence of narration is the famous
description of Achilles’s shield in Homer’s Iliad, which is in turn the model for
Virgil’s description of Aeneas’s shield in the Aeneis (see AE § 459). In these ex-
amples, discourse time asserts itself in a way that modern narratology refers
to as a pause.
(3) Frequency. Finally, Baumgarten attends to deviations in the normal fre-
quency of narration, which prescribes that an event is only narrated once. Virgil
narrates an episode in which Cleopatra fights against Augustus twice – and the
content of the two narratives is contradictory – so Baumgarten ascertains a
switch from singular to repetitive narration: “If you say that she was depicted
twice with the whole army of the East, not without a certain subtle and artificial
interval – (1) giving the sign to fight, and (2) fleeing – then the first difficulty is
increased” (AE § 459; Si dicas ipsam cum omni orientis exercitu fuisse bis pic-
 See Verg., Aen. 5.104–285.
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tam, non sine subtili et artificiosa quadam intercapedine, 1) signum pugnae dan-
tem 2) fugientem, augetur difficultas prima).
While Baumgarten’s analysis of narrative time provides enough material to
reconstruct the fundamental features of a system, some of his other observations
about the spectrum of different kinds of narratives can only be placed in a ten-
tative relation to recent narratological concepts. His formal analysis of narrating
agents is closely related to his understanding of temporal mistakes: he first treats
the narrative function by looking at it with regard to discourse time. A narrating
agent can tell about the past because “I” remember what happened, about the
future because “I” can predict what will happen, and about the present because
“I” can represent what is absent (see AE § 506).⁵⁸ As the first differentiation of
the narrative function, discourse time thus leads to the narratological category
of person as the second differentiation. Baumgarten’s examples are all actually
first-person narratives, which best fulfill the purity and nakedness of narrative
coherence. The level of the narrating agent in relation to the characters is heter-
odiegetic because Livy’s historian and Virgil’s epic singer narrate about others.
With his focus on epics, Baumgarten certainly does not present a theory of
the modern novel, but he does compile substantial pieces of such a theory. The
fact that his favorite examples are all first-person narratives means that he fol-
lows in his analysis a different path than Blanckenburg, who only a little
later in his Versuch über den Roman emphatically prefers third-person narratives
to first-person ones. According to Blanckenburg, novels should narrate the life of
a character as an unbroken causal chain of events – and they should do this not
by following epics, which narrate a temporal chain of external events, but rather
by conveying a complex, psychologically motivated plot. By contrast, Baumgar-
ten pays attention to the unreliable voices of the historian and epic singer. And
he repeatedly notes that these narrating agents let the characters speak: Virgil
relays both Juno’s anger (ira Iunonis) and the dialogue between Zeus and
Venus (colloquium Iovis et Veneris; see AE § 512), and Ovid relates the prayer
of Phaeton (prex Phaetontis) and the speech of Pythagoras (declamatio Pytha-
gorae) word-for-word such that the narrated events are told from these charac-
ters’ perspectives as in the prophecies mentioned above, which represents a de-
viation from pure narrative.
These deviations in polyvocal narratives illustrate the wide spectrum of nar-
ratives Baumgarten analyzes. He thus differentiates, like twentieth-century nar-
ratologists, between various degrees of mediacy, that is, between a narratively
 See Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: An Essay in Method, trans. Jane E. Lewin (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1980), 215–227.
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mediated mode (diegesis) and a dramatically immediate mode (mimesis) of nar-
ration.Whereas Livy’s Ab urbe condita employs the narrative mode, Baumgarten
also analyzes how Virgil’s Aeneis and other examples not only switch from the
narrative mode to the dramatic mode but also switch, frequently at the same
time, from an extradiegetic level to an intradiegetic level of narration when nar-
rated characters themselves become narrators and tell their own stories. In com-
parison to the narrative mode, the dramatic mode is characterized by a high de-
gree of evidentia. For that reason, Baumgarten cites the long speech of the dying
Dido from Silius even though he stays true to his Virgil when he compares ver-
sions of Dido by Virgil, Ovid, Silius, and Ausonius (see AE § 523).
With regard to mediacy, dialogues and monologues replace reportorial nar-
ration with scenic narration. Precisely such shifts in mode are the foundation of
Engel’s treatise Ueber Handlung, Gespräch und Erzehlung, the most important
eighteenth-century narratological text after Blanckenburg’s. Baumgarten uses
switches from the narrative mode to the dramatic mode in dialogues to distin-
guish fiction in general from poetic fiction, which he also differentiates on an on-
tological basis.⁵⁹ His privileging of long passages in direct speech by single char-
acters (and so actually of intradiegetic narration as well) is logical since it
corresponds to giving precedence to the particular over the general (see AE
§ 519): instead of abstract narrative mediation, “people” made of flesh and
blood speak.
Baumgarten’s catalogue of mistakes continues, and one could continue to
analyze it productively. But such an analysis would never derive a narratological
system from this catalogue. We can conclude, however, that a “pure” narrative
does not actually exist; there are only “impure” ones with their special narrative
features such as complex time structures and switches between the narrative and
the dramatic modes. These deviations thus do not represent exceptions to the
norm, though analyzing them can lead us to the rules of narration. As such,
the catalogue of mistakes secures Baumgarten’s place among the protonarratol-
ogists of the eighteenth century. His accomplishment lies in how he understands
the combination of sequentiality and narrative mediation to be the structural
characteristic of narrativity, and so he provides a minimal definition of narrative.
Baumgarten obtains his definition through analyzing a wide spectrum of narra-
tives. But the definition applies independently of genre and also independently
of the differentiation between fictional and factual discourse; this leads to his
theory of fiction.




Sequentiality and mediation define narrativity. But the emphasis of the sections
on fiction is very clearly not on the how of narration but rather on the what of
literature, not on the discourse but on the story, and with it on the narrated
world. At precisely this point, narrativity and fictionality converge in Baumgar-
ten and form a twofold unity that is not separated into narratology and fiction
theory until the twentieth century. This unity arises from how he ties the disci-
plines of psychology and rhetoric (narrativity) to the disciplines of ontology
and cosmology (fictionality) in the sections on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthe-
tica). And this means that he ties representation or narration to the represented
or narrated world. He does so because he is faced in the course of his argumen-
tation with the question of what the world of the poets (mundus poetarum; see
AE §§ 513–515) – the poetic world (mundus poeticus; see AE §§ 516–518) that all
the great epics relate – actually is. The path to the poetic world leads through the
concept of truth.
In the sections on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), Baumgarten is primar-
ily concerned with the difference between logical truth and aesthetic truth – a
difference that he bridges by combining elements of logical truth and aesthetic
truth together in aestheticological truth. But his engagement with the philosoph-
ical challenge of the sensate elements of aestheticological truth in these para-
graphs also conceals an unconventional theory of fiction. This guides the text
in a very particular philosophical direction: poetic fiction is true not in the log-
ical sense but rather in the aesthetic sense – with all the metaphysical premises
tied to aesthetic truth. Baumgarten is not interested in the tiresome discussion
about the difference between fact and fiction that has defined recent debates
and, in the worst cases, is limited to judging whether something is the case or
not. Poetic fiction has, rather, a very particular, indirect mode of truth that de-
pends on aesthetic cognition.⁶⁰
As regards the complexity of his reflections, Baumgarten is light-years
ahead of contemporaneous inquiries into the problem of fiction in genre theory,
and elements of recent theories of fiction can even be seen in his theoretical ap-
proach to the problem of fiction, which takes Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds
as its starting point. Baumgarten’s theory of fiction is based – like the entire
Aesthetica – on preparatory work in the Metaphysica. After part 1 on ontology
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
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(ontologia), which he understands as “the science of the more general predi-
cates of being” (MET § 4; scientia praedicatorum entis generaliorum), follows
part 2 on cosmology (cosmologia), which encompasses “the science of the gen-
eral predicates of the world” (MET § 351; scientia praedicatorum mundi genera-
lium). Baumgarten’s translation machine is again at work here. He takes the
concept (con)nexus – which he uses to analyze the coherence of narrative in
the context of psychology and rhetoric and is rooted in the complexity, opacity,
and performativity of the structure of literary discourse – and applies it here to
analyze the structure of worlds in the context of ontology and cosmology. As a
result, modes of narration and states of worlds become variables in the struc-
ture of literary discourse.
Because Baumgarten is concerned with the relation between narration and
world, both the separation in narratology between story and discourse and the
differentiation in fiction theory between real worlds and fictional worlds fall
short. In Baumgarten, narratology and fiction theory converge in the concept
(con)nexus. Through the ontological concept of the one (unum), (con)nexus
leads to cosmology, which is completely neglected in fiction theory. In the con-
text of ontology, unum refers to how manifold marks (ubertas) interlink, round-
ing out (brevitas) into a unity; as I have shown, the circle is the symbol for such a
unity.⁶¹ Baumgarten applies this ontological principle to the concept of the
world. An entity can only be a world if it is a unity: “Every world is one (§359)
and yet has modes (§361, 112), and hence determinations separable in themselves
(§72, 65), and hence a hypothetical (§76) and intrinsically contingent (§115) unity”
(MET § 362; Omnis mundus est unum, §. 359. modos tamen habet, §. 361, 112.
hinc determinationes in se separabiles, §. 72, 65. hinc unitatem hypotheticam,
§. 76. & intrinsecus contingentem, §. 115). Around the same time, Gottsched
based his Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst (1729) on the triad of contingence,
connection, and possible worlds, as Karen S. Feldman argues.⁶²
With regard to the problem of fictionality, three further paragraphs are par-
ticularly relevant:
A world can only originate from nothing.
Mundus non potest oriri, nisi ex nihilo. (MET § 371)
A world (cf. §91, 403, 434, the universe, πάν) is a series (multitude, whole) of actual and
finite beings that is not part of another.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See Karen S. Feldman, Arts of Connection: Poetry, History, Epochality (Berlin:Walter de Gruy-
ter, 2019), 38–57.
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MUNDUS (cf. §. 91, 403, 434. universum, παν) est series (multitudo, totum) actualium fini-
torum, quae non est pars alterius. (MET § 354)
Since the parts of a world are either simultaneous or successive (§238, 354), if they are pos-
ited mutually apart from one another, then they are connected in a world through time, or
space, or both (§239, 306).
Quum partes mundi vel sint simultanea, vel successiva, §. 238, 354. si extra se invicem po-
nantur, connectentur in mundo aut per tempus, aut per spatium, aut per utrumque, §. 239,
306. (MET § 374)
The primary concepts of these paragraphs – series, connexus, and ex nihilo –
converge with the two structural elements of narration: sequentiality und medi-
ation. On the one hand, the narrative function – si narrem – creates narration out
of nothing – ex nihilo – since, as I have shown, the narrative function is poietic
and not mimetic. Instead, it produces both narrative discourse and a narrated
world.⁶³ On the other hand, the seriality of the world – series – corresponds to
the sequentiality of narration. In the cosmological context, the concept (con)
nexus refers to the linking of actual beings (actualia) that exist. In any case, it
is important to note that Baumgarten’s cosmology is not merely empirical but
primarily rational (see MET § 351). Against this backdrop, possibility establishes
existence and not existence possibility: “This world exists. Therefore, the world
is possible in itself (§57, 18)” (MET § 355; Hic mundus exsistit. Ergo mundus est in
se possibilis, §. 57, 18).
The concept of possibility (possibilitas) is at the core of Baumgarten’s theory
of fiction and suspends the incredulity of Thomas: “Whatever I do not experience
or sense clearly (§544) does not exist, i.e. the PREJUDICE OF THOMAS, or is im-
possible” (MET § 548; Quicquid non experior seu clare sentio, §. 544. non exsistit,
s. PRAEIUDICIUM THOMISTICUM, aut, est impossibile).⁶⁴ In the part of the Meta-
physica on ontology (ontologia), the first section defines the possible (possibile)
as that which does not violate the first philosophical principle, meaning the
principle of contradiction (see MET § 7): “That which is not nothing is SOME-
THING: the representable, whatever does not involve a contradiction, whatever
is not both A and not-A, is POSSIBLE (§7)” (MET § 8; Nonnihil est ALIQUID: re-
praesentabile, quicquid non involvit contradictionem, quicquid non est A et non-
A, est POSSIBILE. §. 7). This is tied to a further differentiation consisting in
whether the contrary of something is fundamentally possible or impossible. If
the contrary is impossible, then Baumgarten speaks of necessity (necessitas);
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
 See Clemens Schwaiger, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – ein intellektuelles Porträt: Studien
zur Metaphysik und Ethik von Kants Leitautor (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011), 67.
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if the contrary is possible, then he speaks of contingency (contingentia). This is
not the place for a philosophical discussion of these premises; I just want to note
that in his cosmological argumentation, they lead to the claim that all worlds are
located in the realm of contingency since they do not exclude the contrary (see
MET § 103): “All the parts of every world are contingent beings […], and every
world is a contingent being (§111)” (MET § 361; Partes omnis mundi singulae
sunt entia contingentia […] & omnis mundus est ens contingens, §. 111). This con-
tingency is softened by the linking of the parts of such contingent worlds: “In no
world is the conjunction of the parts absolutely necessary (§362, 102), and yet
there is a coordination (§78)” (MET § 363; Nullius mundi partium coniunctio
est absolute necessaria, §. 362, 102. est tamen coordinatio, §. 78). While linking
is treated as narrative coherence in the narratological context, in the cosmolog-
ical context, linking has a geometric dimension: “Coordinated beings touching
<contingentia> one another are CONTIGUOUS” (MET § 284; Coordinata se
mutuo contingentia sunt CONTIGUA).
By combining possibility and linking, Baumgarten discovers a criterion for
measuring a world’s degree of perfection. The differentiation between this
world and other worlds makes clear that – in the tradition of Leibniz – Baum-
garten does not exclude other worlds but posits that the actual world is the
most perfect: “In the most perfect world there is the greatest universal nexus
(§437, 94), harmony, and agreement (§436, 357) that is possible in a world”
(MET § 441; In mundo perfectissimo est maximus, qui in mundo possibilis,
nexus universalis, §. 437, 94. harmonia & consensus, §. 436, 357). In such a
world – the actual world – the parts are composed in a perfect order:
There is order in every perfection (§95). Hence, in the most perfect world there is the great-
est order that is possible in a world (§437, 175). Therefore, there are the most general rules of
perfection, e.g. the more, the greater, the more spacious (§280), and the longer lasting (§299),
all else being equal, the better (§437, 187). There is also a maximally composite order (§183),
yet such that all the inferior and superior rules can in the end be known together from one
and the same supreme and strongest rule of perfection (§182, 185).
In omni perfectione est ordo, §. 95. Hinc in mundo perfectissimo maximus est ordo, qui in
mundo possibilis, §. 437, 175. Ergo plurimae regulae perfectionis communes, e.g. Quo plura,
quo maiora, quo spatiosiora, §. 281. quo diuturniora, §. 299. caeteris paribus, hoc melius,
§. 437, 187. & ordo maxime compositus, §. 183. ita tamen, ut inferiores superioresque regulae
tandem ad unam omnes ex una summa perfectionis regula, eademque fortissima, cognosci
possint, §. 182, 185. (MET § 444)
The assumption that the actual world is perfect, that perfection is linking, that
linking is a composite, that a composite is an order, and that an order follows
one rule is the basis of the analogy relating worlds to the structure of literary dis-
144 5 Narratology
course. Not only the latter is beautiful, but also the former: both require that a
manifold converges into a unity that is a contingent phenomenon (see AE § 18).⁶⁵
In the eighteenth century, the phrase “the best of all possible worlds” was a
common topos, satirized in popular works like Voltaire’s Candide ou l’optimisme
(1759). But mockery aside, other worlds than the actual one are possible; and be-
cause they are possible, they can also exist. Based on this precondition, Baum-
garten subjects the objects of aesthetic cognition to possibility in section 27 of
the Aesthetica on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica) using the philosophical
principles he imports from the Metaphysica: the principle of contradiction, the
principle of reason, and the principle of sufficient reason: “Aesthetic truth de-
mands (I) the possibility of thinking of the objects elegantly (§ 426)” (AE § 431;
Veritas aesthetica postulat obiectorum eleganter cogitandorum I. possibilitatem,
§. 426; see also AE § 426). He differentiates between different types of possibility
as follows:
(1) absolute possibility (see AE § 431; possibilitas absoluta)
(2) hypothetical possibility (see AE § 432; possiblitas hypothetica)
(a) natural possibility (see AE § 432; possibilitas naturalis)
(b) moral possibility (see AE § 433; possibilitas moralis)
(i) in the broad sense (see AE § 433; latius dicta)
(ii) in the narrow sense (see AE § 435; strictius dicta)
In addition to demanding that the objects of thought are possible, aesthetic truth
also requires that objects be linked: “Aesthetic truth requires (II) the linkage of
thinking the objects beautifully with reasons and consequences (§§ 426, 431) to
the extent that this linkage is sensately knowable (§ 423; Metaphysica § 24) by
the analogon of reason (Metaphysica § 640)” (AE § 437; Veritas aesthetica requirit
obiectorum pulcre cogitandorum, II. nexum cum rationibus et rationatis §. 426,
431. quatenus ille sensitive cognoscendus est, §. 423. M. §. 24. per analogon ra-
tionis, M. §. 640). Although possibility and linking at first characterize different
modes of aesthetic truth – that is, they are used ontologically – the question aris-
es as to whether the concepts are also used cosmologically in the Aesthetica,
whether they lead to an aesthetic cosmology. In fact, while Baumgarten does
not address the world of the poets (mundus poetarum; see AE §§ 513–515) or
the poetic world (mundus poeticus; see AE §§ 516–518) in the paragraphs on
truth, he does explore them in the sections on fiction. The cosmological model
for the poetic world is the “fabulous world (Metaphysica § 91)” (AE § 455; mun-
dus fabulosus, M. §. 91); in English, one would say a “fantasy world” or “dream
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
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world.”⁶⁶ In any case, the etymological proximity to the genre of the fable is ar-
gumentatively relevant, and by using the literal translation “fabulous world,” I
wish to emphasize precisely this proximity to poetic fiction,which is what Baum-
garten is concerned with here.
He establishes the relation between a world and fabulousness with a struc-
tural analogy: both are defined by coherence.⁶⁷ But what functions without any
problem in rhetoric creates several difficulties in cosmology. In the Metaphysica,
it is less the coherence of the world that poses a problem for Baumgarten than
the concept of world as such. In the part on cosmology, he is still very certain
that all the things the lower cognitive faculties generate are not worlds: “A
dream [I translate as “fabulous,” F. B.] world is not a world (§120)” (MET
§ 359; Mundus fabulosus non est mundus, §. 120). He therefore rigorously demar-
cates fabulous worlds from the true world in the part on ontology: “The confu-
sion opposed to transcendental truth would be a DREAM TAKEN AS OBJECTIVE
(cf. §593). An aggregate of dreams would be a FANTASY [I translate as “fabu-
lous,” F. B.] WORLD (cf. §354)” (MET § 91; Confusio veritati transcendentali op-
posita esset SOMNIUM OBIECTIVE SUMTUM (cf. §. 593.) Somniorum aggregatum
esset MUNDUS FABULOSUS, (cf. §. 354.)). This is because this world would vio-
late the principle of sufficient reason, which Baumgarten posits following
Wolff.⁶⁸ And if a world violates logical principles, it is not possible and so
also cannot exist; it is a fabulous world.
Actually, at this point, Baumgarten uses the term fictus, “fictional” in En-
glish, for the first and only time: “A dream taken as objective and a fabulous
world are non-beings (§118, 91), and if they seem to be beings, they are fictional
beings (§62)” (MET § 120; Somnium obiective sumtum et mundus fabulosus sunt
nonentia, §. 118, 91. et si videantur entia, sunt entia ficta, §. 62). These fictional
beings should not be confused, however, with the problem of poetic fiction; in-
stead, we should differentiate both conceptually and theoretically between ficta
and fictions. Horace’s chimeras are ficta because they are not coherent; by con-
 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
 In his Philosophia prima, Wolff states: “Denial of the principle of sufficient ground changes
the true world into a fantasy world <mundus fabulosum>, in which the human being’s will takes
the place of the ground of that which occurs.” Christian Wolff, Philosophia prima, sive ontologia,
methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur, new ed., in
Gesammelte Werke, ed. Jean École, vol. 2.3 (Frankfurt 1736; facsimile, Hildesheim: Georg Olms,
1962), § 77; translation quoted from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysics: A Critical
Translation with Kant’s Elucidations, Selected Notes, and Related Materials, trans. Courtney D. Fu-
gate and John Hymers (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 116n.
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trast, in poetic fiction, one narrates about chimeras and empty images as well as
about actualia. As a result, ficta can appear in fictional worlds, but they do not
have to, meaning they do not play a role in classifying discourse. Under this pre-
condition, there are fictional worlds with only ficta or actualia as well as worlds
in which there are both ficta and actualia, for example in fables, which are very
important for Baumgarten. There is no definitive indication that he intended this
differentiation, but it is the only plausible reason for why the fabulous world
serves as the model for poetic fiction and as the basis for a genuinely aesthetic
cosmology in the Aesthetica.
In contrast to the rational cosmology in the Metaphysica, which Baumgarten
articulates theoretically, his aesthetic cosmology is quite well hidden, making re-
constructing it difficult. While he takes the ontological premises of fictional
worlds from the Metaphysica and clearly proves them philosophically, his re-
marks on poetic worlds appear in section 28 on aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthe-
tica), which is where one finds his catalogue of mistakes.⁶⁹ There the Platonic
topos of the lying poet serves as the starting point; Baumgarten cites it from Cic-
ero: “A false argument is one containing a statement obviously untrue.”⁷⁰ Yet
Baumgarten does not reject the infinite number of small aesthetic falsities con-
tained in literary texts but rather, in twisting and turning his argumentation, af-
firms them such that his evaluation of mistakes becomes, in the end, the foun-
dation for an aesthetic cosmology: it forms a theory of poetic worlds.
The pivotal point of these intellectual acrobatics is that aesthetic falsity pre-
sents something for evaluation that depends on sensate perception. The organ of
this evaluation is the analogon of reason. Such aesthetic judgments are aesthe-
ticological.⁷¹ In order to evaluate them, Baumgarten plays Horace’s “Ars poetica”
against Cicero’s De oratore because, as he lucidly notes, every forensic speech
contains something false in its narrative part (see AE § 447). Working on the
basis of aestheticological truth, falsities or even lies are, Baumgarten argues,
only aesthetically false when they are judged to be lies not only by reason but
also by the analogon of reason (see AE § 448) – and this analogon seems to
be quite tolerant of mistakes! With a series of quotes from Lucretius, Baumgarten
therefore emphasizes the autonomy of the senses, which cannot be deceived;
somehow they already know what is true and what is false, even though there
is not – as astounding as this finding might appear in the context of the Enlight-
enment – any definitive test or clear boundary between aestheticological truth
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
 Cic., De inv. 1.90. Quoted from Cicero, De inventione, De optimo genere oratorum, Topica,
trans. H. M. Hubbell, Loeb Classical Library 386 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949).
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
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and falsity: “For not only would all Reason fall apart and come to grief / But in an
instant, Life itself, unless you hazard belief / In the senses, and back away from the
brink of sheer cliffs,⁷² etc. (Lucr. 504–509)” (AE § 449; Non modo enim ratio ruat
omnis: vita quoque ipsa / Concidat extemplo, nisi credere sensibus ausis, / Prae-
cipitesque locos vitare. e. c. 511). Not everything logically false is aesthetically
false: this thought leads Baumgarten from legal discourse to the historicity of
truth. He considers the difference between two themes that are both logically
false, but only one of which has been proved false while the other is still consid-
ered true (see AE §§ 452–453). Although the theme that has been proved to be
false suffers from logical and aesthetic falsity, he circumvents the problem of fal-
sity by making it a matter of degree.When considered in this way, the analogon
of reason is very generous with minor falsities because they are evaluated within
the horizon of aesthetics (see AE § 454). This includes, for example, poetic pas-
sages that are characterized by ambiguity or vagueness. In any case, Baumgarten
underhandedly switches the register here by veering from a false transmission to
the falsity of representation. Against this backdrop, he makes the following
claim about the fabulous worlds of poets like Homer and of painters like Apelles:
But let the dream or even the fabulous world be such that (1) the defect of internal impos-
sibility is not at all exposed by the analogon of reason and (2) that it also lies hidden to
reason and the intellect, which you ought to assume is in you and in your foremost spec-
tators, or at least that the evidence of it is not apparent, evidence of the sort that should be
expected to dispel all the craft of a beautifully pleasing work like spider webs: this dream,
this fabulous world will not be annihilated by the aesthetic tribunal (§ 452).
Illud autem, vel hic etiam, ita se habeat, ut 1) impossibilitatis internae vitium prorsus non
pateat analogo rationis 2) rationi ac intellectui, quas in te spectatoribusque tuis praecipuis
praesumere debes, vel etiam lateat, vel saltim ea non obversetur evidentia, quae totam pul-
cre placituri operis fabricam, velut aranearum telas, disiectura sperari debeat: Hoc som-
nium, hic mundus fabulosus per tribunal aestheticum non annihilatur. §. 452. (AE § 455)
Only ficta (in the sense of the Metaphysica) that appear in the dreams of the sick
(aegri somnia) are rejected as really false (see AE § 446). This means that a nat-
ural measurement of forces (dynamomentria naturalis) takes place every time
the analogon of reason judges how much falsity a poetic world can tolerate
(see AE § 457). There is thus – and this is notably modern – no prescriptive guid-
ing principle of falsity but rather a negotiation of aesthetic falsity in every single
text. This judgment of the analogon of reason is supported by ethical common
 Quoted from Lucretius, The Nature of Things, trans. A. E. Stallings (London: Penguin Books,
2007), 508–510.
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sense, which later also plays an important role in Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft
(see AE §§ 463–467).⁷³
In view of the bold thought that, instead of being aesthetically true as they
are supposed to be, poetic worlds also exhibit aesthetic falsities, Baumgarten ex-
claims: “But what kind of ambiguity is that?” (AE § 471; Quid autem illud est am-
biguitatis?). With a predictable yet somewhat tired imperative, he compels the
poet to truth with Cicero: “Ne quid falsi” (AE § 472). But while the poet is a friend
of truth (amicus veritatis), he is not its slave. For poetic worlds are defined by the
necessity of falsity (necessitas falsi; see AE § 473); so simple is the definition.
Such a world “will seem to be similar to the false” (AE § 518; falsi similis vide-
bitur) – or, as Baumgarten’s Latin suggests, falsisimilar – but it will never be
so false that it falls victim to the aesthetic tribunal (tribunal aestheticum; see
AE § 455). Poetic worlds are thus not one but double. Such worlds have, for
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, two poles: a true one and a false one. And they are
only accessible to the child (the paradigm of nonrational perception), who “in-
habits a hybrid zone of oneiric ambiguity.”⁷⁴ The concept of ambiguity thus
changes its setting once again: it refers to the structure of aesthetics, which is
both epistemology and media theory; it refers to beauty, situated in between
openness and closedness; and it refers to poetic worlds. The oneiric – that is,
the dream-like – is the indifferentiable and thus also the undecidable that char-
acterizes this zone.⁷⁵
5.3.2 Probability
Baumgarten’s argumentation in section 28 on aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthe-
tica) clearly leads to a shift in the problem of fiction. He is not interested in
the difference between fact and fiction, in whether there are chimeras or not. In-
stead, the problem of possibility organizes his ontologically and cosmologically
anchored theory of poetic fiction, which – and this is the crux –merely forms the
flip side of the psychological and rhetorical argumentation. The tertium compa-
rationis of world and narration is coherence. In this, he takes a strange middle
position between the premodern tradition that goes back to Aristotle – where
philosophy concerns fundamental determinations of being – and Kant’s modern
analysis of subjective forms of judgment.While Baumgarten’s theory of fiction is
 See 6.3.1 Ethopoeia.
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures 1949– 1952,
trans. Talia Welsh (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 182.
 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.
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not actually based on the modal logic of propositions, he does analyze the mo-
dality of propositions in narration, and he does so with the somewhat cruder
tools of stylistic analysis. This analysis of style is accompanied by a conceptual
shift from ontological possibility (possibilitas) in the Metaphysica to rhetorical
probability (probabilitas) in the Meditationes and then to aesthetic verisimilitude
(verisimilitudo) in the Aesthetica.
Against Wolff ’s ontological disclaimer about figments,⁷⁶ which follows the
Platonic tradition in equating literature with lies because literature contains fic-
tions (ens fictum), Baumgarten begins in theMeditationes to reflect on “what can
be considered thinkable or imaginable at all”⁷⁷ by ontologically differentiating
between three types of fictions:
MED § 51: True fictions (figmenta vera), or representations that are possible in the real
world.
MED § 52: Heterocosmic fictions (figmenta heterocosmica), or representations that are im-
possible in the real world but possible in other possible worlds.
MED § 52: Utopic fictions (figmenta utopica), or representations that are impossible in all
worlds.
The conceptual shifts begin when Baumgarten proposes yet another unique con-
cept of truth for his concept of possibility. He does not, however, take this con-
cept from his philosophical sources, Leibniz and Wolff, but rather from Cicero’s
rhetorical writings:
Hence, concerning contingent things, singular truth constitutes these things either as pos-
sibilities and parts of this universe (Metaphysica § 377) – and this truth, along with the
highest truth of things that are absolutely necessary, is called TRUTH IN THE STRICTEST
SENSE and in popular parlance simply TRUTH – or else as possibilities of another world
and part of it, for the intermediate cognition of men (Metaphysica § 876), which is called
HETEROCOSMIC TRUTH.
Hinc veritas singularis de contingentibus aut ea sistit, ut possibilia et partes huius universi,
M. §. 377. et haec veritas cum veritate absolute necessariorum maxima dicitur STRICTIS-
SIME, popularique sermone simpliciter, VERITAS, aut ut possibilia alterius universi, eius-
que partes, cognitioni hominum mediae, M. §. 876. VERITAS HETEROCOSMICA. (AE § 441)
 See Adler, “Utopie und Imagination,” 23. See also Horst-Michael Schmidt, Sinnlichkeit und
Verstand: Zur philosophischen und poetologischen Begründung von Erfahrung und Urteil in der
deutschen Aufklärung (Leibniz, Wolff, Gottsched, Bodmer und Breitinger, Baumgarten) (Munich:
Wilhelm Fink, 1982), 214–218.
 Adler, “Utopie und Imagination,” 24. See also Pietro Pimpinella, “Veritas aesthetica: Er-
kenntnis des Individuellen und mögliche Welten,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten,” 37–60.
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The attribute heterocosmicus refers to the truth of possible objects (possibilia)
from another world. In the Meditationes, Baumgarten introduces this concept
to describe poetic passages in literary texts and casts it rhetorically: “Confused
descriptions of sense impressions, images, and fictions, true and heterocosmic,
are highly poetic, § 54” (MED § 55; Descriptiones idearum sensualium, phantasma-
tum, figmentorum verorum & heterocosmicorum confusae sunt admodum poeticae
§. 54). One paragraph later, he introduces the concept of fiction for both hetero-
cosmic and poetic fictions, both of which require that “many things can be pre-
sumed to enter the stream of thought of many listeners or readers” (MED § 56;
plura […] seriem in animis multorum auditorum lectorumve ingressa praesumi
possunt). The premise for this is that “there is nothing self-contradictory in po-
etic fictions, § 53” (MED § 57; in figmentis poeticis nil sibi invicem repugnat. §. 53).
To describe the logic of heterocosmic and poetic fictions, Baumgarten thus
never – neither in the Meditationes nor in the Aesthetica – turns to the discourse
on mimesis.⁷⁸ Instead, he embraces poiesis in an emphatically modern sense by
analyzing the rhetorical figures of amplification, which produce evidentia:⁷⁹
If any philosophical or universal theme whatever is to be represented poetically, it is wise to
determine it as much as possible, § 18, by the introduction of examples, § 22, definite as to
place and time, § 28, and by description enumerating as many other details as possible,
§ 49. If experience does not suffice, true fictions are available; if, indeed, the historical
part is not rich enough, heterocosmic fictions are likely to be necessary, § 44, § 47. There-
fore, fictions both true and heterocosmic are, on condition, necessary in a poem.
Si philosophica vel universalia quaevis repraesentanda poetice, determinare quam maxime
§. 18. exemplis involvere §. 22. eaque ratione loci & temporis §. 28. & enumeratis aliis quam
pluribus variis describere §. 49. mens est; experientia non sufficiente figmenta vera, nec hi-
storia quidem satis divite, figmenta probabilter heterocosmica necessaria §. 44. 47. Ergo fig-
menta tam vera, quam heterocosmica in poemate hypothetice necessaria. (MED § 58)
Baumgarten’s poet is accordingly “not an imitator; he mimes imitation,”⁸⁰ as
Derrida puts it. For creating heterocosmic and poetic fictions is an “operation
[that] is no longer comprehended within the process of truth”⁸¹ but rather produ-
ces “reality-effects.”⁸²
 See Gabriel Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life: Aesthetics and Askesis in the German Eighteenth
Century (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 47–48.
 See Adler, “Utopie und Imagination,” 24. See also 3.4.1 Complexity.
 Jacques Derrida, “The Double Session,” in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 219.
 Derrida, “The Double Session,” 207.
 Derrida, “The Double Session,” 206.
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Although Baumgarten primarily addresses lyric poetry in the Meditationes to
analyze the effects of the three functions of the structure of literary discourse –
complexity, opacity, and performativity – he already focuses here, and not only
later in the Aesthetica, on the narrative function, which the evidentia of hetero-
cosmic and poetic fictions depends on. Precisely in analyzing historical narra-
tives from a narratological perspective, he replaces the ontological concept of
possibility with the rhetorical concept of probability. “In fact,” as Douglas
Lane Patey explains this change in register, “for Baumgarten, probability is a
property intrinsic neither to true nor to heterocosmic fictions, but is a relation
to evidence. Baumgarten is clear […] about the status of such evidence as
comes from ‘the work itself ’”:⁸³
More remote history is never so determinately known as the pen of the poet requires – as
already demonstrated.What is narrated, therefore, has to be more fully determined. Deter-
minations have to be added to the poem about those things concerning which history is
silent. They can be discerned only by taking note of whatever must be presupposed for
their literal truth. But since this does not fall within the limits of comprehension, they
must be guessed at from very little and often insufficient evidence. In this respect the
truth of poetic inventions is decidedly improbable; that is, their nonexistence and their sta-
tus among the heterocosmic fictions are probable.
Historia remotior nunquam tam determinate cognita, ut stilus poscit poeticus, per demon-
strata, ergo magis determinanda, quae narrat. Determinationes poemati addendae, de qui-
bus tacet historia, cognosci nequeunt, nisi ex perspicientia omnium requisitorum ad veri-
tatem earundem, quae cum in limitatum non cadat intellectum, ex aliquibus & paucissimis
rationibus insufficientissimis hariolandae sunt, adeoque vehementer improbabilis earum
veritas i.e. probabilis non existentia & statio inter heterocosmica figmenta. (MED § 58n)
He takes up probability again in the next paragraph when he declares that the
degree of rhetorically produced evidentia determines the degree of literariness:
“a poem which treats of probable events represents things more poetically
than a poem which treats of improbable events, § 56” (MED § 59; poema fingens
probabilia facta magis poetice res repraesentat, quam fingens improbabilia §. 56).
Probability and an evidentia liberated from mimesis go hand in hand. Binding
together probability and evidentia makes literature into a simulacrum, though
not in the pejorative sense of deception but rather in the emphatic sense of
the autonomous evidentia of such worlds whose possibility is not morally
 Douglas Lane Patey, Probability and Literary Form: Philosophic Theory and Literary Practice
in the Augustan Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 318n71. See also René Wel-
lek, A History of Modern Criticism: 1750– 1950, vol. 1, The Later Eighteenth Century (London: Jon-
athan Cape, 1955), 145– 146.
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grounded – as was common in the middle of the eighteenth century – but rather
self-referentially grounded.
How tightly probability and evidentia belong together is finally also made
clear in section 33 on evidential arguments (argumenta probantia). Baumgarten
derives them from the arguments of probability (eikota), which play a central role
in Greek rhetoric and dialectics when the orator cannot depend on certain
proofs. In Plato’s Phaedrus, Socrates bemoans rhetoricians who teach the use
of arguments: “It is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher
honor than what is true; they who, by the power of their language, make small
things appear great and great things small; they who express modern ideas in
ancient garb, and ancient ones in modern dress.”⁸⁴ Paregmenon (AE § 543),⁸⁵
sententia (AE § 549), definitio, and descriptio (AE § 551) qualify as such figures
of “making evident”; and Baumgarten discusses descriptio in section 43 on illus-
trative arguments (argumenta illustrantia), that is, again in the arguments re-
sponsible for evidentia.
The relation between probability and evidentia solves the theoretical prob-
lems that arise in the Aesthetica from Baumgarten’s complicated grounding of
aesthetic truth and from his affirmation of aesthetic falsity in the service of
this truth. The change of concepts makes clear that the probability of poetic fic-
tion has to do with a probability based on rhetorical evidentia. This is also the
case when Baumgarten replaces the concept of probability with the concept of
verisimilitude in the sections on aesthetic truth and places verisimilitude
under the auspices of Suada, the Roman goddess of persuasion (see AE § 838)
in section 50 on aesthetic evidence (evidentia aesthetica), directly referring to
Quintilian (who himself cites Cicero).⁸⁶ In the following paragraphs, he then
specifies that aesthetic verisimilitude produces sensate evidentia:
From verisimilar things of this sort (§§ 843–846), provided that persuasive aesthetics
(§ 838) surrounds them with sensate perspicuity (§ 618), is born sensate evidentia (Meta-
physica § 531), which others call a demonstration for the eye, for the senses, and palpable,
the analogue of an intellectually convincing demonstration.
Verisimilibus eiusmodi, §. 843–846. dum aesthetica suada, §. 838. circumfundit perspicui-
tatem sensitivam, §. 618. nascitur inde evidentia, M. §. 531. sensitiva, quam alii demonstra-
tionem ad oculum, ad sensus, et palpabilem dixerint, demonstrationis intellectualiter con-
vincentis analogon. (AE § 847)
 Pl., Phdr. 267b. Quoted from Plato, Phaedrus, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995).
 All etymological figures serve to (mechanically) amplify arguments through repetition.
 See Quint., Inst. 9.2.40. See also 5.3.2 Probability.
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But beside rhetorical evidentia, something else is also at stake with verisimili-
tude. In section 29 on aesthetic verisimilitude (verisimilitudo aesthetica), Baum-
garten is not interested in the stylistic technique of placing something before the
eyes. Instead, he is searching for an aesthetic truth recognized by the analogon
of reason with equal standing to real, proper truth (see AE § 481). Something
verisimilar is not only similar to the truth or seemingly true; it is, rather, a
truth that becomes phenomenally manifest, making it aesthetically true. The
rhetorical discovery of verisimilitude thus helps him draw truth-likeness out of
the false-likeness of poetic worlds:⁸⁷
Now I would think that it is established with the clearest calculus that many of the things
perceptible during graceful thinking are not completely certain, and that their truth is not
completely discerned in the light (§§ 481–482). Nor can, nevertheless, any sensate falsity be
discerned in anything without ugliness (section XXVII). Such things, however, about which
we are indeed not completely certain but in which we nevertheless do not perceive any fal-
sity are VERISIMILAR. Aesthetic truth (section XXVII), more properly called VERISIMILI-
TUDE, is therefore the degree of truth that, even if it is not exalted to complete certitude,
nevertheless contains no trace of observable falsity.
Iam apertissimo putaverim calculo constare plurima inter venuste cogitandum appercipien-
da, non esse complete certa, neque luce completa veritatem eorum conspici, §. 481, 482.
Nec in ullo tamen falsitatis aliquid sensitivae deprehendi potest sine turpitudine, S. XXVIII.
Talia autem, de quibus non complete quidem certi sumus, neque tamen falsitatem aliquam
in iisdem appercipimus, sunt VERISIMILIA. Est ergo veritas aesthetica S. XXVII. a potiori
dicta VERISIMILITUDO, ille veritatis gradus, qui, etiamsi non evectus sit ad completam cer-
titudinem, tamen nihil contineat falsitatis observabilis. (AE § 483; see also AE § 518)
Baumgarten lays out the rules for simulating the quantitative and qualitative
phenomenal concurrence of representation and world in fourteen points (see
AE §§ 491–502).⁸⁸ In the following, I do not want to address them, however,
but rather the result of the conceptual shift from possibility to probability to ve-
risimilitude. And that result is the fable; in analyzing it, Baumgarten brings to-
gether verisimilitude and aesthetic evidentia so as to define the narrative matrix
of poetic fiction. With this move, a “heteronomous minor genre for representing
straightforward morality thus becomes a matrix for evaluating literature in gen-
eral.”⁸⁹
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
 See Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, “Rhetorische und idealistische Kategorien der Ästhetik,” in
Kolloquium Kunst und Philosophie, ed. Willi Oelmüller, vol. 1, Ästhetische Erfahrung (Paderborn:
Ferdinand Schöningh, 1981), 97–98.
 Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 78.
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In section 32 on fables (fabulae), he defines the fable as a small narrative
(narratiuncula) that serves as an example for a moral maxim (sententia; see
AE § 526); in other words, a fable makes a moral maxim evident. In genre poet-
ics, the fable traditionally stood in the service of probability.With the concept of
verisimilitude, Baumgarten changes the relationship between probability and
the fable. Meixner is the first to have drawn attention to the fact that the poetics
of the fable – and so also eighteenth-century narratology – does not begin with
Lessing’s book on fables. And Feldman confirms the importance of this genre for
Gottsched’s poetics.⁹⁰ Baumgarten already uses the concept of the fable to refer
both to the genre and to the structure of literary discourse that creates coherence
in poetic worlds, thereby relating fiction theory to narratology. He differentiates
between fable1 as a genre, which he calls fabella (see AE § 529), and fable2 as a
plot pattern,which he calls a poetic fable (fabula poetica; see AE § 530). Not only
major and minor narrative forms but also dramatic genres like comedy and trag-
edy have fables2 (see AE § 529). “For his purposes, Baumgarten decidedly reinter-
prets Quintilian,”⁹¹ whose typology he cites:
We are told that there are three species of Narrative, apart from the one used in actual Caus-
es. One is Fable [fabulam], found in tragedies and poems, and remote not only from truth
but from the appearance of truth. The second is Plot [argumentum], which is the false but
probable fiction of comedy. The third is History [historiam], which contains the narration of
actual events.We have given poetical Narratives to the grammatici; the rhetor should begin
with historical ones, which are more grown-up because they are more real.⁹²
On the one hand, Baumgarten inverts Quintilian’s hierarchy of narrative types:
historia, argumentum, fabula; but he still retains the climax of the argumenta-
tion. Now truth in the strictest sense (veritas strictissime dicta) is no longer at
the top, but rather fable2, which Quintilian calls plot and is merely similar to
truth (see AE § 529).
Baumgarten abstracts a fable2 structure from a series of Phaedrus’s Aesopian
fables1 (see AE §§ 536–538); it follows the plot structure Aristotle develops in his
Poetics for tragedy: knot (nodus), interwoven and interlinked fables (fabulae im-
plicitae et connexae) with desis (colligatio), metabasis (transitus), and lysis (so-
lutio; see AE § 535). The minor narrative form of the fabella thus has just as much
of a fable2 (see AE § 529) as the major form of the epic. For this reason, Baum-
garten actually differentiates between verisimilitude in the strictest sense (verisi-
 See Feldman, Arts of Connection, 47–50.
 Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 76.
 Quint., Inst. 2.4.2.
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militudo strictissime dicta), which only narratives anchored in the actual world
can possess, and the poetic and heterocosmic verisimilitude (verisimilitudo poe-
tica/heterocosmica) of narratives that take us to other worlds. Only heterocosmic
narratives “without vividly noticeable contradictions, a gap, or a jump” are veri-
similar with regard to their fables2 (AE § 530; sine vividius notabili repugnantia,
hiatu, saltu).
At the end of this complex explanation of verisimilitude in section 32 on fa-
bles (fabulae), Baumgarten suddenly switches concepts yet again and returns to
speaking of probability as he does in the Meditationes. It is hard to tell why. I do
not think it makes sense to translate probabilitas as “Glaubhaftigkeit” (plausibil-
ity or credibility), as both the German translations of the Aesthetica and the
scholarship on the fable tend to do. Baumgarten also seems serious about differ-
entiating verisimilitude and probability, considering that he further differentiates
aesthetic probability (probabilitas aesthetica) into historical probability, poetic
probability, and heterocosmic probability (see AE § 533). So I believe that the re-
lapse to using the concept of probability from the poetologically oriented Medi-
tationes is exclusively due to how Baumgarten follows the history of the genre of
the fable1, in which a distinction is made between probable and improbable fa-
bles (fabulae probabiles et improbabiles). At the end of his analysis of fables1, he
is concerned with precisely this problem: with “(im)probabilities” in fables1 – a
problem that the word verisimilitude simply does not morphologically corre-
spond to.
Yet despite the change in concepts, he is in actuality still interested in the
verisimilitude of fables1. In a close reading of Phaedrus’s first fable, “Lupus et
agnus,” Baumgarten notes the combination of improbability and truth: “Phae-
drus’s first fable is improbable in a stricter sense (§ 532)” (AE § 534; Prima Phae-
dri fabula est improbabilis strictius, §. 532). In this fable, a wolf eyes a lamb and
so as to initiate a quarrel with the lamb, invents a story about how the lamb in-
sulted him six months ago. When the lamb replies that it was not yet born six
months ago, the wolf then suddenly accuses the lamb’s father of insulting him
and eats up the lamb. Baumgarten finds the dialogue between the wolf and
the lamb to be improbable because the narratological coherence in the fable
does not convince him. Yet with regard to the moral of the fable, he notes that
often nothing is more true than that people “invent false charges by which to op-
press the innocent.”⁹³
 Phaedrus, Phaedri Augusti liberti fabularum Aesopiarum 1.1.15; quoted from Babrius and
Phaedrus, Fables, trans. Ben Edwin Perry, Loeb Classical Library 436 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1965).
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The conceptual shifts from ontological possibility in the Metaphysica to rhe-
torical probability in the Meditationes, and then to aesthetic verisimilitude in the
Aesthetica, result from Baumgarten’s reflections on aesthetic truth. In the eigh-
teenth century, the concept of verisimilitude applied to things that were not an-
chored in the actual world, and so he treats verisimilitude as a question of nar-
rative with regard to representation in general. The analysis of “Lupus et agnus”
thus confirms that the ambiguity of poetic worlds consists in a philosophically
troubling truth-likeness. This ambiguity applies to all the types of fiction that
Baumgarten provides examples for in the sections on fiction in the Aesthetica.
5.3.3 Accessibility
The conceptual shift from possibility to probability to verisimilitude prepares a
typology of fictions (systema fictionum; see AE § 513)⁹⁴ that does not differentiate
between fact and fiction but rather combines different ontological states of
worlds and different modes of truth in narration into different types of fiction.
In this typology, both world and truth depend on the narrative function of the
structure of literary discourse. Historical models are available for reconstructing
this typology – in particular, Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds – yet even a
glance at twentieth-century literary theory quickly discloses the dimensions of
Baumgarten’s typology. And this also shows that what seems to be old-fashioned
in this typology turns out to be the silver bullet for fiction theory, a solution that
David Lewis was the first to take up again, two hundred years after Baumgarten,
under the influence of analytic philosophy in his essay “Truth in Fiction” and his
book On the Plurality of Worlds (1986). More recent theories of fiction have fol-
lowed his lead. Using modal logic, they all attempt to escape the ontological
trap of a cheap differentiation between fictionality and factuality.
In her explanation of recent approaches to fiction, Marie-Laure Ryan traces
the current concept of possible worlds back to Leibniz: “For a world to be pos-
sible, it must be linked to the actual world by a relation of accessibility. The
boundaries of the possible depend on the particular interpretation given to
this notion of accessibility. The most common interpretation associates possibil-
ity with logical laws: every world that respects the principles of non-contradic-
tion and of the excluded middle is a possible world. On the basis of this
model, we can define a proposition as necessary if it is true in all worlds linked
to the actual world (including this actual world itself); as possible if it is true in
 See Berndt, “Mundus poetarum.”
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only some of these worlds; as impossible (e.g., contradictory) if it is false in all of
them; and as true, without being necessary, if it is verified in the actual world of
the system but not in some other possible world.”⁹⁵ The approaches that employ
this concept display striking parallels to Baumgarten’s aesthetic cosmology. All
of them differentiate between our actual world and other possible worlds that
are not our actual world.
Drawing on such theories of possible worlds, one can glean a typology of fic-
tion from Baumgarten’s remarks on his examples. The typology consists in three
different ontological states of worlds and two different modes of truth. Combined,
these two variables yield six types of fiction in total, expanding on the three types
of fiction from the Meditationes named above (see MED §§ 51–53): true fictions,
heterocosmic fictions, and utopic fictions. The typology is, however, only implicit
in the Aesthetica, and it is difficult to fill in all the placeholders that it provides for;
furthermore, the borders between the types prove to be problematic. I will first de-
scribe the typology based on the Aesthetica (at times taking into account the Me-
ditationes as well), then briefly explain it, and finally analyze Baumgarten’s “fic-
tion trouble.”





























 Marie-Laure Ryan, “Possible Worlds,” in Handbook of Narratology, ed. Peter Hühn et al., 2nd
ed., vol. 2 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2014), 726–727. See Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelli-
gence, and Narrative Theory (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
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(1) Historical fictions in a narrower sense (fictiones strictius historicae) and
historical fables (fabulae historicae). Although Baumgarten hedges his definition
with a few relativizations, he is still certain that historical fictions narrate events
that took place, that are currently taking place, or that will take place in the ac-
tual world. Livy’s monumental history of Rome, Ab urbe condita, is paradigmatic
for this type of fiction. Historical fables, which are different from histories due to
their brevity, also belong to this group (see AE § 527).
(2) Historical fictions in a broader sense (fictiones historicae latius dictae).
Baumgarten differentiates historical fictions in a narrower sense from historical
fictions in a broader sense. Historical fictions in a broader sense narrate events
that have occurred in a more or less similar way in the actual world:
Thus, fictions, just as truths, falsities, and verisimilitudes, will be either general or partic-
ular, and they will either be engaged in cognition about this universe or be heterocosmic
(§§ 445, 441). The general ones have their own rules (section XXVIIII). The singular ones,
part of graceful cognition about this universe, will be either true in the strictest sense
(§ 506) – matters of fact, whether constituting present events or things that will truly
take place, which the one thinking them has not, however, experienced strictly speaking
– or true in a less strict sense.
Erunt itaque fictiones, sicuti veritates, falsitates et verisimilitudines, vel generales, vel sin-
gulares, et hae vel huius universi cognitionem ingredientur, vel erunt heterocosmicae,
§. 445, 441. Generales habent suas regulas S. XXVIIII. Singulares, pars cognitionis de hoc
universo venustae, aut erunt strictissime verae, §. 506, res facti, vel eventus praesentes,
vel vere futura sistentes, quae tamen ipse cogitans non stricte expertus est, aut minus.
(AE § 507; see also AE § 509)
Narratives about the nature of this world are therefore not generally true but
rather individually true; that is, they only apply to one particular case. The Ae-
neis by the Roman poet Virgil is paradigmatic for this type of fiction. Virgil’s
epic narrates the founding myth of the Roman Empire, which he relates to the
myth of the Trojan War. In Baumgarten’s understanding, such myths are special
historical fictions: “The AESTHETICS OF THE MYTHICAL is the part of aesthetics
that devises and presents fictions” (MET § 592; AESTHETICA MYTHICA est
aesthetices pars de fictionibus excogitandis & proponendis).
(3) Poetic fictions (fictiones poeticae) and poetic fables (fabulae poeticae).
Poetic fictions and their shorter variant, poetic fables, narrate possible events:
If such things should be invented that, because of a circumstance – known, as one must
assume, both to the one thinking and to those who would think under his guidance –
and a hypothesis and a sure event of this world, have no place in this same universe as
its possibilities, but nevertheless, if some other hypothesis is supposed that is not a possi-
bility of this universe, could have happened or could happen in a beautiful or ugly manner
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through intermediate cognition, then such heterocosmic FICTIONS (§ 441) are called POET-
IC since their inventor creates a new world even if they are mostly brought forth from the
historical.
Si fingantur talia, quae ob notam et cogitanti et cogitaturis ipso duce, sicuti praesumi
debet, circumstantiam, et hypothesin eventumque huius mundi certum, in eodem hoc uni-
verso locum non habeant, ut eiusdem possibilia, supposita tamen alia quadam hypothesi,
quae non est possibile huius universi, fieri pulcre potuissent aut possent, vel turpiter, per
cognitionem mediam: tales FICTIONES heterocosmicae, §. 441, quia inventor earum, quasi
novum creat orbem fingendo, si vel maxime ab historico proferantur, dicuntur POETICAE.
(AE § 511; see also AE §§ 527–528)
The proximity of poetic and heterocosmic fictions is not noteworthy since Baum-
garten uses the attributes heterocosmicus and poeticus as synonyms in the Medi-
tationes.What is more important is the fact that he considers narratives about
poetic worlds to be categorically true, while heterocosmic fictions can only be
individually true. But since heterocosmic and poetic fictions are so similar, the
difference between general truth and individual truth becomes porous. This is
confirmed by the fact that Baumgarten does not have a paradigmatic example
for poetic fictions but rather selects Virgil’s Aeneis again, even though he has al-
ready classified it as a historical fiction (in a broader sense). If one looks at this
paradigm from the perspective of production, poets of historical fictions in a
broader sense, poets of heterocosmic fictions, and poets of poetic fictions all ap-
parently enjoy the same poetic liberty (libertas poetica; see AE § 523).
(4) Heterocosmic fictions (fictiones heterocosmicae). Baumgarten does not
have a different definition or a different paradigmatic example for heterocosmic
fictions than for poetic fictions. Narratives about these worlds are individually
true; apart from that, everything that applies to poetic fictions also applies to
heterocosmic fictions.
(5) Anomalous figments (figmenta anomala). Anomalous figments are char-
acterized by aesthetic deviations and ethical irregularities. They narrate impos-
sible events. Such “mistakes” are allowable in small doses in poetic fictions,
as I explained in my analysis of section 28 on aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthe-
tica),⁹⁶ but when more extensive, they are a disqualifying criterion.
(6) Utopic fictions (figmenta utopica) and prophetic fictions (figmenta vatici-
niorum). Aesthetic deviations also characterize utopias in the Aesthetica and pro-
phetic fictions – including wonders (mirabilia), miracles (miracula), and fanta-
sies (phantasmata), and others – in the Meditationes (see MED §§ 43–64).
Contrary to anomalous figments, for which Baumgarten does not provide any ex-
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
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amples, the narratives of this group are individually true, although they also nar-
rate impossible events. Utopias are impossible, though not absolutely impossi-
ble, and disclose a “region of chimeras” (AE § 514; regio chimaerarum; see
also MED §§ 52, 59n), while wonders mainly belong to poetic fiction even though
they narrate impossible events (see MED §§ 43–49). Yet Baumgarten legitimizes
their exceptional state through their poetic autonomy. Fiction is poetic if the
analogon of reason represents it sensately, independently of whether it exists
in the actual world or in a possible world or not. This means that wonders are
even “more poetic” than other narratives (MED § 45; magis poeticae) because
the analogon of reason has to expend more energy than normal due to their
higher degree of complexity, opacity, and performativity. Miracles are also highly
poetic and wonderful for the same reasons, as are fantasies (see MED § 50) and,
most of all, prophetic fictions (see MED §§ 60–64). Baumgarten justifies them
with reference to the Bible – to Noah’s prophecy on the Ark – and to Horace
and Virgil, who narrate prophecies and even the future (see MED §§ 59n,
64n).⁹⁷ Nevertheless, not only wonders but all these narratives require a mini-
mum level of familiarity if they are not to disconcert the reader: “If, therefore,
wonders are to be represented, there ought still to be something that can be con-
fusedly recognized in the representation of them, § 45; that is, to mingle skillfully
the familiar with the unfamiliar in the wonderful itself is in the highest degree
poetic, § 47” (MED § 48; Quod si ergo mirabilia repraesentanda §. 45. debent
tamen quaedam in eorum repraesentatione posse confuse recognosci, i.e. in
ipsis mirabilibus nota incognitis apte miscere maxime poeticum §. 47).
What very clearly unsettles this typology is what I want to refer to as the Vir-
gil paradox. In the end, this paradox solves the problem of familiarity. Baumgar-
ten differentiates historical fiction into generally true histories (Livy) and individ-
ually true myths (Virgil). Virgil’s Aeneis serves as an example of such myths, but
he also cites the Aeneis as an example of poetic fiction, which he then differen-
tiates from heterocosmic fiction with regard to the mode of truth: poetic fiction is
generally true, whereas heterocosmic fiction is individually true. This first aspect
of the Virgil paradox – that is, the difference between histories and myths – is
easy to understand within the typology of fiction: since Livy narrates about
the actual world, the Ab urbe condita is generally true.Virgil, by contrast, invents
a founding myth when he ties the Aeneis to Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey and nar-
rates the descent of the Romans from the Trojans, so his epic is not generally
true. But as a manifest singular case (thema singularis), this Rome cannot be
held to correspond to the actual world; it belongs, rather, to a nonactual, possi-
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
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ble world, so Baumgarten should logically classify the Aeneis as a heterocosmic
fiction.
That he still treats the Aeneis as representing our actual world has to do with
accessibility.⁹⁸ The analogon of reason has easy access to both Livy’s and Virgil’s
Romes because their Romes, while not identical, are maximally similar to one
another and to our Rome. The analogon of reason makes this judgment based
on its experience in the world⁹⁹ and its previous knowledge (praeconceptio)
about the world. Narratives about the nature of the actual world are therefore
generally true. With Ryan, one could consider whether the category of necessity
comes into play here, a category that Baumgarten’s aesthetic cosmology categor-
ically excludes with regard to existing worlds (see MET §§ 102, 363).¹⁰⁰ Narratives
are necessary if they are true in all worlds that are “linked to the actual world
(including this actual world itself).”¹⁰¹ What Baumgarten therefore first attends
to are minimal differences between the two Romes: for example, Virgil narrates
that Aeneas fled from the hostile Greeks, while Livy states that along with Ante-
nor, Aeneas was spared from the “law of war” “because of a long-standing right
of hospitality and because he had always advocated peace and the restoration of
Helen” (AE § 508; ius belli; vetustum hospitii ius, et quia pacis reddendaeque He-
lenae semper auctor fuerat).Virgil takes Aeneas first to Thrace,whereas in Livy he
goes to Macedonia (see AE § 508). And Virgil is especially guilty of one absolute
“mistake” in a passage where the supposed chastity of Dido contradicts the fact
that she and Aeneas have a “cave date” (see AE § 473), which would obviously
signal the end of her virginity.
These differences are at first unproblematic because Baumgarten believes
the historian more than the poet. But things become tricky when Baumgarten
considers the conflicting genealogies of Aeneas’s progeny. With regard to the
son of Aeneas, for whom both the names Ascanius and Iulus have been transmit-
ted, Livy says that Lavinia is the mother of Ascanius and Creusa the mother of
Iulus; that is, he ascribes the two names to different people. By contrast, Virgil
writes that Ascanius and Iulus are actually two names for the one son of Creusa
and Aeneas, so he ascribes both names to a single person. In view of this contra-
diction, Baumgarten approvingly cites Livy, who notes the following with regard
to the state of the sources:
 See David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 27–50.
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
 Ryan, “Possible Worlds,” 727.
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I shall not discuss the question – for who could affirm for certain so ancient a matter? –
whether this boy was Ascanius, or an elder brother, born by Creusa while Ilium yet stood,
who accompanied his father when he fled from the city, being the same whom the Julian fam-
ily call Iulus and claim as the author of their name. No matter where born or of what mother –
it is agreed in any case that he was Aeneas’ son.¹⁰²
Haud nihil ambigam (quis enim rem tam veterem pro certo affirmet?) Hiccine fuerit Ascanius,
an maior, quam hic, Creusa natus matre, Ilio incolumi, comesque inde paternae fugae, quem
Iulum eundem Iulia gens auctorem nominis sui nuncupat. Ubicunque et quacunque matre
genitus, certe natum Aenea constat. (AE § 508)
That Livy replaces matrilineage with patrilineage in his genealogy of the found-
ing family may have been a politically motivated decision: Rome’s father is sym-
bolically more important than Rome’s mother, although biological motherhood
is proverbially always more certain than fatherhood – pater semper incertus
est; perhaps fatherhood has to be symbolically secured so strongly for precisely
that reason. In any case, Baumgarten gives, as Meixner explains, a narratological
turn to the problem of genealogy by attributing, in a laconic sentence, the uncer-
tain fatherhood not to Aeneas but rather to the fathers of the two texts them-
selves:¹⁰³ “Wherever and from whichever father true fiction in the strictest
sense is generated (§ 506), these fictions by both [Virgil and Livy] are, among oth-
ers, historical fictions broadly speaking (§ 507)” (AE § 508; Ubicunque et quocun-
que patre genita sit fictio strictissime vera, §. 506. amborum hae, praeter alias,
sunt fictiones historicae late dictae, §. 507). Virgil and Livy are not giving birth
to Ascanius and Iulus here but rather to fictions.
Yet the point of the sentence is that both fictions of Rome are fictions be-
cause they were created, independently of whether they are a historical fiction
in a narrower sense like Livy’s or a historical fiction in a broader sense like Vir-
gil’s. This “being created” refers to something beyond the narrated world, that is,
to an extradiegetic level where the narrative function is located. The I-Origos of
both the Ab urbe condita and the Aeneis do not bear witness to the history of
Rome through experience or prior knowledge. Instead, the narrative function –
si narrem – is occupied in both narratives by personified narrating agents in
the first-person present singular:¹⁰⁴ in Ab urbe condita, the extradiegetic position
is filled by the persona of the historian; in the case of the Aeneis, by the persona
of the epic singer. But in analyzing the differences, it becomes unclear whether
one of these roles is epistemologically privileged relative to the other, that is,
 Quoted (with modification) from Livy, History of Rome, trans. B. O. Foster, vol. 1, Loeb Clas-
sical Library 114 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919), 1.3.3.
 See Meixner, Narratologie und Epistemologie, 74–75.
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
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whether the historian is a more reliable narrator than the singer. This is because
the point of comparison for deciding what is true and what is false is missing.
Neither of the narrating agents are telling about the actual Rome. As a result,
the narrating agents of both Livy’s history and Virgil’s myth are unreliable and
limited because they can only have an aesthetic perspective and not a logical
one. In Baumgarten’s typology, not only the individually true Aeneis but also
the supposedly generally true history Ab urbe condita would thus have to be
moved from the group of historical fictions to the group of heterocosmic fictions.
By analyzing the minimal differences between the types, one realizes that Baum-
garten transgresses the frame of his own typology of fiction.
He brings the decisive concept of verisimilitude into play again at precisely
this point regarding the unreliable creation of narratives: “In the Aeneis, Asca-
nius is a verisimilar character” (AE § 508; Ascanius in Aeneide est persona veri-
similis). Suddenly, Baumgarten is no longer interested in events, spaces, and ob-
jects in the poetic world as such. Instead, the identity of the characters – in this
case the identity of Ascanius – defies the unreliability of the narration. The prob-
lem of mediation is thus managed with recourse to tradition. For what is the cri-
terion of verisimilitude, which concerns the accessibility of poetic worlds, if ex-
perience and previous knowledge are lacking? The answer to this question leads
to the second aspect of the Virgil paradox. Individually true heterocosmic fic-
tions and generally true poetic fictions can narrate about nonactual, possible
worlds. And why, of all things, are poetic fictions considered generally true? Per-
haps because something is generally true in any poetic world when it is linked to
the literary encyclopedia: it is the similarity of one text to other texts that makes
it verisimilar and guarantees accessibility.
That a poetic world’s accessibility depends on similarity leads again to
Baumgarten’s engagement with Horace: “He tells us that the heroic subjects of
the myths are the most familiar. Medea, Io, Ino, Ixion, Orestes are examples of
the same concept of what constitutes the most tragic characters in the theater”
(MED § 56n; Heroas materias fabularum notissimas.Medea, Io, Ino, Ixion, Orestes
exempla eiusdem conceptus generalioris personarum in theatris tristissimarum).
In the Kollegium, one finds another reference to this intertextual form of poetic
repetition: “What we sense and have sensed, that is old; since he [the poet] is
now to create something new, he must not purely show the old perception
again but rather put the old ones together with new ones with imagination”
(KOLL § 34; Was wir empfinden und empfunden haben, das ist alt, da er [der
Dichter] nun etwas Neues schaffen soll, so muß er nicht pur die alten Empfin-
dungen wieder zeigen, sondern die alten mit Imagination verbunden mit
neuen zusammensetzen). In the Aesthetica, Baumgarten returns to the passage
in Horace, which he cites now in its full length:
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If perhaps as playwright you create Achilles when honored,
Let him be energetic, furious, relentless, bitter,
And renounce laws, saying that everything comes down to arms;
Let Medea be fierce and unrestrained, Ino sorrowful,
Ixion treacherous, Io roaming, Orestes sad. (Hor., Ars P. 120– 124)
Scriptor, honoratum si forte reponis Achillem,
Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer,
Iura neget sibi nata, nihil non arroget armis,
Sit Medea ferox invictaque, flebilis Ino,
Perfidus Ixion, Io vaga, tristis Orestes. A. P. 120. (AE § 517)
Both Livy’s and Virgil’s heterocosmic fictions are verisimilar precisely because
both authors do not have any personal experience with the historical Rome
they narrate about (uterque non expertus; see AE § 508). Instead, their narratives
are based on the same sources, although minimal differences do appear. But Ae-
neas is Aeneas, no matter what route he travels; Ascanius is Ascanius, no matter
who his mother was; both variations do not contradict the common sense of lit-
erature.
This intertextuality has astonishing consequences for the mode of truth.
Baumgarten does not interpret Virgil’s Aeneis as a case of heterocosmic fiction,
as would be expected, but rather as an example of poetic fiction. As sensately
manifest individual cases (themata singularia/individua/obiecta), both types of
fiction – histories and myths – narrate about nonactual, possible worlds. But
such heterocosmic fictions are only poetic if their possible worlds are textual
worlds:
A poetic fiction (§ 511) of a poetic world (§ 513) not bordering on utopia in an ugly manner
(§§ 514–515) will conceive of its world – which it creates by inventing it heterocosmically –
in conformity to some part of that poetic world, and indeed positively; that is, such that it
coheres well inasmuch as it should assume that its particular listeners will scrutinize the
matter, that it can be molded properly by the mind to the known part of the world of
poets from preconceptions about that world, that it thus constitutes its own events, as is
customary, in a given region of the poetic world, that it has an aesthetic unity with that
region, and that it receives its verisimilitude from it in return. Let us call a POETIC FICTION
of this sort ANALOGICAL.
Quaedam fictio poetica, §. 511. mundi poetici, §. 513, non tangens turpiter utopiam, §. 514,
515. cuidam ex eodem parti conformiter, etiam positive, i.e. ita concipiet suum orbem,
quem creat heterocosmice fingendo, ut hic bene cohaereat, quantum aesthetice suos prae-
cipuos auditores rem scrutaturos debet praesumere, probe cognitae parti mundi poetarum,
ex eius anticipationibus mente formari possit, ita eventus suos sistat, uti solitum est, in re-
gione mundi poetici data, habeat cum eadem unitatem aestheticam, et ex eadem suam
mutuo verisimilitudinem accipiat. Eiusmodi FIGMENTUM POETICUM dicamus ANALOGI-
CUM. (AE § 516)
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The analogy ensures that Achilles is similar to Achilles, Medea to Medea, Ino to
Ino, Io to Io, Orestes to Orestes. Imitatio and aemulatio, the humanist model of
influence in Renaissance poetics, are released into the universe of text in Baum-
garten. In contrast to analogical poetic fictions, simple heterocosmic fictions
lack the intertextual interface that makes generally true fictions out of individu-
ally true fictions. The unprecedented modernity of the typology lies in its ap-
praisal of the literary encyclopedia as the guarantor of the general truth of liter-
ature; with it, Baumgarten secures literature’s place in the order of knowledge.
The truth of poetic fiction is thus not anchored in the actual world or in the
poetic world but rather in the literary encyclopedia. This anchoring establishes
the autonomy of literature. Although the truth of poetic fiction makes a claim
to universal validity, it is not absolute. With regard to the metaphysical frames
of the sections on fiction, poetic truth has the same structure as aesthetic
truth. The ambiguity of beauty is reflected in the ambiguity of poetic fiction,





In his theory of literature, Baumgarten analyzes the structure of literary dis-
course, engages with the metaphysics of beauty, and develops a narratology
that adds narrativity as a fourth function to the structure of literary discourse
and ultimately culminates in a typology of fiction. In this theory of fiction, as
well as in other places, Baumgarten engages with ethics.¹ This is because
many questions that arise in the context of aesthetic truth and falsity compel
him to consider the authors of literary texts. In his Meditationes, he uses the
term poeta to refer to the author; in the Aesthetica and Kollegium, he alternates
between a set of terms like auctor, scriptor, and Schriftsteller, unless he calls the
author a felix aestheticus – a term whose meaning is not quite captured with the
translation “happy aesthetician” – or a schöner Geist, a “beautiful spirit.” With
the felix aestheticus, we turn from aesthetics to ethics and, at the same time,
from the theory of literature to the ethical practices of literature, which Dorothea
von Mücke has recently drawn attention to.² The practices Baumgarten observes
are rooted in anthropology,³ which establishes itself in the eighteenth century as
a discipline of observation. He thus articulates an anthropologically based, mod-
ern theory of authorship long before the “genius” comes into view in the middle
of the century. In contrast to the discourse on the genius, he is not interested in
the questions of authorship and originality that will occupy Friedrich Gottlieb
Klopstock or Goethe and that have characterized recent debates – not least be-
cause of Roland Barthes’s and Foucault’s essays on the “death of the author.”
Baumgarten is rather engaged in a genuine ethics of literature, in which
“truth, beauty, and goodness are one, different facets of one basic value,
which is perfection” (see AE § 56: “pulcre! bene! recte”).⁴ This aesthetico-ethical
rationalism not only depends, however, on ethical practices; rather, the practices
 See Hans Georg Peters, Die Ästhetik Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens und ihre Beziehungen zum
Ethischen (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1934), 39–58; Clemens Schwaiger, “Baumgartens An-
satz einer philosophischen Ethikbegründung,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten,” 219–237; Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica,” 102–128; Buchenau, The Founding
of Aesthetics, 178– 192.
 See Dorothea E. von Mücke, The Practices of the Enlightenment: Aesthetics, Authorship, and the
Public (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 6.
 See Stöckmann, Anthropologische Ästhetik, 87–147.
 Frederick C. Beiser, Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 2.
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appear as rhetorical figures that represent the forms of the practices and their
traces in literary texts.
Like Kant’s philosophical system, Baumgarten’s encompasses a logic, an
ethics, and an aesthetics; and like Kant, he bases all three “critiques” on a meta-
physical master plan. Baumgarten’s Aesthetica and Ethica, which he composed
almost twenty years earlier, are thus “twin-sisters” born to mother Metaphysica.⁵
For the “ethical perfection of action is […] dependent on the perfection of cogni-
tion,”⁶ and vice versa. Beautiful cognition and the beautiful spirit are two sides
of the same coin. As ethical categories, Baumgarten therefore adopts the same
six categories of rhetorical style – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude,
and life – that are the basis of the analogy between epistemology and media
theory in the Aesthetica, and arranges his Ethica according to them (ubertatem,
gravitatem, veritatem, claritatem, certitudinem et vitam; see ETH § 443). Cogni-
tive and moral illumination (illuminatio moralis) thus always mirror one anoth-
er.
From the perspective of the intimate tie between the two projects, aesthetics
serves as a school or institution of ethics and is entirely in its service: there is not
any beautiful cognition that is not also ethical. In the lectures transcribed in the
Kollegium, Baumgarten gives himself the pedagogical task of clarifying “how the
subject that is to engage in it [aesthetics] must be constituted” (KOLL § 27; wie
das Subjekt beschaffen sein muß, das sie [die Ästhetik] treiben soll). And the
first seven sections introducing the Aesthetica posit a deep relation between aes-
thetics and ethics. In this, Baumgarten follows Quintilian, who in addition to of-
fering guidance on how to manufacture a good discourse also considers the char-
acter of the speaker and his education. That is why aesthetics consists in
analyzing more than just beautiful cognition; it also encompasses the nature
and education of the happy and successful aesthetician, the felix aestheticus,
who thinks beautifully and desires in the same manner, since cognition and de-
sire are intrinsically tied together. The felix aestheticus is, of course, male, like
all of Baumgarten’s other conceptions of poets and authors. He only considers
women in the Philosophische Brieffe von Aletheophilus when he addresses Char-
lotte Juliane von Lichtfeld as “most estimable beauty” (PHB 57; Wertheste
Schöne) and in the Kollegium when he refers to grooming oneself as an exercise
in beauty: “A woman who grooms herself daily does this to please and to be
beautiful, even if she does not always put on all her finery” (KOLL § 47; Dies
 Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica,” 104.
 Dagmar Mirbach, “Ingenium venustum und magnitudo pectoris: Ethische Aspekte von
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Aesthetica,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten,” 200.
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tut ein Frauenzimmer, das sich täglich putzt, um zu gefallen, und um schön zu
sein, ob sie gleich nicht immer ihren völligen Staat anziehet).With this gendering
in mind, and because Baumgarten describes the practices of thinking and desir-
ing beautifully as literary practices, I refer to the person who “composes litera-
ture” with the historical term poet (as an equivalent to the male Dichter, which
commonly referred in eighteenth-century German to literary authors in general).
Baumgarten devotes the first two sections of the Aesthetica to describing the
innate capacities of a person who thinks and desires beautifully and another
four sections to dealing with his moral duties; in addition to these eighty-six in-
troductory paragraphs he adds another nine paragraphs treating the person’s
abundance of spirit. Together, these sections make up 95 of the 904 total para-
graphs. I will first only treat the three sections italicized below and will come
to the others in 6.2.1 Exercise:
Section II: Natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis)
Section III: Aesthetic exercise (exercitatio aesthetica)
Section IIII: Aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica)
Section V: Aesthetic inspiration (impetus aestheticus)
Section VI: Aesthetic correction (correctio aesthetica)
Section VII: Certain precautions (cautiones quaedam)
Section XII: Abundance of spirit (ubertas ingenii)
In sections 2 and 5, Baumgarten outlines the essential features of the aestheti-
cian (character aesthetici) in the hope that everyone can perfect their aesthetic
cognition so as to contribute to the common good. In the argumentation, a neg-
ative definition (see AE §§ 104– 114) containing warnings and admonitions fol-
lows a positive definition (see AE §§ 28–103) treating the poet’s aptitudes and
education. In section 2 on natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis), Baumgarten
defines the faculties of the soul that characterize the poet as an innate beautiful
and elegant spirit (ingenium venustum et elegans connatum) and an innate aes-
thetic temperament (temperamentum aestheticum connatum).
Under the concept of temperament, Baumgarten treats the poet’s appetitive
faculties, and under ingenium – roughly the poet’s “spirit” or “mind,” though
this term eludes a simple translation and should be understood as a conceptual
token from the millennia-old discourse on creativity – he subsumes both the
higher (see AE § 38) and lower cognitive faculties (see AE §§ 30–37), which he
relates to one another with his usual caution by conceiving sensate cognition
as analogous to logical cognition. Because he also lacks concepts in the field
of ethics, Baumgarten replaces the mind and temperament with two metaphors
that were already dead in the middle of the Enlightenment: he equips the poet
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with “a good head and a good heart” (KOLL § 28; einen guten Kopf und ein gutes
Herz).
To understand these two terms, which Baumgarten uses ubiquitously in eth-
ical contexts, it is necessary to trace the nuance he infuses them with. The poet’s
head is a sensate head; his heart, a rational heart. Just as the poet’s head does
not only think but also thinks sensately, the poet’s heart not only symbolizes the
radical other of reason – drive (instinctus; see MET § 677) – but is also rationally
grounded: it can both choose and err (see KOLL § 63); it can be good and noble
but also evil; and in a moral sense, it can burden itself with guilt and also be
improved (see KOLL § 44); it can be “raw” or “cooked” (inoctum pectus aesthe-
ticum; see AE § 63). So the opposition of head and heart, of reason and sensa-
tion, yields in Baumgarten to the chiasmus of the reason of the heart and the
sensation of the head, a chiasmus that is actually quite typical for the age of
Empfindsamkeit.
Let us first deal with the head of the poet. Baumgarten’s definition of the
mind, which employs an epistemological register, does not offer anything sur-
prising. Natural aesthetics – which encompasses the physical constitution, na-
ture, innate aptitudes, and earliest formation of the poet (see AE § 28) – de-
scribes the sensate faculties essential to his vocation: wit, acumen, memory,
the poetic and inventive faculties, foresight, taste, and the faculty of character-
ization, all of which Baumgarten summarizes in part 3 of the Metaphysica on
psychology (psychologia).⁷ To characterize the natural dispositions of the
poet’s soul (dispositiones naturales animae), Baumgarten simply translates the
faculties of sensate cognition into an anthropological account of character.
The poet thus possesses a disposition to be acutely sensitive (dispositio acute
sentiendi; see AE § 30), which corresponds to the sensate faculty (facultas sen-
tiendi); a disposition to be imaginative (dispositio naturalis ad imaginandum;
see AE § 31), which corresponds to the imagination (phantasia); a disposition
to penetrating insights (dispositio naturalis ad perspicaciam; see AE § 32),
which corresponds to the lower cognitive faculties of wit (ingenium) and acumen
(acumen); a disposition to recognize things (dispositio naturalis ad recognoscen-
dum; see AE § 33), which corresponds to memory (memoria); a disposition to be
poetic (dipositio poëtica; see AE § 34), which responds to the faculty of invention
(facultas fingendi); a disposition to good taste (dispositio ad saporem delicatum;
see AE § 35), which corresponds to the faculty of taste (facultas diiudicandi); a
disposition to foresee future things (dispositio ad praevidendum et praesagien-
dum; see AE § 36), which corresponds to foresight (facultas expectatio casuum
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
170 6 Ethics
similium); and finally a disposition to express ideas (dispositio ad significandas
perceptiones suas; see AE § 37), which corresponds to the faculty of characteri-
zation (facultas characteristica sensitiva).With these dispositions, Baumgarten’s
poet guards the laws of the lower cognitive faculties as a lower judge (iudex in-
ferior; see AE § 35). He is defined by the abundance of his spirit (ubertas aesthe-
tica; see AE §§ 152– 156), which allows him to cope with the abundance of the
world.
In comparison, Baumgarten approaches the heart of the poet much less me-
chanically. To define the innate aesthetic temperament (see AE § 44), he switches
from the cognitive to the appetitive faculties, though nothing changes in his an-
alogical method since the poet desires just as he thinks. Already in the Meta-
physica, Baumgarten does not understand desire to be radically opposed to cog-
nition but rather places both faculties of the soul on the same foundation of
representation. On this basis, he describes a sensate will that, as I have
shown, paradoxically desires what is rational.⁸ Baumgarten mobilizes the meta-
phor of the heart to characterize this paradox of rationalized desire; the heart is
the organ of the sensate will. In this sense, he understands the innate greatness
of the heart (magnitudo pectoris connata) as a “most potent drive to greatness”
(AE § 45; instinctum in magna potissimum),⁹ making its rationalization an ethi-
cal matter. Good desire,which is based on the sensate will, leads to the pursuit of
money, power, work, leisure, pleasure, freedom, honor, friendship, strength, and
health as well as, above all, the pursuit of beautiful cognition.
Because questions of the poet’s heart are so closely tied to ethics, the actual
location in Baumgarten’s philosophical system for treating the innate greatness
of the heart (see AE § 183) is not section 2 on natural aesthetics (aesthetica na-
turalis) but rather the sections on aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica);
with 246 paragraphs, they are the largest cohesive set of sections in the Aesthe-
tica. In addition, in one of her articles on Baumgarten’s ethics, Mirbach notes
that the paragraphs on the spirit, or mind (i.e., the rational aptitude of the
poet), correspond to section 12 on the abundance of spirit (ubertas ingenii).¹⁰ To-
gether with the 86 introductory paragraphs, Baumgarten thus actually devotes
333 of the total 904 paragraphs, so a good third of the book, to the ethics of aes-
thetics. In the sections on greatness, heart and mind form a conceptual pair (pul-
crum ingenium et pectus; see AE § 189).¹¹ In the first of these sections, he views
aesthetic greatness from the perspective of his “science of everything that is sen-
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 See Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica,” 113– 114.
 See Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica,” 114–115.
 See Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica,” 119.
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sate”; that is, he treats the ethics of greatness as a matter of thinking and repre-
senting beautifully. His analysis encompasses both what he calls genera cogitan-
di, which are based on the rhetorical genera dicendi, and magnifying arguments
(argumenta augentia), which cast certain rhetorical figures as arguments that
amplify the ethical greatness of objects of beautiful cognition. Yet the semantic
spectrum of greatness is even wider. Mirbach notes that Baumgarten furthermore
refers to ethical greatness using a number of partial synonyms: pondus, gravitas,
dignitas, nobilitas, maiestas, and magnanimitas,¹² so the following sections ac-
tually also belong to the understanding of character found in the introductory
sections of the Aesthetica:
Section XXVIIII: Absolute aesthetic gravitas (gravitas aesthetica absoluta)
Section XXV: Relative aesthetic magnanimity (magnanimitas aesthetica comparativa)
Section XXVI: Maximum aesthetic magnanimity (magnanimitas in aestheticis genere maxi-
ma)
Baumgarten differentiates moral aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica mo-
ralis) from natural aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica naturalis), moving
moral greatness into the vicinity of freedom (libertas; see ETH § 443), which his
ethics analyzes in various forms, including as freedom of speech.¹³ This is why
aesthetic greatness depends on moral laws (leges morales; see AE § 182). Great-
ness and dignity (dignitas) are neither absolute nor relative; and they are either
objective, that is, of objects and material (obiecta et materiae), or subjective, that
is, of a person (persona; see AE §§ 177– 190).
Such aesthetic greatness, magnanimity, and dignity (see AE §§ 189, 352) char-
acterize the poet, who aims at the “STATE OF LIGHT” or the “moral realm of
light” (ETH § 443; STATUM LUCIS, s. regnum lucis morale): “We wish for this
greatness of mind and heart, both potential greatness, a part of the happy aes-
thetician’s general character (sections II–VI), and then actual greatness when he
turns to thinking beautifully” (AE § 355; Hanc ingenii pectorisque magnitudinem
et potentialem optamus, partem characteris generalis in felici aesthetico, S. II–
VI. et tunc, quando ad pulcre cogitandum accedit, actualem). In this, Baumgar-
ten considers the poet’s social and historical background, measuring the individ-
ual’s potential for aesthetic greatness by his greatness of heart and mind (ma-
gnum satis pectus ac ingenium; see AE §§ 364–422). Whereas Mirbach anchors
 See Mirbach, “Ethische Aspekte von Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Aesthetica,” 202.
 See 6.3.2 Parrhesia.
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Baumgarten’s “heart” in Pietistic theology,¹⁴ such modern moments in which he
historicizes and contextualizes aesthetic greatness distinguish his use of the
term heart from the religious context.
In my view, Baumgarten only mentions a religious context for greatness
twice: he traces objective greatness back to revelation (see AE § 398) and subjec-
tive greatness back to man’s being made in the image of God: “let all human
things, even those that are the greatest in a specific way, be subject to divine
things (§ 206)” (AE § 399; humana quaecunque, vel specifice maxima, divinis
subiicito, §. 206). In all the other paragraphs, greatness is an ethical abstraction
that takes different concrete forms from one context to the next.
6.2 Practices
6.2.1 Exercise
With this anthropological grounding of aesthetics, Baumgarten turns from con-
sidering the appetitive and lower cognitive faculties theoretically to discussing
them as a mode of experience that one can train and exercise. From this perspec-
tive, the “science of everything that is sensate” is actually an art (ars/techne) –
an art of experience in which sensate thinking, desiring, and representing are
translated into ethical practices. “Practices are organised sets of doings and say-
ings”;¹⁵ they involve both mental and bodily actions and are governed by specific
discourses – in Baumgarten’s case by aesthetic discourse, which prescribes eth-
ical practices for training sensate thinking, desiring, and representing in such a
way as to qualify the poet for achieving beauty, truth, and goodness in compos-
ing literature.¹⁶ This qualification for writing literature can only be attained
through attention to reading literature. Baumgarten’s training of aesthetic judg-
ment therefore occurs nowhere else than at his writing desk, where the poet
reads, compares, and imitates (imitatio) so as to perfect (aemulatio) himself in
sensate thinking, desiring, and representing.¹⁷ Only practice makes perfect. In
 See Mirbach, “Magnitudo aesthetica.” See also Simon Grote, “Pietistische Aisthesis und mo-
ralische Erziehung bei Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten,” in Aichele and Mirbach, “Alexander
Gottlieb Baumgarten,” 175– 198; Grote, The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory, 67–101.
 Theodore Schatzki, “Sayings, Texts and Discursive Formations,” in The Nexus of Practices:
Connections, Constellations, Practitioners, ed. Allison Hui, Schatzki, and Elizabeth Shove (Abing-
don: Routledge, 2017), 129.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See 2.1 Ambiguity.
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the Kollegium, he claims that the poet furthermore needs to acquire the “lan-
guage of the heart”:
He [the poet] must speak the language of the heart – that is, he must move – if he is to
move others, he must first be moved himself. He cannot move if he does not arouse desires,
and he cannot arouse desires if the object of them is not in the future. Indeed, if he wants to
be particularly beautiful, then he must at times be able to suppress all his sensations and
let insight into the future alone rule and elevate it above everything. He must intensely
train intermediate knowledge (scientia media). He must always see certain worlds that
would be real if certain hypotheses were real. So intensely must he compose literature
and exercise the faculty of foresight.
Er [der Dichter] muß die Sprache des Herzens reden, das ist rühren, soll er andere rühren, so
muß er selbst zuvor gerührt sein. Er kann nicht rühren, wann er nicht Begierden erregt, und
er kann nicht Begierden erregen,wann der Gegenstand derselben nicht zukünftig ist. Ja,will
er besonders schön sein, so muß er zuweilen alle Empfindungen unterdrücken können, und
die Einsicht in die Zukunft allein herrschen lassen, und über alles erheben. Er muß die
mittlere Erkenntnis (Scientia media) stark üben. Er muß immer gewisse Welten sehen, die
wirklich wären, wann gewisse Hypothesen wären. So stark muß er dichten und das Vor-
hersehungsvermögen üben. (KOLL § 36)
Both the starting point and goal of the training process are thus the beautiful lit-
erary text; as I will show in the following, the process encompasses training the
appetitive and lower cognitive faculties.¹⁸
Within the anthropological foundations of the Aesthetica,¹⁹ the four sections
italicized below are directly devoted to the question of how to train the poet:
Section II: Natural aesthetics (aesthetica naturalis)
Section III: Aesthetic exercise (exercitatio aesthetica)
Section IIII: Aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica)
Section V: Aesthetic inspiration (impetus aestheticus)
Section VI: Aesthetic correction (correctio aesthetica)
Section VII: Certain precautions (cautiones quaedam)
Section XII: Abundance of spirit (ubertas ingenii)
These sections focus on two ethical practices: “askesis and AESTHETIC EXER-
CISE” (AE § 47; Ασϰησις et EXERCITATIO AESTHETICA).²⁰ Following Pierre
Hadot, whose Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique (1981) traces the history
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
 See 6.1 Anthropology.
 See Christoph Menke, Force: A Fundamental Concept of Aesthetic Anthropology, trans. Gerrit
Jackson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 13–29.
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of spiritual exercises (askesis) in antiquity and Christianity,²¹ Gabriel Trop argues
that such exercises are at the center of the Aesthetica. “Baumgarten’s use of the
term askesis” does not refer, he explains, to denying the flesh, but rather “to the
genre of the spiritual exercise inherited from Hellenistic philosophy, a term that
was virtually synonymous with the training of the mind through the careful co-
ordination of semiotic practices (above all speaking, reading, and writing) with
patterns of thought and bodily activity. The aesthetic is therefore an ascetic, but
only in the more archaic sense of the term as one who exercises.”²² Trop explains
how these exercises aim to sensitize perception: “The primary purpose of a spi-
ritual exercise is transformative, and it culminates in the production of a total
way of being: a way of seeing, a way of thinking, and a way of acting in the
world.”²³ From this understanding of spiritual exercises, Baumgarten develops
a specific “bundle”²⁴ of aesthetic exercises with a focus on maintaining and fos-
tering openness and indeterminacy: “Such an aesthetic exercise demands effort
and generates a certain way of being in the world, one that is attracted to cogni-
tive processes that bind the world of phenomena.”²⁵
Section 3 on aesthetic exercise (exercitatio aesthetica) begins with the natu-
ral disposition of the poet. To compose beautiful literature, the poet must train
his sensate faculties:²⁶ the imagination, the faculty of invention, and the faculty
of characterization. Following the rhetorical tradition, Baumgarten repeatedly
uses military examples and metaphors to describe the exercises for training
these faculties. For example, in the Kollegium he reports that the Renaissance
humanist Petrus Lotichius “produced a lot while on sentry duty as a soldier”
(KOLL § 81; hat sehr viel auf der Schildwacht als Soldat verfertigt) and also com-
pares the poet’s exercises to those of a Roman soldier:
To exercise, the Roman soldiers had to make blows and thrusts against a stake in their
drills; this was not required of a soldier who had already mastered all the exercises. But
when one wants to cultivate the beautiful spirit, one sets up the exercises in such a way
that he will not be immediately discouraged and give up all hope that something will be-
come of him.
 See Pierre Hadot, Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique (Paris: Études Augustiniennes,
1981).
 Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life, 40. See also Trop, “Aesthetic Askesis: Aesthetics as a Technol-
ogy of the Self in the Philosophy of Alexander Baumgarten,” Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert 37.1
(2013): 56–73.
 Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life, 25.
 Schatzki, “Sayings, Texts and Discursive Formations,” 133.
 Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life, 48–49.
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
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Die römischen Soldatenmußten,um sich zu üben, die Hiebe und Stöße in ihren Übungen auf
einen Pfahl tun, dazu erforderte man nun noch keinen Soldaten, der schon die Übungen alle
inne hätte. Man richte aber die Übungen,wann man den schönen Geist bilden will, ja so ein,
daß er nicht sogleich niedergeschlagen wird und alle Hoffnung aufgibt, daß aus ihm etwas
werden werde. (KOLL § 49)
The soldiers’ blows and thrusts evoke the flying arrows, spears, and projectiles
whose metapoetic connotation has been well known ever since Aristotle used
them to visualize metaphor.²⁷ Baumgarten replaces the weapons with the sol-
dier’s (and poet’s) blows and thrusts.
But he also refers to rhetoric explicitly as an art of shooting: “A soldier’s
heart can be in his weapons from his nature and training, but all of this alone
will remain dead if he does not really hit the mark” (KOLL § 78; Es kann bei
einem Soldaten Herz von Natur und Übung in den Waffen sein, allein dieses
alles kann tot bleiben, wann er nicht wirklich mit ins Treffen kommt). This mili-
tary allegory leads to the crux of the paragraphs on exercise, which the scholar-
ship has yet to consider. The poet does not only have to train his mind but most
of all his heart – that is, his sensate will²⁸ – by intentionally exercising it. Critical
self-examination therefore comes at the beginning of this creative process, which
is still thoroughly rationally grounded in Baumgarten:
I must ask: What is the state of my horizon? Will I be able to go from this one into another
one? Will I be able to manage everything in this hour, at this time, under these circumstan-
ces? This is the first judgment that the beautiful spirit or the aesthetically rich spirit must
make.
Ich muß fragen:Wie ist mein Horizont beschaffen,werde ich aus dem einen in den anderen
gehen können? Werde ich alles in dieser Stunde, zu dieser Zeit, unter diesen Umständen
zwingen können? Dies ist die erste Beurteilung, die der schöne Geist oder der ästhetisch
reiche machen muß. (KOLL § 149)
Aesthetic exercises discipline the mind and heart. These ethical practices there-
fore form “the foundation for the modern discourse of subjectivity.”²⁹ In a re-
markable move, Christoph Menke relates Baumgarten’s “DYNAMIC or critical
AESTHETICS” (AE § 60; AESTHETICA DYNAMICA s. critica) to Foucault’s Surveil-
ler et punir (1975) by casting aesthetics as the ideology and instrument of disci-
 See Arist., Rhet. 1411b. See also 3.4.2 Opacity.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 Christoph Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin: Baumgarten in
der Perspektive Foucaults,” in Baumgarten-Studien: Zur Genealogie der Ästhetik, ed. Rüdiger
Campe, Anselm Haverkamp, and Menke (Berlin: August, 2014), 241.
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plinary subjectivation. Because the subject has to train sensation, sensation is
itself “a-subjective”: “In aesthetic exercises, the sensate is situated between
the analogy with the form of reason and the ‘alogy’ of formlessness.”³⁰ Menke
therefore inverts Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power: “The disciplining
through aesthetics is answered by the aestheticizing of discipline.”³¹
That aesthetics is the reflection of discipline is nowhere clearer than in the
self-reflexive turn with which Baumgarten confirms that disciplining the sensate
will depends, in the end, on the will itself. Aptitude and exercise in sensation
achieve nothing “if one doesn’t decide to bring them to life” (KOLL § 78; wann
nicht der Schluß gefaßt wird, sie lebendig zu machen). “For a beautiful spirit,
we therefore further require the state where his soul moves to resolve to bring
these powers to life” (KOLL § 78; Daher erfordern wir ferner zu einem schönen
Geist den Zustand, da seine Seele zu dem Vorsatze geht, diese Kräfte lebendig
zu machen). In the Aesthetica, Baumgarten also emphasizes such a sensate
will to bring greatness to life in section 24 on absolute aesthetic gravitas (gravitas
aesthetica absoluta):
This will be the absolute greatness of mind and heart (§ 45), not only the innate greatness
but certainly also the greatness nurtured by exercises, custom (§ 51), and instruction (§ 63),
not that dead greatness but rather a greatness sufficient for eliciting full desires – as much
absolute aesthetic greatness, hence also dignity, as all things that are to have it require to
be thought beautifully.
Haec erit absoluta magnitudo ingenii et pectoris, §. 45, sed non connata solum, verum etiam
innutrita exercitiis, usu, §. 51. ac disciplina, §. 63. non ea mortua, sed plenis appetitionibus
eliciendis sufficiens, quantam omnia magnitudinem, hinc et dignitatem, absolutam aesthe-
ticam habitura pulcre cogitanda requirunt, §. 178. (AE § 352)
The third, fourth, sixth, and seventh sections delineate aesthetic exercises as
technologies of the self for nurturing greatness, to which Barbara Thums, An-
thony Mahler, and Trop pay attention.³² Baumgarten differentiates between
three aesthetic exercises in the broader sense; all of them are rooted in rhetorical
education: aesthetic exercise in the narrow sense (exercitatio aesthetica), aes-
thetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica), and certain precautions (cautiones
quaedam). Among the aesthetic exercises in the narrow sense, he mainly empha-
 Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin,” 246.
 Menke, “Die Disziplin der Ästhetik ist die Ästhetik der Disziplin,” 247.
 See, among others, Barbara Thums, Aufmerksamkeit: Wahrnehmung und Selbstbegründung
von Brockes bis Nietzsche (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2008); Anthony Mahler, “Writing Regimens:
The Dietetics of Literary Authorship in the Late German Enlightenment” (PhD diss., University
of Chicago, 2014); Trop, “Aesthetic Askesis,” 56–73; Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life, 25–49.
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sizes the repetition of certain phrases (repetitio), the imitation of exemplary texts
(imitatio), and the correction of one’s own texts (correctio). All three types of aes-
thetic exercises in the broader sense refer to the literary authority of the classical
canon, as Baumgarten points out by citing a well-known line from Horace:
“Hence it is a greater aesthetic exercise and appears more common (§ 54) to
turn over in one’s hands the models of the finest authors night and day (§ 54)”
(AE § 56; Hinc exercitium aestheticum maius est, ac plerumque videtur, §. 54.,
exemplaria bellissimorum auctorum Nocturna versare manu, versare diurna.
§. 54). As this quote from Horace makes clear, the poet’s work at refining his
texts transfers the Greek tradition of progymnasmata from rhetoric into aesthet-
ics. In the context of education, “progymnasmata […] conveyed to students a
thoroughly useful toolkit of narrative, argumentative, and stylistic techniques,
a certain repertoire of literary models, and a set stock of themes, content, char-
acters, and also moral values, with which students could operate and make
themselves understood in front of a similarly educated audience.”³³ “The pro-
gymnasmata were therefore crucial in laying the foundations for elite dis-
course.”³⁴
In addition to progymnasmata, aesthetic exercises also encompass “auto-
schediasmata [improvisations] without the guidance of the art of erudition”
(AE § 52; αυτοσχεδιασματα citra directionem artis eruditae) and exercises accord-
ing to the rules of the art of erudition (ars erudita; see AE § 58). With spontane-
ous improvisation, Baumgarten bets on the power of a proto-unconscious, over-
coming here his timidity with regard to the dark ground of the soul.³⁵ “The space
of the aesthetic exercise is not rigidly determined by social institutions, nor are
such exercises a result of individual decision-making strategies – which would
represent a decidedly subject-centered mode of exercise – but the energy of
the exercise travels through an openness and attunement to heterogeneous
ways of associating phenomena, to the alterity of imaginary worlds.”³⁶ Christiane
Frey has also drawn attention to the role of improvisation, but she overlooks that
 Christine Heusch, “Die Ethopoiie in der griechischen und lateinischen Antike: Von der rhe-
torischen Progymnasma-Theorie zur literarischen Form,” in ἨθΟΠΟΙΙΑ: La représentation de ca-
ractères entre fiction scolaire et réalité vivante à l’époque impériale et tardive, ed. Eugenio Amato
and Jacques Schamp (Salerno: Helios, 2005), 12.
 Ruth Webb, “The Progymnasmata as Practice,” in Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity,
ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 290.
 See Christiane Frey, “Zur ästhetischen Übung: Improvisiertes und Vorbewusstes bei A. G.
Baumgarten,” in Allerkamp and Mirbach, Schönes Denken, 176.
 Trop, Poetry as a Way of Life, 29.
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this spontaneity is approached with an elaborate complex of rules.³⁷ In Baum-
garten, faith is good, control is better.
Although both Trop and Frey are right to be excited about this modern move
in Baumgarten, they seem to overlook the tradition of progymnasmata, which
appear in the Aesthetica in the form of work on texts (repetitio, imitatio, correc-
tio) in section 4 on aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica). All exercises
would be blind without concepts. Aesthetic concepts mediate between the
mind and poetological rules and norms, which Baumgarten’s theory of literature
in no way throws overboard. Achieving beauty is not simply a matter of the
poet’s achieving agreement within his mind and between his mind and beautiful
nature (natura pulcra), as Baumgarten outlines in section 2 on natural aesthetics
(aesthetica naturalis). Baumgarten is not so modern that he would define the
poet as a genius, excuse him from all ethical duties and moral demands, and re-
lease him into the realm of pure inspiration. He hedges his affirmation of the
sensate will both rationally and also morally. Being healthy, socially acceptable,
and capable of producing something perfect is only a “lower degree” (KOLL § 78;
niedriger Grad) of inspiration. Baumgarten’s poet is not a genius who simply has
to answer to his nature and otherwise has carte blanche. His heart must answer
to obligations other than aesthetic autonomy.
Baumgarten commits the poet to a moral education and the duties of a
happy life (vita beata) including diet (dieta), physical and mental health, leisure,
mineral cures, wine, and sex, which all serve to stimulate the poet. Conquering
poverty, displeasure, ridicule, troubles, and sad circumstances can also stimu-
late him (see AE §§ 81–92). In the Ethica, he sets out the rules of dietetic mod-
eration in the second chapter, in which he treats duties to the self (officia erga
te ipsum); section 11 deals with the care of the body (cura corporis). In section
6 of the Aesthetica above all, Baumgarten obliges the poet to labor on aesthetic
improvement (correctio aesthetica). After first writing a text, the poet must en-
gage in a post hoc, iterative analytic process of critical, rule-governed examina-
tion and improvement (studium correctionis): “Even if the beautiful spirit has
nature, art, exercise, and inspiration, he still must not forget, after being in-
spired and the first fit of writing, to put the finishing touches to the work and
to complete it in an even more elegant manner” (KOLL § 113; Wann auch der
schöne Geist Natur, Kunst, Übung und Begeisterung hat, so muß er dennoch
nicht vergessen, nach der Begeisterung und dem ersten Anfalle, da er geschrie-
ben hat, die letzte Hand an das Werk zu legen und es noch feiner auszuarbeiten).
Improving a work is a step in the process of producing beauty; it “doesn’t have to
 Cf. Frey, “Zur ästhetischen Übung,” 171– 181.
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disturb us when we are inspired; rather, it must occur afterward” (KOLL § 98;
muß uns nicht im impetu stören, sondern sie muß hernach geschehen). Improve-
ment is also itself “part of the beauty of the whole” (KOLL § 98; Teil von der
Schönheit des Ganzen): “If nature remains without disciplinary improvement,
then it does not think in a noble way” (KOLL § 106; Wenn die Natur ohne diszi-
plinarische Verbesserung bleibt, so denkt sie nicht edel).
Based on this emphasis on practice, labor, and improvement, the poet is not
cast so much as a genius but as a craftsman who smooths his texts with the “toil
and tedium of the file” (AE § 97; limae labor et mora). He does this on the basis of
aesthetic topoi: “Who? With what help? What? How? Why? Where, when?” (AE
§ 133; Quis? quibus auxiliis? quid? quomodo? cur? ubi, quando?). The file should
not grind away the artifact, but only this work on the literary text guarantees
its beauty. And for the sensitive poet, honorable labor with the file flows more
easily from the hand anyway than the impulse-driven act of production itself
(see AE § 98). The file abrades the aesthetic and ethical bumps in literary texts
(see AE § 99) and protects the beautiful spirit with his sensate will from narcis-
sistic phantasies of omnipotence (see AE § 113).
6.2.2 Wonder
Training the sensate will is the vanishing point where Baumgarten’s aesthetics
and ethics meet. The ethical practice of exercises ensures that the poet trains
an open and indeterminate mind. To do so, he has to be able to walk a tightrope
between inspiration and control, spontaneity and correction, improvisation and
rules. In any case, the most important ethical practice is cultivating an attitude
that does not belong to the aesthetic exercises but is nevertheless central to
Baumgarten’s ethics of literature. I am referring here to wonder (admiratio).
With wonder, he not only ties together ethics and aesthetics but also relates
the poetic foundation of the Aesthetica to his theory of fiction. In her study on
the aesthetics of wonder, Nicola Gess shows that eighteenth-century French
texts on poetics established an intimate association between the wonderful
and dreams, an association that influenced Bodmer’s and Breitinger’s seminal
articulations of the wonderful:³⁸ “by wonder is understood a dreaming with a ra-
tional foundation that designs fantasy worlds based on new insights into the
order of nature, fantasy worlds that are closer to truth than to mere verisimil-
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
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itude.”³⁹ In the Meditationes, Baumgarten defines wonder as “an intuition of
many things in a representation, such things as are not found together in
many series of our perceptions” (MED § 43; intuitus plurium in repraesentatione
tanquam non contentorum in multis perceptionum nostrarum seriebus). Quoting
René Descartes, Baumgarten “regards wonder as ‘a sudden seizure of the soul,
in that it is lifted into a rapt consideration of objects which seem to it rare
and extraordinary’” (MED § 43n; admirationem habente pro subitanea animae
occupatione, qua fertur in considerationem attentam obiectorum, quae ipsi viden-
tur rara & extraordinaria). Wonder cuts into the symbolic and opens the soul to
the imaginary.⁴⁰ That is the reason why wonders (mirabilia) form the Urszene of
poetic fiction:⁴¹
We generally pay marked attention to those things which have anything of the wonderful in
them. Those things to which we pay such attention, if they are confusedly represented, are
extensively clearer than those to which we do not, § 16. Therefore, representations which
have anything of the wonderful in them are more poetic than those which do not.
Ad ea, in quibus mirabilia, attendere solemus, ad quae attendimus, ea si confuse, extensive
clarius repraesentantur, quam ad quae non attendimus §. 16. ergo repraesentationes, in qui-
bus mirablia, magis poeticae, quam in quibus non sunt. (MED § 45)
What Trop refers to as Baumgarten’s art of attention is therefore an art of wonder.
This art is not rooted in the lower cognitive faculties; it is rather, as I will dem-
onstrate in the following, a genuine act of the sensate will of the lower appetitive
faculties.⁴²
In section 48 on aesthetic thaumaturgy (thaumaturgia aesthetica), Baum-
garten lays out the ethical foundations of sensate desire. He grounds this desire
in wonder from the perspective of affect theory and assigns an aesthetic exercise
to it: the poet must refine his sensibility to phenomena by learning to feel won-
der. This idea goes back to antiquity. According to Stefan Matuschek, thaumazein
refers in Plato’s Theaetetus to a reverential wonder, which is intensified in the
Phaedrus into an ecstatic amazement due to the sublimity of the ideas.⁴³
While Plato’s philosophy leads to wonder, Aristotle’s Metaphysics posits that
wonder as a response to phenomena belongs to the initial stage of philosophy.
 Nicola Gess, Staunen: Eine Poetik (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2019), 66.
 See 4.2.2 Formlessness.
 See 5.3.3 Accessibility.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 See Stefan Matuschek, Über das Staunen: Eine ideengeschichtliche Analyse (Tübingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1991), 6.
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Only by overcoming wonder can the philosopher begin to acquire knowledge
about phenomena. Rationalist philosophy follows Aristotle in this, expelling
wonder from the discipline.⁴⁴
But Enlightenment poetics brings wonder back into play. In this context,
Baumgarten’s student Meier defended the Meditationes against Gottsched and
his followers in Leipzig during the 1740s in the so-called small war of the
poets (Kleiner Dichterkrieg).⁴⁵ In this literary dispute, Bodmer and Breitinger mo-
bilized against Gottsched’s conservative, rule-governed poetics (Regelpoetik) by
elevating the imagination, the new, and especially the wonderful. Baumgarten
did not play any part in the dispute, but if he had participated, he would have
been on the side of the Zurich team, advancing his concept of wonder against
Leipzig. With the ethical practice of wonder, Baumgarten sets a precondition
for creating poetic worlds. Composing literature depends on a certain way of
being in the world, on affirming phenomenal individuality, which wonder both
stimulates and maintains. This is because wonder initiates a cut in the symbolic
order, allowing the real to break through to the poet’s attention.⁴⁶
It is through wonder that the poet attunes himself to objects by desiring
them without preconceptions, indeed, without concepts.Wonder is what affirms
phenomenal individuality and the aesthetic truth of phenomenal individuality,
which makes Baumgarten’s theory of literature so modern. Nondiscursive
thought, which results from and produces the poetic passages in literary texts,
depends not on what the poet perceives but rather on wonder. Unlike Kant,
Baumgarten does not reserve such an aesthetic experience for sublime objects;
instead, every object can become aestheticized through wonder. Wonder thus
functions like a poetry machine by activating a state of the soul that Baumgarten
describes in the first paragraph on thaumaturgy:
The light of novelty illuminates perceptions excellently (Metaphysica §§ 549–550). The in-
tuition of novelty, WONDER, excites curiosity (Metaphysica § 688); curiosity excites atten-
tion (Metaphysica §§ 625, 529); attention brings new light to the thing that is to be depicted
vividly (Metaphysica §§ 628, 531). Hence things that are to be thought beautifully, when they
are to be illuminated (§ 730), are well set up to bring about wonder through novelty, eager-
ness to know a thing more clearly through wonder, and finally attention through the eager-
ness to know a thing more clearly. For the sake of brevity, let us refer to bringing about nov-
 See Matuschek, Über das Staunen, 157.
 See Georg Friedrich Meier, Vertheidigung der Baumgartischen Erklärung eines Gedichts, wider
das 5 Stück des 1 Bandes des neuen Büchersaals der schönen Wissenschaften und freyen Künste
(Halle: C. H. Hemmerde, 1746).
 See 4.2.2 Formlessness.
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elty, and through it wonder, and through it curiosity, and through it attention, as AESTHET-
IC THAUMATURGY.
Lux novitatis perceptiones illustrat egregie, M. § 549, 550. Novitatis intuitus, ADMIRATIO
curiositatem excitat, M. §. 688. curiositas attentionem, M. §. 625, 529. attentio ad rem vivide
sibi pingendam novam lucem affert. M. §. 628, 531. Pulcre hinc cogitanda, quando illustran-
da sunt, §. 730. bene sistuntur admirationem novitate, clarius cognoscendi studium admi-
ratione, tandem attentionem studio clarius rem cognoscendi conciliantia. Conciliatio novi-
tatis, per hanc admirationis, per hanc curiositatis, per hanc attentionis AESTHETICA,
brevitatis caussa, dicatur a nobis THAUMATURGIA. (AE § 808)
Baumgarten uses the concept of wonder (admiratio) in a triad with curiosity (cu-
riositas) and attention (attentio), all of which refer to the Metaphysica. The Greek
verb thaumazein is translated in English as “to be able to wonder” or also simply
as “to wonder,” and it usually means “to wonder at something.” The scene he
outlines in the first paragraph of the section evokes, however, a transitive use
of the verb that defines wonder as a mode of desire related to the ethical practice
of the poet’s pursuit (studium) of beautiful literature. Through wonder, this pur-
suit becomes a more complex desire that hones attention. The thrill of the new is
the basis of this process. The poet should thus strive to feel wonder himself (see
AE §§ 809–810) so that his text, in turn, provokes wonder in its readers.
This ethical practice of wonder is firmly anchored in eighteenth-century the-
ories of literature. Bodmer und Breitinger defend the wonderful as a pedagogical
technique: in their view, the wonderful does not simply entertain; rather, by
arousing admiration, curiosity, and attention, it can illustrate knowledge in a
lively manner, making literature particularly capable of transmitting knowledge
and providing moral instruction.⁴⁷ Because Baumgarten did not finish the rele-
vant sections on aesthetic life (vita cognitionis aesthetica), Gess skips over
him in her discursive history of wonder and turns instead, like Torra-Mattenklott,
to Meier’s articulation of Baumgarten’s ideas in his Anfangsgründe aller schönen
Wissenschaften (1748– 1750), which presents wonder as a mode of sensate cogni-
tion.
By discussing wonder in the context of the concept of life, Meier shifts won-
der from the side of the reader, who wonders at literature, to the side of the au-
thor, who makes literature through wonder. But when one replaces Baumgarten
with Meier, one misses the all-important fact that Baumgarten does not treat
wonder among the lower cognitive faculties but rather among the lower appeti-
tive faculties. In this context, wonder does not represent fantasies but rather af-
fects. This makes it necessary to reconstruct the sections on aesthetic life so as to
 See Gess, Staunen, 64–70.
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differentiate Baumgarten from Meier. In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten defines
wonder as a sensate desire:⁴⁸
The intuition of something as not reproduced is AMAZEMENT [I translate as “wonder,”
F. B.]. The drive <instinctus> to know that which we do not yet know is CURIOSITY, and ac-
cording to the diversity of wits, more broadly considered, it is HISTORICAL, concerning his-
torical knowledge, or PHILOSOPHICAL, concerning philosophical knowledge, or MATHE-
MATICAL, concerning mathematical knowledge.
Intuitus alicuius ut non reproducti, est ADMIRATIO. Instinctus ad cognoscendum, quae
nondum cognovimus, est CURIOSITAS, pro diversitate ingeniorum latius dictorum vel HI-
STORICA in cognitionem historicam, vel PHILOSOPHICA in cognitionem philosophicam,
vel MATHEMATICA in cognitionem mathematicam lata. (MET § 688)
This placement of wonder among the lower appetitive faculties makes two things
clear. First, in Baumgarten, wonder does not build a bridge between aesthetics
and logic, since it is exclusively located in aesthetics. Second, within aesthetics,
it also does not wrangle together sensate cognition and sensate desire; as an af-
fect, wonder is governed rather by sensate desire, plain and simple, and so de-
pends on the sensate will.
In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten ties together intuition and drive by defining
wonder as a representation rooted in the drive of curiosity. Curiosity itself can be
directed toward history, philosophy, or mathematics. But it can also be directed
toward sensate cognition and sensate desire themselves. Although he does not
present a concept of aesthetic curiosity in the Metaphysica, and he does not
use one in the incomplete Aesthetica either, there are two arguments that
move in the direction of aesthetic curiosity, and both lead to literature. Baum-
garten begins the first one with a montage of citations from Virgil’s Eclogae,
in which it is the poet’s rational mind that, “because of this, often wonders at
Olympus’ strange threshold, / And sees the planets and the clouds (§ 318) beneath
his feet / He will often receive the life divine (section V; § 206) and see the gods /
Mingling with heroes, and at the same time be seen by them”⁴⁹ (AE § 394; Hinc
saepe insuetum miratur limen Olympi, / Sub pedibusque videt nubes §. 318. et side-
ra. / Saepe deum vitam, S. V. §. 206. accipiet, divisque videbit / Permistos heroas,
idemque videbitur illis). The poet’s rational head is characterized, in turn, by its
heart (see AE § 394), that is, by the organ of the sensate will.⁵⁰ Head and heart,
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 Quoted (with modification) from Virgil, Eclogues: The Latin Text with a Verse Translation and
Brief Notes, trans. Guy Lee (Liverpool: Francis Cairns, 1980), 5.56–57, 4.15– 16.
 See 6.1 Anthropology.
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the analogon of reason and the sensate will, define the poet as a person who
wonders.
The second argument leading to aesthetic curiosity follows a cross-reference
in paragraph 808 of the Aesthetica to paragraph 730 of the Metaphysica. In this
astonishing paragraph from the Metaphysica, Baumgarten outlines, a good fifty
years before Hegel’s engagement with Plato in Die Phänomenologie des Geistes
(1807), his own master–slave dialectic. The context is formed in section 21 on
freedom (libertas), which outlines an economy of rational desire and aversion
in the upper appetitive faculties:
My free volitions and nolitions are called ELICITED ACTS OF THE SOUL, whereas the free
actions of the rest of the faculties are called MASTERED ACTS, and insofar as they depend
on the freedom of the soul, MASTERY is ascribed to the soul over these. Hence the mastery
of the SOUL OVER ITSELF is the faculty that produces the actions of one faculty, and then
of another faculty, and then that once again produces their opposite, all according to a dis-
tinct preference. Therefore, the greater is the freedom, the greater is the mastery of the free
soul over itself (§725). A significant lack of mastery over oneself is MORAL SLAVERY, IN THE
BROAD SENSE. Whatever functions to promote mastery over oneself is LIBERAL (noble),
and whatever promotes slavery is SERVILE.
Volitiones nolitionesque meae liberae dicuntur ACTUS ANIMAE ELICITI, reliquarum facul-
tatum actiones liberae, ACTUS IMPERATI, & quatenus a libertate animae pendent, ipsi in
eas IMPERIUM adscribitur. Hinc ANIMAE IN SEMETIPSAM IMPERIUM est facultas pro di-
stincto lubitu nunc huius, nunc illius facultatis actiones producendi, nunc earum produ-
cendi oppositum. Quo maior ergo libertas, hoc maius liberi in se est imperium, §. 725. In-
signis imperii in se ipsum defectus est SERVITUS MORALIS SIGNIFICATU LATO. Ad
augendum in se imperium faciens est (ingenuum) LIBERALE, servitutem promovens mora-
lem est SERVILE. (MET § 730)
By rooting human morality in freedom, this allegory brings together psychology
and ethics. While human morals (mores hominum) are naturally determined,
they also depend on free choice (see MET § 720). The master–slave allegory
stages the path to freedom as an ethical practice of liberation, and Baumgarten
transfers this practice – as usual on the basis of his analogical method – from
“above” to “below,” from reason to the objects of sensate desire. Due to this
transfer of the allegory, one could say that he aestheticizes it: statements
about rational will and refusal become statements about sensate desire and aver-
sion. What was his goal with this cross-reference to the paragraph in the Meta-
physica? The allegory narrates a story of self-efficacy that leads from slavery to
mastery (and so to freedom). The will can traverse from one state to the other
because it is attributed with free choice between slavery and mastery. This mas-
tery is the appetitive faculty of producing actions (facultas actiones producenda);
the master–slave allegory visualizes it as an ethical practice, meaning that
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Baumgarten once again turns to employing the techniques of the poet himself to
deal with this tricky point.
In the Metaphysica, Baumgarten sets aside sensate choice so as to consider
different ratios of mixing rational will and sensate desire.⁵¹ The allegorical meth-
od of presentation allows him to avoid the paradox that leads to the concept of
the sensate will, since the displacement itself places us in the context of aesthet-
ics. In the context of this transfer, wonder is the ethical practice of producing ac-
tions in order to increase aesthetic self-efficacy. Only wonder is an elicited act of
the soul; memories, dreams, foresight, anticipation, and mental images are all
mastered acts, formed by the cognitive faculties. They are governed by the sen-
sate will, which manifests itself in the ethical practice of wonder, as Baumgarten
indirectly notes in the citation of Virgil’s fifth Ecloga. The immediacy of wonder is
often expressed in exclamations and punctuation marks, particularly as they are
used in the poetry of Empfindsamkeit in the middle of the eighteenth century:
O … – !
That the master–slave allegory implies an action is not only suggested by the
emphasis on free choice but also by the gradation of wonder. One can wonder
more or less, which means that wonder can be trained like other exercises.
The goal of this training consists in focusing attention on objects that are to
be perceived aesthetically. This attention is related to the attention Baumgarten
discusses among the lower faculties of the soul and not among the higher ones:
I AM ATTENTIVE to that which I perceive more clearly than other things. I ABSTRACT away
that which I perceive more obscurely than other things. Therefore, I have a faculty of being
attentive and one of abstracting (§216), but both of these are finite (§354) and hence they are
only in a certain degree and not the supreme degree (§248). The more that is taken away
from a finite quantity, the less is left over. Therefore, the more I am attentive to one
thing, the less I am able to be attentive to others. Therefore, a stronger perception that great-
ly occupies [my] attention obscures a weaker perception, or causes [me] to abstract from a
weaker perception (§528, 515).
Quod aliis clarius percipio ATTENDO; quod aliis obscurius, ABSTRAHO AB EO. Ergo habeo
facultatem attendendi & abstrahendi, §. 216. sed finitas, §. 354. hinc in certo tantum, non
maximo gradu utrasque, §. 248. Quo plus quantitati finitae demitur, hoc minus est resi-
duum. Ergo quo magis attendo uni rei, hoc minus possum attendere aliis: ergo perceptio
fortior attentionem admodum occupans obscurat debiliorem, seu facit a debiliori abstra-
here, §. 528. 515. (MET § 529)
The more focused the poet’s attention is, the higher the degree of abundance,
greatness, truth, clarity, certitude, and life in literature. For that reason, the eth-
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
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ical practice of wonder – or even, one could now say, the ethical practice of aes-
theticization, rooted in the lower appetitive faculties – is the best path to beauty,
truth, and goodness in literature.
Possessing a sensate will and training it through the ethical practice of won-
der are thus the ethical core of Baumgarten’s aesthetics. But a wondrous danger
is looming. The sensate will may have rationalized desire, but even as the sen-
sate will, desire remains desire. The forms of poetic curiosity are therefore not
simply positive; rather, as the paragraph on wonder in the Metaphysica warns
very explicitly: “The insane, in whose soul only burdensome affects reign, are
MELANCHOLIC, and those in whom anger reigns are FURIOUS” (MET § 688;
Mente capti, in quorum anima soli affectus molesti regnant, sunt MELANCHOLI-
CI, in quibus ira regnat, FURIOSI). An analysis of melancholy is thus necessary
to acquire a better understanding of Baumgarten’s ethics of literature.
6.2.3 Melancholy
“Among the temperaments, the melancholic has been commonly considered the
most suitable for a poet” (KOLL § 46; Gemeiniglich hat man unter den Tempe-
ramenten den Melancholicus zum Dichter am geschicktesten befunden). Yet, un-
leashed from his head, the melancholic’s heart – the organ of the sensate will –
is in danger. Baumgarten plays through the well-known cultural imaginary of
these dangers. The poet is not only radically open and maximally attentive to
the manifold of impressions; he also must govern and manage his supposedly
melancholic temperament, an idea that has shaped our understanding of crea-
tivity since time immemorial:
The beautiful spirit thinks perhaps so deeply into his materials that he has a similarity to
the melancholic, and his thoughts about how he wants to execute his plan – thoughts that
he has been mulling over for a long time and that bring him to this silence or also at times
to a strange gesture – are a distinguishing feature of a beautiful spirit. But this is the nat-
ural order, and the degree of madness that one objects to is not there.
[D]er schöne Geist denkt vielleicht so tief in seine Materien, daß er eine Ähnlichkeit mit den
Melancholicis hat, und die Gedanken, wie er seinen Entwurf ausführen will, mit denen er
sich eine Zeitlang trägt, und die ihn in dies Stillschweigen, oder auch zuweilen in eine
seltsame Geberde bringen, sind Kennzeichen eines schönen Geistes. Dieses ist aber die
natürliche Ordnung, und der Grad der Tollheit ist nicht da, von der man im Einwurfe sagt.
(KOLL § 40)
Melancholic topoi from different origins play an important role in the theoretical
disciplines concerned with creativity. These topoi are stored in the collective
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memory and are constantly combined in new ways. Particularly in the Kollegium,
Baumgarten refers, as if it were self-evident, to the “divine spirit” (KOLL § 58;
göttliche Ingenium), which ennobles the poet in Problems 30.1, the pseudo-Aris-
totelian text that serves as the basis of the European discourse on melancholy.
The discourse on melancholy thus visualizes Baumgarten’s theory of sensate de-
sire.
Two problems arise in this discourse. The first concerns the relationship be-
tween labor and talent, which enter the Aesthetica in the form of the two melan-
cholically indexed concepts of the poeta faber (see AE § 95) and the poeta vates
(see AE § 36). The second concerns the relationship between creative energy and
rational control, which the Aesthetica visibly tries to balance. Creative inspiration
was a tricky topic in the Enlightenment. Only after elaborating the positive influ-
ence of aesthetic exercise (exercitatio aesthetica) on the poet in section 3, the
benefits of aesthetic instruction (disciplina aesthetica) in section 4, and the en-
tire catalogue of traditional rule-governed poetics does Baumgarten turn to aes-
thetic inspiration (impetus aestheticus) in section 5, of course not without again
exhorting the poet to belabor the literary texts produced in this state through
aesthetic improvement (correctio aesthetica) in section 6.
Against the backdrop of melancholy, Baumgarten relates inspiration to the
abilities of foresight and anticipation. On this basis, he characterizes the ancient
poets as seers (see AE § 36), which leads back to his theory of fiction and the
poet’s ability to invent something new.⁵² To describe the poet’s creative and pro-
phetic capacities, Baumgarten invokes the character type of the melancholia
generosa, naming the examples of Homer, Pindar, and their modern descendant
John Milton (see KOLL §§ 29, 53):
The melancholic is more sober, and since we know that a beautiful spirit must be able to
see into the future because he must arouse desires, and that whoever is to see into the fu-
ture must have a sober way of thinking, and since this is present in melancholics and since
they are, therefore, the most skillful at seeing into the future, they also have the most ap-
titude to be beautiful spirits.
Der Melancholicus ist gesetzter, und da wir wissen, ein schöner Geist muß in die Zukunft
sehen können, weil er Begierden erregen muß, wer aber in die Zukunft sehen soll, ein ge-
setztes Nachdenken haben muß. Da sich dieses nun bei den Melancholicis befindet, und sie
also am geschicktesten sind, in die Zukunft zu sehen, so haben sie auch die mehreste Anlage
zu einem schönen Geiste. (KOLL § 46)
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
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The melancholic possesses an aptitude to enter states of inspiration that the poet
must attain in order to be creative at all: “The happy aesthetician’s general char-
acter (§ 27) requires (IV) AESTHETIC INSPIRATION (the beautiful arousal and in-
flammation of the mind, horme [impulse], ecstasy, fury, enthousiasmos [enthusi-
asm], pneuma theou [the spirit of god])” (AE § 78; Ad characterem felicis
aesthetici generalem §. 27 requiritur IV. IMPETUS AESTHETICUS (pulcra mentis
incitatio, inflammatioque, ορμη, ecstasis, furor, ενϑȣσιαςμος, πνευμα ϑεȣ)).
At first reserving judgment as to their characteristics, Baumgarten elaborates
the phenomenal forms of inspiration in the Kollegium as follows:
The beautiful spirit focuses with such strong powers of attention on his topic that he cannot
turn them to other things at the same time. […] This state of inspiration increases even more
when it becomes similar to the phenomenon that one perceives in the mad. That is indeed
why it is called fury. A particular intensity is expressed here, and the soul manages some-
thing that it would not have been able to manage without this fury. […] Enthusiasm is a new
kind of inspiration and does not refer here, as in philosophy, to the mistake where one be-
lieves to have divine sensations and deludes oneself; the name rather derives from the
mythology of the ancient pagans. Since they had such a great quantity of minor deities,
one ascribed being moved in a particular way to one of these deities and called it enthu-
siasm or the spirit of a particular god (pneuma theou).
Der schöne Geist denkt mit so starken Attentionskräften auf sein Thema, daß er sie auf
andere äußere Dinge zu der Zeit nicht wenden kann. […] Diese Begeisterung nimmt noch
stärker zu, wann sie dem Phänomenis ähnlich wird, die man bei Rasenden wahrnimmt.
Deshalb heißet sie auch furor. Es äußert sich hier eine besondere Stärke, und die Seele
zwinget etwas, das sie ohne diesen furorem nicht würde gezwungen haben. […] Der En-
thusiasmus ist eine neue Art der Begeisterung und bezeichnet hier nicht, wie in der Philo-
sophie, den Irrtum, da man glaubt, göttliche Empfindungen zu haben, und sich betrügt,
sondern die Benennung wird aus der Götterlehre der alten Heiden hergeleitet. Da sie eine so
große Menge von Untergottheiten hatten, so schrieb man es einer von diesen Gottheiten zu,
wann man in eine besondere Bewegung gesetzt wurde, und nannte es Enthusiasmum oder
den Geist eines gewissen Gottes (πνεύμα ϑεοῦ). (KOLL § 78)
With recourse to the relevant paragraphs from the Metaphysica, Baumgarten’s
deliberations culminate in the psychological diagnosis that the soul is capable
of the highest achievements under the effects of such inspiration: as if mad, it
imagines, remembers, foresees, and combines data – which he calls marks
(notae) – into something new (see AE § 80; MET §§ 504–518). Melancholy thus
goes hand in hand with poetic world-making.⁵³
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
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Understanding how the aspect of movement, which also organizes the theo-
ry of sensate desire,⁵⁴ is central to the melancholic and enthusiastic poet requires
turning to the psychological tradition, which Baumgarten uses to subject the
body of the poet to a reading: “Because the mad often have peculiar bodily pos-
tures, people have noticed this and often confused this posture with madness it-
self. We also sometimes find strange bodily movements in people who want to
express themselves in a beautiful way” (KOLL § 78; Weil die Rasenden oft wun-
derliche Stellungen des Körpers haben, so hat man dieses auch angemerket und
diese Stellung oft mit der Wut selbst verwechselt. Auch bei Leuten, die sich
schön ausdrücken wollen, finden wir zuweilen seltsame Bewegungen des Kör-
pers). The more moved the beautiful body, the more moved the beautiful spirit
is too – and the more complex, opaque, and performative is the literary text:
“When we perceive this phenomenon, then we can definitely conclude that
the writer was at the time in a kind of state of inspiration through which he per-
formed something that we cannot now manage with cold blood” (KOLL § 79;
Wann wir dieses Phänomene wahrnehmen, so können wir sicher schließen,
daß der Schriftsteller damals in einer Art von Begeisterung gewesen, durch wel-
che er etwas ausführet, das wir jetzt bei kaltem Blute nicht zwingen können).
Behind this is an economy of melancholy: poetry requires not too much in-
spiration but also not too little. Even negative experiences of poverty, displea-
sure, ridicule, troubles, and sad circumstances can be turned into inspiration
(see AE §§ 81–92). Creativity is thus not at all beyond the control of the poet;
rather, states of self-affection can be artificially produced by the sensate will.
If inspiration has “until now only been present, for example, to four degrees”
(KOLL § 78; bisher z.B. nur in vier Graden gewesen), Baumgarten advises “ampli-
fying it such that it immediately grows for instance to sixteen degrees and falls
back down to four after the action” (KOLL § 78; sie so zu verstärken, daß sie etwa
gleich bis sechzehn Grad wachsen, und nach der Handlung wieder zu vieren
herunterfallen). Here too, practice makes perfect: in thirteen points, he not
only demands that poets compete with the beauty of other products; he also rec-
ommends that they care for their corporeal and mental health through leisure,
mineral cures, wine, and love to prevent “blood clotting” (KOLL § 81; stockendes
Geblüt). The poet therefore also benefits from the agility of youth: “the thirty-fifth
to fortieth years are the peak for the beautiful spirit in age” (KOLL § 89; das 35 bis
40ste Jahr die Spitze für den schönen Geist im Alter ist).
To keep the poet’s blood moving, Baumgarten’s economy prescribes “motion
and agitation of the body, especially of a somewhat melancholic body” (AE § 81;
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
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motionem agitationemque corporis, praesertim non nihil melancholici). Physical
and psychic movement – such as “by means of rather brisk horse-riding (§ 46)”
(AE § 81; per equitationem celeriorem. §. 46) – have been considered classic
therapies for melancholy since antiquity. Pliny the Younger “meditated well
after some exercise while hunting” (nach einer Bewegung auf der Jagd gut me-
ditiere); and Horace “often produced verses while traveling or at an inn”
(KOLL § 81; oft auf der Reise oder im Wirtshause Verse gemacht habe). In this
context of visualizing inspiration through the traditional discourse on melan-
choly, allow me to note that no less than Aristotle illustrates his own rational
psychology with an image of motion and agitation in his short psychological
text On Divination in Sleep. He compares the mental representations of dreamers,
prophets, nostalgics, and poets to a disc thrower in a competition and character-
izes them all as melancholics. He thereby describes a genuinely poetic function
of these representations that operate metaphorically and metonymically: “For
just as even madmen utter or mentally rehearse things associated by assonance,
e.g. ‘Aphrodite’, ‘-phrodite’, as in the poems of Philaenis, so do these people
string a series onwards. And again, because of their intensity, one movement
does not get knocked out of them by another.”⁵⁵ Dubos, one of the godfathers
of the Aesthetica, recommends movement to the French nobility to cure boredom
(l’ennui).⁵⁶ So it is not without reason that Baumgarten also brings melancholy
into the eighteenth-century countryside–court topos. The melancholic poet is an
upright citizen, a man of “courteous conduct in society” (KOLL § 78; artigen Auf-
führung in Gesellschaft; see also KOLL § 88), “tenderness in judgment” (Zärtlich-
keit im Urteilen), and “beautiful thoughts” (KOLL § 29; schöne Gedanken), not a
decadent aristocrat. Like the “melancholics” (Melancholicis), the poet should
“practice moderation” (KOLL § 29; Maß zu halten) and not let “the dull and frosty
way of thinking” (KOLL § 111; die matte und frostige Art zu denken) or the “licen-
tious way of thinking” (KOLL § 112; ausschweifenden Art zu denken) take the
upper hand. Both idleness (akedeia; in the Christian context, sloth is a cardinal
sin) and licentiousness endanger him to the same degree (see MED § 68n),
threatening to turn him into the malus melancholicus, who is characterized by
addictions to hypocrisy, competition, fraternization, sycophancy, licentiousness,
orgies, idleness, laziness, and the pursuit of personal gain, especially wealth
(see AE § 50).
 Arist. Div. somn. 464b. Quoted from Aristotle, On Divination through Sleep, in On Sleep and
Dreams, trans. David Gallop (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 115.
 See Jean-Baptiste Dubos, Reflexion critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture, vol. 1 (Paris: Jean
Mariette, 1719), 6.
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Above all, the poet should not lose the right balance of desire: that is, the
touching, moving, passionate, effective idea is living,while the cold, lifeless, the-
oretical, ineffective idea is dead (see MET § 669). Baumgarten juxtaposes the bril-
liance (nitor) of the ethically good representation with the melancholic dryness
(siccitas) of the bad one (see MET § 531). Against this backdrop, the precautions
(cautiones) in section 7 seem as if they could be from a diagnostic compendium
on melancholy. They advise avoiding the following types of cognition (genera
cogitandi): the raw, the uneducated, the sluggish, the pedantic and scholastic,
the forced, the affected, the powerless and frosty, the unrestrainedly excessive,
and the imperfect (see AE §§ 106– 113; ETH § 403).
As the chief witness for his melancholic poet, who works on the border be-
tween creativity and pathology, Baumgarten finally invokes, and not without rea-
son, a pagan god: Apollo, the god of prophecy and poetry, who appears in Plato’s
Phaedrus as a melancholic accompanied by the Muses, Dionysus, and Aphro-
dite.⁵⁷ Apollo is the ancient godfather of the modern poet: “Since Apollo is a
god of physicians, of the future, and the leader of the Muses, one calls such
an inspired person a phoibolepton, one who is inspired by Phoebus” (KOLL
§ 82; Da Apollo ein Gott der Ärzte, der Zukunft und der Anführer der Musen
ist, so nennt man einen solchen Begeisterten φοιβοληπτον, einen, der von Phö-
bus begeistert ist). The Phoebus-Apollo constellation evoked by this turn is re-
flected both in the Aesthetica and in the Kollegium in the attribute of fire,
which Baumgarten uses to refer to the inspiration of the poet. As the flame of
beautiful thoughts (flamma pulcre cogitandorum; see AE § 114), the “wild fire”
of enthusiasm (KOLL § 78; Feuer, das […] wild ist), the fire of “wit” (KOLL § 44;
Witzes), and certainly as the Promethean fire of the creative power, fire symbol-
izes creative inspiration.
Apollo therefore stands at the beginning of a proper mythology of the poet,
at whose side Baumgarten now also places “Orpheus” (AE § 43), the singer and
poet, who is supposed to have descended from the divine Apollo Citharoedus or
at least be devoted to him. Orpheus’s genealogy reveals, however, yet another
tradition in which Baumgarten fixes the melancholic seer: the association with
Dionysus, the god of intoxication and ecstasy. Baumgarten particularly invokes
the essential orphic trait of (fast) movement:
The other characteristic of inspiration is speed.We do not mean the gift of writing swiftly,
since one can safely wager any time that one will be done, for example, with one’s poem
before someone else; rather, we understand here the state of the soul when it decides to
 See Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in
the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art (London: Thomas Nelson, 1964), 355.
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articulate something and in articulating it, feels that it goes faster and faster and never
comes to a standstill.
Das andere Kennzeichen der Begeisterung ist die Geschwindigkeit. Wir meinen hier nicht
jene Gabe hurtig zu schreiben, da man jedes Mal getrost eine Wette anstellen kann, man z.B.
mit seinem Gedicht eher fertigwerde als ein anderer, sondernwir verstehen hier den Zustand
der Seele, da sie sich entschließt, etwas auszuarbeiten, und indem sie ausarbeitet, spüret,
daß es immer geschwinder geht und niemals ins Stocken gerät. (KOLL § 79)
In Orphism, this temporal characterization of the singer is based on mistaking
Kronos (Saturn) with chronos (time). In their classic study on melancholy, Ray-
mond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl explain how the titan Kronos
was melded with chronos, casted “as a seer, and described as a πρόμαντις or
προμηθεύς. The foundation of this lay in the equation, expressly recognised by
the Neoplatonists, of Kronos with Chronos – that is to say, with Time, the funda-
mental principle of the Orphic theology.”⁵⁸ Baumgarten’s primary response to
this association is to radically accelerate the “speed” (KOLL § 79; Geschwindig-
keit) of literature. With regard to Reinhart Koselleck’s characterization of mod-
ernization as acceleration,⁵⁹ Baumgarten’s imagination of even a “machine-like
movement” (KOLL § 29; maschinenmäßigen Bewegung) certainly participates
in the discourse of modernity.
The temperament of the poet – his heart – thus leads not to the ground of
the soul but rather, with mythology, to the ground of the cultural imaginary.
There Pliny the Younger paints the setting of inspiration that Baumgarten appro-
priates in paragraph 84 – not with a word-for-word quotation but rather with a
relatively free interpretation of the following passage, as Andrea Allerkamp has
noted:⁶⁰
I always realize this when I am at Laurentum, reading and writing and finding time to take
the exercise which keeps my mind fit for work. There is nothing there for me to say or hear
said which I would afterwards regret, no one disturbs me with malicious gossip, and I have
no one to blame – but myself – when writing doesn’t come easily. Hopes and fears do not
worry me, and I am not bothered by idle talk; I share my thoughts with myself and my
books. It is a good life and a genuine one, a seclusion which is happy and honourable,
more rewarding than almost any “business” can be. The sea and shore are truly my private
Helicon, an endless source of inspiration.⁶¹
 Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, 154.
 See Koselleck, Futures Past. See also 2.2 Analogy.
 See Andrea Allerkamp, “Onirocritica und mundus fabulosus: Traum und Erfindung,” in Aller-
kamp and Mirbach, Schönes Denken, 204–206.
 Plin., Ep. 1.9.4–7. Quoted from Pliny the Younger, Letters, trans. Betty Radice, vol. 1, Loeb
Classical Library 55 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
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Baumgarten replaces idleness from the discourse on melancholy with leisure
(otium), and Pliny’s villa with Helicon and Parnassus, the two seats of the
Muses. There the poet awaits (pascere) and dreams (somniare) of his inspiration:
inflammation and acceleration. That is why Baumgarten has him cry out: “o!
mare! o! littus! verum secretumque μȣσειον!” (AE § 84). In Allerkamp’s reading,
“with the list of the sea, beach, and the temple of the Muses, three places of na-
ture and culture are invoked that stand for endlessness, contemplation, and po-
etry.” While the sea and beach are “places of creation, places between the work
on memory [memoria] and ingenious invention [inventio],”⁶² the temple and the
invocation of the Muses,which stands at the beginning of all poetry, refer back to
Apollo, the leader of the Muses, whose position the poet has now assumed in
Baumgarten’s mythology.
The affirmation of inspiration looks ahead to modernity, yet Baumgarten
would not have approved of this affirmation. He repeatedly subjects the poet
to the stronger laws of the happy life (fortiores vitae beatae leges). They include
the imperative of moderation, especially in all things that become excessive in
melancholy. In section 28 on aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthetica), he warns
the poet against too much inspiration, which can result in the representations
of literary texts appearing to be lies to the analogon of reason (see AE
§ 448).⁶³ The poet’s creativity can lead to beautiful literature, but it can also pro-
duce – Baumgarten again cites Horace⁶⁴ – literary texts that do not appear like a
dream on Parnassus but rather “like a sick man’s dreams” (AE § 446; velut aegri
somnia). That is the point at which beauty suddenly changes into ugliness, aes-
thetic light into melancholic darkness.⁶⁵
6.3 Traces
6.3.1 Ethopoeia
Recent scholarship has engaged eagerly with the ethical aspects of the Aesthe-
tica. The shift in interest from philosophy to anthropology accompanying this
focus is, of course, very distant from Baumgarten’s actual epistemic object: liter-
ature. Perhaps this is not a problem if one simply accepts, based on common
sense, that any literary text must have been written by a real person. So any
 Allerkamp, “Onirocritica und mundus fabulosus,” 204.
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
 See Allerkamp, “Onirocritica und mundus fabulosus,” 205.
 See 4.1.3 Twilight.
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poet must possess certain talents, be educated as a poet, and fulfill a series of
duties related to literary writing. But Baumgarten does not follow common
sense; on the contrary, he tests it. For he does not direct his attention to the
poet, author, writer, beautiful spirit, or felix aestheticus himself but rather to
the traces that he leaves in literary texts. Even Baumgarten’s analysis of inspira-
tion demonstrates this: “If one wants to examine whether this inspiration was
with a beautiful writer, then one should read him carefully” (KOLL § 79; Wann
man untersuchen will, ob diese Begeisterung bei einem schönen Schriftsteller
gewesen ist, so lese man ihn genau). These traces of sensate cognition and sen-
sate desire become manifest as the abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certi-
tude, and life of the structure of literary discourse. From a psychological per-
spective, Baumgarten views these traces as originating from a person. But he
also views them from a narratological perspective, ascribing these traces to
the narrative voice, which is – as I have shown – the trace not of a person but
rather of a function.⁶⁶ In the Aesthetica, he invents his own persona, or mask,
which gives this voice a face and forms the center of his theory of authorship.
More or less every rhetorical textbook treats the orator and his education in
addition to technical instructions for composing a formally complete speech. Fol-
lowing this model, Baumgarten describes the poet’s nature and education, copy-
ing the antiquated and clearly defined ideal of the orator from Cicero, Quintilian,
and Virgil. It is the ideal of the good man (vir bonus); the Aesthetica does not
conceive of a mulier bona, of course.⁶⁷ Yet the obligation to perfect sensate cog-
nition and sensate desire is only realized in the literary text; the visualization of
a “poet” is merely the aftereffect of the rhetorical figure of ethopoeia, which
Baumgarten uses consciously.
In rhetoric, the figure of sermocinatio (ethopoeia) is, as a sister of personifi-
cation, or fictio personae (prosopopoeia), one of the figures of thought (figurae
sententiae). A speaker uses ethopoeia to let a person other than himself speak
directly within his own speech. The history of the concept reaches back to Aris-
totle, who explains the figure as an ethically coded tool for achieving evidentia
in speech. In ancient progymnasmata, which Baumgarten takes up in his aes-
thetic exercises, ethopoeia becomes a trainable speech act. Whereas the well-
known figure of prosopopoeia is understood more in the sense of personification
and aims to evoke a face and voice,⁶⁸ ethopoeia produces a character. It does so
through characterization, the allocation of characteristics. Particularly central in
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
 See Cic., De or. 3.189, 2.194; Quint., Inst. 2.8. See also Linn, “Baumgartens Aesthetica,” 435–
436; Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens,” 201.
 See Paul de Man, “Autobiography as De-facement,” MLN 94.5 (1979): 926.
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the theory of ethopoeia is Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s description of Lysias in
The Ancient Orators. There he ties ethopoeia to the rhetorical commonplaces
that produce the effect of a good and trustworthy character (loci a persona).
These characteristics are topoi and do not necessarily belong to the person or
speaker,⁶⁹ meaning that the ethics of this rhetorical figure of character-making
is firmly anchored in the consensus of convention.
As the figure of character-making, ethopoeia has the dual task of amplifying
both the evidentia and believability of discourse, so it is strange that Baumgar-
ten does not list this figure in the series of figures he treats in section 53 on per-
suasive arguments (argumenta persuasoria).⁷⁰ Perhaps he overlooked the figure
because it does not seem to be a figure at all. That is, if ethopoeia succeeds, then
one measures its success by whether the audience believes that the real person is
speaking instead of a rhetorically presented persona. Against this backdrop,
Quintilian, Baumgarten’s most important source, treats ethopoeia as the figure
of mimesis: “The representation of the characters of others, which is called Etho-
poeia or, as some prefer, Mimesis, […] operates both with actions and with
words. The form with actions is akin to Hypotyposis.”⁷¹ Ethopoeia is therefore
also a fixed component of rhetorical exercises⁷² and possesses “the closest affin-
ity to creative literature.”⁷³
Tracing Baumgarten’s use of ethopoeia must begin in the Meditationes,
where he creates the ethical character of the poeta by means of a figura etymo-
logica, employing once again his analogical method.⁷⁴ There he replaces the
product – the poema – with the producer – the poeta – by simply exchanging
the m for a t: “By poem we mean a perfect sensate discourse, by poetics the
body of rules to which a poem conforms, by philosophical poetics the science
of poetics, by poetry the state of composing a poem, and by poet the man who
enjoys that state” (MED § 9; Oratio sensitiva perfecta est POEMA, complexus re-
gularum ad quas conformandum poema POETICE, scientia poetices PHILOSO-
PHIA POETICA, habitus conficiendi poematis POESIS, eoque habitu gaudens
POETA). The later baptism of the poet as the felix aestheticus in the Aesthetica
speaks volumes about Baumgarten’s use of the figura etymologica: he simply
changes the gender of the word aesthetica, creating the male aestheticus,
 See Roland Spalinger, “Ethopoeia: Historische und theoretische Analyse einer rhetorischen
Figur” (MA thesis, Universität Zürich, 2018), 8–9.
 See 6.3.3 Dubitatio.
 Quint., Inst. 9.2.58.
 See 6.2.1 Exercise.
 Webb, “The Progymnasmata as Practice,” 306.
 See 2.3 Etymology.
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whose reputation is qualified by the attribute felix. Just how suggestive the figure
of character-making was for Baumgarten is shown in his own reflection on the
“mythology of the old pagans” (KOLL § 78; Götterlehre der alten Heiden), in
which the dance of the Muses is derived from “nothing other than different
ways of expressing oneself beautifully about different objects” (KOLL § 83; nichts
als verschiedene Arten, sich von verschiedenen Gegenständen schön aus-
zudrücken): “Each particular way was given an apt name and transformed
into a person” (KOLL § 83; Einer jeden besonderen Art gab man contenable
Namen und verwandelte sie in Personen). For that reason, the aptitudes, duties,
and exercises of the felix aestheticus do not refer to an actual human being; in-
stead, ethopoeia depends on the structure of literary discourse and its functions.
This is because, as Groß notes, the felix aestheticus is, “as the embodied beau-
tiful spirit, essentially a poieticus.”⁷⁵ He can do what literature can do – only
that, and nothing else.
With ethopoeia, we are thus not discussing a real person but rather a rhe-
torical persona, a mask. In contrast to Quintilian’s rhetorical ethopoeia, howev-
er, Baumgarten constructs an aesthetic ethopoeia. Not the loci a persona but the
aesthetic topoi give the felix aestheticus his ethical profile. In the Aesthetica,
Baumgarten discusses topoi in section 10 on tropes (tropi). There he differenti-
ates positively coded aesthetic topoi from “miserable topics” (KOLL § 130; elen-
den Topiken). After positing that particular topoi (loci particulares), which can
be applied to individual objects, have preeminence over general topoi (loci uni-
versales), he demands aesthetic topoi from psychologists. In free indirect
speech, he puts a series of questions in the mouth of the felix aestheticus,
who thus serves as a personification of aesthetics in Baumgarten’s own dis-
course. The six categories of style – abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certi-
tude, and life – structure the soliloquy:
If I, for example, wanted to compose my own life story, even if just for my own amusement,
then I would first ask myself: how rich is he then, how big is his family, what changes will
occur in it, further, how important are they, what truth, what verisimilitude, what vividness
is there? Where must I direct full light? Where should I move? This is the particular topic we
propose in the first exercises.
Wann ich z.B. meinen eigenen Lebenslauf, auch nur zu meiner eigenen Belustigung auf-
setzen wollte, so würde ich mich zuerst fragen: wie reich ist er wohl, wie groß ist die Ver-
wandtschaft, was für Veränderungen werden darin vorkommen, ferner wie wichtig sind sie,
was für Wahrheit, was für Wahrscheinlichkeit, was für Lebhaftigkeit ist da? Wo muß ich das
 Groß, Felix aestheticus, 119.
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volle Licht hinsetzen?Wo soll ich rühren? Dies ist die besondere Topik, die wir bei den ersten
Übungen vorschlagen. (KOLL § 139)
Baumgarten accordingly translates the parts of literary texts – the canons of rhet-
oric (inventio, dispositio, elocutio) – into steps for producing literature. The parts
listed in the Meditationes – “The several parts of a poem are: (1) sensate repre-
sentations, (2) their interrelationships, (3) words as their signs, § 9, § 6” (MED
§ 10; Poematis varia sunt, 1) repraesentationes sensitivae 2) earum nexus 3)
voces earum signa. §. 9. 6; see also AE §§ 18–20) – thus correspond to the
step-by-step process described in the Kollegium. There Baumgarten obliges the
working aesthetician to “imagine a thing for the first time in such a way that
it becomes manifest to the senses and moves” (KOLL § 14; ein Ding sich zum er-
sten Male so vorstellen, daß es in die Sinne fällt und rührt). The aesthetician
should do so by sticking to “the rules for thinking beautifully and movingly of
things of which one has not at all thought of before” (KOLL § 14; die Regeln
schön und rührend von Dingen zu denken, davon man bisher noch nicht so ge-
dacht). Then the successful beautiful spirit must also “perceive the harmony of
the signs and structure” (KOLL § 20; die Übereinstimmung der Zeichen und
der Ordnung wahrnehmen) to represent something beautifully. Aesthetic etho-
poeia thus acquires its profile through the functions of the structure of literary
discourse, which are rooted in the cognitive and appetitive faculties.⁷⁶ The
poet first places sensately processed elements in relation to one another (combi-
nare) so as to produce complexity; second, he crops the images (praescindere;
see AE § 34) and places them before the eyes (see AE § 39) to produce opacity;
and third, he brings these images to life to produce performativity.
The performative function of the structure of literary discourse depends,
however, on the appetitive faculties. In Baumgarten’s aesthetic ethopoeia, the
performative function configures the desire of the beautiful spirit (see KOLL
§ 45), who therefore seems particularly human. As I have shown, the sensate
will forms the ethical core of the Aesthetica.⁷⁷ Yet mere will is not sufficient
for the felix aestheticus. To be a genuine aesthetician, he must have a will to a
sensate will, which is itself sensate. That is why “the first judgment the beautiful
spirit or aesthetically rich spirit must make” (KOLL § 149; die erste Beurteilung,
die der schöne Geist oder der ästhetisch reiche machen muß) comes before the
six questions listed above: “I must ask:What is the state of my horizon? Will I be
able to go from this one into another? Will I be able to manage everything in this
 See 3.1.1 Cognition.
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
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hour, at this time, under these circumstances?” (KOLL § 149; Ich muß fragen:Wie
ist mein Horizont beschaffen, werde ich aus dem einen in den anderen gehen
können? Werde ich alles in dieser Stunde, zu dieser Zeit, unter diesen Umstän-
den zwingen können?). By means of ethopoeia, Baumgarten stages the Urszene
of literature as an initial reflexive will to a sensate will. In this will, the theory of
literature converges with the theory of creativity, suggesting a causal relation in
which a real person wrote the literary text. That this is the case, that a literary
text always has one or more producers, would of course belong to another chap-
ter of literary theory that does not concern me here.
Here the ethopoeia of the felix aestheticus is not produced by someone but
rather produces itself. Paradoxically, it arises together with the structure of liter-
ary discourse, to which it is indebted. This metaleptic structure does not depend
on any authority beyond itself, especially not on an empirical author. Indeed, the
felix aestheticus coincides with the act that Baumgarten places – above all, in
the context of his narratology – at the base of poetic world-making: “I sense”
or “I narrate”:⁷⁸
The beautiful spirit must have the natural poetic aptitude to create something new and be,
as the French put it, an esprit créateur.What we sense and have sensed, that is old; since he
is now to create something new, he must not purely show the old perception again but
rather put the old ones together with new ones with imagination.
Der schöne Geist muß die natürliche poetische Anlage haben, etwas Neues zu schaffen, und
wie es die Franzosen ausdrücken ein esprit createur sein. Was wir empfinden und emp-
funden haben, das ist alt, da er nun etwas Neues schaffen soll, so muß er nicht pur die alten
Empfindungen wieder zeigen, sondern die alten mit Imagination verbunden mit neuen zu-
sammensetzen. (KOLL § 34)
This sensate will to poetic world-making aims both at the rhetorical completeness
and metaphysical perfection of literature.⁷⁹ Against this metaphysical backdrop,
Baumgarten undergirds the will to will with the allegory of the playing boy,
which he borrows from Horace: “when a boy converses, when he plays, especial-
ly when he invents games or acts like a little leader among his comrades – whol-
ly intent on what he is doing with them – he breaks out in a sweat, endures a lot,
and does a lot” (AE § 55; dum confabulatur puer, dum ludit, praesertim ubi lu-
dorum inventor est, aut parvulus director inter commilitones, iisque gnaviter in-
tentus iam sudat, et multa fert, multa facit).⁸⁰ According to Anthony Krupp, “the
 See 5.2.2 Mediation.
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See Hor., Ars P. 412–413.
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child’s mimetic activity is viewed here as nothing less than the source of cul-
ture,”⁸¹ providing a developmental narrative from childhood to manhood and
from nature to culture. Moreover, Baumgarten takes recourse to one of the tradi-
tional allegories of the alchemical process of transformation; such a ludus pue-
rorum stages the final and highest level of the work (opus) in Alexandrian her-
meticism.⁸² This allegory does not emphasize the goal of the sensate will to
poetic world-making but rather the impulse that keeps the process in motion.
In contrast to alchemic work, the felix aestheticus cannot, of course, ever
reach the goal of literature: its beauty, truth, and goodness.
Although the character of the felix aestheticus could certainly be suspected
of merely serving to visualize Baumgarten’s literary theory, his aesthetic etho-
poeia is actually about something else: poetic world-making. Norbert Menzel ar-
gues that as a maker of poetic worlds, the felix aestheticus was historically typ-
ical and influenced by contemporary theories of genius.⁸³ But since the emphatic
genius of the 1770s was not yet prominent around 1750, one has to invert the di-
rection of influence: Baumgarten influenced the later theories of genius by giving
his felix aestheticus “the contours of the new figure of the great solitary” poet.⁸⁴
6.3.2 Parrhesia
In the very last paragraph of the Aesthetica, Baumgarten gives the persona of the
felix aestheticus an interesting makeover when he concludes his reflections on
literature with the rhetorical figure of frankness (parrhesia). With regard to
Baumgarten’s canon of style, parrhesia supposedly belongs to the “figures of in-
tentionality,”⁸⁵ which he treats in section 53 on persuasive arguments (argumen-
 Anthony Krupp, “Cultivation as Maturation: Infants, Children, and Adults in Alexander Gott-
lieb Baumgarten’s Aesthetica,” Monatshefte 98.4 (2006): 532.
 See Gustav F. Hartlaub, “Signa hermetis: Zwei alte alchemistische Bilderhandschriften,”
Zeitschrift des deutschen Vereins für Kunstwissenschaft 4 (1937): 149; Hartlaub, “Arcana artis:
Spuren alchemistischer Symbolik in der Kunst des 16. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift für Kunstge-
schichte 6 (1937): 289–324.
 See Norbert Menzel, “Der anthropologische Charakter des Schönen bei Baumgarten” (Diss.,
Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1969), 296.
 Finsen, “Evidenz und Wirkung im ästhetischen Werk Baumgartens,” 212.
 Rüdiger Campe, “Epoche der Evidenz: Knoten in einem terminologischen Netzwerk zwi-
schen Descartes und Kant,” in “Intellektuelle Anschauung”: Figurationen von Evidenz zwischen
Kunst und Wissen, ed. Sibylle Peters and Martin Jörg Schäfer (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006), 31.
See also Frauke Berndt, “Schönes Wollen: A. G. Baumgartens literarische Medienethik,” in
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ta persuasoria). While he grumbles in the Aesthetica that “whether the rhetori-
cians always or never call this argument a figure is all the same to me” (AE
§ 349; Hoc argumentum an figura dicatur semper, an nunquam rhetoribus,
mihi perinde est), in the Kollegium he claims that parrhesia is a figure in no un-
certain terms:
If such a passage now appears in a beautiful periodic sentence of a speech or of a poem
where I wait to say something and finally do say it and thereby present the matter really
importantly, this is a particular beauty, and in this whole of the sentence the most beautiful
aspect, and so a figure.
Insofern nun in einer schönen Periode einer Rede oder eines Gedichtes eine solche Stelle
kommt, wo ich anstehe, etwas zu sagen und es endlich doch sage und hierdurch die Sache
recht wichtig darstelle, ist dies eine besondere Schönheit, und in diesem Ganzen der Periode
das Schönste, folglich eine Figur. (KOLL § 349, emphasis mine)
One can understand the relation of the two figures, ethopoeia and parrhesia, as
one of specification: every instance of parrhesia is an instance of ethopoeia, but
not every instance of ethopoeia is an instance of parrhesia. Evidentia is where
they converge. While the duty and goal of ethopoeia is the aesthetic evidentia
of the poetic world,⁸⁶ the duty and goal of parrhesia is frank evidentia, for anyone
who wants to be educated to think and desire beautifully should “gracefully
transition from here to the bella parrhesia of evidentia (§ 349)” (AE § 904; ve-
nuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesian. §. 349). With regard to
the translation of this passage, I propose interpreting “evidentiae” here as a gen-
itive of quality that modifies the accusative object “bellam parrhesian” and not,
as is often the case, as a dative of purpose that makes evidentia, which in itself
can be qualified as something different, the aim of bella parrhesia. If a genitive
of quality, the bella parrhesia of evidentia can basically be understood as frank
evidentia. By contrast, Campe associates parrhesia with a freedom of thought
that results from aesthetic experience.⁸⁷ Either way, Baumgarten recommends
beautiful parrhesia as a figure for producing ethically coded evidentia.
With the concept of bella parrhesia, Baumgarten bridges the gap between
the beginning and the end of the Aesthetica – a further argument for viewing
his theory of literature as complete and not fragmentary. That is, the Aesthetica
concludes with a phrase that replaces the aesthetic goal of beauty from para-
Bella Parrhesia: Begriff und Figur der freien Rede in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Rüdiger Campe and
Malte Wessels (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2018), 171– 194.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
 See Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 255.
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graph 14 with the ethical duty of frank evidentia.⁸⁸ Since they are substituted for
one another within the syntagms in paragraphs 14 and 904, the metaphysical
concept of beauty and the ethical concept of frankness form a paradigm in his
literary theory:
Aesthetices finis est perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis, §. 1. Haec autem est pulcritudo
(§ 349). (AE § 14, emphasis mine)
[…] si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam evidentiae parrhesian. §. 349. (AE § 904, emphasis
mine)
While Baumgarten treats bella evidentia in the context of aesthetic truth,⁸⁹ he
substantiates the paradigm between frankness and beauty by associating evi-
dentia and persuasion so strongly that he does not treat aesthetic evidentia
within the context of truth but rather in the context of verisimilitude.⁹⁰ Evidentia
is produced through what is probable; and because what is evident is probable,
evidentia is also persuasive. One may assume, as Campe notes, that as a political
and legal theorist, Baumgarten was well familiar with the rhetorical figure of
parrhesia before transforming it into aesthetic parrhesia.⁹¹ In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the Greek parrhesia and its Latin translation licentia referred, on the one
hand, to the right to bring a legal suit and, on the other, to being allowed or
qualified to teach in an academic context.⁹² Both meanings are rooted in rheto-
ric, where parrhesia has been caught since sophism between being an aptitude
and a technique, between nature and art (ars/techne).⁹³ In the Rhetorica ad
Herennium, composed in the first century BC, parrhesia has both a narrow polit-
ical definition, since it is about freedom of speech, and a broader ethical mean-
ing that relates to a speaker’s duties: “It is Frankness of Speech when, talking
before those to whom we owe reverence or fear, we yet exercise our right to
speak out, because we seem justified in reprehending them, or persons dear
to them, for some fault.”⁹⁴ It is also in this sense that Foucault develops parrhe-
 See 4.1.1 Perfection.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
 See 4.2.2 Formlessness; 5.3.2 Probability.
 See Campe, “Bella Evidentia,” 255.
 See Johann Heinrich Zedler, Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschafften
und Künste, vol. 17 (Halle, 1738), s.vv. “Licentia,” “Licentiatus.”
 See Michael P. Schmude, “Licentia,” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, ed. Gert
Ueding, vol. 5 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2001), cols. 253–258.
 Rhet. Her. 4.48. Quoted from Rhetorica ad Herennium, trans. Harry Caplan, Loeb Classical Li-
brary 403 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).
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sia into the absolute duty of anyone who wants to speak the political truth: “In
parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of per-
suasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life
and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest
and moral apathy.”⁹⁵
Quintilian depoliticizes parrhesia with the concept of licentia. In contrast to
an absolute duty, Quintilian argues for a relative licentia tailored to the individ-
ual person of the speaker, a licentia that is furthermore not bound to truth but to
consensus: one must “take care that what is said is not out of keeping with the
man who says it. […] For what is liberty in some is called licence in others.”⁹⁶
That is the reason why he integrates licentia into the figures of thought in the
canon of style. As a performative figure, licentia is available to the educated
speaker in various communicative contexts for achieving his goals in these par-
ticular situations. Real frankness is thus hard to distinguish from feigned flattery.
And indeed, only fake frankness is a means of rhetorical persuasion: “When
these expressions are sincere, they do not come under our present topic; but if
they are feigned and artificially produced they are undoubtedly to be regarded
as Figures. The same may be said of Free Speech,which Cornificius calls Licence,
and the Greeks parrhesia. For what is less ‘figured’ than true freedom?”⁹⁷ With
regard to ethics, licentia is therefore also the figure in which the ambiguity of
rhetoric receives a form. Because one cannot distinguish between “eloquence”
and “artful trickery,” between good and bad rhetoric,⁹⁸ Kant calls for vigilance
with regard to rhetoric in its entirety. Even the greatness of the soul and dignity
of the person can, as Baumgarten complains, be simulated by “SWEET-TALKING
AND CARELESS NITPICKERS (quibblers)” (AE § 356; PULCELLI LEVICULIQUE
MICROLOGI. (leptologi.)).
Before discussing it in the Aesthetica, Baumgarten refers to licentia in his
Ethica philosophica, where he is concerned with the appetitive faculties and
the perfection of morality. The Ethica addresses the all-important question of
what the rational will should be directed toward. So far I have focused on the
psychological aspects of the sensate will, tracing its development into the will
to a sensate will and then into the sensate will to poetic world-making; now I
will turn my attention to the ethical aspects. The location of licentia in the syn-
opsis of the Ethica is in itself indicative. In the second chapter, in which he goes
 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2001),
19–20.
 Quint., Inst. 3.8.48.
 Quint., Inst. 9.2.27–28.
 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 53.
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through the duties to the self (officia erga te ipsum) and then comes to the duties
to the soul and its faculties (officia erga animam eiusque facultatem), Baumgar-
ten discusses the duties to the higher appetitive faculty (speciatim officia erga
facultatem appetitivam superiorem). Section 10 on the care of the will (cura vo-
luntatis) deals with freedom (libertas), which he defines in the part 3 of theMeta-
physica on psychology (psychologia).⁹⁹
The precondition of freedom is in the morality of the person, and although a
person has a natural predisposition to certain morals, morality depends, accord-
ing to Baumgarten, on conscious decisions since humans possess free choice. In
the paragraph in which he finally treats licentia, he therefore lists the perfection
of freedom as the seventh of ten strategies for personal perfection: “You are to
perfect your liberty1 (7) lest you confuse it with a false and vapid kind of liberty,
the sort of lawless licentia and liberty2 that operates by pure chance (§ 247)” (ETH
§ 248, subscripts mine; Perfecturus libertatem tuam 7) ne ipsam cum falsa et
inani eius specie confundas, qualis exlex licentia et libertas per casum purum
operata, §. 247). The differentiation between good, true freedom and false, untrue
freedom is noteworthy in this passage where Baumgarten uses the term libertas
twice. First, liberty1 serves as the umbrella concept; second, “licentia and liber-
ty2” encompasses misused types of freedom such as the negatively connoted sty-
listic techniques of frank and free speech (see AE § 877).
In the context of the Ethica, Baumgarten binds liberty1 to truth, which he de-
fines theologically, and to the will: licentia is thus the rhetorical figure of the ra-
tional will to truth. Hence, when licentia appears in the Aesthetica as bella par-
rhesia, it has been displaced from the higher appetitive faculties to the lower
ones (see AE § 904). As a result, bella parrhesia is the figure of the analogon
of the will to truth. Such a sensate will to aesthetic truth corresponds – as an
echo of the paragraphs on exercise¹⁰⁰ – to the felix aestheticus’s pursuit of aes-
thetic truth and the fight against aesthetic falsity (falsitas aesthetica):
Section XXXIIII: The absolute aesthetic pursuit of truth (studium veritatis aestheticum ab-
solutum)
Section XXXV: The comparative pursuit of truth (studium veritatis comparativum)
Section XXXVI: The poetic pursuit of the true (studium veri poëticum)
From the beginning, the duty to pursue truth is understood as necessarily unful-
fillable. For humanity cannot bridge the gap between human truth and the high-
est logical truth (veritas summa logica; see AE § 557), which only God grasps. All
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 See 6.2.2 Wonder.
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that is left for the felix aestheticus is the poetic pursuit of the true (studium veri
poëticum), to which Baumgarten devotes all of section 36. There it is certain that
the only truth the felix aestheticus can strive for is aesthetic verisimilitude.¹⁰¹
The felix aestheticus must thus ask himself no less than sixteen questions so
that, even if he does not speak the truth, he at least does not violate the verisi-
militude of the literary text (see AE §§ 590–613).
Nevertheless, Baumgarten justifies exceptions from the truth as poetic free-
dom (libertas poetica; see AE § 523) as long as they do not offend against taste
(exceptiones non inelegantes; see AE § 25). So such poetic license (licentia poe-
tica) is not only possible but actually defines literature. Although literary texts
are flawed and deficient, their perfection – and that means their beauty – is
greater than the perfection of every other form of sensate discourse:
And so we come to the concept of poetic license. Because poetry must have particularly
great perfections, particularly great exceptions are to be made here; and because one
has not yet heard of rhetorical license, one also sees that the perfections here are not al-
lowed to be so great.
[U]nd so kommen wir auf den Begriff der Licentia poetica.Weil die Poesie besonders große
Vollkommenheiten haben muß, so werden hier besonders große Ausnahmen zu machen
sein; und da man noch nichts von einer Licentia rhetorica gehöret hat; so siehet man zu-
gleich, daß hier die Vollkommenheiten nicht so groß sein dürfen. (KOLL § 24)
Against the backdrop of the ethical duty of verisimilitude, parrhesia is thus the
figure of the sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude. It first appears – initially
without the attributive adjective bella – in the context of aesthetic greatness
(magnitudo aesthetica) in section 23 on magnifying arguments (argumenta au-
gentia) that increase greatness. There Baumgarten lists parrhesia among the fig-
ures of the sublime:¹⁰²
Among the magnifying arguments, we should without a doubt include parrhesia, which re-
veals, whether implicitly or explicitly, that in order for a meditation that is certain or the
signification of a meditation to be decided upon, we needed a notable exertion of freedom,
and that it was not without a fight that the better case nevertheless won in the spirit. For
after a prologue of this sort, or tacitly currying favor, it is not reasonable for one usually to
expect commonplace or familiar things.
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
 See augmentum/incrementum (AE § 330); meteora (AE § 331); hypotyposis (AE § 332); re-
petitio (AE § 333); hyperbaton, climax, gradatio (AE § 334); anticlimax (AE § 335); metaphora, si-
milia, comparatio (AE § 336); hyperbole (AE §§ 339–341); polyptoton (AE § 342); anaphora (AE
§ 343); epistrophe or epiphora (AE § 344); symploce, epanalepsis, anadiplosis, ploce, epizeuxis
(AE § 345); synathroismus (AE § 348); exclamatio (AE § 351).
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In augentibus sine dubio habeamus Parrhesian, implicite vel explicite ostendentem, ut
certa meditatio meditationisve significatio decerneretur, opus nobis insigni fuisse libertatis
nisu, non nisi post luctam aliquam vicisse tamen in animo meliorem caussam. Post eius-
modi enim prologum, vel tacitam insinuationem, sane non vulgaria solent exspectari ac
trita. (AE § 349)
By first introducing parrhesia in a rhetorical context, Baumgarten marks the
state of exception that Foucault later pointedly emphasizes: “Parrhesia, then,
is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak
the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth
takes place in the ‘game’ of life or death.”¹⁰³ In Baumgarten, parrhesia requires
a provisional arrangement, an introduction or silent insinuation, which recalls
Foucault’s state of exception.¹⁰⁴ Within this framework, a speaker decides – de-
spite inner conflict – to employ parrhesia, and this use of it is accompanied by a
turn to the morally good. For this reason, the figure also magnifies the object of
aesthetic discourse, which is not in poor taste. In any case, the freedom that is
the basis of this decision remains strategic and potentially fake.
The examples of parrhesia from Virgil’s Aeneis that Baumgarten cites in
paragraph 349 and the following one are something like ethical clichés for guid-
ing attention. In the Kollegium, he recommends that parrhesia should be used
with “great cunning” (großer List) and states that it has the purpose of arousing
“curiosity” (Neugier) since “one acts like something is important and lets a kind
of hesitation be seen before one says it out loud and then finally says it never-
theless” (KOLL § 349; man eine Sache als wichtig verstellet und eine Art von
Wankelmut blicken läßt, ehe man sie heraussagt und sie endlich doch sagt). Par-
rhesia makes people believe “that it really must be a matter of importance”
(KOLL § 349; daß es wirklich eine Sache von Wichtigkeit sein müsse). As such,
speaking the truth is best evidenced by noting that one is speaking the truth
or truthfully. With regard to this new “discursive reality” of speaking the truth
in aesthetic contexts, Florian Fuchs points out that “Baumgarten […] divides dis-
course into a logical narrative statement and a sensate linguistic effect.”¹⁰⁵ In
this sense, Baumgarten cites the speech of the Greek Sinon from Virgil’s Aeneis.
With an invented story, Sinon convinces the Trojans that the wooden horse in
front of the gates of Troy is the Greeks’ parting gift and that they should bring
it into their city. But behind Sinon’s narrative lurk lies and ruin, as Baumgarten
 Foucault, Fearless Speech, 16.
 See Florian Fuchs, “Sich des Lügners entzücken: Ästhetische Freiheit und Baumgartens
Szene ‘schöner’ Parrhesie,” in Campe and Wessels, Bella Parrhesia, 195.
 Fuchs, “Ästhetische Freiheit,” 202.
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ascertains in his intense close reading of the passage, which highlights Sinon’s
rhetorical techniques and their effects:
The fictitious Sinon proceeds meta polles parrhesias [with much parrhesia] until he thinks
he has enough attention. Then indeed he simulates a struggle within himself again, […]
with what effect? […]
When, however, he nearly hit the nail on the head, on account of which he was playing out
the whole fable, not another word did he utter before:
He raised his hands – unfettered – to the stars.
[…]
But keep your promises, since Troy is saved –
If this true news pays richly for my safety.¹⁰⁶
The result teaches how valuable this parrhesia, as well as the narrative rolled into it, is held
to be.
Pergit fictus Sinon μετα πολλης παρρησιας, donec attentionem ac isse se satis putat. Tum
vero luctam intra animum denuo simulat. […]
quo effectu? […]
Quum autem rem iam acu paene tangeret, cuius gratia omnis ludebatur fabula, non ver-
bulum prius, quam
Sustulit exutas vinclis ad sidera palmas:
[…]
Tu modo promissis maneas, servataque serves,
Troia, fidem, si vera feram, si magna rependam.
Eventus docuit, quanti haec habita sit parrhesia, et narratio huic involuta. (AE § 350)
On account of its affinity to false pathos, parrhesia is generally suspected of de-
ception. Baumgarten therefore confirms Quintilian’s critique of fake frankness
earlier in the Aesthetica. But in stating that Sinon “simulates a struggle within
himself” in this paragraph, Baumgarten breaks, as Fuchs notes, with the rhetor-
ical tradition by turning from content to form to affirm fakery. The effect of the
figure is independent from the truth of the statement. Consequently, parrhesia
becomes an “aesthetic effect.”¹⁰⁷
This finding is correct, but it misses the point. The affirmation of fake frank-
ness occurs when Baumgarten analyzes the use and effects of parrhesia in nar-
ration. Sinon’s intradiegetic narration takes the form of parrhesia; it is the mask
through which Sinon narrates. And since he invents a fake story to tell with that
mask, bella parrhesia is the figure of the sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude,
which is always fake from an ethical point of view.¹⁰⁸ By substituting beauty in
 Quoted (with modification) from Vergil, Aeneid, 2.153, 2.160–161.
 Fuchs, “Ästhetische Freiheit,” 198.
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
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paragraph 14 with frank evidentia in the last paragraph of the Aesthetica, Baum-
garten establishes the ethical ambiguity of literature between frankness and
fakeness.
6.3.3 Dubitatio
The ethical aspects of the will, which specify the sensate will to aesthetic truth as
a sensate will to aesthetic verisimilitude, lead to another figure of thought in the
last paragraph of the Aesthetica: the figure of doubt (dubitatio), which actually
precedes parrhesia and is, in a way, its precondition. This is surprising since
doubt is a highly contradictory concept in Baumgarten’s theory of literature.
On the one hand, doubtful hesitation (dubia fluctuatio) is generally viewed
from a philosophical perspective with suspicion (see AE § 23), and so it is con-
tinually used in a negative sense in the Aesthetica. On the other hand, doubt
is nothing less than a synonym for being human in theology (see MET § 873):
is not every person a doubting Thomas who must be convinced of the truth?
In the end, the mask of the felix aestheticus is thus also the mask of someone
in doubt, and any poet is literally a doubting Thomas. Doubt leads back to
the sensate will to poetic world-making, which provides the impulse for litera-
ture.¹⁰⁹
Baumgarten embraces a dubitatio that belongs, like parrhesia, to the “fig-
ures of intentionality”¹¹⁰ in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio
aesthetica), specifically in the planned but incomplete section 53 on persuasive
arguments (argumenta persuasoria): “Hence I discern cases in which DOUBT can
be put to good use for confirming or reprehending, […] especially if you graceful-
ly transition from here to the bella parrhesia of evidentia (§ 349; section L)” (AE
§ 904: Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confirmandum reprehendendumve
possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, […] praesertim si venuste transeas ab hac ad bellam
evidentiae parrhesian. §. 349. S. L.). Doubt is an ethical practice and, like parrhe-
sia, doubt functions as a figure of thought. A speaker uses dubitatio for the pur-
pose of persuasion so as to strengthen the credibility of his viewpoint with re-
gard to something – and not the credibility of the thing itself. That is why he
simulates doubt: “Hesitation too gives a certain guarantee of sincerity: we pre-
tend to be asking ourselves where to begin and where to stop, what it is best
 See 6.2.3 Melancholy.
 Campe, “Epoche der Evidenz,” 31.
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to say, or whether to speak at all.”¹¹¹ Quintilian differentiates between doubt in
something, which he discusses among the figures of thought, and a linguistic
form of doubt, which he discusses among the figures of speech.¹¹² But instead
of following this path – that is, dealing with the effect of dubitatio on the audi-
ence – my argumentation focuses, as in my analysis of parrhesia, on the struc-
ture of literary discourse.
One has to recall that in the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasio
aesthtica), Baumgarten is concerned with sensate certitude (certitudo sensitiva)
attained through the analogon of reason:
We count a fifth beauty of thoughts (§ 22) among the foremost ones (§§ 113, 177, 423, 614):
sensate certitude, to be obtained by the analogon of reason, the consciousness and light
of truth and verisimilitude, PERSUASION, in particular AESTHETIC PERSUASION (§ 22;
Metaphysica § 531).
Pulcritudinem cogitationum in primariis §. 113, 177, 423, 614. quintam numeramus, §. 22. cer-
tudinem sensitivam, analogo rationis etiam obtinendam veritatis et verisimilitudinis con-
scientiam et lucem, PERSUASIONEM, sed AESTHETICAM, §. 22. M. §. 531. (AE § 829)
Persuasion is a rhetorical concept and so naturally suspect to philosophy. Being
persuaded of something, he thus explains, is catching sight of it “like a moonrise
as one / sees on the first of the month, or thinks one saw, through the clouds (Verg.,
Aen. 6.453–454)” (AE § 678; qualem primo quis surgere mense / Aut videt, aut vi-
disse putat per nubila lunam, Aen. VI. 454). Baumgarten is uncomfortable in this
fog, which makes him feel the need to defend the methodological role of rhetoric
in his aesthetics one last time (see AE §§ 834–838, 841). And one should remem-
ber that he uses dawn, moonlight, twilight, and fog as epistemological meta-
phors in his metaphysics of beauty.¹¹³
I have already argued that Baumgarten juxtaposes the sensate certainty re-
sulting from persuasion with the rational certainty resulting from conviction in
the metaphysical discussion of evidence.¹¹⁴ He differentiates the distinct con-
sciousness of truth (conscientia veritatis distincta), which he refers to as convic-
tion, from the indistinct and sensate consciousness of truth (conscientia veritatis
indistincta et sensitiva), which he refers to as persuasion (see AE § 832). In treat-
ing persuasion, he distinguishes further between general persuasion (persuasio
generatim) and aesthetic persuasion. The latter aims for verisimilitude: “He who
 Quint., Inst. 9.2.19.
 See Quint., Inst. 9.3.88.
 See 4.1.3 Twilight.
 See 4.1.2 Truth.
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would persuade aesthetically knows to give to his [works] (1) verisimilitude in
accordance with §§ 423–613, and to this verisimilitude the necessary light
(§§ 624–824)” (AE § 839; Aesthetice persuasurus dare noverit suis 1) verisimilitu-
dinem secundum §. 423–613, et huic lucem necessariam, §. 624–824). He also
differentiates between absolute persuasion (persuasio absoluta) and compara-
tive persuasion (persuasio comparativa). Aesthetic persuasion is absolute per-
suasion when the felix aestheticus achieves certitude along with fulfilling his
other five duties: abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, and life. In any case, per-
suasion is in the service of the certitude and probability of what is already
known, desired, and represented beautifully (see AE §§ 843–845). Thus, because
aesthetic persuasion has to follow the rules of verisimilitude, one simply be-
lieves fiction (see AE § 839).
In the sections on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), Baumgarten first intro-
duces doubt in the context of probability and improbability, two concepts from
genre poetics, which means that dubitatio secretly leads back to his theory of fic-
tion.¹¹⁵ That is, he treats doubt with regard to the probability or improbability of
poetic worlds. The decision to hold something to be aesthetically true or verisim-
ilar or not is the result of doubt (see AE § 485). Doubt is thus a practice: some-
thing can be doubted logically and aesthetically (see AE § 486); doubt is aesthet-
ic when there is a disturbing excess of aesthetic falsities. The practice of
doubting is not only performed by the audience or reader of literature but also
by the author. It is not uncommon that one becomes a poet (non raro poeta
fiet) by searching for one’s objects in the dubious:
Hence the aesthetician persuades one to seek the beautifully true not only in things that are
completely certain but likewise to rummage through the uncertainties of probable, doubt-
ful, improbable things as long as one is not drawn into ugly falsisimilitude in the eyes of a
connoisseur, or indeed into the ugliness of the false itself (section XXVIII).
Hinc aestheticus suadet non in solis complete certis pulcre verum quaerere, sed idem ri-
mari simul per incerta, probabilium, dubiorum, improbabilium, quamdiu semet ipsum
non subducit amatoris oculis in turpem falsi similitudinem, vel ipsam falsi turpitudinem
desinens. S. XXVIII. (AE § 503)
In section 51 on confirming (confirmatio), it becomes clear that the affirmation of
doubt has far-reaching consequences for Baumgarten’s theory of literature. There
he not only holds aesthetically doubtful objects to be particularly convincing
(see AE § 846) but also derives the ambivalence of literature from doubt. In con-
 See 5.3.2 Probability.
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trast to the ambiguities of beauty, of poetic worlds, and of evidence,which I have
analyzed so far, this ambivalence has to do with evaluating things:
A certain certitude can coexist with a certain incertitude, but no certitude – hence no per-
suasion, no evidence, no confirmation – can coexist with the total incertitude of doubters.
Hence those supporters of universal doubting, as soon as they wish to bring someone
charmingly into this venture, are in the habit of always forgetting their own counsel to
him that one must be in doubt about all things, such that they seem to be less in doubt
about this than about any other matter.
Certitudo quaedam cum quadam incertitudine potest consistere, sed nulla certitudo, hinc
nulla persuasio, nulla evidentia, confirmatio nulla cum incertitudine totali dubitantium.
Hinc ipsi dubitationis catholicae patroni quam primum belle volunt aliquem in hanc
aleam inducere, consiliorum suorum eo usque solent oblivisci, ut de nulla re minus dubi-
tare videantur, ac de eo, dubitandum esse de omnibus. (AE § 857)
Literature is characterized by the fact that its sensate certitude is always uncer-
tain. Literature’s ambivalence arises from this uncertainty. In this context, only
faith (fides) can help. Thus, in paragraph 904, Baumgarten demands that the
felix aestheticus not jeopardize faith by showing too much confidence (fiducia).
The defense’s closing argument in court should not suggest exaggerated confi-
dence or even ignorance or arrogance, as Baumgarten stresses in his commen-
tary on Quintilian, who himself quotes Cicero:
I do not deny Quintilian’s rule (§ 903): Let the orator (all who would persuade beautifully)
display confidence and always speak (think the things that are to be signified) as though he
thought most highly of his case¹¹⁶ (were rightly persuaded about persuading his personal
objects; Quint., Inst. 5.13.51–52). I only advise that one not put belief to the test by display-
ing excessive certitude. Hence I discern cases in which DOUBT can be put to good use for
confirming or reprehending, doubt being the narration or simulation of a state of mind in
which the reasons contending for and against a certain opinion are judged equal by the one
reckoning.
Non nego Quintiliani regulam §. 903. Fiduciam orator (pulcre persuasurus omnis) prae se
ferat, semperque ita dicat (significanda cogitet) tanquam de casu optime cogitet (de persua-
dendis suis obiectis personalibus probe persuasus). Inst. V. 13. Moneo tantum, ne nimiae
certitudinis ostentator de fide periclitetur. Hinc agnosco casus, in quibus belle ad confir-
mandum reprehendendumve possit adhiberi DUBITATIO, narratio vel simulatio status
animi, cui rationes pro quadam sententia pugnantes et contra eandem connumeranti cen-
sentur aequales. (AE § 904)
Only one conclusion can follow from this: effective aesthetic persuasion relies on
dubitatio instead of on fiducia, and both are rhetorical figures of thought that
 Quoted (with modification) from Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, 5.13.51.
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leave traces in the literary text. The actual point is to employ doubt – which is
explicitly allowed for the purposes of confirming (confirmatio) in section 51 or
reprehending (reprehensio) in section 52 – in a narrative (narratio) or simulation
of a fictive character (simulatio status animi). These narratives and simulations
are characterized by their ambivalence: they are positive and negative about the
same things at the same time. This ambivalence infects the felix aestheticus with
doubt.
In his lucid reading of paragraph 904, Fuchs calls attention to the implicit
structure of repetition with which Baumgarten switches from rhetorical to aes-
thetic persuasion by staging the poet’s ambivalence toward a thing. Dubitatio
makes the felix aestheticus think through the pros and cons once and then do
it again. Only on the second iteration does a “both … and” become a pro and
a con. But with repetition, time comes into play, and with time, sequentiality,
and with sequentiality, narrativity,¹¹⁷ for repetition is the mother of narration.
Considering this, it is easy to understand why Baumgarten treats dubitatio, nar-
ratio, and simulatio in paragraph 904 as paradigmatic variations of the same
narratively structured operations – namely, of confirming or reprehending. In
conclusion, doubt – just like a narrative or simulation of a fictive character –
is a form of poetic world-making, which shows that Baumgarten thinks of
doubt in the form of narrative.
But we may even want to go a step further and consider whether doubt func-
tions as the figure of poetic world-making in general. While the problem of fake
doubt and the orator’s strategies for employing dubitatio are at the center of rhe-
torical discourse, Baumgarten’s engagement with ambivalence leads back once
again to the point in the argumentation where the figure of parrhesia unfolds
its potential as the mask of the felix aestheticus. But in contrast to parrhesia,
doubt does not seem to have its own genuine form; instead, it is nested in liter-
ature. For that reason, Baumgarten again refers in section 53 on persuasive argu-
ments (argumenta persuasoria) both to evidential arguments (argumenta pro-
bantia) from section 33 and to illustrative arguments (argumenta illustrantia)
from section 43.¹¹⁸ In this reappearance in the context of doubt, aesthetic eviden-
tia – both the figures of amplification and the figures of hypotyposis – is sudden-
ly again under discussion.¹¹⁹ But if dubitatio is nested in literature, ambivalence
will appear in any literary text. I would even go a step further and argue that du-
bitatio is the figural form of the sensate will to poetic world-making in literary
 See 5.2.1 Sequentiality.
 See paregmenon (AE § 543); sententia (AE § 549); definitio, descriptio (AE § 551).
 See 3.4.2 Opacity.
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texts. While “I sense” is the formula for sensate thinking, desiring, and repre-
senting, and “I narrate” the formula for sensate thinking, desiring, and repre-
senting in poetic fiction, “I doubt” is the formula for the impulse to poetic
world-making.
Yet Baumgarten does not repeat Plato’s verdict that all poets lie. This claim
would miss the theoretical point. Instead, he pokes around at a theory of liter-
ature when he carefully treats ambivalence. When Eugen Bleuler introduces
the concept of ambivalence in 1910, he describes the phenomenon as one of
“double valence that is usually by definition an opposing valence.”¹²⁰ Interest-
ingly, Bleuler does not find “ambivalent complexes” in his patients suffering
from schizophrenia in the clinic;¹²¹ he rather defines ambivalence as the primary
formative principle of myths, dreams, and poetry.¹²² Baumgarten too ties the
problem of ambivalence to the linguistic medium of the literary. In the second
paragraph of the sections on aesthetic persuasion (persuasion aesthetica), he re-
flects on the ambiguity of language itself, which makes literature ambivalent:
“As a result of this ambiguity of words, there are those who take the opportunity
to apply more pandering and makeup (§ 688) than true charms to every speech
meant to persuade” (AE § 830; Ex qua vocabulorum ambiguitate, sunt, qui sibi
fenestram aperiunt, orationem ad persuadendum idoneam omnem lenociniis
potius et fuco, §. 688. quam veris accensendi venustatibus).
Because of this ambiguity of language, the final commitment of the felix
aestheticus to literature becomes both an affectively doubtful and ethically dubi-
ous undertaking. The sensate will to poetic world-making is the result of ambiv-
alence and produces the ambiguity of beauty, of poetic worlds, and of evidence.
Even etymologically, ambiguity refers precisely to this: ambigere means “to be in
doubt.” The essence of literature lies in this constitutive ambiguity. In the middle
of his intensive engagement with the structure of literary discourse, Baumgarten
asks: “But what kind of ambiguity is that?” (AE § 471; Quid autem illud est am-
biguitatis?).¹²³ At the end of this book, one could reply with Derrida that, at the
threshold of modernity, literature is a “supplementary double.”¹²⁴ In this sense,
Baumgarten could not have chosen a clearer ending point for his Aesthetica than
exposing the ethical epicenter of literature: doubt.
 Eugen Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” in Universität Zürich: Festgabe zur Einweihung der Neu-
bauten 18. April 1914 (Zurich: Schulthess, 1914), 105.
 Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” 96.
 See Bleuler, “Die Ambivalenz,” 102.
 See 5.3.1 Possibility.
 Derrida, “The Double Session,” 191.
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7 Conclusion
In the introduction, I laid out the frame for my reading of Baumgarten’s work. To
conclude, I would like to consider the relevance of facing poetry for studying lit-
erature today. In the past fifty years, our discipline has gone through a number of
turns, ranging from the linguistic turn to the cultural turn, to mention only the
two most important ones. In the course of these turns, literary studies has lost
sight of its foundation, namely its concept of literature. No academic discipline
can do without a fundamental understanding of its object of inquiry. And yet in
literary studies today, we consider all kinds of questions except for the most im-
portant one: what is literature?
Like busy hunters and gatherers, we forage in the forest of historical phe-
nomena and certainly make some exciting discoveries; but in doing so, we risk
forgetting why we have set out on this quest in the first place. What is the epis-
temological potential of literature? What are literature’s contributions to a better
understanding of what it means to be human? What does literature have to say
about forms of human cognition and desire? Or, to put it differently, why is liter-
ature, even today, still a necessary epistemological object, one that is capable of
revealing insights that cannot be gleaned from an MRI scan or statistical analy-
sis? Baumgarten’s philosophical project not only represents the beginning of
modern literary theory but also advances an understanding of literature that an-
chors it in an entire order of knowledge. Baumgarten was aware that analyzing
literature requires a holistic approach. His theory contains a methodology (chap-
ter 2), sketches out an epistemology (chapter 3), makes forays into metaphysics
(chapter 4), and marks its own intersections with ethics (chapter 6). In progress-
ing through the various ways in which literature is embedded in the order of
knowledge, Baumgarten shifts from analyzing poetic passages with their figures
and tropes to analyzing narratives (chapter 5). The concept of literature at stake
in his discussion of narration brings to the fore what has been lost in the second
half of the twentieth century: truth and method, philosophy and rhetoric. Baum-
garten investigates literature’s capacity for truth and its task in the world.
Today literary studies no longer asks these questions because narratology
has made sure that theories of literature are circumscribed by technical con-
cerns. Moreover, exponents of poststructuralism have all but banned engaging
with the epistemological and ontological aspects of literature. Their critiques
of metaphysics threw the baby out with the bathwater. Epistemological and on-
tological concerns are now restricted to theories of fiction and no longer relevant
to the foundations of literary studies, just as literary epistemology is no longer
relevant to the epistemology of aesthetics. This might explain why current writ-
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ing in literary studies is becoming more and more similar to journalistic forms
and formats. Basic rhetorical and generic terms are neglected in favor of merely
thematic and, at times, ideologically motivated discussions. Anybody can speak
about literature with whatever concepts they choose. Even the distinction be-
tween our world and fictional worlds, which lies at the foundation of Baumgar-
ten’s literary theory, is disregarded. This precludes working on a concept of liter-
ature that reflects the five types of ambiguities Baumgarten addresses: first, the
ambiguity of aesthetics between epistemology and media theory; second, the
ambiguity of beauty between finitude and infinity; third, the ambiguity of poetic
worlds between truth and falsity; fourth, the ambiguity of evidence between
being frank and being fake; and fifth, affective ambivalence, which is rooted
in the constitutive ambiguity of literature.
I sense, I narrate, I doubt: it is the right to doubt that preserves our liberty –
a liberty that was philosophically claimed and politically institutionalized in the
European Enlightenment. In its forms and practices, literature nurtures precisely




The founding mythology underlying the genesis of aesthetics in the work of
Alexander Baumgarten circles around an initial audacious idea. To lose sight
of this initial idea and its audacity risks dissolving the extraordinary intensive
and extensive dynamism of Baumgarten’s thought into a static system of scholas-
tic distinctions, lifeless typologies, and overly complicated conceptual nuances.
Baumgarten expresses this idea in the introduction to his Meditationes philo-
sophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus as follows: “to demonstrate that
many things that have been said hundreds of times, but scarcely ever proven,”
can in fact be proven, and most importantly, such things “can be proven from
the single concept of the poem” (MED, [preface], 4; Ut enim ex una, […] poematis
notione probari plurima dicta iam centies, vix semel probata posse demonstra-
rem).¹ The concept of the poem, as an evidentiary source heretofore unexplored,
constructs a paradigmatic body from which cognitive, affective, metaphysical,
ethical, and veridical operations can be drawn out of their latency. The work
of art becomes not just one source of intelligibility among others, but the arche-
typal model through which an ideal order manifests itself, and even distorts it-
self, phenomenally (distorting itself inasmuch as the poem as an analogue of
reason introduces a gap between itself and absolutely ideal, logical order). It
is not the philosophy of the logicians that comes to light in the order of the
poem. It is a lived and embodied philosophy, one intimately connected to the
“sensate” truth that forms the primary interface of human beings with the prob-
lematic, ambiguous world surrounding them.
The power of the foundational myth surrounding the origin of aesthetics in
Baumgarten’s work derives not merely from the epistemological and metaphysi-
cal gains henceforth attached to the poem qua literary object, but also perhaps
from a submerged narrative of fetishization, a kind of erotic cathexis: the poem
as the transgressive and unruly erotic object that is eventually reconciled with
the norms of philosophical thought through sheer force of passionate dedication
and intellectual will. At first, then, the origin of aesthetics has the structure of a
love story. Baumgarten broaches the emergence of the attraction to the poem
through narrating his own personalized history in the introduction to the Medi-
tationes philosophicae: the story of a young man who passed “scarcely a day […]
 Translation into English lightly modified from Grote, The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic The-
ory, 72.
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without verse” (paene nulla dies sine carmine), who was drawn to other academ-
ic interests and yet, who “never entirely renounced poetry” (MED, [preface], 3; ut
poesi tam a castissima iucunditate), only to finally dedicate his entire life to the
elevation of this supposedly diminutive object to a status commensurate with
philosophical dignity.² While the love story that gave birth to literary theory
began when Baumgarten was nineteen years old, it continued until the day of
his death, and then beyond his death, in the testament left behind in the frag-
ments of his Aesthetica: unfinished and hence, in proper erotic fashion, always
calling out for completion as an infinite task.
Such a self-representation – originally written as a young man and then,
whether intentionally or not, enacted over the course of his life – belongs to a
genre of rhetorical performance and hence is unapologetically self-mythologiz-
ing, even when it purports to be self-denigrating. The performative and rhetorical
elements of any such self-mythologization would be unproblematic for the new
type of philosopher eventually proposed by Baumgarten, the sensate philoso-
pher who is also a joyful aesthete. Such rhetorical and figural elements would
represent precisely the proper form in which sensate truth could concretize itself:
the shape of a life become poetry, poetry as a vehicle for the force of life. It was
indeed such a mythology that was transmitted through many of Baumgarten’s
eighteenth-century disciples and biographers, until the heroic narrative – the
story of the improbable audacity of aesthetics – eventually was overcome by
other aesthetic tendencies less ensconced in a seemingly scholastic idiom
(Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder) and less committed to rationalistic ontological
tendencies. Finally, Baumgarten was to be submerged by the currents driving
the history of the discipline that he helped found.
In spite of the relegation of Baumgarten to a moment in often teleological
historiographies of aesthetics that posit a robust thesis of autonomy as the cul-
minating point of modern theoretical aesthetic achievement, Baumgarten’s med-
itations on poetry in the light of the absolute surpass in their force of aesthetic
cathexis many of the supposed sources that could otherwise claim foundational
status for the birth of a theory of literature. In terms of the epistemological and
metaphysical burden that is to be borne by the literary object, Baumgarten goes
beyond early German Romanticism’s poetization of theory and theorization of
poetry, Schelling’s philosophy of art, Nietzsche’s aesthetic affirmation of exis-
tence, or the late Heidegger’s poetic thought as an alternative mode of dwelling
to the enframing of technology. In each of these instances, the poetic object is an
element in a more capacious philosophical project rather than the singular ar-
 See Grote, The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory, 67–68.
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chetypal paradigm of order in phenomenal being. In its most extreme formula-
tion, Baumgarten’s project seems like an improbability at the heart of rationalist
philosophy, something that harnesses the very heterocosmic power that it other-
wise ascribes to fiction: to make the illumination of the normative structure of all
sensate experience, the ordo plurium in uno, depend upon the analysis of litera-
ture.
Such is the provocative idea that animates the emergence of aesthetics, and
exploring the consequences of this idea – what it would mean to think about the
literary object in this way, as generative of an entire way of looking at the world,
a theory (theoria) in the proper sense of the term – has been the subject of much
of Frauke Berndt’s seminal work on Alexander Baumgarten, from Poema / Ge-
dicht: Zur epistemischen Konfiguration der Literatur um 1750 (2011) to the current
work, Facing Poetry (2020). Above all in German-language scholarship, Berndt’s
work has played and continues to play a significant role not only in reawakening
interest in Baumgarten, but also in exploring the ramifications of such aesthetic
investigations as they extend into unexpected territories (narratological theory,
media theory, psychoanalysis, ontologies of ambiguity, to name a few of these
directions).
Baumgarten in Berndt’s work does not appear as a figure of antiquarian or
merely intellectual historical interest. Rather, his work represents a suppressed
foundational moment in literary theory that both informs implicitly what literary
theorists do (a descriptive element), suggests what they ought to do (a normative
element), and indicates what they could do (a poetic element). Berndt’s own
work functions here paradigmatically in these respects, above all in this latter
sense, by indicating what lies within the range of the possible – or even what
lies just outside the possible – in the medial, rhetorical, affective, and semiotic
potentialities and tendencies not just of literary art, but of theories of literary art
that themselves harbor an irreducibly poetic element.
Berndt revives what is living in Baumgarten by framing his work as the first
modern theory of literature, where literature becomes an epistemic object with
its own distinctive methodologies, epistemologies, metaphysics, narratological
frames (i.e., theories of fiction), and ethical concerns. Her critical approach is
at one and the same time conceptual, historical, and most importantly, energetic.
For what is needed in the case of Baumgarten is not yet another scholarly reeval-
uation of his work, but reanimations, discursive interventions dynamically or-
ganized around impetus and stimulus. It is precisely such a reanimation that
takes place in Facing Poetry.
In meeting this challenge, Berndt follows Baumgarten’s own program of an
epistemology, aesthetics, and ethics of vivification. The program of aesthetics in-
cludes an energetics; a notion of force –material, epistemological, metaphysical,
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semiotic – subtends Baumgarten’s thought. Just as bodies at rest tend to main-
tain themselves at rest, so too is knowledge itself – its forms, signs, and practices
– subject to the force of inertia (see MET § 669).³ Part of the ethics of aesthetics
entails countering the force of inertia in the life of the mind by cultivating works
of art as sources of aesthetic exercises. This pragmatic dimension of aesthetic
thought introduces an anti-speculative dynamic into the aesthetic field, albeit
in a particular sense of the word “speculation.”⁴ Speculation, for Baumgarten,
refers to an inert, bloodlessly theoretical, insensate form of knowledge: “perfect”
(complete) and thus without lack or excess, but empty, hollow, and dead. In
speculation, as the absolute limit point of epistemological inertia, the corpus
of knowledge becomes a perfect corpse. In response to speculation as inert, im-
mobile knowledge, aesthetics sets up a counter-attraction: the counter-perfec-
tion of sensate, living perfection, namely, the beautiful.
One of the byproducts of the beautiful consists in the systematic impurifica-
tion of theory. Aesthetics provides a remedy for the fatal illness of speculation by
connecting knowledge up to the motive and emotive forces that drive bodies and
minds. This theoretical impurification is at the same time a rejuvenation, an ani-
mation of theory. In the function of the beautiful as an impurification of theory,
error and falsehood thus become endowed with a generative potential. One of
the most significant sections of Facing Poetry discovers the “birth of narratology
out of the spirit of deviation”: deviations not as mistakes, but as “achievements
within the wide spectrum of possible kinds of narratives.”⁵ The “catalogue of
mistakes” becomes an aesthetic and narratological resource.
If aesthetics is meant to counter the inertia of knowledge – and by extension
the tendency of signs, texts, and ideas to fall into a state of atrophy and torpor –
it is one of the great ironies of philosophical history that Baumgarten’s texts
themselves were particularly vulnerable to this inertia. There still remain strong
impediments to the reanimation of Baumgarten’s works. Among the many
tendencies conspiring to keep Baumgarten in a philosophical limbo may be
counted: the legacy of the multiple critiques of rationality that continue to in-
form the theoretical landscape; the sheer complexity of rationalist philosophical
discourse and a stylistic aversion to the more geometrico (which seems to exempt
thinkers with strong heretical tendencies such as Spinoza); the development of
nationalist programs of literary and philosophical schools that consciously or
unconsciously prioritize vernacular works, especially after 1800; the dearth of
 See 3.1.2 Desire.
 According to Menke, “‘force’ and ‘proficiency’ both designate the faculty of the subject” for
Baumgarten. Menke, Force, 21.
 5.2.2 Mediation.
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adequate modern translations, which is only now being remedied; an associa-
tion of processes of aesthetic subjectification with a Foucauldian analysis of dis-
cipline that dampens the emancipatory potential of rationalist and heterono-
mous aesthetic theories (even those that, like Baumgarten’s, exhibit nascent
tendencies toward harnessing a power of normative deviation in aesthetic repre-
sentations); a general skepticism towards aesthetic ideologies; and historicizing
and periodizing tendencies that do not adequately grasp the “heterocosmic”
power of seemingly defunct ways of looking at the world.
In each of these impediments, however, lies an energetic potential waiting to
be realized. Untimeliness can suddenly and unexpectedly become contemporary.
The revitalization of Baumgarten could thus spawn its own set of heretical ges-
tures and questions: What if Kant were not to be seen as the initial event of aes-
thetic modernity, but rather, to draw on Nietzsche, already symptomatic of a de-
cline, of a weakening and impoverishment of the aesthetic field and its set of
technical repertoires linking the work of art to lived practices? What if the imag-
inative potential of Baumgarten lay precisely in the malleability and cultivation
of characterological capacities emerging from the frictions and tensions between
norm and the sensuous gap from the norm held open by the operation of the
analogy (the work of art as sensate analogue of reason rather than reason itself)?
What if Baumgarten’s contribution to aesthetic philosophy lay not in the emer-
gence of a notion of the subject (reading Baumgarten retrospectively through
the lens of Kant), but in the cultivation of a more capacious – more anthropolog-
ically determinate and yet open – human type, namely, the happy aesthete, the
joyful philosopher of the senses or the philosophically-minded producer of art?
Or, as Berndt claims,what if Baumgarten’s theory of literature reveals an order of
beings suffused with an ineliminable and constitutive ambiguity, both as a
source of risk and creativity? Revisiting Baumgarten in a way that would do jus-
tice to the “energetics” of aesthetics requires asking such questions.
Rekindling the ambition of Baumgarten’s aesthetic project proposes that
imaginatively emancipatory tendencies might yet be uncovered where many
would least expect to find them: in the epistemological, rhetorical, mediological,
and semiotic operations of philosophical holisms and aesthetic heteronomies. If
heteronomous aesthetic tendencies imbricate the work of art in as many mutu-
ally determinative sources of order and value as possible, sources that are indeed
metaphysically one (ordo plurium in uno), the aesthete does not remain limited
to these sources as static givens, but moves among new and different worlds. The
aesthete is always translating self into text and text into self. Heteronomous ten-
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dencies, or the activation of the “translation machine”⁶ between discursive or-
ders, can thereby drift into a heterocosmos, where the aesthete can be exposed
to the laws of an “other” order. Facing literature in such a theory entails encoun-
tering an object whose power derives from its many faces.
 See 2.3 Etymology.
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